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Lars Levi Laestadius (1800–1861) is commonly known as an influential North Swed-
ish Lutheran revivalist and a multidisciplinary scientist. His work in botany, Sámi 
mythology, theology, and his strong influence on North Scandinavian spirituality 
and culture have been widely studied. The studies on Laestadius’ theology agree that 
anthropology forms the core and basis of his theological and religious thought. In 
his main work, Dårhushjonet: En Blick I Nådens Ordning (The Lunatic: An Insight Into 
the Order of Grace), a grounding anthropology is conceived as having a holistic and 
vitalistic psychology in its character. However, the fundamental role of anthropology 
and vitalist psychology as a founding “insight” of Laestadius’ systematic theory has 
never been a topic of academic philosophical research.
In this offered dissertation, The Lunatic is approached holistically as a philosophical 
and scientific-psychological apology for North Scandinavian pietism. The Lunatic 
proved to have a strong tendency to rationalize religious views via scientific-concep-
tual systematization, especially vitalist psychophysiology. As a basic philosophical 
study, utilizing philosophical analysis and phenomenological interpretation as its 
method, this effort confirms the vitalist character of Laestadius’ theory and points 
out the central philosophical and psychological insights that underlie the “system” 
of Laestadius’ religious and theological views. Through the use of historical con-
textualization, the study argues that the criticism of Enlightenment rationalism, 
German idealism, and Western metaphysics overall forms the counterpole for all of 
Laestadius’ theoretical elaborations. In this regard, Laestadius sought to overcome 
classical Cartesian mind/body dualism and its intellectualistic emphases. Thus, the 
study carries out an interpretative task to analyze the ways in which the human 
person and its faculties of soul are redefined within the vitalist frame in Laestadius’ 
theory. The specific objective was to follow and analyze how Laestadius sought to 
hold the physical, moral (psychic), and spiritual (metaphysical) spheres of human 
existence together, especially in relation to the psychophysiological foundation 
adopted from the vitalist tradition. In this respect, the focus was placed on the 
psychophysiological explanations of morality and spirituality and on the idea of 
intentionality as such. 
In the end, Laestadius’ critique of metaphysical rationalism and transcendental 
philosophy was raised for more discussion. The question of whether Laestadius’ 
critique and vitalist philosophy and psychology can be attached to the more general 
critique of Western metaphysics is discussed with special reference to the tradition 
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of phenomenological philosophy, the aim of which is overcome the prevailing stance 
of “constant presence” (substance) found in Western metaphysics.
In the main chapter, Chapter 4, Person and Intentionality, Laestadius’ vitalist con-
ception of person and intentionality is analyzed. Chapter 4 deals with the analysis of 
the central concepts, including the soul, the principle of life, passions, body, the mind, 
the Self, reason, will, understanding, and imagination. As a result of this research, 
Laestadius’ anthropology is interpreted as being firmly attached to medical vitalist 
theorizing and especially to Xavier Bichat’s vitalist medical philosophy. Driving back 
to vitalism from the prevailing metaphysical rationalism and idealistic metaphysics 
the effort includes a clear critique of the classical concepts of “substantia” and “es-
sentia,” wherein Laestadius developed a vitalist redefinition of essentiality (väsendet) 
as a vital force for indicating the actual human condition of existence without being 
simply substantial or essence/being (existentia sine essentia et sine substantia) in terms 
of classical metaphysical meaning. 
This deconstructive redefinition was the groundwork for Laestadius’ further psy-
chological and theological elaboration and an alternative to the metaphysical ration-
alistic and simple mechanistic idea of man and worldview. Emphasizing embodied 
experience and the processual dynamic event of life in a pre-phenomenological way, 
Laestadius’ analysis constituted a holistic idea of man, and it sought to overcome 
a simple Cartesian mind/body dualism with the concepts of the principle of life 
(livprincip), organic life, and sensory life (nervliv). In Laestadius’ theory, the faculties 
of soul, such as reason, understanding, and will, were redefined in vitalist terms as 
more or less organic sensible functions of the human organism, not as distinct and 
autonomous faculties of the soul. Chapter 4 thus argues that Laestadius’ vitalism 
forms a psychosomatic theory of the constitution on a human being and human 
existence. The passions and their impacts on the physiological organism laid the 
groundwork for all other higher faculties and functions of the organic-embodied 
soul, including the possibility of spiritual faith and a living relationship with God. 
The notion of consciousness, including its objective and subjective dimensions, was 
determined as embodied intentionality based on a psychosomatic constitution and 
the vitalist-panpsychistic idea of emergence. The holistic notion of person was thus 
inextricably attached to the organic body and its surrounding world, thereby con-
stituting a viewpoint of personal embodied intentionality. 
In the second main chapter, Chapter 5, Laestadius’ theory is viewed from the 
perspective of the common Enlightenment vitalist concept of physical/moral, which 
sought to replace Cartesian body/mind dualism. In this respect, the psychophysiologi-
cal origins of morality and spirituality are analyzed in more detail through notions 
of the soul as the principle of life, passions, heart, conscience, perception, awakening, 
reconciliation, and redefined notions of faith and God. The general conclusion is that 
Laestadius aimed and managed to overcome the body/mind dualism in the level of 
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origin and cause. His monistic conceptions notwithstanding, he created a different 
kind of dualism that manifested itself in the cognitive-psychological sphere as a 
dualism between sensuous “natural” feeling and “moral” feeling. 
This distinction derived its roots both from the notions of natural and moral 
passions and the twofold physiological functions of neural and humoral impacts. 
Laestadius sought to elaborate on the view of different levels of sensible experience 
on a physiological plane, so that “moral feeling” would distinguish itself from the 
mere sensuous natural and more immediate relatedness to its object. Here it was 
clearly seen how Laestadius’ psychophysiological anthropology turned into onto-
theology. This insight was based on the idea of the corrupted nature of the passions 
that set the vital basis for the faculties of soul, constituting a dissonant turbulence in 
human experience, and also on the idea of the transcendental character of the flesh 
itself. Both psychopathological dissonance and the need for reconciliation indicated 
that natural sensuous intentionality does not fulfil the proper moral and spiritual 
prerequisites and remains as an objectifying relationship to the “object.” This natu-
ral egocentric condition further entailed the necessity of a religious experience of 
awakening (väckelse) as an initial precondition for reconciliation, and thus also the 
living dynamic relation to God, existence, and moral way of being in the world. The 
psychosomatic contradiction of awakening formed the groundwork for the need to 
conceive a reconciliation as the experiential “psychic” justification of morality and 
genuine spirituality (psychic reconciliation). Here the moral feeling was conceived 
to transcend the mere objectifying sensory relationship.
Through the vitalist deconstruction of the notions of man and God, Laestadius’ 
whole ontotheological system aimed to form a correlation (kinship) between the 
triadic constitution of human beings and the Trinity of God. The initial constitutive 
condition of that union is psychic reconciliation. According to Laestadius, genuine 
spirituality or a “living faith of the heart” is seen as the fundamental of genuine 
practical morality and spirituality. This emphasis of inward faith signified that con-
science has the capability of moral and spiritual judgment to ground the functioning 
of practical reasoning in matters of life and faith.
At the end of Chapter 5, Laestadius’ critique of metaphysical rationalism is dis-
cussed, as it relates to a more general critique of Western metaphysics of substance. 
Laestadius’ anti-metaphysical stance, combined with the theological insights of 
psychic reconciliation, included the idea of faith as an un-objectifying intentionality 
and contrasted with the metaphysical objectifying approach toward being (in their 
beingness; substance, and essence). Here the “embodied” intentionality of faith and 
psychic reconciliation was conceived to relate with Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 
which is generally seen as one of the main sources of the phenomenological critique 
of Western metaphysics (Heidegger). Laestadius’ vitalist psychophysical manner of 
analysis gave a reason to define Laestadius’ philosophy and psychology as physiological 
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transcendentalism. A conclusion of Chapter 5 indicated it was possible to interpret 
the living faith of the heart as embodied un-objectifying intentionality.
These concluding remarks propose that Laestadius’ physiological transcenden-
talism and philosophy of religion can be considered as a vitalist existentialism or 
pre-phenomenological approach to the question of Being, God, faith, and human 
existence. As such, Laestadius’ holistic ontotheological system could be interpreted 
as a reversal of absolute idealism and its dialectical process of spirit into psychophysi-
ological event of factual life. In this way, Laestadius’ elaboration opposed the intel-
lectual and idealistic tendencies of anthropology and theology and was conceived as a 
philosophical theology that “makes space” for experiential religiosity and spirituality 
(utilizing vitalist existentialism). 
At the end of these concluding remarks, the more general philosophical question 
concerning ontological and theological realism in Laestadius’ theory is taken into 
a preliminary discussion. It is pointed out that the questions of realism were prob-
lematic in terms of Laestadius’ theory mainly because Laestadius’ metaphysical and 
pre-phenomenological presuppositions constitute a vitalist “naturalistic” stance within 
which the physical and psychic-experiential realms as well as immanent-humane 
and transcendental-spiritual realms are conceived as co-existing, or constituting a 
single unity reality. Further, it was proposed that Laestadius’ notions of God and 
Evil as personifications of passions execute a naturalistic anthropological reduction 
within the vitalist frame. Accordingly, spiritual-moral experiences and perceptions 
were interpreted as vital-natural psychophysiological phenomena having, however, a 
distinct transcendental aspect as a calling “voice of God” which calls a human being 
to the connection and likeness of God and coincidentally to one’s original soul [or 
the Self ]. The categorical questions of realism were overcome by Laestadius’ vital-
ist presuppositions and the holistic notion of existence having coincidentally both 
organic material and vital transcendental dimensions, and the experiential reality 
being conceived as encompassing both psychophysiological and natural spiritual-
transcendental aspects.
Key Words: Lars Levi Laestadius, Laestadius’ philosophy, laestadianism, religious 
philosophy, vitalism, physiological transcendentalism, Christian apology,  Lutheran-
pietism, critique of Western metaphysics, Protestant metaphysics, intellectual history 
of North Calotte.
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1  Introduction
1.1  Who was Lars Levi Laestadius?
Lars Levi Laestadius (1800–1861) was a Swedish Lutheran priest and multidis-
ciplinary scientist. He is commonly known as a Protestant revivalist and apologist 
for marginalized North Scandinavian Lutheran-pietism. Pietism, which emphasize 
personal devotion and inward religious experience, had already spread into North 
Calotte in the 18th century, and Laestadius had had close contact with the pietistic 
currents through relatives, vivid social relationship, and the pietistic literature. Laesta-
dius had strong sympathies toward pietism, and as a Christian apologist he defended 
broadly pietistic forms of Christianity.1 His religious preaching and writings had a 
strong influence on North Scandinavian religiosity, and indeed, he later became a 
leader of the Laestadian-Lutheran movements, which are generally interpreted as 
reinforcing and redirecting pietistic religiosity.2
Academically, Laestadius is especially well known for his research on botany, theol-
ogy, and Sámi mythology. Laestadius’ interests in natural history and natural science 
coloured his thinking, starting with his early botanical work and moving on to later 
theological and philosophical anthropology. Despite his natural scientific interests, 
Laestadius did become a Lutheran priest. However, he continued his multidiscipli-
nary scientific work throughout his lifetime, first in botany, soon after in the history 
and mythography of Sámi culture and religion, and finally to theology, anthropology, 
and the philosophy of religion.3
Laestadius began his academic studies in Uppsala in 1823, where he studied and 
worked intensively in botany under the supervision of Göran Wahlenberg and also 
became known as the most diligent student of Carolus Linnaeus. His botanical re-
search included several field trips to North Calotte, the collection of approximately 
10,000 plant specimens and several botanical research publications. Loca Parallela 
 
 
1 See further Sandewall 1951, 142–164. (On Laestadius’ relationship with pietism) 
2 See further e.g., Larsson 1999; Talonen 2001, 53–59.
3 See, e.g., Pentikäinen, J. 1998. Lars Levi Laestadius Revisited: a Lesser Known Side of the Story. 
Journal of Finnish Studies 2: 103–135.
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Plantarum4 was his most extensive publication on the subject. Loca Parallela Plantarum 
was completed in 1832 and was first published in 1839. The book was coolly received 
and considered to be conservative by the majority of Swedish botanists, as it focused 
on the different variations of species and argued against the prevailing trend of end-
lessly finding new ones. Laestadius’ strikingly original considerations concerning the 
influence of light, climate, and environment on plants forms were little regarded5. 
In Loca Parallela Plantarum, Laestadius also emphasized the relationship of organic 
life to its geographical environment and seemed to indicate there were both vitalist 
and monistic tendencies6.
Laestadius also wrote a major work on Sámi history, culture, and religion at the 
request of the French expeditioners for whom he worked as a guide in 1838.7 The 
book, Fragmenter i Lappska Mythologien (later, Mythology), was written between 
1838–1844, but it was lost soon after he delivered it for publication and thus only 
partly published posthumously in 1959 in Swedish and in its full extent in 2011 in 
Finnish8. In this work, Laestadius studied the early lappological theories (early Sámi 
studies) and critically examined them in terms of the horizon of his own experiences 
and field research. In this work, Laestadius emphasized the empirical first-hand 
experiences of Sámi life to understand its “inner economy”9. Laestadius generally 
criticized the objectivistic approaches toward Sámi way of life and spirituality, ar-
guing that spiritual matters demand a different kind of hermeneutic methodology 
distinct from a strictly mathematical method10. Altogether, Laestadius used a clear 
scientific approach to explain and understand the psychological phenomena of Sámi 
4 Loca Parallela Plantarum, seu animadversiones physiologico-botanicae de variis plantarum 
variationibus, praecipue in Svecia boreali observatis […] (Nova acta Regiae societatis scientiarum 
Upsaliensis, Ser. 2, 11: 205–296). Upsaliae, 1839. In Swedish Loca parallela plantarum (ed. G. 
Gripenstad) Tonedalica 51. Luleå 1993. In Finnish Kasvikirja (2001) Loca Pralela Plantarum, 
translation. Larry Huldén, Pohjolan Painotuote oy, Rovaniemi. See more about Laestadius’ 
publications in Rydvig 2000.
5 Franzén 1973, 295–300.
6 Loca Parallela Plantarum, Reminder, see §1 about the sensitive capability of a plant. Laestadius 
has empiric method but holistic tendencies; see §32. General idea is that plants are sensitive 
organic beings that may transform in a period of time depending on the geographical conditions.
7 See: Marmier, Xavier 1840. Letters sur le Nord: Danmark, Suéde, Norvége, Laponie et Spitzberg 
2. Paris: Bibliothéque choisie 2. (about Laestadius, p. 133, 148–154, 166–168); Willers 1949, 
51–56, 67–69; Hallencreutz 1985, 174.
8 L. L. Laestadius: Fragmenter I lappska mythologien. Ed. Grundström, H. (Swenska landsmål 
och svensk folkliv, B 61. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell. The full Finnish edition, Laestadius 
2011 (Lappalaisten mytologian katkelmia. Eds. Juha Pentikäinen ja Risto Pulkkinen. Helsinki: 
Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Tietolipas 231). Partial English edition, Laestadius 2002 (Fragments 
of Lappish mythology. Translated by B. Vähämäki. Ontario: Beaverton).
9 Laestadius 2011, Part 1. (Mythology) 
10 Laestadius 2011, 279. About distinction to mathematical truths and methods see, Laestadius 
2011, 280, §17.
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spirituality. It is worth mentioning here as well that Laestadius started focusing on 
spiritual experiences and phenomena (the spirit-world) as an object of study for the 
first time when he was writing about Sámi mythology and history. 
Laestadius’ depiction of mythology as a socialization11 of strong individual experi-
ences was explained in psychological terms as an “aroused imagination,” which has 
clear similarities to his later vitalist psychological ideas12. In Part 3 §1 of Mythol-
ogy, Laestadius discovered the phenomenon of the “spirit-world” and elaborated 
on a view of their relationship to the embodied life of human beings. Part 3 §13 
also showed that more general questions pertaining to the relationship of the soul 
to the transcendental spirit-world were already present. In Part 3 §14, Laestadius 
stated that the aroused condition of the imagination allow the mind to receive im-
ages more quickly and intensively13; this aspect is important, as he later conceived 
of Christianity as being based on passions and “noble feelings” and high images14. 
Vitalist interpretations were also present when Laestadius dealt with the effects of 
beliefs on the vital functions of human organisms15. Thus, Laestadius’ Mythology, as it 
tried to encounter the problem of how to research spiritual experiential phenomena, 
could be conceived as a step toward his later psychology and philosophy of religion. 
Laestadius’ Mythology has clear connections to The Lunatic on both the phenomena 
and the method16. 
While he had multidisciplinary scientific interests, Laestadius was also an in-
fluential revivalist and awakener of Lutheran church in North Sweden. General 
characteristics of his preaching emphasized pietistic personal spiritual experience. 
He was also a strong critic of Lutheran orthodoxy and the phenomena of modernity 
that he saw as corrupting the way of life in the north. These dimensions are clearly 
present in his pastoral dissertations, Crapula Mundi17 (Delirium of the World) and 
 
 
11 Laestadius 2011, Part 1, 45.
12 Laestadius 2011, Part 1, 44–45. Laestadius’ definition of mythology highlight psychological 
perspective as he conceives mythology as the socialization of individual mythical experience. 
Individual experiences may become a part of general mythology. See, Laestadius 2011, Part 1, 
reminder, 42–45.
13 Cf. Laestadius 2011, 279.
14 e.g. Laestadius 2015, §721.
15 Laestadius 2011, §67.
16 Laestadius on the transcendental experiences of Sámi religion (inner economy) see, Laestadius 
2011, Part 3, §16. Laestadius’ polemics of Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum and embodied consciousness 
or soul see, Laestadius 2011, 278–279.
17 Lars Levi Laestadius, Crapula Mundi, seu morbus animicontagiousus […]. Harnoesandiae, 1843. 
In Swedish: Crapula mundi: världens rus, eller själens smittosjuka. [Red.] H. W. Hackzell. Luleå 
1973.
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Tidskriften Ens röpandes röst i ögnen18 (1852–1854) (The Voice of One Crying in the 
Wilderness). The Laestadius biographies quite commonly hold that Laestadius turned 
to stronger religious preaching, theological elaborations, and philosophy of religion 
after his personal religious experience19. It seems obvious, therefore, that Laestadius 
was convinced on many levels that pietistic spirituality was an authentic Christian 
faith. However, his focus on religious matters during this period by no means signi-
fies that Laestadius gave up his scientific and theoretical interests. Rather, the social 
phenomena of awakenings that spread in North Calotte in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury and his personal religious experiences further directed his theoretical interests 
in philosophical theology and the religious character of human beings.
In the last thirteen or sixteen years of his life20 (1844–1857), Laestadius wrote an 
extensive philosophically oriented book titled, Dårhushjonet: En blick I nådens ordn-
ing21 translated into English as The Lunatic – An Insight Into the Order of Grace22, to 
ground and scientifically explain his own and common pietistic-religious experiences 
and views (I refer to The Lunatic using the section mark [§] and the number of its 
sections [x§]). In this book, Laestadius defends the pietistic emphasis on subjective 
experiential faith and living Christian faith in general. Simultaneously, Laestadius 
18 Lars Levi Laestadius, Tidskriften Ens röpande röst i ögnen (1852–1854) (Genomsedd, ordanad 
och utgiven i bokform 1908 av J. F. Hellman. Granskad och språkligt reviderad och ånyo uttgiven 
1979 av S. Wettainen.) Norrtälje, 1979. In English: Laestadius, Lars Levi 1988. The Voice of One 
Crying in the Wilderness (1852–1854). Trans. The Old Apostolic Lutheran Church of America, 
August 26, 1988: USA.
19 Laestadius met a Sámi women who was part of the pietistic reader movement in 1844; this 
meeting led to Laestadius’ personal conversion. (Laestadius 1988, 36.) There has remained 
continuous interest concerning Laestadius’ personal religious experience and spiritual progress. 
Laestadius’ himself tells in few occasions how he realized the prober ”order of Grace” via Sámi 
woman called Maria (Milla Clemensdotter). See, e.g. Hallencreutz 1985, 176–182; Wikmark 
1980. More literature concerning Laestadius’ personal spiritual progress and other Laestadius 
-studies can be found in Rydvig 2000.
20 Bäcksbacka 1938, 48.
21 Posthumously published in 1964 in Swedish as Dårhushjonet. En blick I nådens ordning systematiskt 
framställd under form as betracktelser öfwer själens egenskaper och tillstånd, i enlighet med 
de bibliska författarenas psychologiska åsigter, med afseende på christendomens högsta 
idé – försoningen, 2–3 (Inl. E. Bäcksbacka.) Suomen kirkkohistoriallisen seuran toimituksia 
50:1–2, 1949. Helsinki. Dårhushjonet. En blick I nådens ordning systematiskt framställd under 
form as betracktelser öfer själens egenskaper och tillstånd […] 1. (Inl. B. Åberg.) Suomen 
kirkkohistoriallisen seuran toimituksia 50:3, 1964, Helsinki.
22 Translated into English in 2015 as The Lunatic: an Insight into the Order of Grace – Systematically 
presented in the form of observations of the characteristics and states of the soul, in accordance with 
the psychological perspectives of the biblical authors, pertaining to the highest idea of Christianity - 
reconciliation. In my study all the references are to the English edition translated by Anders 
Strindberg. I refer to The Lunatic using the section mark [§] and the number of its sections 
[x§], and a term “Note” if referred to the appendix later added by Laestadius; thus the citations 
referred are easy to find from all other editions. 
1 Introduction  | 17
delivered a harsh critique of the Lutheran orthodoxy, claiming their views were adul-
terated with “unchristian” metaphysics and rationalism. Laestadius also intended to 
participate in multidisciplinary discussions on religion. His theoretical critique was 
grounded in the Church’s political context of Sweden in the 1800s when pietistic 
movements were marginalized and even criminalized by a State law known as The 
Conventicle Edict (konventikelplakatet).
Laestadius’ scientific work in theology and philosophy of religion were written and 
elaborated on outside the academic world, but he had vivid epistolary connections 
to academic scholars from Sweden, Norway, Finland, and France23. He was also well 
aware of the currents in the history of ideas and scientific developments of his time. 
It has been stated that Dårhushjonet is probably one of the most remarkable and 
interesting products of 19th –century Swedish theology.24
In The Lunatic, most of Laestadius’ philosophically and psychologically interesting 
elaborations are formed as they related to certain religious and theological questions 
and problems. Especially he aimed the vitalist deconstruction and redefinition of the 
notion of person and faculties of the soul to elaborate on the psychologically emphasized 
insight into reconciliation. The whole system climaxed in the notion of reconciliation. 
Religious goals and emphases, however, do not exclude the possibility that his theoretical 
elaborations would be important and interesting as such. Quite the contrary, having the 
notion of a “living God” and “psychic reconciliation” as a horizon increased the inter-
est and awakened the holistic philosophical questions concerning life and existence. 
Specifically, what is the ultimate horizon and intentional object of an existing human 
person and mind, and how are they structured and explained in terms of Laestadius’ 
theory? What moral and religious indications emanated from Laestadius’ holistic theory?
Laestadius is definitely not speaking against reason and reasoning in The Lunatic. As 
a successor of the Enlightenment and Romantic ideas and leaning on medical vitalism, 
he demanded a more concrete ground and a more holistic notion of reasoning as the 
basis for proper philosophical-psychological and theological thinking. One of the main 
concerns for Laestadius was that philosophical, psychological, and theological reflec-
tion and theorizing had lost the physiological and holistic experiential fundamentals 
and been turned into mere intellectual reflection. For that reason, he argued that the 
idea of man, and the concept of reason, will, understanding, and the whole notion of 
human intellect had become empty and abstract and, therefore, had produced to a false 
and narrowed understanding of the nature of proper reasoning and authentic faith.
Laestadius put forth the vitalist notions of human organisms as the foundation of 
human cognitive abilities and mind. According to him, all of intellect functions under 
the dominance of organic passions and worldly intentions. This is the fundamental 
23 See a list of Laestadius’ letters in Laestadiusarkivet: http://laestadiusarkivet.se/
24 Hallnencreutz 1985, 180.
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fact that should be recognized and admitted to in order to enable a holistic manner 
of reflection and reasoning. It also allows for conceiving of human existence and faith 
as an embodied and dynamic relatedness (intentionality) with the world, others, the 
Self, and God, or in other words, all of existence. Behind these elaborations, Laes-
tadius held to the common Enlightenment ideas of the precedence of anthropology 
in relation to theology as well as the idea of knowing oneself as a prerequisite for 
knowing the Christ – to gnoti seauton, to gnoti Christo (§1384, Cf. §1394). As we 
will later see, for Laestadius, knowing one’s self – To gnoti seauton – signified know-
ing one’s own fundamentally passional and sinful embodied character (Cf. §1040).
Laestadius did not exclude the spiritual domain from his naturalizing theory, but he 
did include it into the vitalist psychophysiological analysis. In the following analysis, I 
reveal how Laestadius’ theoretical stance can be conceived as “physiological transcenden-
talism25.” Altogether, Laestadius drove into serious philosophical problems to formulate 
a different kind of conceptual distinctions and dualisms to achieve his own goals.26
* * *
The popularly given picture of Laestadius, however, is mediated through examin-
ing of the colorful history of Laestadianism. Therefore, it is understandable that 
Laestadius himself is often seen as a passionate awakener who did not care about 
anything but proselytizing Sámi’s and the settlers of North Calotte into his pietistic 
view of Christianity.
This study of Laestadius’ philosophy, psychology, and his critique of Western 
metaphysics reveals another picture of Lars Levi Laestadius by setting aside the 
given popular picture of Laestadius’ person for a while and focusing on his written 
theoretical work on anthropology, psychology, and religion. As his botanical and 
mythological scientific works have already been brought into the focus of academic 
study and have been recognized as systematic scientific studies of his times, it is now 
important to recognize and begin a discussion on Laestadius’ anthropological and 
philosophical work and do so in an academic fashion.
Laestadius was a systematic and critical writer in his later research on the idea 
of man and the essence of religion. His magnum opus, The Lunatic (Dårhushjonet: 
25 A branch of physiological thinking that elaborated on the theory of the relationship of the brain 
and soul. See e.g. Hagner 1992.
26 Cf. Åberg 1997, 24. Åberg mentioned a vitalistic dualism. In Laestadius’ theory dualism does not 
emerge between the mind and body but instead between the destructive natural forces and vital 
forces. Natural vital forces such as drives and natural passions are viewed as causing destruction and 
degeneration in human life while moral passions are viewed as vitalizing forces. These distinctions 
manifest itself in many levels, also in psychological level (Cf. § 167), in Laestadius’ theory as we 
will see in this current study.
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En Blick I Nådens Ordning, 1844–1857) of over 800 pages represents the core 
text of Laestadius’ philosophy; however, it still awaits precise scientific editing and 
publication. That posthumously published book is the main source of this study. The 
early motifs of The Lunatic were theological and church political, but through vari-
ous rewritings, the book has been extended into a holistic consideration of the idea 
of man and the essence of religion. In this study, the philosophical interpretation 
of Laestadius’ thought and work is justified by contextualizing and reconstructing 
Laestadius’ thought in terms of the horizon of history of ideas. That focus shows that 
Laestadius was aware of the philosophical currents and the scientific knowledge of 
his time toward which he intentionally then formulated his own theories. 
Using both historical reconstruction and contextualizing analysis, my approach to 
examining The Lunatic as a philosophical work is supported by a chosen metaphysical 
frame, used here to interpret and analyze Laestadius’ thoughts as the holistic theory 
of human existence. My perspective emphasizes the holistic ontological view within 
which I look at Laestadius’ disciplinary and detailed analysis on different themes in 
his whole project. I see that it is not necessary to make disciplinary distinctions, for 
example, between the theological and the philosophical, but rather see different parts 
of Laestadius’ thought as separate dimensions constituting his holistic psychophysi-
cal and psychosomatic constitution theory on human beings and human existence. 
This study shows that Laestadius was a committed and serious academic scholar in 
the field of anthropology and philosophy of religion who formulated an interesting 
critique of Western metaphysical presuppositions.
In present day philosophy, especially in French phenomenologically oriented 
thought, philosophical and theological traditions are moving closer to each other 
again when one is dealing with foundational metaphysical questions. In Laestadius’ 
case, there is not a sharp distinction between the theological and philosophical or 
the anthropological, as he grounded his theology on anthropology and seems to view 
the theological as a genuine “love of wisdom”. It is also worth noting that Laestadius’ 
thought leaps historically over and thus theoretically overcomes the dualistic and 
theoretically totalizing metaphysical epoch of the Western intellectual tradition by 
leaning on the theological anthropology of Luther, Augustine, and also scientifically 
on French physiological medicine and its vitalist philosophy.
Laestadius’ psychology, theology and philosophy of religion deserve to be taken 
seriously in academic philosophical research as well. Philosophical research does 
not necessarily produce any new scientific innovations. Its meaning is elsewhere; 
it is idea- and theory-historical and the basic philosophical study of the theoreti-
cal thinking of one of the most influential persons in North Calotte.27 By studying 
27 See e.g. Raittila 1976. Also Lohi 1997, 771-783 (English summary for Doctoral dissertation: Northern 
Christianity. The Expansion of Laestadianism in Finland between the Years 1870 and 1899.)
20 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
Laestadius’s notion of human being, the concept of religion and God, faith and the 
whole of his philosophy of religion, this research effort releases Laestadius’ thoughts 
into philosophical existence and offers a background for deeper understanding of 
the intellectual-existential roots of Laestadianism. The fact that Laestadius really 
worked theoretically through the religious and spiritual atmosphere and experiences 
that were presented in Northern Scandinavia in the 1800’s, offers a unique possibility 
for widespread and ambiguous religious traditions to understand their roots from 
theoretical perspectives and reach forward to the future by critically attaching to 
their own theoretical and dogmatic history. Beside its philosophical, psychological, 
and theological innovations, it is generally important to know Laestadius’ theoretical 
thoughts on the research concerning North Scandinavian history of ideas, spirituality, 
and culture. This study hopes to reveal Laestadius thought as an interesting example 
of the vivid intellectual life of 1800’s Northern Scandinavia. 
1.2  The Current State of Research in Laestadius Studies
Lars Levi Laestadius’ person and multidisciplinary work have been widely studied in 
both academic research and popular writing for a long period of time (1876–2016) 
in various disciplines and languages, especially Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian28. 
Laestadius’ writings, including his religious sermons and scientific publications, are 
continuously translated into new languages, especially into English. However, there 
are not many scientific studies concerning Laestadius’ theoretical thought (neither 
his theological nor anthropological nor ethnography) in English despite the fact 
that his thinking has continuously remained of international academic interest and 
research. In late 2015, Laestadius’ systematic theological and philosophical main 
work, Dårhushjonet: En blick I Nådens Ordning, received its English translation under 
the English title, The Lunatic: An Insight Into the Order of Grace (2015). This transla-
tion presumably marks the start of broader international discussion on Laestadius’ 
theoretical thinking.
A common agreement remains in the Laestadius studies that the core of the philo-
sophical-theological theory presented in The Lunatic is the anthropological theme 
concerning human existence in accordance with the common Enlightenment line 
of thought.29 In the eighteenth century, human nature became a dominant concept 
in philosophy. In the Enlightenment era, anthropology also was set into the core of 
28 See e.g. Raittila 1967; Rydvig 2000
29 Cf. Zidbäck 1937; Juntunen 1982, 17. An informative presentation concerning to the birth, 
purposes and early research on The Lunatic is given in Bäcksbacka 1938 (Lars Levi Laestadius’ 
Religionfilosofiska Arbete ”Dårhushjonet”: Dess Tillblivelse och Syfte.)
1 Introduction  | 21
theology; it was common to think that the correct concept of man was a prerequisite 
for the correct understanding of God. The central role of anthropology is also seen 
to have coloured the entire theological and philosophical thought of Laestadius, 
especially in The Lunatic.
The vitalist character of Laestadius’ anthropology has also been noticed in the 
studies of Laestadius30. Likewise, the strong critique and evaluation pertaining to the 
Enlightenment rationalistic emphases of reason, freedom, and autonomy, as well as 
the tendency of Romantic thought to emphasize experience, emotion, and regional 
life and provincial locality has been pointed out31. Further, the spiritual character 
of Laestadius has been interpreted to be pietistic32, influenced by Sámi culture and 
history, and in the broader sense, inflected toward mysticism33, simultaneously mean-
ing the ineffable nature of life, the anti-intellectualistic character of religiosity and 
religious experience, as well as the impossibility to grasp and reach God by relying 
on mere use of intellect or reason34.
Generally, Laestadius’ theoretical thought is seen to be interlinked with the En-
lightenment and Romantic heritages, especially via his anthropology35. Laestadius’ 
thought relates particularly to the philosophical heritage of medical vitalism in the 
Enlightenment. From that perspective, he presents a criticism against the rationalistic 
(intellectualistic, mechanical) idea of man and the notion of faith and God. Simulta-
neously, Laestadius elaborates on his own views concerning the general questions of 
the Enlightenment and the Romantic era, questions that pertain to social-political 
life, morality, and the philosophy of religion. Problems concerning the relationship 
between revelation and natural religion, the character and meaning of education and 
social convention, the nature and position of religion in society, and free will are all 
found to be present in Laestadius’ theoretical thought36.
From a theoretical point of view, the inwardness, ineffable and mystical dimension 
of religious experience, and the vitalist-animistic tones of Laestadius’ thought have 
been highlighted, and several valuable presentations and summaries have been pub-
lished on his theoretical thinking37. Nearly every of the more extensive study sketches 
the main ideas and “principles” of Laestadius’ anthropology as a necessary part of its 
30 See, Åberg 1997/1964; Dahlbäck 1950; Zidbäck 1937; Juntunen 1982.
31 See, Laestadius 1946; Dahlbäck 1949; Cf. Pulkkinen 2002; Zidbäck 1937; Pentikäinen & 
Pulkkinen 2011.
32 Sandewall 1951; Brännström 1962, 33–39, 66–73; Juntunen 1982, 12–14.
33 In theological context especially Zidbäck 1937, 130–210, 211–231.
34 Dahlbäck 1949, 53–66 and 1965, 267–294; Also Kristiansen 2004; Zidbäck 1937; Outakoski 
1991; Østtveit Elgvin 2010
35 E.g. Juntunen 1982. For the general history of Natural history, See, Sloan 2007, 903–938.
36 For the prevailing philosophical discussions in Laestadius’ times, See e.g., Antognazza 2007, 
666–682. 
37 e.g. Englund 1881; Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982; Kristiansen 2004.
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thematic research and interpretation38. However, most of the dissertations have been 
theological, church historical, or religious studies. In other disciplines, mainly there 
are studies on article forms, and the best philosophical studies concerning Laestadius’ 
thought are shorter presentations39.
In the first academic study of Laestadius’ theology in the end of 1800’s, Laestadius 
was interpreted as a materialist40. Subsequently, the philosophical character of Laes-
tadius’ anthropology has been labelled contradictorily as materialism, spiritualism41, 
parallelism, and vitalist monism. The difficulty in situating Laestadius’ philosophical 
thought in a single conceptual category or school derives mainly from the multi-
disciplinary, holistic, and ambiguous character of Laestadius’ thought itself. While 
it has religious motifs and thus a Biblical and theological background, the thinking 
is simultaneously attached to natural and scientifically emphasized vitalist theories 
and Romantic psychology42. The Lunatic is not a completely detailed scientific work, 
however, as it was never finished by Laestadius in the sense that it would have been 
edited and published in a scientific manner. However, its variegated sources are also 
interpreted by Laestadius for his own purposes, so that they receive theological, 
existentialistic and pre-phenomenological meanings and indications. The fact that 
Laestadius’ thought had different levels and dimensions has not been fully recognized 
as yet. Indeed, he held the views of Biblical authors and reformers as religious truths 
of human life, the vitalist medical science, and Romantic psychology43 as a rational-
izing explanatory basis, and his own experiences and the experiences of his fellow 
human beings as the phenomenal experiential horizon for theoretical thematization.
38 Within Laestadius’ holistic theory theology and vitalist anthropology are inextricably attached 
with each other in a way that Laestadius’ dogmatic views are impossible to analyze without first 
knowing its anthropological argumentation. Neither does the vitalist anthropology becomes fully 
understood without its theological purposes. For this reason, for instance, Zindbäck’s (1937) 
Dahlbäck’s (1950) and Juntunen’s (1982) dissertations have analyzed Laestadius’ anthropology 
as part of their theological and church historical studies.
39 See, Dahlbäck 1964; Dahlbäck 1949; Kristiansen 2004; Rossvaer 1997.
40 Englund 1881, 435–465; Cf. General introduction to Laestadius –receptions in Bäcksbacka 1938, 
7–9.
41 Cf. Zidbäck 1937, 73, 211–231.
42 Cf. Bichat 1815; Carus 1989. Especially the Enlightenment vitalist, Xavier Bichat, and the 
romantic psychology of Carl Gustav Carus are the authors that Laestadius’ agrees with concerning 
the understanding of the nature of life and in basic presuppositions concerning anthropology. 
However, Laestadius’ thought has also broader theory historical connections to enlightenment 
and romantic currents as will be shown later in this current study.
43 Readers of Laestadius can hear the romantic tone through the emphases of “emotion,” “feeling,” 
and experience overall. Laestadius also considered Carl Gustav Carus’ romantic idea of the divine 
soul as coinciding with his own ideas. However, Laestadius’ relation to romantic naturphilosophie 
is complicated, as he tries to distinguish his own ideas from the pantheistic and panpneumatist 
currents of his times.
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Because of these natural scientific tendencies, it is understandable that Laestadius’ 
thought may have led some to interpret his theory as materialism. On the other 
hand, Biblical and reformatory emphases on subjective faith, the ineffable character 
of life, and religious experience have led others to interpret his thought as one of 
spiritualism. These interpretations are not fully satisfactory, as Laestadius also criti-
cized empiricistic-materialism44: Laestadius viewed that rationalists ended up with 
spiritualism while rational empiricists ended up with materialism. Therefore, Laes-
tadius accepted neither the simplistic idealistic stance of conceiving a human being 
as spiritual (possessing a [self-given] pure transcendental spirit or rational soul) in 
its primal essence nor the mechanistic notion – that all movements of soul and hu-
man action are only movements of “inert matter” – which lead to a raw materialism. 
Laestadius sought a third alternative, and so the question is how would Laestadius 
have found a way between idealism/spiritualism and materialism that were indeed 
the dominant currents of his time?
From a philosophical perspective45, the most extensive overall presentations that 
include an analysis of Laestadius’ anthropology are found in Zidbäck’s (1937), 
Dahlbäck’s (1950), and Juntunen’s (1982) dissertations46. In addition, several research 
articles have been important and inspiring for this study. Bengt Åberg’s (1997, org. 
1964) introduction to an archived manuscript of Dårhushjonet and Gustav Dahlbäck’s 
(1965) extensive article on Laestadius’ philosophy are valuable early introductions to 
The Lunatic, as they reveal the context for interpreting Laestadius’ thought in the early 
1900’s. Common to these studies is that Laestadius’ thought is most often referred to 
as “psychological-philosophical,” “philosophical,” “psychological,” and “philosophy of 
religion.” Åberg’s editorial introduction to The Lunatic traces the immediate scientific 
multidisciplinary contexts, relationships, and the central ideas of the sources of The 
 
44 However, Laestadius accepted many of Hobbes’ ideas – for example, the material-physiological 
basis of human cognition and action (§27Note1) as well as the idea of fundamental corruption 
and the incapability of natural humans to live a peaceful communal life.
45 Cf. Bäcksbacka 1938.
46 Zidbäck’s dissertation is purely theological and the first overall presentation of Laestadius’ 
theoretical system in relation to the idea of following the Christ. His dissertations include many 
influential and interesting interpretations of Laestadius’ philosophy such as Platonic-Catholic idea 
of soul, parallelism of body and mind and immanence and transcendence. Juntunen’s dissertation 
is Church historical, and it studies Laestadius’ ecclesial views and concept of church in relation 
to the Lutheran Church. Juntunen also presents a tight overview of Laestadius’ anthropological 
theory. The more interesting point is, that Juntunen also discusses and criticizes some of Zidbäck’s 
influential views concerning Laestadius’ notion of a freedom of will that does not seem possible 
from the perspective of Laestadius’ own anthropological principles. Philosophically it’s most 
valuable work is a quite detailed idea historical and theory historical attachment in footnotes. 
Zidbäck and Juntunen both also attach Laestadius’ thought to the enlightenment tradition and 
points out important connections to the history of ideas.
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Lunatic and is one of the most detailed interpretations to use for contextualizing 
Laestadius’ theoretical thought within the Swedish history of ideas.47
Regarding such philosophical research, Gustaf Dahlbäck’s (1965) article is worth 
mentioning. Dahlbäck compared Laestadius’ critique of rationalism to Immanuel Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy by analyzing their similar intentions to thematize the neces-
sary prerequisites/limits of the pure, genuine, and moral concept of reason as well as the 
fundamental conditions of moral reasoning. The article is also insightful as far as it reveals 
how Laestadius’ vitalism and emphasis on emotional or anti-intellectualistic character 
of human being in contrast with the Kantian Enlightenment rationalistic stance.
Altogether, Dahlbäck presented the idea that Laestadius’ intentions were the same 
as Immanuel Kant’s in searching for the purified basis for and proper concept of 
reason even though their theoretical standpoints are different. Both Kant and Laes-
tadius could be seen as looking for the initial conditions for pure reason, religiosity, 
and morality. While Laestadius saw intellectual capabilities, such as reason, will, 
and understanding, to be corrupted by natural passions, at the same time, he tried to 
formulate initial conditions for the possibility of pure and moral capabilities of the 
soul. Here Dahlbäck emphasizes the same problems and intentions between Kant 
and Laestadius even though they grounded their views on a totally different theoreti-
cal basis and argumentation48: Kant on idealistic transcendentalism and Laestadius 
on medical psychophysiology and the vitalistic psychology of the Enlightenment.
However, did Laestadius really have the same intentions as Kant49 since he criti-
cized the Enlightenment notion and the emphasis of human reason and freedom 
as imaginary postulates? While Kant was looking for the pure concept and purified 
phenomena of reason and its conditions for epistemological purposes, Laestadius 
was taking the whole phenomena of reason and will into consideration in a more 
fundamental way, emphasizing the “dirty” passional and embodied characteristics of 
reason. This analysis will also reveal that Kant and Laestadius drifted apart because 
of their different purposes and theoretical standpoints [Transcendental idealism vs. 
Transcendental physiology]. Should we then think that Laestadius tried to find a 
more plausible and concrete basis for the “practical reason” of Kant’s?
More recent philosophical articles have been written by Norwegian researchers. 
The most distinguished and informative research on Laestadius’ philosophy is Roald 
A. Kristiansen’s article. Kristiansen precisely analyzed Laestadius’ line of thought, 
emphasizing Laestadius’ physiological explanations and emotivistic emphases. The 
47 Åberg 1997/1964, 14–43. Åberg highlighted similarities between Laestadius and Fechner. The 
comparative analysis of their theories is a task of another research. For this analysis see e.g. Fechner 
1946a and 1946b.
48 Dahlbäck 1965.
49 See, Kant 1998. (Critique of Pure Reason) Available in www: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-
texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf
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article summarizes the most important themes of The Lunatic, interpreting Laesta-
dius’ philosophical thought as a “philosophy of heart.” However, Kristiansen does not 
pay much attention to the context of history of ideas that are present in Laestadius’ 
thought and partly bypassed, for example, Laestadius’ vitalist worldview and the 
holistic structure of his philosophy. However, Kristiansen’s article is also one to rec-
ommend, as it offers an interesting interpretation of the legitimacy of Laestadianism 
by questioning Laestadius’ idea on the possibility of autonomy.50
Viggo Rossvaer’s essay51 proposed viewing Laestadius as one of the most significant 
philosophers of the 1800’s North Calotte. Rossvaer related Laestadius’ holistic philoso-
phy to the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas: Certain points 
of contact may be found on the concept of the Self, personhood, embodiment, ultimate 
responsibility in front of an [ultimate] Being, existence, or God, to mention just a few.52 
In Finland, only a few articles have commented on Laestadius’ philosophical di-
mension. Kari Sallamaa noticed Laestadius’ relevance in Northern philosophy and 
related Laestadius’ thought to the later French and German vitalist philosophies 
and assumed that Laestadius’ could have been considered as great a philosopher as 
Kierkegaard or a successor to vitalism as Bergson and Nietzsche were if he would 
have written in French or German.53
The way in which Laestadius’ philosophical-anthropological thought is taken into 
consideration also reflects its time and theoretical atmosphere. From Englund54 to 
Juntunen, the interpretations of Laestadius vary from materialism to parallelistic55 
50 See, Kristiansen 2004, 65–82. (Religious Philosophy for Fools: On the Philosophical Basis for L.L. 
Laestadius’ theology. University of Tromsø, Faculty of Social Sciences: Department of Philosophy 
/Department of Religion.)
51 Rossvaer 1997, 269–283. (Zappe eller Laestadius? Universitetbiblioteket I Tromsøs Skriftserie, 
Ravnetrykk nr. 12)
52 See further especially Heidegger 1992 (Being and Time) and Levinas 2007 (Totality and Infinity: 
An Essay on Exteriority). Also Theunissen 1986.
53 See, Sallamaa, Kari. Lars Levi Laestadius filosofina. AGON 4/11, pp. 13–15. In www: http://agon.
fi/pdf/AGON-32-2011-4.pdf
54 Englund 1881, 435.
55 In earlier studies, Laestadius is most often interpreted as an empiricist who emphasized in a 
naturalistic way human physiology and psychology based on anatomy. However, he also re-interprets 
the concepts of anatomical research and vitalism into the dimensions of theology, metaphysics, and 
even existentialism and phenomenology (Cf. Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982; Joensuu 
2013). Also, in earlier studies, Laestadius’ position regarding to the question of substantiality and 
emergence of soul has been seen as parallelism, the notion that either matter and spirit, body and 
soul or man and God are the different dimensions of the same vital principle (lifprincipe). However, 
this parallelism –interpretation resonates with Laestadius’ contemporary history of ideas, but it is 
not a satisfactory interpretation in Laestadius’ case. What is not fully recognized is that Laestadius 
emphasizes vitalist and panpsychistic interpretation of organic matter – signifying the principle of 
life as the intensive core-force of the embodied soul – as a constitutive ground. Rather this stance 
seems to form the philosophical explanatory basis and a theory of [psychophysiological] constitution 
for his philosophical and psychological monistic vitalism.
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idealism. Parallelistic interpretation dominated the earlier Laestadius –studies. 
The concept of parallelism functioned as a technical term very generally from the 
1800s to the present day. Parallelism works as a simple heuristic term to govern 
and comprehend complex system theories. Within the ethos of idealistic thinking, 
it was also typical to develop alternatives to rough dualism: Kant Hegel, and Leib-
niz’s philosophies in general, and certainly the Swedish philosopher Swedenborg’s 
correspondence theory affirmed the parallelism interpretations based on idealistic 
dualism. The term “parallelism” fits well with the schism between metaphysics (theol-
ogy) and progressing natural science; the core problem was the relationship between 
transcendence (God) and immanence (Human being) and the thematization of the 
constitution of it. However, the use of the technical term “parallelism” does not mean 
that the philosopher in question would definitely be a simple parallelist. What is 
problematic when using such a term for Laestadius’ thought, is that it overlooks many 
of the constitutional elements within Laestadius’ theory. “Parallelism” does not open 
a heuristic view of the holistic way of thought, and it neither follows nor discusses 
constitutive elaborations and problems of psychophysiology. In the worst case, it only 
dogmatically states that matter and spirit or body and mind are in parallel to each 
other, giving no hermeneutic or explanatory information in that respect, and thus 
preserving, replicating and legitimatizing the dualism.
In the light of earlier Laestadius studies, it seems clear that Laestadius’ thought was 
influenced by currents of Enlightenment and the Romantic era, Lutheran-pietistic 
emphases of inward faith and piousness, the deep significance of an animated nature, 
and the place of man as part of that nature inherited from the ethos of the Sámi 
tradition. In particular, the pietistic (readers’ and Herrnhutian) view on the ordo 
salutis is a commonly agreed upon theological doctrine in Laestadius’ theology. This 
view emphasizes the classical Lutheran idea of grace, while an objective part of the 
reconciliation, and the psychological dimensions of contrition, repentance, and rebirth 
signify pietistic as a subjective emphasis of reconciliation (order of grace)56. It can be 
suggested that Lutheran and pietistic emphases are not necessarily contradictory in 
Laestadius’ theory, but may be combined as the subjective and objective dimensions 
of the more holistic view of reconciliation. 
It could be also pointed out that Laestadius’ theoretical elaborations were influenced 
by the classical conceptualizations of the faculty psychological doctrine of the soul 
that he combined into his interpretation of the vitalist theory. The latter, as well as 
the pietist-Herrnhutian conception of the “order of grace,” will be further interpreted 
in this study, as they seem to form crucial aspects of Laestadius’ “insight” that was 
already stated in the headline of The Lunatic. However, this study does not evaluate 
Laestadius’ views from the perspective of a history of the theological doctrines, but 
56 See further e.g., Juntunen 1982, 77-95.
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instead it seeks to interpret and clarify how Laestadius explained his dogmatic and 
religious views using vitalist psychology and family psychological examples. This study 
naturally deals with the theological-philosophical interpretation of religious experi-
ence, and it simultaneously takes cognizance of some theological-historical aspects 
concerning Lutheranism and pietism. Further still, beside interpreting Laestadius’ 
thought on the horizon of vitalism, the present study argues that Laestadius’ theory 
also has existentialistic and pre-phenomenological dimensions.
1.3  Research Task and Research Questions
Despite the fact that anthropology is commonly seen as central for understanding 
and evaluating Laestadius’ theoretical thought, the founding character and “insights” 
of Laestadius’ anthropology have not been closely studied from a philosophical per-
spective. This lack of philosophical research signifies that Laestadius’ philosophical 
starting points and psychological views have been relatively disregarded with respect 
to the formation of his theological, moral philosophical, social-political, and religious 
views. The absence of a closer analysis of Laestadius’ vitalist perspective is also part 
of the difficulty when trying to comprehend Laestadius’ systematic and relatively 
coherent theory. Partly for this reason, both popularly and academically, there has 
remained a quest and indeed a need for studying the philosophical and psychological 
bases of Laestadius’ ideas about man and life.
The main task of this research then is to analyze and interpret the philosophical 
and psychological standpoints, ideas, and elaborations of Laestadius’ theoretical 
thought. The research primarily focuses and delimits the analysis and interpretation 
on The Lunatic, which is the main source of Laestadius’ theological, philosophical, and 
psychological thought. In The Lunatic, Laestadius’ theoretical insights and notions are 
also the most clearly presented. The Lunatic is approached as a scientific-psychological 
apology of North Scandinavian pietism, as we will later see when contextualizing 
Laestadius’ thought in relation to Lutheran orthodoxy and metaphysical rationalism 
in Chapter 2. In particular, the medical vitalist character of Laestadius’ theorizing 
and its application for theological, psychological, and apologist purposes frames the 
perspective of the interpretation. 
As a basic philosophical study, this study points out the central philosophical and 
psychological standpoints that constitute the underlying insights of Laestadius’ an-
thropological and theological “system,” and particularly discusses Laestadius’ intention 
to deconstruct classical Cartesian dualism and the general intellectualistic emphases of 
the Western philosophical-theological tradition. Roughly, my intention is to analyze 
Laestadius’ holistic account of the human person as an alternative for intellectual-
istic accounts that restrict the evidence of the human experience to the capacities 
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of intellect [reason, will, understanding; perceptual and judicative dimensions], thus 
dismissing the psychophysiological foundation of experience. Therefore, the main 
task of the present study is to provide an interpretative analysis of the metaphysical, 
philosophical, and psychological standpoints of Laestadius’ theory and their indica-
tions when applied to the classical philosophical themes, such as character of soul 
and body/mind, faculties of soul, notions of Self and person, explanation of nature, 
significance of religious experience, and explanations of morality and spirituality. 
In this regard, the study also provides historically tenable accounts and interpre-
tations of Laestadius’ thought that coincide with Laestadius’ intentions.The study 
analyzes the ways in which a human person and its faculties of the soul, morality, and 
spirituality are redefined within the vitalist psychophysiological framework. Simul-
taneously, the study carries out an interpretative task by analyzing the phenomenal 
references and indications for a better understanding of the phenomena in question.
 Chapter 2, Historical Contextualization, briefly depicts the historical context, in-
cluding the spiritual and intellectual background, of Laestadius’ theory. In this chapter, 
I analyze and depict the historical conditions within which Laestadius’ theoretical 
thought is attached and interpreted. My intention in this chapter is not to present 
a detailed analysis of specific theories and ideas to which Laestadius’ thought can 
be related, but instead describe more broadly the detailed background that will help 
us understand Laestadius’ thought in terms of a philosophical horizon.57Therefore, 
the quest of Chapter 2 is to find the grounding ideas of Laestadius’ thought so as to 
posit Laestadius’ intentions and theoretical thought within the broad history of ideas.
In Chapter 3, The Creation and Initial Condition, I question the theological, 
dogmatic, or ontotheological starting points of Laestadius’ thought. Here Laesta-
dius’ idea of the creation and the created is discussed as the origin problem, and thus 
a precondition for the possibility of anthropological and theological thinking and 
theorizing. The aim is to disclose the broad extent of Laestadius’ thought and assess 
the possibility of its philosophical interpretation. Therefore, the problem is to find 
the most primal metaphysical stance and initial conditions within which Laestadius 
deals with the questions of existence, the idea of man, and the notion of God.
Chapter 4, Person and Intentionality, is the first main chapter of the study, as it 
discusses Laestadius’ vitalist account of person and intentionality and presents the 
main philosophical anthropological ideas for Laestadius’ further theological and moral 
philosophical elaborations. I discuss and thematize Laestadius’ vitalist explication of 
embodiment and the faculties of soul that constitute the core of his psychology and 
philosophy of the mind. I interpret how precognitive states, especially passions, emo-
tions and drives, and the whole subjective consciousness as a pre-reflective ground, lay 
57 For a detailed interpretation of the close history of ideas and theories in regard to The Lunatic 
see, Åberg 1964/1997.
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the constitutive basis for the functions of the mind and higher cognitions and thus 
constitute the human/world relation [disposedness, situatedness, and stationedness]. 
This discussion includes an analysis of the central concepts, such as the soul, passions, 
body, mind, self, reason, will, and understanding. Here is questioned how Laestadius 
stated the notion of a person within the world and what kind of epistemic and onto-
logical significances of the subjective consciousness is received in human existence. This 
chapter aims to uncover Laestadius’ notion of person and the character of embodied 
intentionality as the basic structure of human-world relations or human existence. 
In the second main chapter, Chapter 5, Laestadius’ theory is viewed from the 
perspective of the common vitalist dual conception of the physical/moral which 
sought to replace or overcome Cartesian body/mind dualism. In this respect, Laes-
tadius’ elaborations on the psychophysical origins of morality and spirituality are 
analyzed in greater detail. The relationship between the physical, moral, and spiritual 
are discussed by analyzing the notions of soul, passion, heart, conscience, percep-
tion, awakening, reconciliation, and the deconstructed notions of faith and God. 
Here the particular question is how Laestadius explained the spheres of morality 
and spirituality on a physiological plane and how the constitution of the moral and 
spiritual is thematized. In this chapter, the vitalist-psychological notion of faith and 
the ontotheological reconstruction of the relation between the Trinity of God and 
the constitutive triadic of the human person (the principle of life/lifprincip, organic 
life/organlif, and sensory life/nervlif ) are discussed by exploring the intentional 
character of faith in God.
At the end of Chapter 5, Laestadius’ critique of metaphysical rationalism and 
transcendental philosophy is raised to a more general level of discussion in order 
to apprise whether it offers insight to criticize Western metaphysics in a way that 
is consistent with the more common phenomenological criticism, for example, the 
attack on the metaphysical stance of a “constant presence” (substance) and its impli-
cations.58 Here Laestadius’ critique of the classical metaphysical concepts of substance 
and essence is discussed in relation to the wider context of metaphysical rationalism 
and idealism. This more general analysis seeks to relate Laestadius’ vitalist notion 
of faith to Luther’s Theology of the Cross, commonly seen as one of the main sources 
of phenomenological critique of Western metaphysics59. Does Laestadius’ notion of 
man  and faith constitute a non-metaphysical elaboration on the existence of the 
human? And what are the epistemic and ontological consequences?
In the Concluding Remarks, I summarise the conclusions and implications of my 
58 See, Heidegger 1992 (Being and Time); Kisiel & Sheehan 2007 (Becoming Heidegger); Heidegger 
2010 (Phenomenology of Religious life); See further, Stanley 2010; Adluri 2013; Marx 1982; Backman 
2015.
59 Heidegger 2010; Kisiel & Sheehan 2007.
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interpretation and analysis and simultaneously lift up themes and questions to a more 
general philosophical level. This discussion points out the more specific problems 
and questions present in my interpretation, but not systematically analysed. In this 
respect specific questions, such as those on ontological and theological realism, are 
preliminarily discussed as possible directions for further Laestadius –research. 
1.4  Method and Conceptual Perspective
The method of this study is philosophical analysis and phenomenological interpreta-
tion. Therefore, both the ontological basis and the methodological perspective were 
a phenomenological understanding – namely, phenomenological hermeneutics60 
– which is an interpretative way for explicating Laestadius’ ideas in relation to the 
phenomena of lived experience. In a broad sense, this “ontological basis” indicates 
that the experiential lifeworld (lebenswelt, Dasein) is an initial condition for expe-
riencing and understanding.61 
Phenomenological interpretation differs from mere textual exegetics or an analyti-
cal conceptual analysis which take the linguistic system and its conceptual relations 
as its main objectives. The analysis of relations and references to certain concepts and 
thoughts did not suit Laestadius’ case, as he himself criticized formal rationalistic 
and metaphysical analyses as “speculation” and “mere reflection” by insisting on an 
approach that would encounter the special character of experiential phenomena. In 
contrast to semiotic and analytical analysis, phenomenology takes existence as the 
broad horizon of philosophical understanding and explication. Through phenomeno-
logical interpretation, it is possible to open up Laestadius’ concepts and thoughts in 
relation to phenomena and those things that are indicated and meant. This method 
is important for this study, as it focuses mainly on philosophical and psychological 
elaborations, namely on the way in which Laestadius explained his views, not pri-
marily on Laestadius’ religious and theological views as such62. This approach allows 
60 Phenomenological interpretation always takes necessarily the first person perspective for its primal 
stand point (see, e.g. Zahavi 2006; Shoemaker 1996). Interpretation is always an endeavor where the 
researcher has to posit itself in the text, and thus interpretation is always the elaboration or “better 
understanding” (Gadamer) than the authors in a sense that it is interpretation from a different 
situation. Phenomenological interpretation is always “more” than just exegetics because it reaches 
toward phenomena that has been thought through lived experience, and thus possibly reachable for 
the interpreter. This is because of the phenomeno-logical dimension of hermeneutics that demands 
things, themes, and phenomena that are experienced to be investigated in the first place.
61 See further e.g. Dreyfus 1991; Theunissen 1986; Hodge 1995; Bernsen 1986; Zahavi 2006 as an 
introductory texts to Heideggerian phenomenological philosophy.
62 I want to loosely refer to Russell’s thought here, as he thought that the views of the philosopher are 
not necessarily interesting – more interesting are the reasons why someone thinks as he does.
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the philosophical and psychological dimensions of Laestadius’ thought to rise to 
the surface63. 
Using philosophical analysis and interpretation, I determine the meaning and 
indications of Laestadius’ central notions. Through phenomenological interpreta-
tion, I thematize the content and intentions of Laestadius’ conceptions and interpret 
them in the wider context as they relate to the phenomena given by experience and 
dealt with using other theoretical perspectives. Therefore, the method also extends 
to the experience of the interpreter and thus includes my own experience as part of 
the research. In phenomenology, the first person perspective signifies a certain kind of 
psychological empathy toward the studied author’s thought, while it simultaneously 
holds a reflective distance. The presupposition, therefore, is that any kind of genuine 
understanding – whether critical or emphatic – is possible only through first having a 
personal grasp of the phenomena given in one’s own most lived experiential relation-
ship to the studied subject. Thus, phenomenological interpretation presupposes and 
respects Laestadius’ theoretical thought in such a way that it deals with the subjects 
and phenomena available to any other researcher, although in a different situation. 
For this study, the emphatic relation to Laestadius’ writings and the phenomena 
on which he focused does play an important role and does not deny their inner 
truths. However, as a theoretical interpretation, the present study leans on its own 
theoretical insights and conceptualizations in order to reflect and evaluate whether 
Laestadius’ theory includes fruitful and interesting views, elaborations, and solutions 
that relate to classical philosophical and psychological themes. 
Laestadius held philosophy to be conceptual and theoretical thematization that 
belonged to the sphere of mind (intellectualization) while matters of life and faith 
belonged more holistically to the experiential sphere of subjective consciousness or 
heart. Is it then still possible to conceptually and theoretically study matters of life 
and faith without violating the experiential phenomena that were in question? Given 
that phenomenological analysis is primarily an analysis of a pre-reflective constitutive 
basis and Laestadius’ intention was to thematize that same constitutive basis in vitalist 
terms to include the idea that pre-reflective ground will never become transparent 
in its varying content. Indeed, the whole task is actually paradoxical or a dead end. 
However, the impossibility to thematize pre-reflectivity in reflective [conceptual] 
terms does not necessarily signify that the “use of reason” can be dispensable.
 Instead, phenomenological analysis can very well clear the existential or psycho-
logical initial structures of human existence, life, faith, or God-relation, leaving the 
63 Through contextualization and close interpretation of The Lunatic in terms of the history of ideas, 
I open up the possibility for a philosophical analysis and interpretation of Laestadius’ thought. 
In a philosophical manner I will set more specific questions in regard to the theme and problem 
in question while proceeding forward with my own analysis.
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individual content of experience untouched (as such) for the subject of experience 
in question. In Laestadius’ words, this aspect could be said to be in the form of 
apologizing for the exercise of mind (förståndet) at the expense of the heart by adding 
that “feelings and moral passions reflected in this work [The Lunatic] are not only 
those of the author: judgements and conclusions also draw on the experiences of 
simple Christians, but my own heart, not entirely unfamiliar with these experiences, 
approves of them unreservedly.”64 The question of life and faith is endless, but not 
impossible and indeed vain in the sense that we should reject it. On many occasions, 
Laestadius also seems to view rational thinking and philosophical reflection as fruit-
ful for human life, faith and especially, he sees philosophy as possible for apologetic 
purposes. However he also emphasizes that philosophical reflection should be based 
on moral emotions and passions. Altogether then, philosophical and psychological 
theorizing plays an important role in matters of faith and life even though they can 
never replace them as matters of life and faith itself constitute the actual substantial 
ground for all theorization.
The central technical concepts used in this current research are constitution, in-
tentionality, existential, and formal indication elaborated on in the phenomenological 
tradition, but used also in different ways within phenomenology. These concepts and 
their meaning are briefly depicted for the way they are used in this current research.
The idea of constitution is a classical phenomenological concept that is closely 
attached to the starting point of phenomenology, which is an emphasis on the 
first person lived experience. Generally, it signifies that the way to approach the 
phenomena in question is not as an object-like entity, but experientially, seeking 
to find the initial constituents of a being or a meaning whatsoever65. There can also 
exist many “constitutions” such as physiological, psychological, psychophysiologi-
cal, social-cultural, historical, and others. In this study, the notion of constitution is 
mainly approached as a psychophysiological embodied constitution with respect to 
Laestadius’ way of thematizing the physiological-vital basis of living organisms and 
also the constitution of consciousness, morality, and spirituality. Herein, constitution 
signifies the endeavour to thematize and explain the initial conditions of the “higher” 
manifestations of physiological constituents, especially consciousness, states of mind, 
self-knowledge, moral feelings, and spirituality.
Intentionality is also a classical philosophical concept that is closely related to 
the concept of constitution. It generally means that the character of consciousness 
as is always “reached out” from itself “towards something” that is transcendental to 
64 Laestadius 2015, The Lunatic, Foreword, p. 14.
65 The constitutive perspective is often seen as an alternative for categories and categorical thinking. 
For the constitutive significance of embodiment in classical phenomenology, see, e.g., Taipale 
2009 (Incarnate Subjectivity: The Constitutive significance of Embodiment in Husserlian 
Phenomenology. Department of Philosophy. Helsinki.)
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the [sometimes assumed capsulated] mind itself; consciousness is always considered 
to be the conscious “of something,” i.e., intentional. Thus, intentionality signifies a 
“directedness” of mind, consciousness and – in a more fundamental ontological or 
holistic sense – body, when the mind is conceived to be corporeal and embodied. Thus, 
intentionality signifies a “directedness” of mind and body. In the phenomenological 
tradition, intentionality refers broadly to the interrelated character of subject and 
object, whether that character is a question about mind’s relationship to the world 
or, more holistically, man’s relation with the world. Hence, intentionality signifies 
the intertwined character of man and world; as well as how man is in the world, how 
the world is in the man; or how the perceived is always perceived of some particular 
person in a specific situation and from a particular embodied intentional state. In 
other words, intentionality means that the object or horizon of an experience and 
perception is always pulled into the midst of the embodied experience or perception 
itself; the object whatsoever cannot be conceived as being absolutely distinct from 
the agent and its embodied situation of the experience, as the object itself is included 
or comes along with the perception. 
For instance, the theory of intentionality signifies man’s situatedness in Heidegger’s 
philosophy. He expanded the idea of intentionality so it pertained to the whole ex-
istence (sorge), meaning that the structure of human existence is ex-istence, always 
already reached out or outside of itself, for example, coincidentally directed into the 
future or/and being historical.66 In the phenomenology of the body, the notion of 
intentionality is not limited to pertain only to the intentionality of consciousness 
or mind, but rather refers more holistically to the tacit or habitual way of being in a 
world of embodied consciousness. Further, in this current study when discussing the 
intentionality of body, intentionality refers to more of a holistic view on habituality, 
namely, a tacit or unconscious dimension of humane being in the world. In this study, 
the notion of intentionality is primarily used as a perspective to analyze Laestadius’ 
notion of passions, consciousness, perception, and faith as they bridge the human mind 
and body to the world outside or to the Divine and existence as such in varying ways. 
With respect to my use of the term “intentionality” as a perspective, I also use the 
term “existential” in a similar manner to depict how human beings relate to the world, 
God, and existence. With regard to Laestadius’ vitalist psychophysiological approach, 
it will be shown that Laestadius himself elaborated a specific vitalist existential stance.
Formal indication is developed in Heidegger’s philosophy to use concepts in an 
unsubstantial, un-objectifying, and non-nominalistic sense67. This formal way to use 
66 See, Heidegger 1992.
67 See e.g., Heidegger 1992, §25, 15. In Being and Time, for Heidegger already has the notion of 
Formale Anzeige in use, but it is elaborated on earlier. See further of the formal indication through 
Index p. 592 in Kisiel 1995, 592. (The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being & Time.)
34 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
concepts theoretically means that certain concepts are not closed in a sense that they 
would refer to their objects in terms of content (contentually); they do not grasp the 
content because the manifold and ambiguous meaning-content is always a matter of 
lived experience and existentiality. Formally indicative concepts are needed, especially 
when depicting the existential structures of experiential life and world because the 
singular and individual experiences initially vary from their content (with regard 
to person, situation, etc.) All of the existential concepts, such as time, attunement, 
language, togetherness (co-existence) (Mitsein), and being-in-the-world actualize 
in their contentual existential meaning or significance in different ways depending 
on the individual, the situation, culture, and spatio-temporality overall.
In this study, the notion of formal indication offers an applicable perspective, as 
Laestadius used his primary conceptions, such as passions and all the faculties of the 
soul, as indicative significance. Even if they have organic physiological ground and 
vital content in an actual event of life, they refer formally to some psychological-
experiential phenomena that are not strictly defined in their content. For instance, 
passions are conceived as vital-ontological, or to be specific, vital-existential struc-
tures and correlates that characterize the particular kind of intentional relatedness 
with the world, others, existence, and God. Yet their actuality (experiential content) 
always depends on the situated individual in question, indeed on how the passion 
or combination of passions manifests itself in the individual’s mind or embodied 
thought and action in relation to the “object”; and the unique situations of the world. 
The basic idea of Laestadius is that passions lay the groundwork for the directedness 
and content of reason, the will, and understanding; therefore, it was consistent for 
Laestadius to depict the notion of faculties of soul in a “formally indicative” manner 
as they will receive their continuously varying phenomenal-vital character based 
on the individual, the situation, passion, etc., in question. Formal indication serves 
as a perspective also for Laestadius notion of Life as the ineffable principle of life 
(lifprincip) that can be reached and studied only through its manifestations in the 
actual and experiential human life and world.
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2  Historical Contextualization
Researchers into Laestadius’ thought have to recognize its multidisciplinary na-
ture, which makes his thought both multilayered and ambiguous. His thought has 
theological, scientific, psychological, philosophical, and political dimensions and 
motifs. Also, the historical context and connections to history of ideas are manifold. 
Currents of history of ideas, local Sámi culture and milieu, the spiritual context of 
1800’s Sweden as well as the deep tradition of religious and theological writings are 
all present and integrated in his theoretical thought.
2.1  The Spiritual Situation in 1800’s North Sweden
In 1686 the first church law after the Reformation was settled in Sweden. It defined 
Sweden as an evangelical nation and required Swedes to confess to the evangelical 
faith. The power of the monarch also extended to the church, and he or she was re-
sponsible for ensuring that God’s law applied to the realm. Foreigners with business 
in the realm who wanted to practice another form of Christianity or another faith 
were bound to and obliged to worship in privacy in their homes.
Already in the first decades of the 18th century, the religious monopoly was threat-
ened by pietistic influences from Germany and later also by “Swedenborgianism.” 
The Swedish scientist and philosopher, Emanuel Swedenborg, founded the New 
Church to which the authorities reacted strongly. In 1726, the Conventicle Edict, 
which prohibited worship in private groups, was enacted. 
Enlightenment and romanticism influenced the spiritual and intellectual life in 
Sweden in 1800’s. Enlightenment and romantic ideas were the intellectual tools 
for reforming national Lutheran religion. On the other hand, pietism had spread 
to Northern Calotte and formed a counterforce for the ethos of enlightenment 
and modernism. Besides its religious intentions and aims within Christianity, early 
Laestadianism has also been interpreted as a reaction to the Enlightenment.68
In 1800 and 1900’s Sweden theology was again looking for help from philosophy 
for integrating the dogmatic system of Lutheran faith. This endeavor was part of the 
political interest in forming unifying conditions in the Kingdom of Sweden. Dur-
ing that time, church and state were not divided into their own regimes as strictly as 
68 Minde 1998, 16–17, 21; Pyysiäinen 2004, 180.
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today, and the church was thus naturally a structural part of the governance of the 
state69. Traditionally the power of the monarch also extended to the church. Even 
if Lutheranism disliked and shunned the use of philosophy in matters of theology 
and faith, soon it was again willing to apply it, first Aristotelianism70 and later in the 
1800’s rationalistic and metaphysical idealism in the spirit of enlightenment and 
romanticism71. The theological standardization of dogmatic views was also needed 
for the diagnosis of religious heresies. Reforming theological doctrines into a more 
coherent whole was seen as a possibility for creating shared ground for a common 
faith and, therefore, a homogeneous nation. Especially Hegel’s philosophy seemed to 
serve national monarchic purposes in 19th century Sweden72.
In the broader picture, the theological result of the political-ideological unification 
process was Lutheran orthodoxy as the official religion of the State. There remained a 
high governmental trust of Lutheran orthodoxy as a unifying and morally enlightening 
religion in Sweden. However, during the 18th and 19th centuries, Swedish church 
history was characterized by several evangelical revival movements.73 Different pietistic 
movements, born in Europe to fight against the (rationalistic) reformations of Lu-
theran orthodoxy, were spreading into Sweden, Norway, and Finland, and most often 
through Denmark from the beginning of the 17th –century74. Major pietistic move-
ments appeared in Northernmost Sweden, Laestadianism in the Torne Valley (inspired 
by L.L. Laestadius, 1800–1861) and Rosenianism in Västerbotten (C.O. Rosenius, 
1816–1868), and on the West Coast, Schartauanism (H. Schartau, 1757–1825).75
It is interesting that 17th –century pietism is often interpreted as a movement that 
paved the way for the Enlightenment and especially romanticism. However, when 
pietism spread into North Calotte, pietistic theologians and philosophers attacked 
Lutheran orthodoxy strongly, as it was seen to combine “unchristian” enlightenment 
rationalistic and metaphysical elements in the Lutheran faith.76
As a result of tensions between the church leadership and the revival movements, 
as well as for theological reasons, some groups left the Church of Sweden and formed 
“free congregations,” despite several laws that were prohibiting secession. 
Within Lutheran orthodoxy, different religions and religious practices caused 
suspicion, so especially pietism remained under the surveillance since Swedenbor-
69 See, Westman 1943.
70 Cf. Knuuttila 2010a.
71 See, Juntunen 1982
72 See, e.g., Osselaer and Maurits 2011, 63–94, 79. See further, Wallgren 1959, 80–101.
73 See further, e.g., Lenhammar 2000; Jarlert 2001; Bexell 2003; Jarlert 2010, 225–241. 
74 See, e.g., Juntunen 1982; Lohi 1989.
75 Especially of Laestadius see, Hasselberg 1935, 107–226.
76 Debates concerned Lutheran confession books, meaning of reason and freedom of will in matters 
of faith, etc.
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gianism. This political-ideological ethos also formed an explanatory background for 
the criminalization and prohibition of religious devotions and services in Sweden. 
The Conventicle Edict of 1726, which prohibited private devotions, was also enforced 
in the 1800’s. The re-emphasis of the Conventicle Edict can be seen as being caused 
by the rise of new pietistic revival movements. Even though the Edict could not 
prevent the pietistic revivals, its reinforcement strongly expressed the attitude toward 
Pietism. It was not their religious “enthusiasm” as such that was under suspicion, 
but rather the possibility that it might lead to “separatism,” i.e., doctrinal innovation 
that threatened the authority of the Lutheran Church and, thus, the whole State77. 
Practically the Conventicle Edict78 (1726–1869) signified that religious devotions 
were not accepted without the presence of an official priest of the Lutheran Church. 
Thus, the freedom of religion or religious tolerance was quite limited in Sweden 
during that time. Everything that differed from the official Lutheran orthodoxy was 
often seen as Christian heresy and an actual threat to a nationally unified state. Only 
in the late 1800’s was greater freedom of religion allowed in Sweden. However, full 
religious freedom was not guaranteed to everyone by law until 1951.
Pietism was the preferred form of Christianity especially among Sámi people79 
partly because it left more space for inner and mystical religious experiences which 
resonated with the Sámi existence and way of life80. Pietistic emphasis on inwardness 
and a personal living faith as well as resistance to both ideological and economical 
currents and changes of early modernity fit well with the Sámi “worldview” and 
situation of life in the 1700’s and 1800’s. Laestadius was Sámi himself and had 
strong sympathies81 for the Sámi people82. It can be assumed that there was also a 
pietism-Sámi –combination, as they both had occasionally separatist, and sometimes 
77 e.g. Sulkunen 1999, 22–26; Pyysiäinen 2004, 181.
78 Laestadius tells that Conventicle Edict was extended to pertain also to the so- called Readers 
(läseriet) which was a more moderate form of pietism. (§§1069–1070, 1073.) However, early 
Laestadianism practiced religious teaching, as it was an important part of school teaching; a part 
of the so-called catechetical teaching which meant that a teacher travelled into villages and the 
homes of people. (e.g. Hallencreutz 1985, 172; Lohi 1989)
79 See, Hallencreutz 1985. Lars Levi Laestadius’ attitude to Saami religion. In Ahlbäck T. (ed.) 
Saami Religion. Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis 12, 170–184.
80 See, e.g., Outakoski 1991; Østtveit Elgvin 2010; Pentikäinen 1995.
81 It is interesting that Laestadius as an official priest of the Lutheran Church considered the 
“pagan” Sámi religion sometimes better and more authentic than the faith of the official Lutheran 
orthodoxy [corrupted by foreign philosophical ideas and losing its concrete experiential basis of 
faith]. For instance, Laestadius’ argues in Mythology (Laestadius 2011) that the Sámi people are 
not worshiping Seitas (Sámi “totems”) as Gods but rather the sphere that Seitas disclosed for 
Sámis; in these parts Laestadius’ also seems to have conceived of Seitas of having vital significances 
for the Sámi people. It could thus be assumed that Laestadius was collecting and writing Sámi 
mythology and defended pietism as the Sámi religion partly in a romantic tone.
82 e.g. Laestadius 2011 (Mythology).
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radical, tendencies that may have increased the governmental-ideological suspicion 
towards pietism and Sámis.83
Altogether, common religion, Lutheran orthodoxy as supported by rationalism 
and metaphysics, was seen as the core of national consistency. In this historical situ-
ation, Laestadius wrote his apology of pietism, arguing that pietism was a theologi-
cally genuine Christianity and practically even better in the sense that it was able to 
awaken the authentic Christian faith and genuine morality. Therefore, Laestadius saw 
that pietism also served the national interests with regard to the unitary and moral 
conditions of the State84. Laestadius seems to think that the Lutheran orthodoxy, 
combined with metaphysical rationalism and reflective speculation, missed the proper 
Christian understanding of man and, as a consequence, also the full understanding 
of faith and God. 
Laestadius claimed that it was actually rationalism and speculative metaphysics 
that led to the mystification of Christian faith, because both ignore the experiential 
and emotional basis of faith. Laestadius seemed to be warning authorities in the 
Church and state that Lutheranism was in danger of being replaced by rationalistic 
religion and thus losing both its civilizing and spiritual-moral significance. (§1082.) 
Without a living religiosity, “politics becomes its most sacred interests,” which will 
lead to violations against the state, and Laestadius thus opposed the secular politi-
cization of religion. (§1085, see also §§1158, 1189.) 
Altogether, Laestadius attacked the Church harshly, stating that pietism “could 
breathe life into the spiritual cadaver” (§1155) as he saw that pietism was rather 
living Christianity while the faith of the State Church is already “dead” and “use-
less” because it does not “provoke” moral habits and a living Christianity among the 
citizens. The Church had traditionally played an educational role which was naturally 
emphasized in the spirit of enlightenment and romanticism. Thus, Laestadius points 
to the original task of the Church, saying, “We have many educational institutions 
aimed at the memory and intellect, but none aimed at heart. The church, which was 
to be an educational institution for the heart, is transformed into an educational 
institution for the belly.” (§1075.)
It is evident that Laestadius’ work had a political dimension. The opposition of 
the Conventicle Edict, the Church’s support for the government’s alcohol policy and 
hostility against the priests who preached for sobriety85, and the general apology of 
North Scandinavian pietism can be seen as the main political motifs of The Lunatic. 
83 See e.g., Zorgdrager (2000, 188–207) and Franzén (1999, 24–29) for further analysis about 
political and spiritual situation in the confrontation of West and Sámi people (and Laestadius’ 
role in it). Lehtola (2004, 30) has pointed out that the rejection of state religious authority by 
the Sámi was partly a response to the Sweden had over Sámi territories.
84 Laestadius 2015 (The Lunatic); Joensuu 2013; Juntunen 1982.
85 Cf. Boëthius 1952, 92, 137, 273, 276.
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The apologetic intention of The Lunatic becomes evident all through the book. The 
last words of the book are even addressed to the State’s leaders: 
“But the world is strange. Trajana, the best monarch in the world, persecutes 
the Christians! Charles XI, an excellent monarch, persecutes Pietism! If 
the monarchs of the world ever have their eyes opened, they themselves 
will realize the folly of intolerance. Then they will not be blind tools of the 
bloodthirsty inquisition!!” (§1630.)
Laestadius states that religious intolerance is also bad religious leadership, which 
actually gains enthusiasm that later backfires against the leaders and institutions of 
the nation in the end. (§§1073, 1074.) 
2.2  The Rise Against Metaphysical Rationalism
Beside its political-apologetic motifs, The Lunatic had also broader theoretical –theo-
logical, anthropological and even philosophical – intentions. Here it can be asked 
what were Laestadius’ motifs for criticize rationalism, transcendental philosophy, and 
speculative metaphysics, and, what did he sees as an alternative for the prevailing 
currents. In this respect, the general ethos of enlightenment and romantic ideas and 
their presence in Swedish spiritual and intellectual life became the background for 
Laestadius’ thought86. In a wider picture, the shift from the earlier Aristotelian para-
digm to enlightenment and the Romantic era, had enormous cultural and spiritual 
impacts. The autonomous and individual use of reason signified an emancipation 
of the views interpreted as representing prejudice and superstition. External guid-
ance and the domination of reason as well as superstition were more often seen as 
religious87. Thus, the exhortation of the individual use of reason, as detached from 
all authorities, formed a common chant of enlightenment and modernity. Within 
the intellectual atmosphere of enlightenment, the idea was formed that the human 
being does not have to build up his worldview on religious revelation, but rather 
could trust and lean on the light of reason. 
86 In Sweden, Enlightenment ideas colored both the spiritual and academic life. Aristotelian 
philosophy was traditionally harnessed into the service of theology, but the enlightenment had 
pressed Aristotelian tradition out of the center. The closer union between theology and philosophy 
that prevailed in the middle Ages begun to crack and get new dimensions. This signified a 
critical relationship with Aristotelian thought on the communal nature of human life. Instead, 
the autonomy, individuality, individual freedom, and independent use of reason were strongly 
emphasized in the Enlightenment. See, e.g., Keskitalo 1997.
87 Keskitalo 1997, 23
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The word of the Bible as a main Canon was weakened concerning both the rela-
tionship between man and God and man and existence. Also, Kant’s ideas of “the 
maturity” and independent use of reason are enlightenment rationalistic notions. 
The self-defining (and self-justifying) subject was further theoretically developed 
and elaborated in enlightenment rationalism; now, however, the basic problem was 
how to reconcile the experiential faith based on revelation with the re-formed ideas 
of reason and freedom, or with the whole transcendental domain of reason as being 
relatively distinct from corporeal being in the world. 
In general, Laestadius carries out a broad, partly explicit, critique of metaphysical 
rationalism with respect to both the theological and the anthropological theories. 
Cartesian dualism and rationalism, as well as further metaphysical-rationalistic specu-
lations of Spinoza, Leibniz, etc., about being, God, trinity, reality, and ethics loomed 
in the background. Descartes’ philosophy had laid the new basis for western thought 
and intellectualism. Descartes had explicitely argued that the body is something 
completely different from consciousness and something that consciousness could 
also do without.88 Building on that view Cartesian tradition identified the field of 
prima philosophia with the indubitable sphere of a disembodied consciousness. By 
conceiving the subject of consciousness as a mundane being, the empiricist tradition 
proceeds in the opposite direction. Whereas rationalism ultimately opened the door 
to absolute idealism that reduced the body to consciousness of the body, empiricism 
eventually culminated in a type of naturalism that on the contrary reduced conscious-
ness to the body (or, to a certain locus in the body, e.g. the brain).89
Enlightenment ethos and its philosophical ideas re-formulated theological doc-
trines that were more suitable for the demands of human reason and were called 
neology on the continent and deism in England. In general, God was believed to 
be reached through intellect as the “highest Being”. One of the most influential 
figures was Christian Wolff (1679–1754) who laid the groundwork for rationalistic 
philosophical theology. Neology and deism were harnessed for political use, as they 
became, especially in France, the official rationalistic religion of the State90.
In The Lunatic Laestadius generally uses the name “philosophers” to refer to the 
wide range of philosophical rationalistic, idealistic metaphysicians and theologians, 
and other intellectuals who held rationalistic or idealistic metaphysical expressions 
as their views. Laestadius was familiar with philosophical ideas naturally through 
88 Taipale 2009, 5. “I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.” (Descartes 1984, 54, 
119; Descartes 1970, 87.); “the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, 
[…] and even if the body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is.” (Descartes 1967, 
101.); “this I which is thinking is an immaterial substance with no bodily element”. (Descartes 
1970, 84.)
89 Taipale 2009, 6.
90 Cf. Juntunen 1982, 112–120.
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his studies at the University of Uppsala (1820–1825) but he referred to philosophers 
mainly through the commentaries of Petrelli’s Psychologie91 and Heinroth’s Anthro-
pologien92. Laestadius often referred polemically to Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Fichte and Goethe. They were often Laestadius’ targets as philosophical 
rationalists and metaphysicians even if there were certain similarities between their 
thought that could be found. He also used the term “philosopher” when referring to 
Petrelli, whose study book delivered his interpretations of philosophical ideas. Yet 
the name “philosopher” is also used for theological metaphysicians Laestadius read 
such as Hans Lassen Martensen, Möhler,93 Ignelli94 and Semler (§1147)95 whom he 
also called “free thinkers96.” 
Behind all the critique of the rationalism of famous thinkers are various dogmatic-
theological questions concerning human nature, the role of intellect and free will, and 
the threat of pantheism and panpneumatism.97 More broadly, he expresses general 
disagreement against mere intellectual speculation which leans on metaphysical 
reflection both in anthropology and theology. His conviction was that enlighten-
ment rationalism and later romantic metaphysical speculation that was based on it 
constituted a fatal wrong track for theology and anthropology.98
Laestadius’ academic studies and work as a botanist, priest, and ethnographic and 
theological anthropologist belong to the era of romanticism. Romanticism is often 
seen as a counterforce to the enlightenment emphases on the significance of human 
91 Petrelli, Carl Magnus Joachim. Menniskosjälens natur: Försök till psychologie 1–2. Lindköping 
1845–1846.
92 Heinroth, J. C. A. Lärobok I Anthropologien. Öfversatt af E. Rancken. Stockholm, 1837.
93 Möhler, J. A. Sympolik eller framställningar af de dogmatiska motsatserna emellan Katoliker och 
Protestanter enligt deras offentliga bekännelsekrifter. Översättning. Norrköping, 1842.
94 Ignell, N 1842 and 1846. Grunddragen af den Christliga Sedeläran. Band 1–2. Stockholm. And 
Ignell, N. 1850. Christendomen Huvudläror. Populära föreläsningar. Stockholm.
95 Laestadius mentions also Schleiermacher, but does not seem to be familiar with his thought.
96 General critic is that these thinkers have wrong idea of human being when using the notions of 
substance and essentia, and do not conceive the passional or sinful character of human personhood, 
and by their intellectual emphases do not come down to the lived experiences of ordinary people. 
97 Cf. Kristiansen 2004, 77.
98 Laestadius does not explicitly debate with philosophers, but by forming his holistic theory and 
defining his own philosophical notions, he clearly pointed out where his views differed. For 
Laestadius, the anthropological and theological critique went naturally hand in hand because of 
his holistic insight. He did not distinguish between the different aspects of human life, especially 
the vitalist idea of man and the theological insights concerning faith and spirituality. This is 
partly comprehensible as the moral, spiritual, psychological or physiological health and wellbeing 
were not strictly separated spheres within the common cultural ethos of 18th century. Basically 
because of his holistic insight Laestadius strongly opposes dualistic and rationalistic, as well as 
philosophies and theologies that bend over speculative and idealistic ways of thought. See further 
Caputo 2006 about the relationship between theology and philosophy, and about the influence 
of enlightenment rationalism.
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reason and autonomy. It is true that the emphasis were shifted back to emotion and 
human communality and historicity. However, in the broader picture, romanticism 
kept the rationalistic emphases of enlightenment and combined them with more 
idealistic-metaphysical systems. The philosophy of “transcendental subjectivity” first 
determined by Descartes, but then fully elaborated by Kant (both for epistemologi-
cal and life-philosophical purposes) opened up the possibility for romantic natural 
philosophy (naturalphilosophi) and absolute transcendental metaphysics. In the 
humanistic sciences particularly Hegel’s philosophy of spirit (Geisteswissenchaft), 
but also Schelling and Herder’s philosophies came into fashion99. Hegel’s philosophy 
influenced the intellectual and spiritual life of Sweden strongly, and his ideas were 
put into the service of the nation.
In the times of romanticism, European intellectual life was longing for the lost 
original unity found within original Divinity. Theology led often into the abstract 
philosophy of spirit within which the Christian idea of God was undergoing trans-
formation. The romantic-idealistic conceptions of man and God were often seen as 
a threat to genuine Christianity. Indeed, Laestadius wrote: 
“In these enlightened times … we have acquired entirely different under-
standing of world. New social conditions have arisen with the ascendancy 
of the Enlightenment, to the point that these new times demand new 
reformation … Enlightenment and civilization is the mare on which rea-
son rides. But it is almost too late to construct a religion of reason, since 
the world has been Christianized for almost two thousand years.” (§545.)
Within theology, Hegel’s philosophy spread through Sweden, thanks to the work 
of the Danish theologian and philosopher, Hans Lassen Martensen, a recognized 
Hegelian, who taught philosophy and whose work was translated into Swedish. 
Martensen’s dogmatic insights, philosophical theology, and moral philosophy were 
formed mainly from Hegel’s metaphysical rationalism (Idea, Absolute, Dialectics). 
Martensen was also Sören Kierkegaard’s teacher, and it is commonly known that 
Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel and metaphysical rationalism was elaborated on in 
relation to Martensen’s Hegelian philosophy and teaching. 
Laestadius also read Martensen’s work and elaborated on his critique of ration-
alist-metaphysical theology with a special reference to Martensen’s thought. It is 
noteworthy as well that through Martensen there was a genuine link between the 
two influential Northernmost pietistic philosophers, Kierkegaard and Laestadius. 
We can point out many similarities between Kierkegaard and Laestadius’ thought. 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on subjectivity, the idea that subjective truth does not demand 
99 Cf. Juntunen 1982, 41.
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objective evidence, the distinction between the stages of existence (esthetic, ethical, 
and religious) and the subjective “Leap of faith,”100 can be compared to Laestadius’ 
emphases on the precedence of “subjective consciousness,” the conceptions of re-
ligious modes like “carefreeness (sorglöshet),” “awakened state,” “death faith,” and 
“living faith,” culminating in the idea of “testimony of feeling” as evidence of a heart 
but without objective proof. The more specific quest on whether these similarities 
were constituted from a shared pietistic background or derived from a shared critical 
relationship to Martensen and Hegel is a task for another study.101 
Altogether, it can be stated that Laestadius’ critique of Martensen, particularly as a 
metaphysical rationalist, is one of the main intentions of Laestadius’ Lunatic102. How-
ever, instead of an explicit Martensen-critique the holistic critique of metaphysical 
rationalism is inscribed into the whole system of The Lunatic. Through this focus, the 
critique is expanded to pertain to the whole range of academic and spiritual scholars 
who followed the currents of rationalism and idealistic metaphysics. Laestadius’ 
holistic critique pertained also to governmental metaphysical idealism; for instance 
his polemics also tackled Jacob Boström’s (a philosophy professor at the University 
of Uppsala) speculative social philosophy and anthropology.103
In 1800’s Sweden, during the expeditious rise of natural science, a general discus-
sion of the relationship between natural science and metaphysics took place. Did 
metaphysics have significance during a time of natural science? For what purposes 
were metaphysical speculations and theories necessary? This discussion derived its 
roots from the classical problem between empiricism and rationalism. We should 
highlight that Laestadius’ theoretical thought was particularly attached to these 
problematics, as he generally denied the validity of metaphysical rationalism, while 
simultaneously as a natural scientists, he connected his anthropology and philosophy 
of religion to a natural scientifically oriented medical vitalism. Actually Laestadius’ 
endeavor to deny the validity of metaphysical rationalism or transcendentalism and 
ground his theory in vitalism for his philosophy of religion constituted the context 
within which his elaborations then were formed. 
In regard to the relations between developing natural science and new metaphysical 
elaborations, we can note that Locke’s (1632–1704) and David Hume’s (1711–1776) 
empiricisms posed crucial problems of the possibility of obtaining absolute knowledge 
of nature by empirical and mere rational means. Hume claimed that certain concep-
100 See, Kierkegaard 1974 (Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Orig. 1846); Cf. Liehu 1990.
101 See, e.g., Stewart (ed.) 2012. (Hans Lassen Martensen: Theologian, Philosopher and Social Critic.) 
and Stewart 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph Series: Kierkegaard and His Contemporaries: 
The Culture of Golden Age Denmark). The more detailed analysis of the relationship between 
Kierkegaard, Martensen, and Laestadius is outside the frame of this study. 
102 See, Zidbäck 1932; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982.
103 See, e.g. Boström, C. J. 1859. Grundlinier till den philosophiska statsläran. Uppsala.
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tualized phenomena that we lean on in our everyday empiric perception proved to 
be problematic; especially causality was such a phenomenon104. Further, Locke posed 
a similar kind of problem105. Even though the problems highlighted by empiricists 
did reveal their restricted concept of experience, the ideas had an enormous impact 
on philosophy and intensified the controversy between empiricism and rationalism. 
The relationship between empiricism and rationalism was crucially important for 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).
Kant started to formulate his transcendental insight that sought to synthesize 
empirical and rationalistic approaches. Kant’s solution was simply that all perceptions 
are possible only through the schematic capability, categories and concepts of mind106. 
As is well known, Immanuel Kant formulated a satisfactory synthesis of empiricism 
and rationalism in his transcendental idealism where empiric perception is structured 
and mediated through categories and the concepts of mind which produce the initial 
transcendental conditions for real and possible empirical perception107.
Now, jumping over all the logical problems and their solutions in Kant’s tran-
scendentalism, we do notice how transcendental philosophy orientates philosophical 
enterprise; it is a way of thought that turns to the subjective sphere in order to find 
a satisfactory explanation as proof and evidence of the thing or condition as it is for 
our experience. In this sense, Kant formulated a broader concept of experience that 
pays attention to empirical sense perception, but also to the characteristics of the 
rational capabilities of mind.108 
However, it seems evident that Kantian transcendentalism, when emphasizing the 
capacities of “transcendental mind or reason” abstracts the analysis of the empirically 
given experiential phenomena and leads to idealistic theorizing; the transcendental 
sphere of mind is found, and philosophical reflection turns to a focus for exploring 
the laws of thinking mind. This transcendental turn could be conceived as a further 
elaboration of Cartesian subject-ontology or epistemology. The road is then open to 
104 Hume argued that when seeing, for instance, the moving ball hitting the other static ball and 
making it move, we presuppose that the moving ball causes the movement. But what is this cause 
or causality to which we refer? What we perceive are regularities and different events and changes 
in that situation, but we do not perceive the causality itself. In regard to the epistemological 
question, it seemed that man cannot trust empirical perception or rational capability. How can 
we then explain the experiential reality that is present to us and that we trust in our actions?
105 How can we generally define a triangle by empirically comparing different triangles? It seems that 
empirical perception alone cannot constitute the “image” of a general triangle; it is impossible to 
draw so that it pertains to all variable triangles.
106 See, e.g. Määttänen 2013, 78–87. For instance, we have a scheme of triangles in such a way that 
“it is three points that are connected with the line,” or we have a concept of causality through 
which we perceive all causal effects in the world.
107 Kant 1998. (Critique of Pure Reason) Available at www: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/
kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf
108 Kant 1998
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phenomenalism, methodological solipsism, etc., and the lived existential-ontological, 
or psycho-physiological, world-relation is bypassed as only secondary in favor of 
transcendental epistemological interests. Generally speaking, this line of thought 
led to the classical tradition of philosophy with Hegel and his phenomenology of 
Spirit as its end point: 
“The redefinition of ‘anthropology’ and the refocus of attention on the 
questions related to ‘natural history of man’ in latter part of Enlightenment 
reflected this new level of concern. Kant, for example, inaugurated his own 
lectures on anthropology in 1772, splitting these off his own lectures on 
physical geography. Furthermore, he was concerned to distance his project 
of transcendental and ‘moral’ anthropology from the growing ethnographic 
and physical approach generated by the work of the philosophical physi-
cians and natural historians.” (Sloan 2007, 930.) 
Henceforth Kant was seen as the one who drew a distinction between the transcen-
dental and physiological domains of study. Transcendental philosophy was distracted 
from physiological research: Kant emphasized that research into the matters of soul 
and mind did not belong to the field of physiology, but rather to transcendental 
philosophy.109 Thus, medical physiology was philosophically limited to a mere study 
of organism, organs, and their functions as such. Kantian distinction influenced the 
general ethos in philosophy and later in psychology and anthropology wherein the 
physiological study of the human organism was not applicable in anthropology. 
Kant’s denial of using physiological knowledge in matters of the soul made a strong 
impact on the multidisciplinary investigation of human being and human life. The 
distinction between the domains of moral philosophy and the philosophy of mind 
was now forming (Locke, Kant).110 
On the other hand, Kant seemed to empower common belief for the power of 
reason, both to reach and gain knowledge and also orient oneself morally via reason 
and free will. In general, Kant’s intention was to limit sense-based empiricism and 
draw the limits of reason precisely in order to make “room for faith” but his ideas 
simultaneously indicated an intellectualization of religious faith and ethics111. Within 
109 e.g,. Hagner 1992. From that distinction, the romantic idea of the parallelism between soul and 
nature can also be interpreted to be born. Schelling is one of the most famous romantic parallelists 
and natural philosophers whose thought became into fashion. Medical [sense]physiology, natural 
philosophy and transcendental philosophy formed a rich intellectual field in 1800’s Europe 
(encounter between natural science and metaphysics).
110 See further, Reill 2005. (Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment (1). Berkeley: University of 
California Press.)
111 Kant 1998, Critique of Pure Reason (orig. 1781); Cf. Kristiansen 2004; Keskitalo 1997.
46 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
the emphasis of epistemological interests, faith was more often conceived as a matter 
of individual and transcendental consciousness. Even if Kant’s early work dealt with 
physiology and anthropology112 he later distanced his thought clearly from physi-
ological anthropological research, and thus he shifted the soul and the questions 
concerning both faith and morality to the domain of transcendental philosophy 
and ethics. This shift created a problem for how to talk about a transcendent God 
without restricting oneself to merely the practical reason and ethics of the categori-
cal imperative113. It followed then from his epistemology and metaphysics that the 
essence, animated nature of embodied human beings, consciousness, and henceforth 
religiosity could not be approached within empirical means or by emphasizing the 
physiological corporeality of human beings (schematicism, categories, concepts were 
transcendental prerequisites for meaning and being whatsoever). Henceforth, Kant 
coincidentally undermined the aspects of factual corporeal experientiality and world-
relation within anthropological research, ethics, and theology114. 
Contrary to the emphasis on rationality and transcendental metaphysics Laestadius 
points to the direction where he was heading, i.e., “man’s true nature cannot be per-
ceived as thought, but as drive and feeling.” (§699) This claim is exactly the opposite 
claim to what we find in Martensen’s Moralfilosofiens system (p. 13), namely, that “man’s 
true nature cannot be perceived as drive and feeling, but as thought.” (§§699, 700.)
Laestadius had clear opinions about certain philosophers’ ways of proceeding: 
“The philosopher has created for himself an entirely wrong image of the 
relationship of the rational soul to the body. He cannot accept the physical-
psychological opinions. He considers reason as the ruling principle within 
man. Although he assumes that all faculties of the soul are autonomous 
and mutually independent, he nevertheless considers reason to be the 
most important and claims that moral ennoblement should proceed from 
reason.” (§698.)
112 See further, Kant Immanuel 1995-. Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Translated 
and edited by Guyer, P. and Wood, A. W. Cambridge University Press. (e.g. Gedanken von der 
wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte, 1749); Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des 
Himmels (1755); Untersuchungen über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der Natürlichen Teologie 
und der Moral, 1764); De Mundi Sensibilis Atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis, 1770).
113 Kristiansen 2004.
114 Cf. Taipale 2009, 5–20. Taipale states that Kantian philosophy orients according to “transcendental 
cognition: Kant investigates the general ‘conditions of possibility’ for empirical experience, and 
thus thematizes the ultimate consciousness with a priori structures. … he never constructed a 
general and concise argument about the constitutive, transcendental significance of embodiment, 
and in his main work he explicitly considers the body as a mere external thing: ‘I distinguish my 
own existence, that of a thinking being, form other things outside me (to which also my body 
also belongs). (Kant 1998b, 409)’.” (Taipale 2009, 6.)
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However, not all the disciplines did followed transcendental philosophy. For 
instance, young biology and physiological medicine placed their focus strictly on 
the organism and pursued to find ways to explain organic function and also human 
beings by different [anti-intellectualistic] means. 
From the present day perspective, it can be seen that the medical physiological 
science of 1700’s within which vitalism was elaborated formed an important counter 
theory to Kant’s transcendentalism, or in other words, Kant’s transcendental ideal-
ism was formed as a critical relation to empiric and physiological research of soul 
or subjectivity. I see it important in regard to this study to point out the shift in the 
history of ideas within which the phenomena of morals and spirituality were moved 
from the empiric and anatomical studies of medical physiology into transcendental 
philosophy due to the strong influence of Kant’s transcendentalism115. 
The medical science of man that holds a holistic approach to human beings, 
including vital movements, organs, organic functions, cultural factors, religious and 
spiritual dimensions, the environment, natural-geographical conditions, was margin-
alized first because of the efficacy of positive explanatory power or rationalistic and 
mechanical thought in natural science and in medicine, and later because of the pre-
vailing transcendental philosophical and idealistic ethos. However, in medical circles 
Kantian notions were quite soon replaced by the notions of F. J. Gall (1758–1828) 
who proposed a theory of different cognitive functions that were closely related to 
specific parts of the brain, and stated that natural science maintained its own distinct 
insight into the human mind as organic function116.
Enlightenment rationalism and its emphasis of reason and metaphysical reflection 
led often to a mechanistic worldview and idea of man. With regard to the idea of 
man’s rationalistic dualism led to conceiving of the human being as analogical to a 
complex machine. Within theological metaphysics, the world as a whole was more 
or less approached as being a complex clock-work. Rationalistic metaphysics and 
rising natural science explored the laws of the whole mechanist system that was set 
in motion by God, but right after creation was left to its own fate. In human life, 
reason was seen as an initiator, and it formed the central foundation for criticism 
in the area of religion. Enlightenment ideas signified – also in Sweden – both the 
criticism of the theological doctrines and belief in the power of human reason and 
[natural] virtue. Thus faith, as it related to God, was more often seen as constituted 
through reason, not mediated through emotion, experience, revelation and miracles.
115 Even if Laestadius’ was familiar with the transcendental philosophy, rationalism and holistic 
metaphysical systems emerging from that tradition, he chose to attach his theory to earlier medical 
thought, because he saw that it coincided better with actual lived experience and the idea of man 
and the notion of God given in the scriptures.
116 Hagner 1992
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Laestadius was aware of the natural philosophie that was constructed on the 
grounds of Kant’s philosophy but also seemed to consider it as being way too intel-
lectualistic and idealistic leading to pantheism.117 He neither followed the transcen-
dental philosophical metaphysics nor the natural philosophical Hegelian tradition, 
but rather held tight to the theological and Biblical tradition, explaining it using the 
vitalist psychology and philosophy.
Laestadius recognized the danger alienating of transcendentalism and metaphysi-
cal rationalism. As an educated natural scientist and, above all, a passionate botanist, 
Laestadius had a genuine interest in and love of plants and the phenomena of nature. 
Nature was something real and actual for Laestadius, nothing schematically or con-
ceptually constituted as phenomenal experience. Plants were unique in nature and 
in his hands; the smell and touch of the petals of the flowers immediately disclosed 
the existence of a unique organism, even if only partly, thereby never revealing its 
deepest secrets. We can imagine that Laestadius was simultaneously interested in the 
empirical and transcendental character of the organism itself. Contrary to enlight-
enment rationalism, transcendental idealism, and romantic metaphysics, Laestadius 
found medical vitalism to be a more plausible ground for beginning to elaborate his 
understanding of organic and spiritual existence and justifying the pietistic ideas of 
man and religiosity118.
Given the general depiction of Laestadius’ background and situation, we can now 
summarize both by highlighting that Laestadius’ critical attitude toward the prevail-
ing currents had both anthropological and theological dimensions. Laestadius saw 
that the modern philosophical and metaphysical understanding of human beings, 
life, faith, and God was alienated from experiential reality and the experiential basis 
of faith. In the theological dimension Laestadius resisted the national interests to 
empower Lutheran orthodoxy by means of metaphysical rationalism as a State re-
ligion. Philosophical-theological and anthropological reflection were influenced by 
rationalistic, metaphysical and wolffian philosophy and the light of reason and virtuous 
life, as noted above. In the religious dimension Laestadius found pietistic emphases 
of faith of the heart and a living God more truthful than the intellectual emphases 
of Lutheran orthodoxy. In relation to the prevailing anthropology, Laestadius found 
vitalist physiology, philosophy, and psychology more truthful as they all clearly denied 
the autonomy of rational soul and emphasized the vital movements of corporeality, 
physiological, but simultaneously animated, organism as a basis for human exist-
ence, consciousness, morality and spirituality. Laestadius also saw the “physiological 
ground” offered by the prevailing medical vitalism as consistent medical knowledge, 
fitting together well with the Biblical and Lutheran understanding of human beings. 
117 See further on the relationship between vitalism and Kant in Reill 2005
118 Joensuu 2013
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Laestadius saw that rationalistic and idealistic philosophy as applied in theology was 
the actual reason for the mystification of Christian faith (§546, 553); intellectualistic 
emphases do not help people understand the experiential psycho-physiological basis 
of man and actual Christian faith. For Laestadius, metaphysical rationalism led to a 
false optimism in religion and theology and did not enable one to grasp the embod-
ied human condition properly. It also constituted an illusion of religious, scientific, 
technological, cultural, and political optimism and disconnected man from the proper 
relation to nature and life in the world (§1099, 1102, 1105, Cf. §1120).119 According to 
Laestadius, 18th century rationalistic reformation was revolutionary and political and did 
not consider human nature, morality, and essence or religion deeply enough (§1132).
A denial of the metaphysical rationalistic explanations of the human soul, con-
sciousness and ego and the grounding of his own theory in medical vitalism were 
Laestadius’ basic philosophical issues that he dealt with in detail all along in The 
Lunatic, and therefore, I return to this subject continuously in my analysis.
2.3  Toward Medical Vitalism and Psychology
Laestadius wrote The Lunatic during the time when natural science120 and philosophy 
progressed in many fields. Linnéan influence at the University of Uppsala in 1800’s 
was strong, and his taxonomy was in use then as it is today. Natural historical and 
natural philosophical interests, especially in botanical theories, were notably present 
in Uppsala during the time of Laestadius’ studies in 1820–1825. Much happened in 
biology, medical science, zoology, and different fields of physics. Darwin’s evolution 
theory was not published yet, but ideas of change and the variety of organisms are 
being presented. Climate, geographical location, the environment, and surrounding 
conditions of living beings are generally conceived as central factors of the biological 
functions of life. Laestadius’ botanical theories leaned on these ideas and he even 
insisted that certain Northern plants did not constitute an owned species, but rather 
geographical variations of particularly general species.
119 See Heidegger’s analysis of the essence of technology for further analysis: Heidegger 1993b, 
311–314.
120 Among the numerous references to philosophers and influential persons in Western political, 
cultural, religious, and scientific history, we find many references to contemporary scientific 
inventions from Laestadius’ The Lunatic. Laestadius refers to the law of constancy, embryology 
with speculations concerning the emergence of self-consciousness in fetus, and the hypothetical 
theory of the determination of sex within which Laestadius’ offers his own hypothesis for the 
origin of hermafrodicy (e.g. §163). He even seems to hold it as natural that life exists on other 
planets as well (“inhabitants of other planets”) (e.g. §1598). Together with his strict commitment 
to physiology and medical vitalism, Laestadius was an exceptionally open -minded religious 
scientist and philosopher, both a successor and a critic of enlightenment and romantic thought.
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Progress in anatomical and physiological research offers a new insight into human 
organism which modifies the prevailing ideas of the human soul or actually turned 
back closer to the more traditional Aristotelian idea of soul. Organic functions, neural 
systems, blood vessels, brain investigations, and many empirical observations inspired 
discussions on the human organism, body, soul, human behavior, and spirituality. The 
relationship between brain and soul was widely discussed and the soul was often seen 
to be located in the brain. Knowledge of anatomical and physiological research was 
used in explaining the human soul, and thus, also in this same direction, the monopoly 
of theology on the matters of soul was weakening. In the situation where medical 
science with its many debates progressed, romantic natural philosophy, together 
with idealistic insights of an animated nature, became the prevailing current; also 
psychology as a distinct discipline was emerging.121 In its dawning days, psychology 
was naturally considered a “border-science” as it was still searching for its own field 
located between other different disciplines.
Vitalist thought was also common in Uppsala also through its direct epistolary 
connections with Montpellier, the center of vitalism as suggested by Williams: 
“The unfolding of Sauvages’s career illuminates the existence of a shared 
Protestant medical culture – sustained chiefly by epistolary connection with 
Uppsala, London, Halle, Geneva, and Lyons – that linked Montpellier to 
physicians throughout Europe who refused the dualism of mind and mat-
ter, soul and body, that undergirded the mechanist medicine articulated by 
followers of Descartes.”122
121 From the 1600’s to 1800’s there was growing interest in physiological and anatomical research 
as well as natural philosophy (naturphilosophie) strengthening in the intellectual life of Europe. 
Philosophical problems and elaborations were often connected to new ideas and views on human 
physiology and anatomy. The problem of the substantiality and location of soul had arisen when 
materialistic medicine began to focus on human embodiment. The complex history of anatomical 
research brought forth new views of the origins of the movements of the soul and action of body, 
and these conclusions started to compete with the accepted philosophical ideas of autonomy 
and distinct soul. Partly on that basis, psychology was born in the 1800’s. The ideas of human 
physiology and a living organism were applied to question the nature of the soul. It was no 
longer only theology that could question and theorize on the human soul. It is understandable 
that this confrontation between traditional theology (considered as metaphysics) and modern 
physics (psychology and anthropology) new psychological views and theological understanding 
led to many debates. The questions about the nature of the soul, emotions, passions, instincts, 
drives, and the unconsciousness were again lifted up in the cross-examination of these different 
disciplines. See, e.g. Åberg 1997/1964.
122 Williams 2003, 9–10.
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Laestadius’ became acquainted with vitalism in his early botanical work123. Further, 
in his work on Sámi history and mythology, Laestadius explained the Sámi beliefs and 
spirituality partially in vitalistic tone124. Also, Laestadius criticized the mathematical 
and mechanistic approach in matters of spirituality, religiosity, and psychological 
phenomena, a topic he had already dealt with in Mythology.
Laestadius personally became properly acquainted with vitalist thought by 
studying vitalist physicians. After writing Mythology, he turned to “more important” 
questions of religion, which finally lead to the birth of his manuscript, The Lunatic. 
Therein Laestadius names several vitalists and romantic psychologists as authorita-
tive sources that he relied upon to elaborate his theory.125 Laestadius also admitted 
explicitly leaning on enlightenment “doctors,” “psychologists,” and “physicians” and 
their notions of the soul. He referred to these scientific authors and highlighted their 
psycho-physiological approach and considered it as more plausible than the position 
of metaphysical rationalism held by philosophers, rationalists, metaphysicians, and 
“rationalistic priests”. Therefore, Laestadius can be posited in the very broad sense in 
the scene between mechanism and vitalism and the field of vitalistic anthropology.
In line with the basic enlightenment trend, Laestadius elaborated an anthropologi-
cal theory to ground his theological views; his anthropology is theoretically based on 
vitalistic medical thoughts on enlightenment, deriving from the Montpellier vitalist 
tradition. Laestadius mentions that his most important scientific authors126 were in 
enlightenment medicine, such as the anatomist and father of histology, Xavier Bichat 
(1771–1802); the father of psychosomatics, Johann C. A. Heinroth127 (1773–1843) 
and Carl Gustav Carus (1789 – 1869), known as a developer of the earliest formula-
tions of psychoanalytic unconsciousness128; and Felix Descuret (1795–1872) known 
as a physician and doctor who interpreted physiology and the theory of passions in 
 
123 Laestadius 1839 (Loca Parallela Plantarum); Franzén 1973.
124 Laestadius 2011 (Mythology) 
125 It is assumed that Laestadius was introduced to French medical vitalism by the French explorers 
for whom he worked as a guide and an expert on the Sámi culture and flora of North Calotte. Yet 
it is also possible that Laestadius became familiar with vitalism in his student years and studied 
the medical and psychological literature used in The Lunatic already at Uppsala 1820–1825. Cf. 
Bäcksbacka 1938.
126 The philosophical and philosophical theology sources for Laestadius were primarily Hans Lassen 
Martensen’s (1808–1884), C. M. J. Petrelli’s (1806–1889) and Marcus Wöldik’s (1699 – 1750) 
writings and with whom he discussed and that offered him interpretations of philosophical 
thought and problems. See more on Laestadius’ sources from Juntunen 1982, Chapter 2.1.1.; 
Åberg 1997/1964; Zidbäck 1937.
127 See further on Heinroth, e.g., Allen 2009. (Revels in Madness: Insanity in Medicine and Literature. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.)
128 Further on Carus see, e.g. Brown 2014, 5, 6 and 75; Bell 2010, 156–172.
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a spiritual and religious direction129. All these authors developed anatomical re-
search and medical psychology to create theories of vitalism and psychosomatics 
from which Laestadius adopted these central ideas and “guides” for his own theory 
and purposes:
”These are the psychological ’guides’ used by the author, and while he has 
been unable to approve of any of these works, he has nevertheless found 
in them some starting points and points of reference in his efforts to reach 
an accurate comprehension of spiritual matters.” (The Lunatic, Foreword 
p.15–16.)
Laestadius especially followed Bichat’s theory and vitalist principles in his de-
pictions of the principle of life, vital functions and passions, and he also attached 
these concepts to theological ideas, and re-interpreted them in an existential and 
phenomenological direction. Especially Bichat’s book Research on Life and Death that 
gathered the most important notions of vitalist philosophy was the main source of 
Laestadius’ vitalist theorizing.130 Laestadius read Bichat closely and grounded his 
anthropology and philosophy of religion on his thought131. Xavier Bichat was linked 
to the Montpellier tradition through his father, who studied with Barthez and also 
took his medical degree from Montpellier in 1769.132
The Mechanism-Vitalism –debate formed during the Enlightenment and Ro-
mantic era and was partly related to the more general schism between speculative 
metaphysics and natural scientific thinking. Descartes’ thought had laid forth a strong 
basis for mechanistic-rationalistic anthropology. Newton’s successful investigations 
inspired and strengthened a mechanical worldview, which was dominant thinking 
in medical science, 
“that the physical body is a complex mechanism which operates in accord-
ance with the laws of matter and motion. It was assumed that willed and 
129 In Laestadius’ use: Descuret, J. B. F. 1847. Passionerna uti deras förhållanden till sjukdomarna, 
lagarne, och religionen. Översättning av A. Ekström. Norrköping.
130 Bichat’s Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort was originally published in 1800. In 
Laestadius’ use: Bichat 1805. Undersökning om Lifwet och Döden. Stockholm: Öfversatt af Gustaf 
Wallenberg. In this current study I have used the same edition as Laestadius and the English 
translation: Bichat 1815. Physiological Researches on Life and Death. Translated by F. Gold. 
London: Longman. WWW-access available for several editions: e.g. https://collections.nlm.nih.
gov/catalog/nlm:nlmuid-2543052R-bk and https://archive.org/details/physiologicalre00bichgoog 
131 Cf. Bichat 1815/1805; Gonzales-Crussi 2008; Rey 2006, 206, 265. Bichat also elaborated on 
important distinctions, such as that of “animal life” and “organic life” that Laestadius interpreted 
and applied directly in The Lunatic, as we will see later.
132 See, Haigh 1975, 77; Haigh 1984; Williams 2002, 75–76.
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conscious activity derive from a rational, immaterial principle located in 
the brain or the soul.”133 
Vitalist revolution of the late Enlightenment marked the crucial transition from 
the assumptions of the ‘mechanical’ philosophy to those of nineteenth-century phi-
losophies of nature134. Vitalism, which emphasized the concrete physico-biological 
starting point, emerged as a counterforce for rationalistic intellectualism and mecha-
nistic worldview.
Mechanistic viewpoint, contrary to vitalism, holds that all forms of life can be 
explained entirely by physical causes. Life is seen as no more than a special case of 
physics and chemistry, even though it is one of enormous complexity. Mechanists 
assert the similarity between phenomena in biology and those in the world of inert 
matter. Today, mechanism has triumphed, which has very important implications 
for medicine.135
Vitalism was not a unitary current, and it is impossible to be defined precisely. 
Vitalists based their research on empirical observation, and theoretical reflections and 
postulations were also based on concrete anatomical-empirical research and observa-
tion. Philosophically central were those observations through which classical dualism 
was challenged, e.g., different organs like glands seem to function independently and 
autonomously and did not seem to demand any “distinct outer” soul-principle as the 
explanatory basis for their functioning. The function and the pulse of the heart were 
also seen as independent and autonomous movements. Different organs were related 
to each other via tissues, fibers, blood vessels, nerves, etc., and thus, they constituted 
the integrated human organism.136 
Vitalist theories were united by the conclusions that said that the inert concep-
tion of matter assumed by Cartesians, and some versions of Newtonian natural 
philosophies were inadequate to account for important areas of biological function. 
In the most general sense, vitalism assumes that the study of organic phenomena cannot be 
reduced to a branch of physics or chemistry. While vitalism resisted the Cartesian notion 
of soul as an autonomous and immaterial principle, it affirmed that the living body 
possesses a unique entity, a soul, a force, a capability or principle which causes it to 
transcend the realm of inert matter.137
The most central philosophical thesis of vitalism was the notion of a principle of 
life or vital force (vis essentialis, Le princip vital, livprincipe) that was seen to super-
133 Haigh 1977, 3.
134 Sloan 2007, 924.
135 See, González-Crussi, 2008, 52; Williams 2002 and 2003; Haigh 1984.
136 See e.g. Haigh 1984.
137 See, e.g. Sloan 2007, 925; Haigh 1984; Williams 2002.
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sede the idea of the soul as independent of an organism138. This view fundamentally 
opposed the prevailing tendency among the rationalistic medical theorists that a 
living body is a complex mechanism139. 
Vitalists also insisted that life and non-life should be studied using different tools 
and means. Among vitalists it was accepted to make a distinction between laws 
of nature that were invariable and laws of life and its organic functions that were 
conceived as variable in their nature. Vitalists held that the natural activities of the 
body are directed by a special force, one that is unique to living beings and permits 
them to go on living.140
In place of the mechanical models of an organism, living beings were re-concep-
tualized as governed by new powers within matter in various ways: Vis essentialis 
(Caspar Friedrich Wolff ); Lebenskraft (Friedrich Casimir Medicus); Bildugstrieb 
( Johann Blumenbach); Anima (Stahl); sensibilité (Théophile Bordeu, Paul Joseph 
Barthez); and ‘matter of life’ ( John Hunter). 
Altogether, thoughts of physiological medicine constituted an alternative ground 
for philosophical anthropology, as it related rationalistic-mechanical, and metaphys-
ical-idealistic conceptions. 
The Vitalist Xavier Bichat, also the main scientific source for Laestadius, defined 
the vitalist notion of life as follows: 
“Life consists in the sum of the functions by which death is resisted. In 
living bodies, such in fact is the mode of existence; that whatever surrounds 
them, tends to their destruction. They are influenced incessantly by inorganic 
bodies; they exercise themselves, the one upon the other, as constant an 
action: under such circumstances they could not long subsist, where they 
not possessed in themselves of a permanent principle of reaction. This 
principle is that of life; unknown in its nature, it can be only appreciated 
by its phenomena […].”141 
Vitalists often believed that the vital or living/animated principle operated in 
opposition to physical laws. It was typical for them to reason that the processes 
necessary to life could just as easily end it. Living organisms were viewed as being 
subject to death and decay. Therefore, the human bodies would also crumble in a 
matter of seconds were it not for the organizing energy, the vivifying spark, that 
keeps them going.142
138 e.g. Haigh 1984
139 See, Haigh 1977, 1.
140 See, González-Crussi 2008, 51.
141 Bichat 1815, 20–21.
142 Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 51–52; Cf. Normandin & Wolfe 2013.
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Vitalism became particularly influential in the seventeenth century due to the 
German physician and chemist, Georg Ernest Stahl (1660–1734). Stahl argued 
that all the functions of a body, unwilled as well as those willed, unconscious as 
well as conscious, are the result of the activity of a soul or anima. He intended for 
his arguments to go against the prevailing mechanist theory and its idea of animal 
clock-work. Stahl conceived the soul as sheltering the body from corruption. The 
immaterial, rational, and spiritual soul existed in a situation of mutual dependence 
on the material body.143 He also called people’s attention to the chemistry of the hu-
man body in health and disease, believing that the organs of the body were subject 
to the laws of physics but proposing that the soul also regulated and harmonized 
their functions. Thus Stahl’s view is commonly seen, as was Aristotle’s, as a form of 
animism. The implications for medicine were very important, and much attention 
was devoted to the passions that agitated a patient’s embodied soul. Also, his view 
of the harmonizing ability of the soul led him to conclude that this “soul” had the 
power to heal; from this view, Stahl revived the ancient thesis of natura medicatriz 
(Nature as physician). As there was a healing vital principle within the body, the 
medical practitioner should simply be an assistant of Nature’s curative potency, not 
a mechanic repairing a broken machine.144
Stahl’s ideas had great influence throughout Europe. Especially physicians at 
the Medical University of Montpellier further evolved Stahl’s ideas, creating their 
own brand of vitalism. Particularly, the Montpellier vitalist physicians resisted the 
mechanical interpretation of rationalistic philosophy (Parisian physicians) within 
which a human being was conceived as a complex machine145. Francois Sauvages 
(1706–1767) adopted the vitalist notions that then re-directed the whole Montpel-
lier school from mechanism to vitalism. Sauvage’s ideas had an especially strong 
hold on his disciples, Théophile de Bordeu (1722–1776) and Paul-Joseph Barthez 
(1734–1806), and reached their highest expression in Marie-Francois-Xavier Bichat 
(1771–1802).146
Bordeu proposed that there was a “sensibility” (sensibilité) that belonged to the 
matter from which all living structures are made. Many of the Montpellier physicians 
also contributed to the development of a theory concerning the vital role of the force 
of sensibility. “Sensibility” was a force or principle that was considered to be inherent 
in and inseparable from the very substance of [living] matter. This view made living 
motion a function of the body itself and not the consequence of some other force or 
substance separate from it and possessing a different nature147. As a vitalist concept, 
143 Haigh 1977, 3.
144 Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 55.
145 See, Haigh 1984, 14
146 See, Conzáles-Crussi 2008; Williams 2004; Normandin & Wolfe 2013.
147 Cf. Haigh 1977, 1.
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“sensibility” was not reducible to physicochemical terms. This idea clashed with the 
mechanist theory that saw the body as a conglomerate of inert parts cleverly assem-
bled (like a clock in which the gearwheels keep turning as long as it is wound)148. 
Bordeu expanded the notion of sensibility by proposing that each organ had its own 
individual life, distinguishable from the life of the total organism149. 
The phenomena of sensibility and irritability seemed to be confirmed by a wealth 
of experimental evidence, and it is easy to see how these ideas may have originated. 
“Anyone familiar with a biology laboratory or the receiving room of pathology 
laboratory or any place where freshly removed organs and tissues are examined 
knows that the movement and contractility are the most striking hallmarks of life.”150 
Anatomical and pathological observations as well as their experiential affirmation 
in the lived experience must have inspired the vitalists with the idea that life resides 
in the constituent of the body and is an integral part of their being. The vital force 
and its variable functions were present everywhere in organic life; in plants, animals 
and the whole of nature around them.
The most influential Montpellier vitalist was Barthez who attributed the function 
of the living body to the action of force that he referred to simply as the vital principle 
(le principe vital). For Barthez, this vital principle coexisted in the body with a rational 
soul. The role of the rational soul was limited to overseeing that small proportion of 
body activity which was due to the will and which was conscious. The vital principle, 
on the other hand, governed the functions that had traditionally been assigned to the 
vegetative or lowest soul in the Galenic system. Barthez could not define whether this 
vital principle was material or immaterial substance although he thought that all the 
evidence pointed to its existence separate from matter of the body itself. He assumed 
that the vital principle was not part of the matter of the body although it controlled 
it throughout the span of its life. He also thought that an organism carries out its 
functions as long as it remains attached to the body in some way. This dualistic no-
tion that the source of motion in a body is outside its matter pushed Barthez out of 
the vitalist mainstream in the 1770’s151. Barthez thought that “all the functions which 
Bordeu and others had assigned to a multitude of organic sensibilities could be more 
accurately attributed to the faculties of [a] single principle.” Thus, Barthez considered 
it probable that the vital principle has an existence separate from that of the body. He 
also held that this vital principle can be destroyed or leave the body, for example, when 
the body was drowned.152 The debate between vitalist dualism and monism influenced 
in later anthropological and psychological elaborations in many ways. 
148 See, Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 56.
149 See, Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 57
150 See, Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 57.
151 Haigh 1977, 1.
152 Haigh, 1977, 8–9.
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The speculations concerning the nature of organs that rest and those that do not 
was developed further by Grimaud in Montpellier. Xavier Bichat adopted the 
distinction and made it the basis for his distinction of the living functions of ani-
mal and organic categories.153 In medicine, Bichat is seen as the father of histology. 
He is known to have combined and systematized an enormous amount of earlier 
medical knowledge and notions. He expressed his ideas in a simple and compre-
hensible manner, which is why he became known as the leading advocate of vitalist 
persuasion; he became known as the vitalist par excellence154. 
Bichat’s definition of life was celebrated by the philosophers and intellectuals of 
his time, and his work widely inspired further human scientific and philosophical 
research. Contrary to mechanistic medicine that often admired the Newtonian way of 
formulation in biology, Bichat emphasized a phenomenological, rather than a realistic, 
conception of vital agencies155. Bichat’s manner of combining physiological knowledge 
and views, together with his holistic way of thought and holding the question of human 
existence as a horizon, gives a phenomenological dimension to his thought. We find 
many philosophically interesting elaborations in Bichat’s Life and Death: The emergence 
of mind, relation between mind and body explained in vitalist terms, psychosomatic 
relation between organic life and animal life, experientiality, perception, habituality, 
and morality viewed from the vitalist-existential perspective to mention just a few.156
It has been recognized that some versions of the vitalist theories were able to 
escape the charges of inserting occult forces into passive matter157. Insofar as the 
“vitalists” did not postulate irreducible occult ‘vital forces’ as much as they empha-
sized the specificity of the phenomena of life and emphasized autonomy of life, and 
criticized the mechanism and reductionist theories, it has been suggested that instead 
of calling the Montpellier physicians “vitalists”, it would be more appropriate call 
them “holists” or “organicists.”158 Overall, Bichat was neither an occultist nor fully 
reductionist when holding onto the notion of the principle of life; he also relied on 
empiric and experiential phenomena given in the lived experience159. 
153 Haigh 1975 and 1984.
154 Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 59–60; Cf. Normandin & Wolfe 2013.
155 Sloan 2007, 925
156 A kind of panpsychistic notion of the human consciousness and a power of subjective consciousness 
could be found also from Schopenhauer. It is commonly known that Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
is constructed on the metaphysical interpretation on Xavier Bichat’s vitalism. (See, Schopenhauer 
1995/1819.) In addition to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Foucault and modern neo-vitalists 
have been influenced by Bichat’s theories and thought. For a brief and general philosophical re-
evaluation of vitalism and possible significance of vitalism for further philosophical elaborations, 
see, Kanamori 2005. 
157 Sloan 2007, 925.
158 Kaitaro 2007, 312; Cf. Kaitaro 1998, 289–312.
159 See, Bichat 1815.
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Bichat’s principle of life as the totality of the vital functions that resist death and 
ground vitality and the motion and activity of human life remains beyond intellectual 
and scientific comprehension. That is because the vital powers, functions, and their 
relationships, influences, and manifestations are so variable. As reflective human 
intellect is part of this same variable and dynamic organization, it follows that the 
embodied human being is not transparent in and of itself through reflection and 
conceptualization. Human beings cannot transparently objectify their own passions, 
affections, and emotions that direct their reflectivity.160
Especially the Montpellier vitalists persisted in their view that the only true 
medicine was one that recognized the uniqueness of human beings and grounded 
its investigations in a genuinely anthropological vision161.
Williams points out that medical vitalism – called as “science of man” – was not 
united current and could not be precisely defined. However, Williams thematizes the 
specific thoughts common to Montpellier vitalists and I follow here to summarize her 
notifications as important broad background to Laestadius’ holistic elaborations162.
Williams pointed out four principal nodes of reference for vitalist “science of man”163:
1. It was holistic, both in its conception of the human persona as an integral, 
functionally interdependent whole and … embrace the myriad, interdependent 
phenomena of human experiences. Thus, it was not limited to a discrete set of physi-
cal phenomena, but instead was extensive and sometimes also comprehensive in its 
purview. 
2. It postulated intimate relations (rapport) among separate domains of human 
experience, such as the physical, mental and passional, that were later reduced by 
physicians of the revolutionary era to what was called the ‘physical and moral’. It did 
not reduce the psychic domain to the physical, and thus was not monist or material-
ist. Most physicians who worked with the tradition accepted there was some kind of 
distinction between mind and body and between willed and un-willed action. But they 
taught, nevertheless, that these realms of existence and experience were still closely 
interdependent. This signified that ‘rapport’ meant, not control or determination of 
the mind by body or vice versa, but rather a linkage, interrelationship, and reciprocity. 
3. The vitalist science of man pushed medicine into society by its own internal 
logic as much as by any overt ideological or political intention, for it was a medical 
philosophy that regarded the intellectual, passional and social phenomena as being 
intimately tied to the well-being of the body. Also, Hippocraticism held the teaching 
of health not to be individual, but rather dependent on social practices and milieu. 
160 See. Haigh 1984, 85; Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 60–61.
161 Williams 2002, 14.
162 My summary follows Williams 2002, 8–13.
163 Williams 2002, 8–13. 
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4. It privileged the problem of discerning human ‘types’ amid the great variety of 
clinical and social detail (gathered in the course of medical investigations). These 
types were generally articulated in terms of their variable distribution in individuals 
of vital energy and, more specifically, in terms of temperament, constitution, age, 
sex, climate, disease, and ultimately, race. Typologization was rooted in the medical 
vitalism from which the science of man derived its original encouragement. Vitalism 
insisted by definition on the variability and diversity of human phenomena. It origi-
nally assumed coherence as a medical doctrine by attacking universals in the form 
of the mechanical and physiochemical constant of iatromechanism and Cartesian 
conception of the body physics. Rejecting mechanical constants, vitalist physicians 
looked instead for patterns, regularities, and generalities that would allow them to 
devise meaningful pathological, therapeutic, and physiological explanations. Thus, 
the discernment of types that showed regularities different from those found in the 
physical universe was one of the special contributions that the science of man had 
to make to the larger scientific enterprise.164
Early vitalist (medical) philosophy (science of man) was holistic. It did not ex-
clude environmental, cultural-historical, cultural-social, or religious conditions when 
explaining the normal, pathological or general habits of human beings. Rather, the 
human organism and its functions, health and illness, and common habits were studied 
in relation to the existing immanent and spiritual spheres. In Montpellier, vitalism 
was ineluctably connection with physiological and anthropological problematics. 
That view was reinforced by the Montpellier concept of “organization”, which, ac-
cording to Williams, necessarily entailed the investigation of any and all phenomena 
connected to the life of the organism – internal and external, physical and mental, 
healthy and pathological: “Nothing could be justifiably excluded since any process 
or operation might constitute the key to explaining the activities of the interrelated 
whole. Physiologically based medicine thus had to take into account any influence, activity, 
or circumstance that affected general vitality and health”.165
Paris doctors adapted vitalist physiology and retained its focus on the human and 
indeed conceived of it as the fundamental framework for the larger science of man 
that was to claim authority in diverse areas of human life and experience: 
The science of man was to investigate not the body, mind, or feeling in isolation 
but instead the ‘relationship between the physical and the moral.’ It was grounded in 
physiology, and promised to extract from the study of human ‘organization’ the fun-
damental principles for a science of human beings as individuals in society. Later, 
during the late Empire and Restoration, “new anthropology” was identified with 
“medical Ideology” and provoked strong reactions. The debate took place in medical 
164 Williams 2002, 8–10.
165 Williams 2002, 12.
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circles between “materialists” and “spiritualists” over the mind/body relation. Mar-
ginalization of philosophical medicine happened while physicians were trying to 
find an ideological free medicine; a holistic philosophical current was marginalized 
in favor of positive mechanical medicine.166
“The medical science of man, despite the high ambitions of its early ad-
vocates, was not destined to march in step with dominant trends in either 
medical theory and methodology or the organization of medicine as a social 
enterprise. By 1850 it was evident that an omnibus, general, anthropological 
medicine rooted in vitalist holism would not flourish in an era dominated 
by positive philosophy, reductive and experimental methodology, and 
professional specialization. … This discursive framework of the science of 
man may have disappeared but elements of the science of man survived in 
diverse and influential forms.”167
Williams highlights the significance of vitalist anthropology (science of man), which 
lay in its power to supply the basic and endlessly renegotiable terms of discussion of a 
problem – the relationship of the physical and the moral –that had, from all ideological 
perspectives, become inescapable168. Even if vitalism went into eclipse after the mid-
century when its diverse elements gradually sedimented out into a range of emergent 
disciplinary constructs and medical specialties, and were “forced into a subterranean and 
muffled existence, it continued to exert powerful influence in the human sciences169.” 
2.4  “The Physical” and “the Moral” in Vitalist Philosophy
With regard to the emphasis of moral significance of religion in Laestadius’ thought, 
it is worth highlighting the fact that Laestadius saw moral and spiritual overlap-
ping as actually synonyms from the vitalist and religious perspectives. To conceive 
spiritual and moral as “synonyms” fit well with Laestadius’ conviction that spiritual 
preaching and awakening were the best channels for re-vitalizing morality. In The 
Lunatic, both the moral and spiritual are actually conceived of as belonging to the 
same psycho-physical constitution of human life, and are dealt with on the same 
plane. Laestadius’ elaborations also seem to coincide with the central vitalist idea of 
a close relationship between the physiological and the moral domains.
166 See Williams 2002, 11–13.
167 Williams 2002, 19.
168 Williams 2002, 6
169 Ibid.,3
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“The vitalists’ primary thesis was an affirmation of the unity of man, a 
being which must always be studied as a whole, and whose physical and 
moral aspects are closely conjoined. The belief in this unity, which presup-
poses a continual interaction between physical and the moral, is reflected 
in their conviction that medicine and morality are interconnected, in their 
conceptualization of mental illness, and in their careful observation of the 
effects of psychological states on the health of the body (the sign of nascent 
psychosomatic medicine).”170
Already during the time of P. J. G. Cabanis’ (1757–1808) work, the physiological 
(physique) and “moral” were commonly seen to conjoin; physiological and moral was 
thought as overlapping or being dealt with in the same physiological plane.171 “The pair 
physique/moral had by the date [1769–1801] become commonplace as the pair body/
soul a century earlier.”172 Azouvi offered an insightful analysis of the pair physique/
moral and the use of the notions in France173 but concluded, however, that the moral 
in a general sense did not belong to the order of physical reality: “Moral is introduced, 
it seems, when the necessity is felt to designate a realm of experience which is opposed 
not only to that of physical nature, but also to that of the soul, in the then accepted 
sense of the term.”174 Azouvi assumed that this use of “moral” was needed 
“when, as the result of the Cartesian revolution, soul came to designate the 
opposite of mental reality, designate the realm to which we refer today with 
the term psychique – in English, ‘psychological’ – a term as indispensable 
as it is vague. Moral, then, would be the ancestor of psychique, referring to 
something non-material, which is nevertheless not pure thought.”175
In the golden age of vitalism and before there was a rigorous philosophy present 
to set the intellectual and moral world into a relationship with its organic and vital 
causes, moral science had no fixed basis” (before John Locke). Azouvi summarized 
the main point of Cabanis: 
170 Rey 2006, 256
171 Azouvi 2006, 267.
172 Azouvi 2006, 268
173 However, it was long before Cabanis when the pair known as physique/moral had made its entry 
into the French language. Azouvi (2006, 268–269) points out that in the “1721 edition of the 
Dictionnaire de Trévoux, physique as an adjective means ‘real, existing in nature’, whereas moral 
means ‘that which concerns morals, conduct of life’.”
174 Azouvi 2006, 270. [Later we will see how this relative difference could be interpreted to relate to 
Laestadius’ distinction made between natural passions and moral passions, and higher cognition 
thereof. 
175 Azouvi 2006, 270.
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“The dualism of Descartes dug out a chasm between physical and moral 
man which subsequent philosophy and medicine have striven to fill up. The 
discipline called the ‘science of man’ (anthropologie) owes its novelty and its 
importance to the decision made at its inception to handle together both 
the science of physical man (or physiology) and the science of moral man 
(or the study of ideas, or again, ideology). It is in opposition to Descartes, 
in opposition to his dualism of soul and body, that the science of man 
defends and cultivates the study of the relationship between physical and 
the moral.”176 
From this perspective, it becomes clear that during the time that moral philosophy, 
as we comprehend it today, was not differentiated from physiological study or from 
the more holistic and fundamental endeavor to thematize human existence in all its 
various dimensions177.
Naturally vitalists had to re-formulate the idea of ego cogito, the notion of the Self 
that would correlate with the idea of vital force and sensibility. For indeed,
“Every event occurring in physical man is capable of ‘influencing’ moral 
man through this common sensitivity. In this passage, Cabanis formulates 
a kind of anti-Cartesian ‘cogito’ which shows clearly his true philosophical 
design: ‘From the moment we have sensations, we are.’”178
Often “moral man” was also conceived as “inner man”, as in Syndeman where “’The 
other name for moral man is interior man, that is, the cerebral organi’”179. In Cabanis, 
moral is reduced to physical and the problem of the relationship of the moral to 
physical is resolved, and there is only the relation between the physical and physical. 
Azouvi highlights the intellectual heritage of Cabanis.
Rey accredits vitalism in the following way: 
“In particular, by discarding the identity of sensibility and consciousness, 
vitalist physiologists and physicians were able to secure access to a collection 
of phenomena like somnambulism or such dissociative states as catalepsy, 
which called into question the simplicity and oneness of psychic activity. 
(It should not be thought, however, that they arrived at the idea of the 
176 Azouvi 2006, 270.
177 I have earlier pointed out that it was particularly Kant who made a far-reaching influential 
distinction by stating that matters of the soul and thus of morality do not belong to the domain 
of physiology. See further on vitalism and Kant in Reill 2005.
178 Azouvi 2006, 271.
179 Azouvi 2006, 272
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unconscious, as has sometimes been claimed)180. Sensibility, on its side, al-
lowed a progression from confused, undifferentiated, and local sensation to 
a combination of sensations capable of explaining judgment, memory, and 
imagination. The contribution of M. F. C Bichat to this division of sensi-
bility into the categories ‘organic’ and ‘animal’ was decisive, as was his idea 
that there is a transformation from one to the other according to various 
thresholds of intensity. In the second place, the vitalists were particularly 
interested in boundary concepts that are difficult to assign clearly to either 
the physical or the moral sphere – for example, temperament, the effects of 
habit, the process of sleep, irregularities of activity or energy.”181
Vitalists were highly interested in the application of physiological knowledge to 
pathological problems or, as we today consider them, “psychological” problems. Dur-
ing that time it was common to interpret mental phenomena based on physiological 
dysfunction and try to find a balancing intervention for such a problem from that 
perspective. As a human being was conceived holistically, no human phenomena – 
whether it was physiological injury, abnormal behavior, spiritual or even an ideological 
way of thought – was excluded from being an explanatory “cause.”
This holistic approach often explained religious and spiritual dissonance in 
physiological-vitalist terms. For example, religious enthusiasm was often interpreted 
as an aroused activity of passion, and the cure for such a “psychic-physiological” dis-
sonance was to look in the direction of religious rituals and practice. For instance, 
in Sweden, mental asylum workers conceived Christian fatherly care, love, and faith 
overall as balancing the influence of psychological disturbance.182 Also Laestadius 
saw the power of strong religious and poetically figurative preaching as a way to 
awaken moral passions and thus a way to heal the psychophysiological condition of 
the human being. Laestadius’ scientific author, Felix Descuret, conceived of the sacra-
ments as harmonizing psychic-physiological means.183 From the vitalist perspective 
Laestadius conceived his own strong preaching in a plausible and justified way, also 
in the philosophical-scientific sense, so as to awaken the genuine healing spirituality 
in human beings.184 
Given the general presentation of vitalist anthropology here, I have tried to lay 
for the general background of Laestadius’ anthropological elaborations, as they seem 
to color Laestadius’ thought as a whole. Laestadius leaned mainly on the vitalist 
180 [Laestadius elaborated on the notion of unconsciousness with the help of ideas of Carl Gustav 
Carus]
181 Rey 2006, 265.
182 See, Qvarsell 2004, 86–97.
183 Cf. Zidbäck 1937; Also e.g. Szabo 2009, 117.
184 See further on the vitalist account of mental pathology in Rey 2006, 262.
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tradition, especially Xavier Bichat’s medical vitalism, and adopted the physiological 
emphasis and the main idea of human soul as a principle of life and the notion of 
passion as the groundwork of his psychology and philosophy of religion. Also, certain 
similarities with the thematics of the physical/moral seemed to influence Laestadius’ 
elaborations as well, as we will see later.185 However, it is not known how widely 
Laestadius’ read vitalist literature or was familiar with it except for the references he 
offers in The Lunatic.
2.5  On the History of the Concept of Passion
The notion of passion and the vitalist notion of the principle of life are the most central 
notions in Laestadius’ philosophical theology and psychology. I want to briefly draw 
a general background of the notion of passion that has philosophical, psychological 
and theological significance for Laestadius’ theory. In general, the notion of passion 
is the vital force of human life, but it is also interpreted as the prerequisite of sin.
The notion of passion has been one of the most central concepts in philosophical, 
theological, and anthropological traditions.186 The questions concerning the nature 
of passions have traditionally been considered in varying ways, some of which have 
emerged as quickly as others have disappeared. Beginning in late antiquity, the theory 
of passions has changed over time with regard to the demands addressed of it.
The treatment of the Alexandrian Church Fathers, who centered on the Christo-
logical problem for how Christ’s agony in the garden was possible if He were God, 
lead to a further study of the passions in Athanasius and Clement’s discussions. 
The former attributed the passion of agony to Christ’s body alone, while the latter 
distinguished passions into bodily areas necessary for the preservation of life, and 
passions of the soul. These concerns later formed one strand in Augustine’s account 
185 In Laestadius, there is a relative “transcendental dimension” of morality or spirituality that is 
actualized through religious experience, which seems to make his notion more phenomenological. 
The principle of life is not a mere physiological force or law of nature, but also experiential and 
phenomenal, and in this sense the principle is not reduced to pure “inert matter”. For instance 
Laestadius uses the manifestations of the principle of life, passions, as synonyms of the world; also 
moral passions are synonyms for the [manifestations of ] living faith that signify an intentionality 
that overcomes being [substance, essence] or the constant presence, or Grace that is the result 
of a “psychic act” of reconciliation within which human beings and passions are freed from the 
intimate shackled relationship to the present world or being. We can notice that Laestadius 
does not formulate “moral” or “spiritual” as a distinct sphere in regard to the physiological plane. 
However, his interpretation does introduce interesting new dimensions when the moral and 
spiritual are dealt with on the physiological plane in the pre-phenomenological analysis of faith.
186 About general history of the meaning, use and translations of the notion of passion see, Fitzgerald 
2008, 1–25. For comparison with Laestadius’ notion of passion see Chene 2012 on Descartes’ 
notion of passion.
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of the nature of passions, the influence of which on the seventeenth-century and 
later discussions became immense.187
Stoic theory of passions was inherited for Christian theology and philosophy188. 
Major change in the theory of passions emerged in Augustine’s thought, which con-
trasted with the stoic idea that passions are not innocent forces. Thus, pre-passions 
or first movements came to signify a certain kind of pre-reflective ground of cogni-
tion, and they became free from only when they were recognized in consciousness, 
either by denying them or voluntarily accepting their influence. Augustine thought 
that stoics failed to see that the first movements were corrupted by Original Sin.189
Gaukroger sees that it could be found a number of issues at the end of the early 
modern era that formed a core part of the discussion of the passions, but which disap-
peared from that discussion only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(rationalism and mechanism, natural science), for example, the idea that a theory 
of the passions might provide the basis for a therapeutic practice. Melancholia as a 
passion received the greatest attention in this tradition in the early modern era190. 
It was often interpreted as an imbalance of the humours associated with genius and 
profundity. Centrality of passion in psychopathology only extended the multidisci-
plinary interest toward the passions:
“The combination of physiology, psychology and ethics that underlay the 
treatment of melancholy was typical of the kinds of considerations that 
lay behind thinking about passions, and they had always been associated 
with bodily conditions, bringing them under the purview of medicine and 
physiology, but they were also given ethical meanings, bringing them under 
the purview of moral psychology and theology.”191
In the seventeenth century, the Christian moral code still centered on the “seven 
deadly sins” – pride, envy, wrath, avarice, gluttony, sloth, and lechery – which were 
not merely the cardinal sins, but also distinct and identifiable passions. Passions were 
virtually constitutive of sins, and thus passions and morality were closely articulated.192
Gaukroger (1998, 4) pointed to two core questions that can be identified in dis-
cussion of the passions from antiquity to present: First, passions as a determinant of 
human personality and human action, and second, the question of the nature of moral 
187 See, Gardiner et al. 1935; Gaukgroger 1998, 1–14 (The Soft Underbelly of Reason. The Passions in 
the Seventeenth Century. New York: Routledge.)
188 See, Knuuttila 2010b.
189 See, e.g., Knuuttila 2010b, 172.
190 See, Stanley 1986.
191 Gaukroger 1998, 2.
192 Bossy 1988, 214–234; Gaukroger 1998
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judgment. For both questions, the central contrast is between reason and the passions. 
Further, the contrast (between reason and passions) received a new significance in 
the early modern era, given the question of the control of passions by reason, and 
states that Christianity worked as a catalyst by taking over and transforming the idea 
of self-control. Gaukroger indicated that this self-control transformed into a kind 
of “internalization” of self-control within Christianity, and “it was achieved through 
the idea of the exercise of self-control, which was construed explicitly in terms of 
the regulation of [the] passions by the reason.”193
When the question is posed between will and the passions, there emerges a third 
possibility: Is it the will, the combination of the two, or just the passions acting alone 
that determines the action? This third possibility was raised by Hobbes, and thus, 
the nature of passions took on a new significance.194
Within this early modern era, medical and anatomical physiology paid attention 
to the passions as well and integrated the philosophical and theological insights of 
passions into its own theory. For example, in Bichat’s theory, the passions are seen 
as vital functions, which can be conceived as vitalizing or destructive forces. In the 
nineteenth century, Heinroth also leaned on the concept of passion when creating his 
psychosomatic theory. Descuret as well as Heinroth were influenced by the theological 
notions of passions that originated in the notions of sin.195 In a present day studies 
Heinroth is seen as an early discoverer of the psychosomatics and psychotherapeutics 
before Sigmund Freud.196 Altogether, the concept of passion became in many ways 
psychologisized and theologisized in Laestadius’ times. Passions also had a politi-
cal and cultural significance because they were fostered by different institutions.197 
Laestadius’ ideas and “psycho-therapeutic” approach influenced by the work of 
Heinroth, Bichat, Descuret and Carus remind us that psychosomatic thinking did 
not originate as late as the 20th century, but has its roots in medical history far back 
to previous centuries.
193 Gaukroger 1998, 4–5.
194 Gaukroger 1998, 6–7; See further, James, Susan 2011. Explaining the passions: passions, desires, 
and the explanation of action. In Gaukroger S. (ed.) 1998. London and New York: Routledge, 
pp. 17–33.
195 See, e.g., Greenfeld 2013, 474. It is generally known that Heinroth held that the sin causes 
degeneration. (Accessed on-line: ProQuest ebrary. Web. 27 May 2016.)
196 See, Steinberg et al. 2013, 11–16. ( Johann Christian August Heinroth: Psychosomatic Medicine 
Eighty Years before Freud.) Steinberg et al. highlight the several aspects of Heinroth’s thought: 
the holistic notion of personality; mental illnesses viewed as the ‘disorders of the soul’; human 
being susceptible to religious influences and worldly influences. Steinberg views that in Heinroth 
“mental power was largely conceived in religious terms,” which signified that pietistic religiosity 
was incorporated into medicine; “For him [Heinroth] the purely medical erasion of symptoms 
would not bring about cure, for the illness needs to change his whole life and attitude towards 
it, if he want to be cured.” (Steinberg 2013, 14.)
197 Gaukroger 2008, 5.
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The rise of the natural sciences and mathematics in the early modern era marked 
a change in the interest towards passions. Natural and mathematical sciences were 
being developed as the model for reason, and as a consequence, the passions became 
the antithesis of the canons of rational enquiry that the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries set up for themselves. As a consequence, the passions received a different 
kind of treatment; they were re-described, reclassified, explained away, reduced to 
physiology, used to account for the differences between men and women, and used 
as a basis for a theory of pictorial expression, etc. Passions became the “dark side” of 
reason which must be understood in order to have any true comprehensive grasp of 
the scientific rationality (of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries).198
In this brief introduction to the notion of passion, I have tried to offer a wide 
horizon within which Laestadius is thinking and using the concept of passions. 
He uses Bichat, Heinroth, and Descuret but refers also to Paul199, Augustine, and 
Luther as well as numerous philosophers that include the Stoics, Socrates, Origen, 
Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, and Martensen. We can assume that Laestadius was broadly 
aware of the ambiguous meanings of passions, and adopted influences from different 
sources. Laestadius received Bichat’s and other medical vitalist notions of passion and 
combined them with Biblical ideas of sin. Moreover, he uses the term “passion” also 
in terms of the significance where it is in critical opposition to certain rationalistic-
mechanistic and intellectualistic tendencies. He denies the existence of intellectual 
passion, or passions of reason, but accepts that there are passions of will, demonstrated 
as desire. Overall Laestadius emphasized classically that passions are the primus mo-
tor of human action, thought, and the whole embodied intentionality. Furthermore, 
his idea was for the most part in line with Augustine’s idea of passion, including the 
stance that said that the passions, despite the fact they are corrupted, could also be 
moral and thus lay the ground for moral and just action and thought. Laestadius’ 
notion of passion demonstrates different meanings for different contexts where he 
is using it; the relationship of his notion of passion to Christian and philosophical 
definitions becomes clearer when he discusses passions and their relationship to the 
objective faculties of soul, the sensory life, and when he thematizes awakening as a 
tension existing between the different passions.
Generally philosophers have seen passions and emotions as disturbing the higher 
cognitive faculties of human beings; thus, passions and emotions are subsumed under 
 
198 Gaukroger 2008, 5.
199 See further of Paul’s use of passion in Engberg-Pedersen 2008, 238- 266 (The Logic of action 
in Paul: how does he differ from the moral philosophers on spiritual and moral progression and 
regression? New York & London: Routledge) And in Aune 2008, 221–237 (Passions in the 
Pauline epistles: the current state of research. New York & London: Routledge).
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the control of intellect and reason.200 However, passions have not always been inter-
preted as being opposite to reason and rational will. In Augustine, who had important 
influence on Laestadius, passions and emotions are seen as the preceding level to 
first emotions. Augustine also saw that passions and emotions could be meaningful 
for morality. In this respect, Laestadius’ theory of passions is close to the Augustin-
ian theory of emotions, as for Laestadius, the soul has definitely an emotional and 
passionate level, which is significant for morality and genuine spirituality. 
However, Laestadius thought, as did Augustine, that because of corruption, the 
emotional and passional basis of human mind is disturbed. Laestadius and Augustine 
also differed in their ideas about freedom of will. Augustine gives more freedom for 
will but Laestadius gives only negative freedom.201 In terms of the broad history of 
the term “passion”, we can orient Laestadius’ theory toward questioning what philo-
sophical, psychological, theological, and moral significances Laestadius’ notion of 
passion contained? As mentioned earlier, Laestadius did not conceive passions merely 
as disturbing factors of higher cognitive life, but rather as fundamental constituents 
of human action, thought, and life as a whole.
2.6  Summary: Contextualizing Laestadius’ Thought
The contextualization of Laestadius’ theoretical thought is not an easy task, first of 
all because of the rich and ambiguous history of ideas and political-cultural situa-
tion in which was he writing. However, a generalized contextualization seems to be 
necessary for constructing a view for how Laestadius’ thought relates to Western 
theological, scientific, and philosophical traditions. 
Laestadius’ holistic thought was simultaneously church political and multidisci-
plinary. In the above discussion, I depicted the general background of Laestadius’ 
situation and thought as a marginalization of pietistic movements, the rationalistic 
and metaphysical currents dominating theology and anthropology, and an expeditious 
natural scientific progress characterizing his situation. For this reason, it is often hard 
to see what particular theological doctrines, philosophical or anthropological ideas, 
or church political tendencies motivated Laestadius’ writing.
200 See further of the history and early modern use of the notion of passion in, Cummings & Sierhuis 
2016. It is noteworthy that the notion of passion has been commonly conceived as an important 
factor of the human embodiment, cognition and action in early modernity. There is growing 
interest on the theories of passions in the modern philosophy and philosophical psychology. See 
further Airaksinen & Gylling 2016 as a general discussion of the philosophy of desire and will, 
and therein referred important research literature concerning to emotions.
201 Cf. Knuuttila 2010b, 158–160.
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Laestadius saw hope in Christian pietism in the moral and political sense. Instead 
of turning to rationalistic theology and metaphysics, he wanted to make space for an 
experiential Lutheran faith that he called a “living faith” found in pietism. The theo-
retical support for his apology of experiential religion of pietism he found especially 
in Augustine and Luther and anthropologically in French physiological medicine and 
vitalist psychology. Laestadius saw that medical physiology and psychology offered a 
scientific plausible ground for anthropology and a Lutheran-pietistic theology and 
philosophy of religion. In a sense, he was against the intellectualization of faith and 
emphasized instead its experientiality. In line with the pietistic emphasis on individual 
piety Laestadius highlighted the precedence of lived experience and feelings over 
conceptual-intellectual doctrines and dogmas. In faith and life proper understanding 
is reached through the own-most experience, not via doctrinal knowledge or the use 
of mere reason.
Laestadius’ thought was controversial in at least two respects: Firstly, he stood 
against the Lutheran orthodoxy defending pietism, and secondly his vitalist per-
spective was already being debated in the 1850’s in favor of positive medicine. Thus, 
both pietism and vitalism provoked suspicion, and there remained no assurance for 
whether pietism might turn into separatism and vitalism into materialism.
Laestadius as an educated natural scientist and theologian who was having continu-
ous contacts with intellectuals around Europe attached his theoretical thought to the 
natural scientifically oriented vitalist tradition. He was able to obtain the important 
sources of the 1800’s physiological medicine and psychology, romantic psychology, 
and also some general study books on philosophical psychology (Bichat, Heinroth, 
Descuret, Carus, Petrelli, Martensen). 
With the religious, church political and theological motifs, Laestadius formed a 
multidisciplinary holistic theory of human existence which could be seen as being 
in relation to all the trends of thought mentioned above. Laestadius’ anthropology 
and psychology can be connected to the discussions on the relationship between 
growing natural scientific interests and metaphysics, as well as to the mechanism-
vitalism debate. 
Regional religious phenomena often were manifested in embodied forms, such as 
enthusiasm, and moral-spiritual influences of those phenomena that served as the 
empirical and experiential basis for his thought. Thus, Laestadius’ vitalist thought is 
not mere theoretical reflection but rather is based on factual everyday observation 
and experiences. 
Eventually, The Lunatic became a holistic reflection on the idea of man and the 
theory of experiential religion and the main source of Laestadius’ theological and 
philosophical thought. As an apology and the justification and scientific explica-
tion of northern pietism, vitalism offers the main perspective on Laestadius’ theory. 
Laestadius highlights “his teaching”, which was under attack, and Northern pietism 
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as both being grounded in a clear “system”. By means of vitalism and support of the 
ideas inherited from his authors, Laestadius objected to the metaphysical rational-
ism that often led to a mechanical worldview and intellectualistic ideas of man and 
God (deism). For example,
“The primary purpose of this treatise is to show the psychological perspec-
tives that have provided the foundation for the author’s sermons, which, 
on the other hand, have been considered Jesuitism, fanaticism (svärmeri), 
and indecency, but on the other hand, have had a remarkable impact on 
the hearts of those who have heard it. If the author is able, through these 
treatise, to convince some of the intellectuals that there is a consistent 
system of thought underlying this so-called fanaticism, then the semi-
educated who are not bothered with thought may continue to call him a 
Jesuit and say: ‘thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil.’” (Laestadius 2015, 
The Lunatic, Forewords, p. 16.)
The main claim of Laestadius is that pietistic experiential religiosity is not only a 
fanatic and emotional movement, but also has a clear idea of man and an understand-
ing of Christian faith as its basis. This system is thematized in The Lunatic in order 
to reveal and justify the pietistic idea of man and the character of religiosity – i.e., 
“the order of Grace” – within the State and State church of Sweden. 
In terms of the title, The Lunatic – An Insight into the Order of Grace, the choice of 
the word “Insight” can be interpreted as an implicit reference to vitalism while the 
“the order of Grace” indicates pietistic-Lutheran and a Biblical understanding of 
faith that Laestadius wanted to defend and justify in the context wherein pietism 
was marginalized by the Conventicle Edict.
The development of Laestadius’ philosophical thought can also be seen as extension 
of vitalistic insight. Already in his botanical research, several monistic and vitalistic 
tendencies were present; they can also be detected during the period of research 
concerning Sámi history and mythology where he found the actual phenomenon of 
spirituality or spirit-life and tried to explain it in vitalist terms; finally in the latest 
period in The Lunatic, he places specific vitalist theories and insights in use when 
defending, explaining, and justifying the pietistic religiosity of North Calotte. In 
particular, this vitalist theoretical basis and insight has a crucial significance for the 
formation of and the explication and justification of Laestadius’ philosophical, psy-
chological and religious views. From this perspective, it can be noted that Laestadius 
theoretical thought develops from natural historical botanical research to the vitalist 
philosophy and a psychology of religion.
Altogether then, we can summarize by saying that metaphysical rationalism and its 
intellectualizing influence on theology and anthropology formed the general back-
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ground of Laestadius’ combatant writing within which he found pietistic religiosity, 
medical physiology, and vitalist philosophy as the proper ground for his criticism. 
Within the historical context thematized above, I research Laestadius’ thought, 
emphasizing especially its pietistic and vitalist approach toward notion of human 
being and religiosity. In the following chapters, my focus is to question particularly 
the vitalist background of Laestadius’ thought and interpret his psychological and 
religious insights using this perspective. How did Laestadius carry out his criti-
cism and what was the result of Laestadius’ attack on intellectualized philosophy 
and theology? Insofar as we can keep open the traditional questions about whether 
Laestadius was a vitalist monist or dualist, how did he elaborate on his critique of 
metaphysical rationalism? Also, how does Laestadius’ use of “passion” relate to the 
traditional meaning of the word passion? And more generally, what was the character 
of his religious vitalism?
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3  The Creation and The Initial Condition
Laestadius’ thought sought to explain the Biblical myths of God, Evil, and Crea-
tion from a vitalist perspective. The tension between given scriptural revelations and 
vitalist explanation makes his theoretical thought original and gives his analysis its 
unique character.
The Biblical story of the creation or the origin of the world and human beings 
tells us that God’ spirit wandered above the water and God created the world by the 
Word (kr. logos). Laestadius interprets this view so that the living force, the principle 
of life is embedded into the organic matter which was seen as the foundation of life. 
Through the configurations of the principle of life, organic life developed into various 
forms and created nature. Thus the original creation of life is an act of God but the 
proceeding creation happens from the inside of animated organic life. Using this idea, 
Laestadius was able to argue that we can approach the “living God” through nature. 
Further still, he also considered the other Biblical myth of the Fall when he dealt 
with the problem of the origin of evil or theodicy. According to the Biblical myth, 
God and Evil are in constant tension, and as a result of the first and “most original” 
combat, Lucifer was driven from Heaven into the world. For Laestadius, however, 
this tension not only takes place in the metaphysical sphere of a “spirit-world” but 
is also part of earthly life. Lucifer was not able to bring revenge directly to God, 
so he decided to revenge God via his firstborns by seducing them. In terms of the 
human Fall, passions of human beings became corrupted, and man was driven from 
Paradise into the world.
Laestadius offers the Biblical metaphysical myths both as a fundamentals and a 
naturalistic approach through which he believed he could determine more properly 
the vital characteristics of God and Evil. Thus, the (formal) characterizations of God 
and Evil were given first premise throughout the Bible, while at the same time, their 
vital character was approached through the manifestations of their influence on the 
natural world. In a sense, Laestadius appeared to think that the essential characters of 
God and Evil cannot be approached directly (as Ideas), and thus man cannot become 
familiar with or recognize their actual character in other ways than through their 
actual manifestation, i.e., the ways they are actualized in the natural human world. 
Therefore, the process of gaining comprehension of God and Evil was circular. 
Starting from the Biblical myths where the notions of God and Evil are declared 
[“first ideas”], Laestadius turns and approaches them in vitalist terms through their 
manifestations as personifications of both natural and moral passions. Altogether, 
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from this perspective Laestadius believes he can reach a more substantial (vital) 
characterization of the nature of the opposing forces indicated in the Biblical myth. 
This circularity could be also interpreted as a hermeneutic circularity in character. 
The thought is that God and Evil were given as “first ideas”; however, their actual 
essential character – what they really are and how they manifest themselves in human 
life – could only be grasped in relative terms through their manifestations. Therefore, 
these “first ideas” demanded a temporal-situational interpretation and received their 
vital substantial characteristics in the actual passional situatedness of being in the 
world of human beings.
The third myth is the promise of redemption that Laestadius holds as his fun-
damental horizon and tries to explain also in vitalist terms. As a consequence of 
the Fall, man is captured in the world of natural passion[s] and sin. For this reason, 
an experiential vital awakening as a precondition of reconciliation is necessary for 
emancipation from the domination of sin and the world.
This Biblical line of thought remains on the horizon for the whole of Laestadius’ 
system in all of its “anthropological” or psychological elaborations. Laestadius holds 
that the task of all Christian moral systems should be to show the corrupt nature 
of human beings and the necessity of reconciliation. In the following section, I go 
through Laestadius’ elaborations from a philosophical perspective and do not discuss 
its theological and dogmatic references and implications. I will rather question how 
the notion of man and existence is opened up further in Laestadius’ theory. 
3.1  Animated Nature as Beginning
The grounding idea of Laestadius’ philosophy was that Life itself has to come before 
all the theoretical and intellectual theories of life – whether theological, philosophi-
cal, or scientific:
“The principle of life is, admittedly, obscure and incomprehensible to 
reason, but it is closer at hand to our eyes, than the abstract idea that the 
philosopher takes pains to hold up to the world as the first beginnings of 
all creation. Just the same, an idea without life cannot be thought, but a 
principle of life without self-consciousness is something that we can see 
with our eyes, in the nature. From this principle of life emerges creative 
organic life. And this life is now closest to us.” (§1420.) 
This approach indeed signifies the critical attitude to take toward all traditionally 
given philosophical ideas, dogmas, or metaphysical descriptions of God as first Idea; 
the criticism extends also to the idea of creation as a mere intellectual act of God.
74 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
Because all the ideas on intellect are basically created and developed on the basis of 
organic human life (nature), they cannot precede life itself. This becomes the problem 
of origin: Does the Idea or Life itself come first? What principles, philosophical or 
any theoretical system, are plausibly the beginning?
Laestadius holds, in contrast to the philosophical expression that nothing comes 
from nothing (nihil fit ex nihilo), that creation actually is a genuine miracle that has 
to be accepted and appreciated as such. Creation and life itself is a given in nature 
and is beyond our conceptual reasoning and thus constitutes the limits of reason202. 
“The abstract idea, which is an idea realis, non substantialis, from which 
it follows that the idea and the substance are not identical. It also follows 
that the idea and the principle of life are not interchangeable concepts. 
But which one is the foundation of the other? Has the idea emerged from 
the principle of life, or has the principle of life sprung from the idea? The 
wise men of the world are free to answer to this question if they are able 
to do so.” (§1409.)
Laestadius continues by letting the insolvable problem stay unsolved and takes it 
for granted (assumes) that the phenomena of life are given and reachable through 
the experiences of Nature; functions, processes and the phenomena of life are given 
in Nature right there before our eyes203. It is thus understandable that Laestadius was 
indeed convinced of the existence of certain vital forces of nature as he, an eager 
botanist, zoologist and friend of nature, daily observed the vital phenomena in plants, 
animals, human beings, and the effects that changes in climate, season, etc., had on 
the vitality of organic life. The vital life of nature is given to humans both empirically 
and experientially, which means that the principle of life was conceived also as the 
“psychic essence” and original soul of the human organism and given as the experience 
of one’s own lived body.
With regard to the classical question regarding the temporal precedence of life 
and the Idea, Laestadius was absolutely pessimistic. The problem could not be solved 
by any rational means (in this context, Laestadius was already discussing the person 
of God, but the emphasis on the precedence of Life was still apparent):
202 On being and nothingness see, §§1594, 1595, 1596; reason is overcome in the miracle; intellect 
must be humble before the miracle wherein God created Heaven and earth out of nothing, a 
affirmed fact that reason cannot comprehend, be held as a real possibility.
203 With these expressions, Laestadius emphasized the distinction of the classical form of 
transcendentalism, thus emphasizing the empirically and experientially given starting point. I 
later argue here that Laestadius was forming a certain kind of stance related to transcendental 
empiricism or physiological transcendentalism.
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“On the other hand, ‘idea realis’ and ‘idea realisata’ cannot be counterpoised. 
The abstract idea is, admittedly, an idea realis, insofar as it is not merely 
possible, but real; but it is not actualized until it becomes actualized. We are 
unable to think otherwise than that of creation, nature, is an actualized idea. 
But this only proves that the idea preceded matter. Yes, it even preceded all 
of that which is referred to as an actualized idea; but precisely in this lies the 
logical knot: since, according to all human experience, the idea itself is not 
absolutely without preconditions in that the ego is unthinkable as merely an 
idea, even within the highest personhood – what, then, was the foundation 
of ego that, according to what has been shown above, cannot be a persona 
idealis only (which is indeterminate and without character) but must be a 
persona realis, which has character and acts according to define propositions 
and cannot act contrary to its own nature? Only God himself may be able 
to solve this riddle.” (§1230. emphasis added) 
Is Laestadius’ idea similar with Descartes’ idea that “we have to assume” God 
who has given the nature and thus proceed from this naturally given starting point? 
Laestadius did not accept the traditional way beginning with “first Idea” but instead 
tried to approach and re-define the first “Idea” anew as a vital force. In this regard 
“the first principle” is not just a cognitive Idea “that grants” our existence for us, but 
instead it is present and manifested in the functions and vital processes of nature 
that human being is inextricably part of. Here the difference laid in the way the 
created was given to human experience and thought; whether it is given as an idea 
reached by intellect or as “something” given to experience that evoke the question of the 
origin. In vitalist account of creation the existence of human being is not given to 
itself in “ego cogito” as pure thought (that reaches the absolute idea of creation and 
God), but instead as passionate organic body and vital functions and feelings (facul-
ties of soul); human being finds itself always already in this “psychic vital essence” 
or on the ground of principle of life, that Laestadius called as “original soul” of 
human being204.
When Laestadius claims that the character of the ego (jag) is “unthinkable as 






204 I later discuss more details about the idea of vital organic man as immanent-transcendence.
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wider intellectualistic, especially rationalistic and idealistic, tradition of philosophy205. 
Since Laestadius took the starting point in a given life as being in nature, his view 
simultaneously brought the body and its functions of soul within the body together. 
Altogether then, Laestadius’ idea is that the vital processes of life are given for em-
pirical perception and vital embodied experience, and this view could be taken as a 
plausible starting point for philosophical theology and psychology.
For Laestadius, the principle of life signifies the life given by a living God in crea-
tive thought/will in eternity206; thus, he combines Biblical vitalism and the idea of 
creation with the classical vitalist thought on the principle of life. 
God has given life via creative thought/will207 in eternity, and human beings must 
begin research experientially with empirical observation of the phenomena of nature. 
Only in this way can human beings reach toward the [vital] Idea or proper dynamic 
concept of man and God –keeping in mind that one can still not achieve any strict 
conception of the creation of the First Idea (God) as such.
”Certainly we have noted that these metaphysical definitions are more 
physical than metaphysical once we have grasped the principle of life, 
which is ’existentia sine essentia et sine substantia.’ However, if the principle 
of life were an idea, then not only would the crow be able to be a person, but 
the caterpillar (larven) and the straw of grass on the ground would be 
able to be a persons. The materialist and the pantheist are unlikely to go 
that far in personification. We must therefore remain within the limits of 
the possibilities of human thought: the idea and the principle of life are not 
identical; the ego is not a subject, but a predicate. The ego has a foundation for its 
being, and this foundation is not the ego.‘Existentia non est substantia’. Since 
life within man is concurrent with the body, we could, in accordance with 
common laws of thought, conclude: that life and substance within God are 
concurrent. But we are unable to formulate even a fraction of the concept 
of the emergence of this, the first idea. We are unable to say that idea realis 
came before idea substantialis, especially since idea substantialis is, to us, 
205 For Laestadius, the mind or the self (jag) is not a distinct substance in regard to the body, but it is 
always attached to organic matter, indicating a particular event and happening in life. The principle 
of life as “psychic essence” manifests itself in a present nature and inwardly as transcendental capacity 
through perception, mind, and experience, and thus also, the soul “happens” as the “life of the body.” 
I return to this aspect later. This idea could also be contrasted in many ways with the whole Western 
metaphysical tradition and its dualities found in Descartes (body/mind dualism), Kant (time-space, 
transcendental subjectivity), and Hegel (weight of material substance and freedom of the substance 
of spirit where only spirit can become self-conscious, the absolute idea of freedom). 
206 §1230 Note.
207 Not a mere intellectual act but an event of the principle of life as a necessary vital activity of God 
itself.
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unthinkable. Idea vitalis is more possible, insofar as the idea cannot exist 
without life. Here, too, we met by the contradiction of nature: that the life 
and idea are not interchangeable concepts, and cannot be counterpoised.” 
(§1229. my emphases added)
Laestadius’ own approach as a whole drove into paradox as he simultaneously tried 
to hold onto an internal vitalist explication and empiric observation and philosophical 
conceptualization together. His argumentation is circular from the beginning: starting 
from the necessary notion of principle of life within the nature – which is necessarily 
just an idea because it is conceptual human thought (or at least a necessary belief/
hypothesis) – and by studying its functions [in nature], he assumes to reach a more 
proper notion of the “essence” and characteristics of the “first idea”208. Therefore his 
first principle is a postulation and in this sense “an Idea”209. Laestadius recognizes the 
circularity of argumentation as “the problem of origin” and states that the principle 
of life is just a “hypothesis”, adding that it is, however, necessary to begin with the 
hypothesis that “coincides with healthy popular opinion” and experience210. 
“We freely admit that the idea of a common principle of life (lifeprincipen) 
is a hypothesis, but note that hypotheses are the psychologists’ only point 
of departure. Hypotheses, however, need to be such that the conclusions 
(slutsatser) to which they lead are not in opposition to sound popular 
opinion (folkomdömet).” (§118. See also §58)
In a sense the presupposition of the principle of life is a necessary theoretical 
horizon that enabled the whole philosophical-theological work: in itself ineffable, 
but reachable through its manifestations and functions that would presumably gain 
208 Laestadius offered a specific critique of the metaphysical notions of substance and essentia as 
an abstract incomprehensible notions and pursued it so as to replace the metaphysical concept 
of essence with his vitalist definition of essence (väsendet). I come back to this concept in the 
chapter on the principle of life.
209  Basically this is the problem of metaphysical foundation of science or conceptual thinking: all 
investigation remains on particular metaphysical presupposition in regard to the perennial character 
of their objects and means of investigation (how is the character of language and technology and 
method conceived as the means to reach the goals.) 
210 The coincidence of empirical manifestations of the principle of life in nature and common 
experience [of one’s own existence] indicate that Laestadius assumed a certain kind of “natural” 
or intuitive capability of conceiving own embodied existence as a part of the creative nature; man 
is from the start a part of the common vital organic nature as the principle of life signified the 
common foundation for all organic beings. Here we could speculate whether the principle of life 
signifies a certain kind of vitalist re-definiton of “thing as such” (ding an sich), which furthermore, 
in onto-theological contexts is the pre-requisite for the necessity of the God’s becoming into 
flesh in the world.
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understanding of its vital-substantial nature. In this way, Laestadius seemed to lean 
on common sense and lived experience as the evidential support (conviction that the 
nature of man could be reached from this stance, and the notion of God would in 
this manner become more accurate as well). 
Vitalistic approach makes Laestadius’ ideas of God and creation interesting. His 
main purpose was to think in the internalist way, for example the notion of God as 
the first principle. God is not conceived as the highest intelligence, ultimate being or 
the first cause, but a dynamic creative force, vital principle of life as the ground of life.
Starting from his fist premises, Laestadius tried to deconstruct the objectifying 
philosophical thematic, criticizing the prevailing philosophical idea of God insofar as 
it was conceived within philosophy as an absolutely transcendental Idea and separated 
from [organic event of ] human life. Coincidentally Laestadius criticized the idea 
of creation as a mystical act of some ultimate being or cause, to which philosophy 
often lead: 
“If one imagines creation as an external act, then one will have peculiar 
notions of the Creator. The Creator will then seem similar to a potter who 
makes different shapes out of clay. But it has most certainly not happened 
that way. All creation, which we now perceive in nature, takes place from 
within, and has a rather unremarkable beginning. All creation that takes place 
these days contains a principle of life, which is now a metaphysical force that is 
incomprehensible to us, originally implanted into the first individuals to proceed 
from the hand of the Creator.” (§1590. emphases added)
Laestadius also indicates that the whole of creation has proceeded via the force of 
principle of life that manifests itself in nature211. Creation is not seen as an external 
act of the assumed, ultimate Being/subject absolutely separated from immanence, but 
rather as an inner process within matter itself212, indeed, after the creation principle 
of life works through and within the matter in nature itself and as a vital function 
and force in human being. Instead of beginning with the philosophical notion of the 
first Idea (the Deistic idea of God), Laestadius assumes that is possible to proceed 
toward a more genuine notion of God by starting with the vitalist notion of the 
principle of life.
Life – in the meaning of living spirit – was originally given to human beings by 
blow of God into Adam’ nostrils (Pneuma as the highest objective manifestation of the 
211 Cf. §169 Note 1, Nature is an actualized idea, but is completed. However, the life force continues 
within mankind. See also, §225Note.
212 Principle of life is also in this respect an independent and autonomous “something” that cannot 
be defined.
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principle of life), which made man an actual human being. Thus the spirit (and later 
the Holy Spirit) are conceived as a manifestation of God’s creative act or conceived 
of as “Godhead itself ” in an immanent world.213
Thus, all organic beings are part of the same creative act of God, one common mani-
festation of the living force of principle of life. Laestadius is critical of rationalistic 
starting point and notions of God because “reason demands the first cause”. On the 
opposite side, he refers to Plato’s idea of anima mundi, the world-soul, which is not 
a mere “Idea” for it does not signify the “unconscious force of nature.” Laestadius 
seems to think that to begin with a created nature, the whole idea of Idea has to be 
conceived as substantial in the vital sense. (§1600.)
In earlier studies, Laestadius’ idea of soul has been regarded as neo-platonic214. 
The idea of the immaterial soul was an invention of neo-platonic philosophy, which 
was also commonly applied in early Christian philosophy215. However, when em-
phasizing Laestadius’ vitalist notion of the principle of life as an original soul, it 
has to be understood as connected to (or inextricably of ) the human organism, as 
a constitutive and creative principle. Thus it is not clear whether Laestadius’ notion 
of soul should be interpreted more like the Aristotelian conception of soul216. For 
instance, Aristoteles held that earlier thinkers identified thinking and sensing, and 
thus conceived of thinking as a bodily activity.217 We have to leave open the theory-
historical categorization of Laestadius’ concept of soul, and come to it here later. 
However, we can make a rough general interpretation and state that Laestadius’ idea 
of soul is a certain kind of hybrid between Platonic notion of the independent soul 
(anima mundi) and organic vital force, “life of the body”. It functions as the basis of 
all of human intentionality, and thus alludes to the Aristotelian notion of soul (soul 
is a form of the body) as well.218
Because Laestadius’ references to the ancient philosophical notions of soul and the 
theological elaborations of the functions of soul and passions in medieval theories are 
mostly arbitrary and fragmentary, it is almost impossible to analyze the relationship 
to them using only Laestadius’ own reference. Altogether, as medical vitalism offers 
213 See, §225. “Life force is a continuation of that which was originally given at the time of creation; 
the rudiment of the body is given to man by his parents, but life is given by God.” (§225 Note.) 
Cf. §224, §226, §65; Laestadius does not seem to make a sharp distinction between the spirit of 
animals and that [of ] which is a human being.
214 Zidbäck 1937; Juntunen 1982.
215 See Knuuttila 2010b, 258–259.
216 Aristotle 1986 (De anima/On the Soul). See further a broader history of vitalism, van der Eijk 
2006, 57–78. (Aristotle’s Psycho-physiological Account of the Soul-Body Relationship. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press.)
217 Taipale 2009, 5; Aristotle 1986, 427b (De Anima).
218 For comparing Laestadius’ notion of soul with the notions of soul in the tradition of philosophical 
theology see e.g. Knuuttila 2010b, especially p.258.
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the closest background of history of ideas, and is the most clearly referred background 
of Laestadius’ theory, it is more justifiable to analyze Laestadius’ idea of man and his 
notion of soul in that respect.
* * *
To contrast Laestadius’ vitalist position with the philosophical starting point of the 
first Idea or rational-mechanical stance one must raise a question: Does it make any 
difference if one begins to study nature as mechanical clock-work set in motion by 
an absolutely transcendental God that does not partake to the events of life after its 
first creative act? Or alternatively should one begin with the vitalist idea of God as a 
vital force manifesting itself in continuous creative acts in the organic life of nature 
and thus begin to study nature based on those given manifestations and phenomena 
(in man and nature)? For sure, we can state that for the former option, God remains 
absolutely transcendental, and the origins of the movements of organic body and life 
are distanced into strict law-like structures in a kind of “other-world” of the “true” 
principles of the life. 
In the latter option we face the question of inaccuracy as a law-like structure, and 
the principle of life embedded in matter itself seems to vary, depending on the body 
and matter in question. However, the reality of the vitalist is not dichotomized (in 
a similar way) and the God and soul are not reduced to the absolute transcendental 
world, but rather are manifestations of the principle of life itself, and are reachable in 
their manifestations – both empirically and experientially. The latter option fits well 
with Laestadius’ conviction both for scientific-philosophical and religious purposes 
to proceed from an internal perspective and hold the vitalist-experiential dimension 
within.219
However, despite these monistic tendencies, we note that Laestadius seemed to 
hold a certain kind of dualistic stance with regard to the metaphysical “first principle” 
that in a sense God as the first “principle” (Creator) cannot be conceptualized and 
grasped by intellect and thus remains ineffable and autonomous, but simultane-
ously only approached by intellect through its manifestations. Therefore, God or 
the principle of life is simultaneously independent of matter and embedded into 
matter, as it always functions through matter. Thus, this dualism is not between the 
(embodied) thinker and the thought (concepts of mind) but instead is seen relatively 
in the character of the ground itself; yet how could the foundation be simultane-
ously autonomous and independent (ineffable principle of life) and dependent on 
219 Perspective is totally different and creates different contraries: Idea or force, image/theoretical 
representation or event, glory/intellectual relationship or suffering/existential relationship, reached 
through cognition or as influence etc.
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the nature and human life as it always has to function through organic matter and 
human body. Furthermore, the ground is intuitively offered for human experience 
as the “foundation (uphov) or ground of life,” and thus indicates more of a monistic 
stance than a dualistic one.
3.2  Created Human Being and the Corrupted Power of Soul
Laestadius seems to criticize the Hegelian metaphysical tradition when arguing that 
the Idea (as God) does not precede the life (principle) and Idea cannot be grasped by 
mere intellect. What is different in Laestadius’ view with regard to Hegel’s absolute 
idealism is that spirit does not develop through a mere dialectical process, but rather 
through the actualization of spirit within the organic life and human experience; it 
is not an intellectual dialectical process of the absolute spirit, but rather a vital event 
within organic life and human experience. For Hegel also, creation originated from the 
necessity of [absolute] consciousness to manifest itself via otherness.220 For Laestadius, 
God is not re-presented as an idea in the first place, but still always already actualized 
in the present. Thus the self-manifestation of God is a continuous creative process 
within organic nature itself221. For Laestadius, it’s signified a possibility to reach out 
toward the proper concept of human personhood which would henceforth lay the 
basis for conceiving of God in a proper living/dynamic sense. 
“The first great word in anthropology is ‘to gnothi seauton’ [to know yourself ] 
and the second great word in theology is ‘to gnothi Christon.’ If we have a 
skewed and one-sided knowledge of our nature, any conclusion that we 
draw from it about the personhood of God will be false.” (§1384.)
For this reason, Laestadius proposed an alternative vitalist way to conceive of a 
human being as a sensitive experiential and psychic being for proper starting point 
for questioning the nature of God. 
However, even though God manifests itself in nature through creative “works” 
of principle of life, man cannot gain an understanding of God by merely studying 
nature outwardly. Instead, Laestadius holds to the classical Enlightenment principle, 
namely, that the proper notion of personal God will be relatively reached by first 
 
 
220 See, Hegel 1977 (Phenomenology of Spirit).
221 Originally, the principle of life was a creative force actualized in nature and given by God to all 
organic beings.
82 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
forming a proper notion of the human person and approach to the question of God 
and reconciliation from an experiential point of view222.
“By assuming common principle of life for both lives, many other sources 
of confusion will disappear from anthropology and theology, of which the 
former has generally provided the model for the latter. Note. Man cannot 
imagine the Godhead in any other form than as an idealization of perfect 
humanity. Drawing a conclusion from man about the Godhead means that 
it is of utmost importance to acquire a correct knowledge about man. If one’s 
knowledge of man is false, then one’s knowledge about the Godhead will also be 
false, insofar as man cannot imagine the Godhead in any other form that 
as an idealization of perfect humanity.” (§115& Note. emphasis added)
As Laestadius modified the principle of life for his own metaphysical [theological-
anthropological] purposes, it was typical for him also to modify the whole vitalist 
psychology into a theological direction. This change could be interpreted as ad hoc 
postulations, necessary elaborations based on his Biblical fundaments: As we saw 
above, the first starting point was recognizing the principle of life as a manifesta-
tion of God in nature. This viewpoint also entailed God’s creation being perfect in 
the beginning which signified that the human was created as an image of God. The 
second starting point for Laestadius was the corrupted nature of human beings after the 
fall (sinful), and the third, which he mentions in the headline of The Lunatic, is the 
psychological notions of “the Biblical authors” as well as the church fathers’ emphases 
on the precedence of experientiality – heart and organic life – as the core of living 
faith (the order of grace). These emphases or starting points radiate to all of anthro-
pology. For instance, Laestadius holds that the faculties of soul have remained even 
after the Fall because man was created in the image of God; however the passions 
that lay the groundwork for the functions of faculties of soul have corrupted. 
Thus, the emphasis on a corrupted passional nature is meant to highlight the captiv-
ity of the will and whole intellect, and subordinate them to organic life and the natural 
passions. Besides, there is the “unbroken” part of the image – the relationship between 
the faculties of soul is maintained – as neither the original soul nor the principle of 
222 The shift from the emphasis of consciousness also has crucial implications for the notion of 
reconciliation, as we will see later. Contrary to the Hegelian idealistic view Laestadius emphasized 
that God functions through an embodied experience (awakening and reconciliation), not through 
mere consciousness. “The first great word in anthropology is ‘to gnothi seauton’ [to know yourself ] 
and the second great word in theology is ‘to gnothi Christon.’ If we have a skewed and one-sided 
knowledge of our nature, any conclusion that we draw from it about the personhood of God will 
be false.” (§1384.)
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life is corrupted, as it is sinless223. However, for Laestadius, the Biblical fundamentals 
are not mere given dogmas, but rather are conceived as existential-vital conditions. 
These, as well as the relationship between the faculties of soul and the passional 
character of man is attested/confirmed by public opinion and lived experience. The 
faculties of soul and passions are experientially given (I come back to this later). 
After the corruption, the problem was that the faculties of soul and their rela-
tionship were maintained, but the organic life and passions that direct them were 
corrupted and thus sinful224. For this reason, the human intellect (the rational soul) 
is not able to reach God, morality, and reconciliation by its own power. In a simi-
lar way, God cannot be comprehended through natural reason. In a pietistic tone, 
Laestadius emphasizes that reason must be awakened and that cannot happen 
merely through enlightenment or outer educational development because awakening 
(väckelse) necessitates moral passion. Laestadius emphasized the importance of an 
embodied religious experience of awakening that changes the passionate ground of 
activity for intellect/reason. For Laestadius, spiritual and moral enlightenment does 
not begin with intellectual or moral education or development, but instead start as 
with a change of embodied passions, experience at the level of subjective consciousness 
that would be the initial (preceding) condition for the enlightenment of reason, and 
thus also for a genuine relationship with God. As I will analyze in more detail in 
Chapter 5, Laestadius held that a genuine change of mind is founded on the psycho-
physiological change of heart. 
In order to show this need for experiential awakening and reconciliation, Laesta-
dius constituted his philosophical psychology and theology; his re-definitions of the 
notions of Self, the person, faculties of soul, and passions are all directed to support 
the system which demands experiential religious awakening and psychic reconcili-
ation as the initial condition of morality and living faith: “All Christian systems of 
morality should serve to demonstrate, first, man’s corrupt nature and, second, the 
223 §192 Note 2. :”If the idea of the human being were embedded in the life force rather than in the 
element through which the life force is developed and takes shape, then sin would also belong to 
the principle of life; to the being of the soul [see,§§226–227]. But Scripture tells us that, ‘I was 
shapen in iniquity.’ [Psalm 51:5] The source of original sin is thus the seed; throughout Scripture, 
sin is said to be located in the flesh. That which is born of the flesh is flesh [ John 3:6], but sensory life, 
the soul, is contaminated by the sinful element through the passions that arose sinful thoughts 
and desires in it. Thus, not even the rational soul is as free of sin as the philosopher would like to 
believe. The philosopher views sin as something foreign to the rational soul, belonging neither to 
substance, nor that which is contingent. On that basis we could abstract sin from the principle 
of life and say: sin does not belong to the principle of life, but to the flesh. In reality, the passions 
do not belong to the sphere of sensory life but to the sphere of organic life. But as the passions 
affect the organs of sensory life, all the faculties of the soul are contaminated by the sinful element. 
Intelligence, reason, and will become the tools of passions; when this happens, the rational soul 
is as holy and sinless as the philosopher deludes himself into thinking.” See also §196 Note2. 
224 Cf. Augustine 1991; See, e.g. Knuuttila 2010b.
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necessity of reconciliation.” (§881.) Laestadius saw this awakening as an event of 
self-recognition of one’s own passional/sinful condition and as the pre-requisite for 
genuine psychic reconciliation (vs. mere juridical reconciliation).
To put it succinctly, Laestadius follows here a quite common pietistic emphasis 
of the “order of grace” where one’s own contrition, awakening, guiltiness, sorrow of 
sin and repentance is required to receive the grace of God225 as a new vital basis for 
human life, action and thought. Despite the common Lutheran emphases on “faith 
alone” and pietistic “subjective” devotion, Laestadius dealt with those themes on a 
physiological plane in vitalist terms. Thus, Luther’s doctrine of justification (emphasis 
on Grace) and the pietistic-Herrnhutian demand of subjective “order of Grace” are 
combined and dealt with on an experiential basis; Contrition as an awakened condi-
tion as well as reconciliation are now emphasized as being embodied experiences. 
For example, repentance is not only a “change of mind,” but first of all, a change of 
embodied intentionality (I return to this later in more detail).
3.3  Constant Struggle Between Good and Evil
Laestadius’ way of beginning with the vitalist stance created both logical and philo-
sophical problems. How was one to proceed to the nature of a living God if God 
was not graspable by intellect, and if all the means by which we can approach God 
were only empirical observing and experiencing the manifestations of God in nature 
(in the form of vital the forces of principle of life)? Wasn’t it necessarily a vicious 
circle, proceeding to the conclusion that was actually given in the first premise? 
What kind of knowledge of human beings and God was gained with this kind of 
vitalist philosophy? Or how was one to comprehend Evil if it was not created in by 
God in the first place? Is the principle of life, as a manifestation of God in nature, 
corrupted in itself? What was the origin of evil? How then could Laestadius arrive 
to the nature of evil by using vitalism?
In regard to these questions, one could say that Laestadius simply leaned on ad 
hoc postulations, adding moralistic or religious descriptions to a natural scientific 
analysis. This focus pertained especially to the notion of passion which was a com-
bination of vitalist and Biblical emphases. However, using Laestadius’ interpretation 
of the mythical origin of life, Good and Evil was quite comprehensive when viewed 
in relation to his vitalist-anthropological explanation within which he conceived of 
good and evil as both personifications of the passions. Here Laestadius deals with 
225 For the pietistic “religion of heart” and the emphasis on justifying reconciliation, a short depiction 
See e.g. Norton and Kuehn 2007, 972. For more detailed analysis of Laestadius’ views in Zidbäck 
1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982, 11–29.
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the classical problem of evil or theodicy in a vitalist way. Laestadius realized that 
evil has its origin in the ongoing combat between God and Evil in the metaphysical 
sphere or spirit-world, using the original Biblical myth as the horizon. The existence 
of earthly evil derives from the fall of the angel Lucifer. Laestadius believed that 
Lucifer’s egoism and jealousy against God’s self-sufficient and omnipotence existence 
was the original evilness for which God drove Lucifer away from Heaven. Lucifer 
wanted to revenge that relegation by seducing God’s first-borns, Adam and Eve, 
into committing sin, a plan that made Lucifer an actual Devil (diabolos). Thus, evil 
is an earthly fact. When falling into the seduction of Lucifer, a human being’s pas-
sions became corrupted, and the passions that are egoism and jealousy captivates the 
human person. As a consequence of the Fall, egoism especially became the primary 
human passion.226
Laestadius conceived of the principle of life as Good in-itself, but simultaneously 
held that vital forces and functions within human beings are corrupted as a conse-
quence of the Fall. Even if God reveals Himself in nature through manifestations of 
the principle of life, every human being is under the dominance of corrupted natural 
passions. By observing and experiencing the effects of natural passions, human be-
ings can gain understanding of evil itself. Although corrupted, natural passions are 
not usually recognized without an awakening, which actually signifies an embodied 
reflective relationship to the passions.
Here circular argumentation is present again. Having the Biblical myth as a ho-
rizon, evil is first of all depicted as egoistic with a jealous tendency to rise against 
God. According to Laestadius’ interpretation of the myth, the main passion of egoism 
became a part of human person in the Fall. Henceforth, by analyzing and recognizing 
those natural passions and their influences on the natural world Laestadius eventually 
concluded that the personal character of evil could be depicted as a personification 
of natural passions. Natural passions and their actualizations are predicated to the 
essence of evil (what evil really is). The same argumentation holds for the personal 
character of God.
Similarly the nature and personhood of God is revealed in these moral passions 
and divine manifestations of nature (heart of the loving mother), as far as they are 
manifested and re-vitalized in the human soul by awakening and reconciliation 
through the vital force of Grace. From this vitalist-anthropological reduction, Laes-
226 The problem of theodicy is quite similar to Augustine’s theodicy. Both see that the existence of 
evil derives from the fall of Lucifer. However, Laestadius did not emphasize freedom of will and 
its misuse as a cause of evil in the same way as Augustine did. Laestadius thought a change in the 
passions in seduction which resulted in the fall into sin. (See, §963b, §964, §1023; Cf. Dahlbäck 
1950, 42–46.) God is Good, omnipotent, omniscient, and graceful, but evil happens because of 
human natural passions and sin. God cannot be blamed for the evil in the world, but for that evil 
and passion which does governs the world.
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tadius states that God and Evil are personifications of natural and moral passions227. (In 
a sense awakening in and of itself creates the difference [conflict] for the human 
consciousness)
Laestadius believed that physiological organic passions are not innocent in their 
ontological character.228 Furthermore, Laestadius emphasized the point that the 
faculties of soul (reason, will, understanding, and imagination) naturally serve the 
satisfaction of natural passions and thus immorality and sinfulness (§275). 
“Intelligence (förståndet) ponders how the desire may be satisfied and 
devises instruments for doing so. Reason (förnuftet) approves of the act 
by understanding; reason approves of that which man strives for the most 
is that which he is inclined to believe. This is the normal state of affairs.” 
(§275. See also §266)
Due to the fact that Laestadius aimed, using holistic anthropology and psychology, 
to reveal religious awakening and reconciliation as a necessity for morality and faith, 
his expanded notion of passion can be interpreted as the radical vital-ontologization of 
sin. This aspect relates to Luther’s radicalization of sin, and seems to be an important 
part of Laestadius’ manner of elaborating a “proper understanding of the human 
being” as a pre-requisite for understanding God [in suffering and on the Cross].229 
From this perspective, Laestadius proposed a certain kind of vitalist rationalization 
of corrupted nature of human beings which is regarded as the initial condition for 
the proper Christian idea of man230.
227 I later discuss how Laestadius conceives the man/God relationship in vitalist and family 
psychological terms as dynamic “psychic” relatedness in the Chapter 5 concerning “Reconciliation, 
Faith and God”.
228 Laestadius seems to criticize the neutral use of the term “passion”, and all the neutralizing 
terminology which tries to avoid the sinful character of natural passions (§269).
229 §424 Laestadius’ intent is to show that man’s own will is actually one’s essential will, which 
signifies a radicalization of sin. Laestadius’ way to radicalize the sinful character of man can 
be seen as it relates to Luther’s idea that an understanding of God is possible only when there 
is understanding the sinful character of human beings. This idea is dealt with, for instance, in 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Luther. Heidegger concludes in his analysis of Luther’s notion of 
sin that “In summary, all these components show how [1] Luther’s orientation in regard to sin is 
completely different from that of Scholasticism and how [2] he understands sin as fundamental 
antithesis to faith. In theological terms this means: [3] ‘Faith can be understood only when sin 
is understood, and sin is understood only by way of a correct understanding of the very being of 
the human being.” (Kisiel & Sheehan (eds.) 2007, 194.) 
230 This would also entail initial requirements for genuine reconciliation to understand the “order of 
grace” properly as an initial constitutive structure of the living human-God relationship, namely 
living faith.
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Laestadius also states clearly that the devil or evil becomes personified through 
the natural passions of human beings (egoism, ambition, greed, sexual drive, jealousy, 
hatred, and drunkenness):
”Insofar as the passions are real ’powers and forces’ within organic life, which 
can lay the foundation for disease and cause death (Descuret), we ought not 
to disdain the power of the devil within man, but rather fear it as a ’fatalistic 
power’ that can produce great changes in the world. The infernal passion, 
which resides in man’s flesh and blood, may at first seem to be a ‘blind force’ 
existing as ‘drive,’ instinct, temperament, and passion – which does not allow 
it to be joined to the concept of a ‘personal devil’ that is endowed with will 
and intellect. But far from joining Martensen in deluding ourselves that 
‘the spirit is the organ of the will,’ we must assume that the ‘human will is 
the organ of the devil spirit’ (465), through which passion becomes a personal 
will and the devil, in man’s own flesh and blood, becomes a ‘personal devil.’ 
The blindly operating force, the drive, instinct, temperament, and passion, 
attains personhood through the human will.” (§913. emphases added)231
As well as in regard to the question concerning God, the mere idea of Evil is not a 
satisfactory depiction but demands personal characterization. The devil is conceived 
similarly substantial and personal as God is seen as manifesting itself in existing 
event of life – the principle of life, indicating simultaneously the spirit blown into 
man by God and vital forces influencing in organic life (monism) – and thus they 
have to be admitted as real existences. (see, §914.)
Actually Laestadius’ “naturalistic” endeavor was to question what God and Evil 
really are through a vitalist psychological analysis. (Even if both have their own 
mythical expressions, Laestadius pursues an analysis to see how they are actualized 
in the natural world, and he concludes the nature of their vital substantial essences 
from that perspective. In this sense, Laestadius’ theory of the passions functions as 
his rationalization of the notion of sin. In the wider picture, man dwells in the world 
in the midst of natural and moral passions. As passions are always awakened by one’s 
sense perceptions and they also function in the human flesh, the situation is that 
human being must exist placed in between Good and Evil. However, this tension 
between the natural passions and the moral passions, can be existentially experienced 
only through the awakened conscience.
231 Descuret regarded the religiosity and religious sacraments as having a vitalizing impact on passions 
and thus significant factors for human well-being. For instance Descuret considered hope as 
a healing passion. (See, Szabo 2009, 117.) These ideas have seemingly influenced Laestadius 
theoretical convictions.
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3.4  The Way: Physiology and Vital Phenomena
In the rich contexts of history of ideas and spirituality of the1800’s Laestadius de-
manded the more “concrete” and a “real” foundation for metaphysical, theological, 
and anthropological theorizing concerning the human soul, body, mind, personhood, 
religion, faith, and God. He blamed philosophers and theologians for grounding their 
views on mere intellectual reflection. This accusation included a critique of rational-
ism and metaphysics also in the general sense. While attacking the metaphysical 
rationalism of anthropologists and leading theologians of his time, Laestadius also 
grounded his theoretical insights mostly on the medical and psychological views 
already mentioned above.
Laestadius began his treatise by presenting and criticizing the prevailing concepts of 
soul and human reason, which he conceived as both dualistic and idealistic in character. 
In an academic manner, he discussed and pointed out their problems and presented 
his own alternatives by founding his insights on medical vitalist and psychosomatic 
theories and also lived experience and popular opinion as well. Throughout his trea-
ties, a combination of medical psychosomatic theories and common lived experience 
and popular opinion remains theoretically important for Laestadius’ way of thought 
and argumentation (§§102, 64, 103). This becomes clear especially when Laestadius 
repeatedly highlights the vitalist presuppositions, for instance, the principle of life 
as [the original soul and] a unifying principle of mind and the physical body, a view 
coinciding with common lived experience and popular opinion.
Most often, Laestadius had religious motifs, especially when dealing with the no-
tion of life and God, the role of reason and freedom of the will. However, he also had 
philosophical and anthropological intentions to elaborate on an alternative conception 
of soul against the Cartesian dualistic or Hegelian idealistic notions, which he saw 
leading to spiritualism or pantheism. Laestadius’ evaluation of rationalism saw it as 
materialism when it emphasized mere physiological and empiric aspects. He also 
criticized rationalism for turning into spiritualism when it emphasized the capacity 
of the mind. His attack extended also to idealistic theories, especially those related 
to German idealism and natural philosophy, which could be turned into pantheism 
or panpneumatism. For instance:
“If one can prove that the soul, or life, is dependent on organic conditions, 
or that ‘all supersensory perception is also sensory’ [§189, intra. Cf. 139 &Notes, 
§147&Note] or that ‘the ego that perceives through the senses is the same ego 
that thinks’ (Petrelli [1845], §100); then I hope that both spiritualism and 
materialism may collapse, and a new foundation may be laid for a correct 
psychology that more closely agrees with reality. Note. All spiritualists have 
considered Descartes’ forceful assertion (cogito, ergo sum) to be an axiom. But 
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the claim that man thinks without the mediation of organs now requires 
proof. [See, §192] On the other hand, the materialists have asserted that 
thoughts are nothing but ‘motus agiles in cerebro’ (delicate movements in 
the brain). But the claim that these ‘delicate movements’ take place with-
out a metaphysical activating force requires proof. [See, §147&Note] The 
spiritualist must pause to ponder dual consciousness, the physical and the 
metaphysical. The materialist must pause to ponder a physical and meta-
physical activating force. I believe that, eventually, they will meet halfway. 
The spiritualist will say: I believe that man thinks through organs. The 
materialist will say: I believe that the delicate movements in the brain take 
the place through a metaphysical force. This force is life, which exists but 
does not consist of any substance (Existentia, sine essentia et sine substantia.) 
[See, §§ 37–43, 90, 130, 227–228.]” (§245&note.)
Laestadius’ “half-way” or “third option” between spiritualism and materialism is 
the vitalist notion of life. His re-definition of the notion of soul as a principle of life 
radiates through all of his ideas, so that classic themes like mind/body, personhood, 
morality, perception, and spirituality, as well as the classical faculties of the soul and 
its relations and functions are re-envisioned.
Laestadius was not an anatomist or a physiologist, but he had acquired physiologi-
cal and anatomical knowledge as second- hand information. Still, he did have a close 
relationship with the phenomena of nature, as he was botanist and natural historian232. 
In his theoretical thinking, Laestadius read and referred explicitly to Xavier Bichat’s 
Physiological Researches on Life and Death233, and to Johann Heinroth’s Anthropolo-
gie234 both translated into Swedish at the beginning of the 1800’s. It is important to 
highlight that Laestadius uses enlightenment and romantic medicine as a concrete 
and precise physiological framework for approaching the human being. The devel-
opment of the natural sciences influenced humanistic research in such a way that 
the human organism was put to the center and discussed and debated extensively 
in various ways; within this anthropological emphasis the human being was often 
taken into focus in the most radical empiricist way.
Thus, at first glance, Laestadius also seems to hold a naturalistic and empirical 
approach when emphasizing the physiological constitution of human beings. Partly 
232 See, e.g., Franzén 1973.
233 In Laestadius use: Bichat, M. F. X. Undersökning om Lifwet och Döden. Öfversatt af Gustaf 
Wallenberg. Stockholm, 1805. I have also used Bichat 1815.
234 In Laestadius’ use: Heinroth, J. C. A. Lärobok I Anthropologien. Öfversatt af E. Rancken. 
Stockholm, 1837. See further Heinroth 2009/1818, 115–110. (Textbook of Disturbances of 
Mental Life. In Eghigian 2009. New Brunswick, US: Rutgers University Press). See also on 
Heinroth in Allen 2009, 173–177. 
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because of this emphasis, Laestadius’ way of thought was dismissed in philosophical 
theology as being roughly materialistic after the first academic studies on Laestadius’ 
thought235. Laestadius’ anthropology was generally taken as bizarre and obscure; it 
wondered how Laestadius could be a spiritualist as a religious priest, but then be a 
materialist as a scientist236. 
It is true that for Laestadius human being were constituted of “physiological mat-
ter”, organs, such as tissues, muscles, inner and outer organs, nerves, blood vessels, 
blood, humoral liquids, etc., which were in an intimate sensory relationship with 
the surrounding environment, nature, and world [and God through the conscience]. 
Different organs are connected to each other by blood vessels, nerves, and humoral 
activity, and they are in interaction. The human being is conceived from the beginning 
as a living organism and an embodied entity constituted of certain interrelated organs.
It is understandable then that since the phenomena of life are inseparably attached 
to physiological organs, Laestadius’ theory was sometimes conceived as being bio-
logical reductionism or some form of naturalism. However, Laestadius followed the 
ideas of medical vitalism by conceiving the different organs (first of all) as sensitive 
and susceptible seats of different vital influences, affects, and even the foundation of higher 
cognitive functions. Organs themselves have the character of sensibility, and in this 
sense they are animated or ensouled in themselves. Altogether, organs are conceived 
rather as seats of vital functions, not mere inert matter. 
Vitalist tradition debated mechanical “human machine” harshly–interpretations 
that derived from Cartesian dualism and mechanism. Also, Bichat drew a clear distinc-
tion between the laws of physics and the laws of living organic life, thus distancing 
medical vitalism from the mathematical argumentation of mechanistic natural science. 
Bichat stated that the invariability of physical laws that preside over the phenomena 
of physics, lets us apply the formulae of calculation to all the sciences that have the 
phenomena of physics as their object. However, he also stated that when “[a]pplied 
to the actions of the living body, the mathematics can never give us formulae.”237
Bichat writes of the distinction between vital power and physical law that must 
be studied with different tools, as follows:
”Attraction is a physical power; it is always in proportion to the mass of 
brute matter in which it is observed; sensibility is a vital power, but in the 
same mass of matter, in the same organic part its quantity is perpetually 
changing.” (Bichat 1815, chap. 7, §1, 80.)”This instability of the vital powers, 
this disposition, which they continually have to change, impress upon all 
235 See, e.g., Englund 1881, 435.
236 See, e.g., Hasselberg 1935, 218.
237 Bichat 1815, Chapter 7§1, 10–81.
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the physiological phenomena a character of irregularity which particularly 
distinguishes them from those of physics.” (Bichat 1815, 81)
Laestadius was well aware of this vitalist distinction between the physical laws 
of nature and the laws that pertained to organic life: One “ought not to forget that 
the force of life is of different kind than the forces of lifeless nature.” (§155 Note.) 
This view is evident in many contexts. Laestadius adopts Bichat’s definition of life 
for his philosophy: 
“The forces through which matter interacts with life are physical forces; 
when the physical forces were to gain preponderance, the body would 
become immortal. The struggle between matter and spirit is a struggle be-
tween life and death; the physical forces are, in this regard, the adversaries 
of the metaphysical force.” (§ 167)
For Bichat, it was typical to observe and analyze vital powers (fluids) within the 
whole of an organism’s relational living conditions. This way of thought indicated 
how Bichat paid attention to the world-relation of the organism in a holistic way.238
* * *
For Laestadius, organic vital functions and their co-operative action develop and 
generate innumerous variations of vital forces, creating a complex and endlessly vari-
able totality of the vital organization of living organism. This complex organization 
constituted by the interaction of organs and their vital functions forms a ground for 
human life. Laestadius calls this ground a principle of life (lifprincip) and original 
soul, which also signified the “psychic essence” of the human being. 
The organizing totality of the vital functions constitutes the unknown/ineffable 
nature of the principle of life. Once it has come into existence, the principle of life 
is not reducible to singular vital functions derived from organic functions (also from 
the passions). Even if the principle of life functions always through matter (actu-
ally), it still remains independent potentially. Laestadius stated that a human being 
can only know that the principle of life exists, meaning that it must be assumed, 
and yet a human cannot fully know what it is (§1205, 1206, 1420). This undefined 
and ineffable, but simultaneously experientially given, embodied “intuition” of the 
existence and nature of the principle of life is given as the manifestation of God’s (or 
Evil’s) creative/destructive act, everyday lived experience (whenever we try to ques-
tion what and how life is), and theoretical problem (when we try to conceptualize it 
238 Bichat 1815, Chapter 7§, 1.
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and its functions and principles). The principle of life somehow indicates all the life 
phenomena that we can only appreciate as such239. 
In the anthropological context, the principle of life is ineffable as such for two 
reasons-- first for its endlessly variable nature, which indicates its infinity and ever-
changing character; and second, because the reason or intellect in charge of the rational 
conceptualization of “it” belongs itself in the order of the vital forces of the principle 
of life, and thus can never be transparent to itself. In other words, the principle of life 
is never transparent to the human mind because that mind itself is the manifestation 
of the vital forces of the principle of life. Reason as a faculty of mind cannot fully 
reflect its own affective roots that direct its action and contents. Mind, consciousness, 
and spirit as manifestations of the principle of life are reducible to singular organs or 
vital forces of passions even though some Enlightenment physicians believed that 
they were able to localize some of the bearers (seats) of passions through empiric 
and anatomical research.
* * *
By adopting philosophical and metaphysical conceptions like sensibility, passions, 
and the principle of life and drawing several phenomenal distinctions, Laestadius 
conceives matter itself in non-materialist terms. Also, the phenomena of life are not 
to be understood in mere material terms. Laestadius saw organic matter as sensible 
or “mental” from its fundamental character and refers to panpsychism as his own 
theoretical stance. Laestadius actually limited his interpretation of panpsychism, as 
he did not expand the notion of “sensibility” or mentality (psychic) as pertaining 
to all physical matter240. By referencing “panpsychism” Laestadius only wanted to 
highlight how his vitalist stance differed from pantheism and panpneumatism, and 
he delimited the notion of panpsychism to having an anthropological-psychological 
context. For Laestadius, restricted concept of panpsychism was as technical term 
that referred to the holistic idea of man241. I return to Laestadius’ interpretation of 
panpsychism in Chapter 4, which is entitled Person and Intentionality.242
239 Cf. Bichat 1815.
240 See Skrbina 2007 on the Western tradition of panpsychism.
241 A more specific interpretation of Laestadius’ panpsychism is the task of another philosophical study 
which would demand a radical philosophical interpretation of Laestadius’ notion of a “living God” 
as proto-panpsychistic principle that simultaneously functions as a source of law-like structures 
of a physical universe and a source of vitality and the animated character of all organic beings. 
(Cf. Skrbina 2007)
242 Here it can be noted that panpsychistic philosophy of mind was common during the time. One 
can consider for a comparison, for instance: von Hartmann, E. 1950/1869 (Philosophy of the 
Unconscious. London: Routledge).
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3.5  Summary: Beginning with Nature and the Flesh
Laestadius’ philosophical theology can be interpreted as beginning with his discussion 
of the nature of God and creation. The philosophical notion of God as a first Idea is 
discussed as it relates to the question about whether theoretical thinking should begin 
with the represented Idea or the dynamic processes present in nature. Laestadius 
chose the second option which led to an anthropological or vitalist psychological 
theme. God is approached in His dynamic and personal character through the vital 
manifestations of the principle of life and the vital forces and functions in nature and 
embodied human experience. However, the principle of life does not yet encompass 
the personal trinity of God but does offer a first starting point. 
This chapter begins with the ideas of creation, fall and corruption. For Laestadius, 
the fall means the fall into natural passions, and thus the world. As a result of such a 
fall, only passions, not the faculties of soul and their relationship to each other, were 
corrupted. Even if Laestadius took a “naturalistic approach”, he had the metaphysical 
“spirit-life” or Biblical myths as a background that actually offered the fundamentals 
of his views. Also, God is given in the first premise as a vital dynamic force, but then 
approached through nature or natural phenomena, concluding that a personal God 
is a vital force but triadically constituted. Similarly, the whole origin of evil derived 
from the myth of the fall within which Lucifer’s passions of egoism and jealousy 
(disbelief ) became part of human nature. However, the personal character of evil is 
reached through an analysis of natural passions and defined as the “personification of 
natural passions.” Thus, evil is understood as the actualization and manifestation of 
natural passions within a corporeal personal life.243Altogether, in both cases, gaining 
an understanding of God or Evil, man has to proceed through the natural world to 
know the real character of these great combating personal spirits, i.e., the positive and 
negative forces of life and death, which signify [vital-existential] existence without 
being either substantial or essences (exsitentia sine essentia et sine substantia).
Due to this vitalist re-definition, it is not possible to approach God or evil directly 
via theoretical-intellectual insight, but only through their actual manifestations.
Laestadius’ starting point had philosophical and psychological consequences, as 
God is conceived as a creative force that manifests all over nature as vital functions 
and forces and material configurations of principle of life. There is no sharp distinc-
tion between divinity and the immanent world or between natural and supernatural 
forces. However, Laestadius distanced his views from pantheism and materialism in 
243 This vitalist reduction reveals actually the foundation of sin. Sin actualizes within organic life 
and sensory life and is a negative vital force. See, §§998, 999, 213, 914, 1203, 1172. For evil as 
personification of natural passions and its functioning through organs in time and space, see 
§§611, 913, 461.
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two ways: 1) by a panpsychistic interpretation of the vital principle, and 2) by positing 
the necessity of a religious experience of awakening and (Christian) reconciliation 
as the initial condition for morality and a living relationship with God. Laestadius 
conceived the vitalist stance as a common sense starting point and also as being 
consistent with the Biblical understanding of a Christian God. 
Actually, the endeavor to keep matter and life together constitutes the basic 
character and specific problems of Laestadius’ thought I show in this study First, 
he conceived the physical, psychic-moral and spiritual together and explicate them 
on the same physical plane and demand a detailed analysis of the physiological 
constitution as well as several circular arguments. Second, as human life grounded 
on the principle of life, there is no problem with the origin of soul. All organic life 
shares the animated nature and are thus conceived as a continuation of God’s crea-
tive acts. This latter point is also important for Laestadius’ psychology. Especially the 
development of the organism, human consciousness, its faculties and manifestations 
are all continuations of the creative functioning of the principle of life in the world. 
Altogether, Laestadius’ idea of God as a creative vital principle becomes theoretically 
comprehensible only from a vitalist perspective.
Further, Laestadius’ thought still ends up with the problem of Evil. If there are no 
innate ideas about God or Evil, and all ideas are constituted through sense percep-
tions and passions, how can we differentiate the works of God from the works of 
Evil? This problem finds its solution in Laestadius’ insight when he conceives God 
as the personification of moral passions and Evil as natural passions. Thus he offers 
a vitalist anthropocentric emphasis on the notions of God and Evil.
Laestadius’ approach to the question of existence, human beings, and God could 
be interpreted as belonging to natural theology and the natural philosophical. How-
ever, his thought and explications differ from the general natural theologian way of 
thought in various ways. His goal is not to explain or prove in the ontological sense 
the existence of an ultimate reality. Rather, the given ultimate reality (spiritual or 
spirit world) is explained naturalistically and thus is not “ultimate” but instead an 
actual and real aspect of the phenomenal-experiential world of immanence. In other 
words, spirituality is a natural part of the human psychic life. Laestadius’ approach 
differs also from romantic natural philosophy (naturalphilosophie), as it does not lean 
on romantic idealism, but instead on vitalist presupposition. Anyhow, Laestadius 
starts with the specific philosophical presuppositions of the ontological foundation 
of nature and proceeds to question the nature of man, morality, spirituality, and the 
nature of God from that vitalist perspective. Thus, Laestadius does not try to argue 
for the ontological existence of “ultimate reality” (spirit-life), but rather takes it for 
granted and elaborates on the constitution of spiritual life and faith beginning with 
the ontological presuppositions of nature and flesh. As long as God and Evil re-
mains ineffable existences in and of themselves, Laestadius, in a way, holds that the 
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Ideas of them are unreachable, and we must be indifferent about their ontological 
existence. However as these concepts are reached through nature and the flesh and 
are determined to be “personifications of passions,” we can interpret that Laestadius 
makes a certain kind of naturalistic anthropological reduction regarding the notions 
of God and Evil within the frames of medical vitalist psychology. 
Laestadius’ starting point can be conceived as being more dynamic in relation to 
rationalistic and idealistic beginnings. First, it is immediately reachable by empirical 
and psychological experience and may resonate with the common Christian experi-
ence. Second, it does not create a mechanistic divide in a way that leaves the immanent 
world to exist by itself after the creation. God or His manifestation as the principle 
of life is continuously present, along with evil, in the dynamic events of life.
The panpsychistic interpretation of existence as such (the principle of life, vis 
essentialis) is for Laestadius a way “into thoughts” (Ideelif ) that I conceive as the 
pre-phenomenological grasp of the subject. He is not thinking in terms of substance 
or essences as a representation of First Idea, but instead inwardly thinking of a con-
stitution of ideas through lived vital experiences (Idélif ). As a beginning condition, 
Laestadius’ position can be put into argument form as follows:
Argument 1: Laestadius’ Argument for Vitalism (From substantiality to vitality):
1. We cannot know whether the Idea of Life (God) or Life itself precedes (the 
problem of origin)(the problem of what we mean by “knowing”; as we see 
the knowing of existence is rather a matter of feeling than it is cognition.)
2. The philosophical God as an Idea is defined in substantial terms and 
signifies a bare abstract and idealized self-identical entity that cannot be 
comprehended
3. The idealized starting point is not experientially plausible, but rather a 
vitalist notion of the principle of life that can be reached by empirical and 
existential experience and affirmed by common sense.
4. Thus, Nature has to be accepted as the initial given condition
5. Nature is animated 
6. Thus one must presuppose that there exists a principle of life, a receiving, 
sentient and acting vital power that is also the core of human experience 
(affirmed by common sense and lived experience; a solid presupposition 
by its very implications)
7. By studying the functions of the principle of life research can understand 
the natural character of an embodied human being (anthropology) and thus 
move toward the proper [vital] notion of human personhood 
8. Through a proper vitalistic concept of personhood, research can proceed 
toward a relationship with an “absolute” constituting structure as such (Idea 
or God as an absolute Being)
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9. THEREFORE, there must be a Foundation and Ground for all existence 
that absolute vital Being (Idea/God) that grants life for all organic beings. 
This Idea has to be conceived as the creative and Graceful Idea presented 
in all of nature (the living personal character of an immanent God)
10. THEREFORE, Life signifies the vital principle, “animated nature of all 
things”, as those dynamic vital forces of life that manifest themselves in 
different configurations and phenomena of existence. Thus, Laestadius is a 
vitalist who conceives of God as an immanent transcendence. It is distinct 
from animism, certain sympathies for pantheism BUT still holds that God 
and original Soul remain partly transcendental and independent and not 
manifested in-itself in all organic things. God is therefore conceived as 
the/a vital principle.
Argument 2: The principle of life is the necessary beginning of philosophy
1. Nothing comes from nothing (nihil fit ex nihilo)
2. We exist in nature, and thus we must take Nature for granted as our initial 
condition
3. Nature is animated, and thus we have to presuppose a principle of life that 
makes Nature alive
4. Through common sense and experience, we can conclude that the principle 
of life is present in all organic beings
5. Man is an organic being, and thus we can study the functions of the prin-
ciple of life and proceed toward a proper understanding of man and the 
functions of life
6. THEREFORE, the principle of life (as a panvitalist principle) is an expe-
riential and necessary presupposition to use to begin philosophy/
If the primary question is about life, then the examination must begin with the 
principles and aspects of life. In this respect, Laestadius’ proceeding is twofold, namely, 
the principles and aspects of life are analyzed both in an empiric-physiological di-
rection and in an experiential direction within the Christian-pietistic framework.
However, Laestadius’ starting point is highly problematic, as its grounding concep-
tion is just a presupposition, a belief that cannot be reached or experienced as such 
by anyone. Thus, Laestadius’ philosophy is a religious philosophy from the beginning. 
However it does not include mysticism or occultism, for it has a scientific basis and 
makes a strict endeavor to explicate the experiential phenomena using the psycho-
physiological vitalist perspective.
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4  The Person and Intentionality
In this chapter, Laestadius’ conceptions of person and intentionality are analyzed. I 
approach Laestadius’ thought toward its vitalist background and analyze his idea of 
man and person relatively independently of his theological purposes244. I also analyze 
and interpret Laestadius’ vitalist explication of embodiment and the faculties of the 
soul that constitute the core of his psychology and philosophy of mind245. These 
includes an analysis of his central notions, such as the principle of life being the 
original soul, body, mind, passions, the Self, reason, will, understanding and imagi-
nation. Attaching his vitalist psychological insights to his Biblical and theological 
 
 
244 This anthropological and psychological emphasis is justified in its special reference to Laestadius’ 
own use of vitalist anthropology for laying the philosophical-psychological groundwork for his 
further religious elaborations and “system.”
245 Laestadius himself does not use the word “mind” in a systematic way. In §§644,645 he uses the 
word “hug (håg)” to signify “mind”. Overall he is critical toward the varying distinctions between 
reason, intelligence and mind. Thus, in this chapter, I use the concept of “mind” to construct an 
interpretation of Laestadius’ views concerning psychological and the mental sphere of a person 
for contemporary readers. Laestadius’ himself refers to the phenomenal sphere of mind for many 
different concepts, for instance, själ (soul) and psyke (psyche) as the most holistic notions, and 
consciousness (medvetande) and understanding (förståndet) as the main faculty of objective 
consciousness. Depending on the context, further the English translation of Dårhushjonet 
“förståndet” (objective faculty of understanding) is often translated as “mind” and sometimes as 
“intellect” (e.g. §1206). This knowledge is enlightening for the contemporary reader in the sense 
that förståndet refers to the capacity of consciousness that encompass and functions as a compilation 
of the operations of other faculties of subjective and objective consciousness. Förståndet as a faculty 
of objective consciousness signifies “the capability for thinking”, as it also operates within the 
contents of other faculties of soul, such as ideas of reason and desires of the will, and thus signifies 
the broader function of consciousness. It comes closer to what we nowadays refer to by the term 
“mind”. Therefore, I use the notion of mind as partially parallel to the concept of förståndet, but 
– in regard to the modern philosophical use of the term mind – in a wider phenomenal indication 
to include embodied subjective and objective faculties and the functions of soul. This is also a way 
to show how Laestadius’ “philosophy of mind” covers a broader sphere than the modern narrower 
concept of mind so as to encompass the aspects of embodied pre-reflective functions and the 
spatial-habitual world-relation. My idea here is that the soul (själ) and the faculties of soul can 
be transformed into the “language of mind”. The reason for bringing this concept of mind into 
the analysis of Laestadius’ psychology receives clarification when one is analyzing Laestadius’ 
re-definitions of the faculties of soul in the upcoming chapters.
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views, he comes to re-define all these mentioned concepts for his own purposes246. 
These central notions are interconnected in Laestadius’ theory; the principle of life 
as the constitutive basis of embodied life is inextricably attached to the physiological 
body or organic life, while the sphere of mind as analyzed through the term sensory 
life is not distinct from organic life. The functions of mind are thus viewed in their 
psychophysiological extent, and the passions signifying a driving and constitutive 
force of human life are in no way distinct from the embodied mind. In this way, 
passions become the link between the constitutive basis of the principle of life and 
the surrounding world. This view creates challenges for the study on the order for 
proceeding in an analysis from one notion to another. For this reason, the particular 
analyses are partly overlapping in this current study. The parts of the analysis in each 
particular chapter have to be read in relation to each other in order to achieve full 
comprehension of what the different notions mean and how they relate to each other 
physiologically, psychologically, and phenomenally.
From a wider perspective, the chapter questions how Laestadius posits the em-
bodied person within the world and what epistemic and ontological significances 
subjective consciousness possesses in human existence. I interpret the how of the 
whole subjective consciousness as pre-reflective and pre-cognitive ground that sets forth 
the constitutive basis for the functions of mind and higher cognition, while moving 
onwards constitutes the intentional human/world relationship. 
The chapter thus aims to reveal Laestadius’ notion of person and the character of 
embodied intentionality as the basic structure of human-world relation or human 
existence as such. A strong emphasis on physiological and vital embodiment, and a 
criticism of intellectualistic notions of man and faculties of soul characterizes Laes-
tadius’ way of thought. The overarching philosophical themes are the overcoming of 
a body/mind dualism via vitalism and an intentional relatedness of man to the world. 
246 Here again we have to remind one that the re-definition of the person and the faculties of soul 
seeks to elaborate on the groundwork for Laestadius’ insight on reconciliation. (e.g. §247) The 
re-definitions relate to classical philosophical and psychological elaborations in many ways. Using 
triadic conception of man as the unity of the principle of life, organic life and sensory life, with 
the notion of passions partly combined with Biblical and Augustinian notion of passions and the 
vitalist notion of vital force, by the classical idea of faculties of soul attached to the vitalist system, 
and finally by forming a theory for the co-existence between triadic man and the Trinity of God, 
Laestadius comes to elaborate on holistic philosophical-theological insight into the possibility 
of morality and spirituality with an experiential emphasis.
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4.1  Principle of Life as the Core of the Human Person
4.1.1  The Problem with the Metaphysical Notion of Soul
Laestadius’ psychology was constructed as a critical alternative to the rational-
metaphysical notions of soul and person. In order to criticize the prevailing notion 
of soul, Laestadius presents a phenomenological247 analysis of the constitution of 
the metaphysical notion of soul as substance, essentia, and existentia248. Through this 
analysis, he paves the way for his own vitalist-phenomenological249 interpretation of 
the human soul as the principle of life250. (§§33–38.) 
According to Laestadius, philosophers have misinterpreted the nature of the soul 
because they have approached the phenomenon of soul in a problematic metaphysical 
way. At first, Laestadius states that mind relates external perceptions to some es-
sence (väsendet251) and considers it as the cause of experienced phenomena before any 
theoretical reflective attribution of perceptions are connected to any kind of essence. 
Thus, Laestadius interprets the concept of essence or being (wäsende) as originally 
referring to matter (materien). Therefore, the soul is, in the first place, conceived as 
substance, thus signifying the element itself in terms of ‘chemical’ categories.
“But before man began to relate his inner perceptions to some object or 
cause, he related all external perceptions to some being (väsende) believed 
to be the cause of those perceptions (fenomenet).” (§36.)252
247 Here I use the term “phenomenological” in terms of a broad significance and to refer to the 
experiential sphere.
248 “The concept of ‘being’ (wäsende, essentia) originally referred to matter (materien). In the mind’s 
(förståndet) quest to understand everything, it added two metaphysical categories to the concept 
of being (wäsende), existentia and substantia. Of these, substantia denotes the material thing itself 
(chemistry’s notion of the elements); essentia denotes the inner nature of the thing (tingen), as 
characteristics imperceptible to the senses; and existentia denotes the outer characteristics of the 
thing that are perceivable by the senses, or the nature of its manner of acting and reacting.” (§37.)
249 “Phenomenological” refers here generally to Laestadius’ way of holding “feeling” and “experience” 
as testimony regarding the correct understanding, and to his way of holding lived experience 
and popular opinion as a horizon when he analyzes phenomena. In this sense, vitalism, despite 
its physiological emphases, turns toward the analysis of experiential phenomena, which is also 
present in Laestadius’ manner of deconstructing the notion of soul in the following critique.
250 On the principle of life see, §§112–114, 138 Note, 155 note, 159–160, 165, 167 &note, 185&note, 
appendix, 192–193, 195, 220–225, 245, 246&note, 209, 331.
251 Laestadius is not always consistent in his writings. It is unclear whether Laestadius wrote “väsen” 
when indicating his vitalist notion of soul, and “wäsende” when indicating the metaphysical notion 
of essentia.
252 Alternative formulation of this notion: Before man began to relate to all of what he perceived as 
something in-himself, which would include the cause and ground for the perceived, he related all of 
what he could have perceived via his external perceptions (sinne) to some essence (väsende), which 
would include cause and the ground for externally perceived phenomena (förnimbara phenomena).
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Secondly, the objective approach toward the phenomenon of soul enabled one to 
postulate the second meaning of soul as ‘existentia.’ In Laestadius’ use, existentia refers 
to external attributes that can be detected by the objective consciousness and perception 
when existentia is intended to mean the outward manifestations of the soul. (§37.)
Thirdly, metaphysical reflection turns into the inner sphere of the soul, gathering 
the character of soul directly from the faculties and functions of soul. (§§33, 34.) In 
this way, the soul receives its third [categorical] meaning, which is ’essentia,’ signifying 
the inner properties of things or entities not detected by the objective consciousness 
and external perception. 
According to Laestadius, this final metaphysical disintegration of the soul into 
substance, existentia, and essentia happens in the following way: 
“The mind (förståndet) relates all of man’s perceptions to some object 
(fenomenet) that is the cause of that which is perceived, but the philosopher 
searches for the foundation of all the faculties of the soul in a subject, which 
he refers to as the rational soul.” (§35. emphasis added)
Here Laestadius reveals his presuppositions of “philosophers” and “theologians” 
and their metaphysical interpretation of the soul. Laestadius objected to the idea of 
rational soul in its given philosophical significance, claiming that it resides on false 
metaphysical ground and indicates an abstract immaterial entity or essence. 
To transfer the metaphysical concept of essentia to pertain to the soul, there are 
three grounded meanings to the soul as it relates to the physical body, namely, es-
sentia, existentia and substantia. (§38.) First, the soul is conceived as some sort of 
objectified being. Secondly, it deconstructs the unity of soul into substance, essence, 
and existentia; into the matter itself, the inner characteristics of a thing, and the outer 
characteristics of a thing. According to Laestadius this approach causes the classical 
distinction between vegetative, animal, and rational soul, and because Laestadius does 
not conceive of them as modes of Being, he seems to conclude that they destroy the 
unity of the embodied human person as well. 
Laestadius states that the metaphysical approach has caused harm and confu-
sion in theology and anthropology: For the question pertaining to the relationship 
between body and soul and for the questions of the Trinity and the two natures of 
Christ. (§42.) In terms of psychology Laestadius finds the metaphysical notion of 
soul problematic as well because it divides the human consciousness, Self, and will 
into two distinct parts (inner and outer). Laestadius denies that both the soul and 
the body could be substances, for that would lead to panpneumatism, and he sought 
to establish a one and common principle for both the soul and the body.253 (§44.)
253 Laestadius makes a later distinction for panpenumatism and pantheism using the term, panpsychism.
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Laestadius was convinced that the philosophical, and especially the rationalistic, 
idea of soul that leaned on the notions of substance and essentia emphasized and is 
sometimes limited to the rational part of the soul. The soul becomes conceived to be 
as large as it is intellectual in its character, and the rational aspect (intellectual and 
conscious capacities) is then conceived as the highest principle of soul. Henceforth 
the intellectual life of the soul is understood to determine human personhood, life, 
morality, and the relation to existence and God. In this respect, human life is seen 
as governed by both intellect and reason. 
Further, Laestadius accused those philosophers who argue that soul is essence 
(being) of materialism (§129note, §§132, 137, 228note). This criticism indicates 
that Laestadius saw rational conceptualization as an “objectifying” thematic that 
does not grasp the proper mode of the being of the soul as simply the life of the body. 
Laestadius also indicated that the substantial notion of soul is materialistic and thus 
makes the soul mortal (See, §228&note).
In the broader picture, Laestadius sees the application of the concepts of substance 
(kr. ousia) and essence as pertaining to the human soul and leading to conceiving 
the nature of the human being as rational and intellectual in its basic character, and 
thus to the idealistic intellectualization of the notion of person. 
Laestadius considers the rationalistic and metaphysical notions of the soul to be 
problematic because they single out the phenomenon of soul from any connection 
to the physiological basis [of life]; the soul becomes distinct from the functions of 
organic mind (sensory life neural-life, brains) and the organic body (organic life).254 
Philosophers have concluded directly from the functions of the soul to the soul 
itself, and thus dismiss the spatial, temporal, and organic constitutive basis of soul. 
According to Laestadius, these philosophers simply dismiss and bypass the organs. 
Metaphysical rationalism conceives of the soul as either materialistic or immaterial, 
as mere spiritual or ideal. In both cases, Laestadius argues that the application of 
the notions of substance and essence makes the soul a “being,” an obscure entity, 
and a “flowing” essence without any real physiological basis. It is exactly here that 
Laestadius tries to find a way between materialism and idealism, or materialism and 
spiritualism, by holding onto the vitalist notion of the principle of life as original soul.
The main problem with the rationalistic notion of soul is that it conceives of the 
soul as a substance. This means that soul is in one way or another objectified as a 
categorized entity distinct from organic life and sensory life and distinct from the 
physiological organizations of human life. Using his critique, Laestadius paves the way 
for his alternative notion of the nature of soul in vitalist terms as the principle of life.
254 Cf. Kristiansen 2004, 65–82.
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4.1.2  The Vitalist Roots of the “Insight”
Laestadius’ principle of life in its general definition is a vitalist notion255 that mostly 
parallels Xavier Bichat’s determination of the “principle of life” or “vital principle.” In 
the opening paragraph of Life and Death that is the most important scientific source 
in Laestadius’ The Lunatic, Bichat defines the principle of life as follows:
“Life consists in the sum of the functions by which death is resisted. In living 
bodies, such in fact is the mode of existence; that whatever surrounds them, 
tends to their destruction. They are influenced incessantly by inorganic 
bodies; they exercise themselves, the one upon the other, as constant an 
action: under such circumstances they could not long subsist, where they 
not possessed in themselves of a permanent principle of reaction. This 
principle is that of life; unknown in its nature, it can be only appreciated 
by its phenomena:256.” 
Even if Laestadius does not directly refer to Bichat’s definition of Life, it appears 
to be crucially important for him. We find that Laestadius applies Bichat’s idea 
of the struggle between life and death to “[t]he struggle between matter and spirit.” 
Laestadius clearly states that “the physical forces are, in this regard, the adversaries 
of the metaphysical force.” (§167.) If Bichat is the root of Laestadius’ re-definition 
of “spirit” (pneuma), then we can gain new light on Laestadius’ notion – the spirit 






255 Dahlbäck states that Laestadius’ principle of life does not suggest any idea-realistic stance. It 
is rather a 1800 century way of shifting away from the classical philosophical concept of idea 
(idee, idé) to the more natural scientific concept of force (kraft), which became influential in 
the anthropological study in vitalism. Human being received a redefined principle that truly “is” 
or exists. This is no less a metaphysical approach though, but it does replace partly the earlier 
theological way of leaning on the concept of Idea. (Dahlbäck 1950, 25.)
256 “[A]n habitual alteration of action and reaction between exterior bodies, and the living body, an 
alternation, of which the proportion vary according to the age of the latter, is the most general of 
these phenomena. … it is then that life languishes, and insensibly advances towards its natural term, 
which ensues when all proportion ceases. The measure, then, of life in general, is the difference 
which exists between the effort of exterior power, and that of inferior resistance. The excess of the 
former is an indication of its weakness; the predominance of the latter an index of its force…” 
(Bichat 1815, 21–22.)
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of nature257. Based on these vitalist definitions and views, Laestadius began to elabo-
rate his psychological notions concerning the vitalizing significance of morality and 
spirituality. Generally speaking, Laestadius sees moral passions and living spirituality 
as vitalizing, rehabilitating, harmonizing and empowering natural psychosomatic 
affects that go against the natural corrupting forces of life/death. In this respect, 
strong natural passions and sin are also viewed as corrupting and destructive powers 
of an embodied life. The idea of the positive significance of moral and spiritual life 
for human well-being was common in the 1800’s.
In a note added later to the manuscript of The Lunatic, Laestadius mentions his 
debt to Bichat:
“Like Bichat, we are convinced that the soul, referred as ‘principle of life,’ 
is present in the fetus shortly after birth (Bichat 1805, 53), is the author’s 
absolute conviction that the same principle of life is present in organic life, 
or the vegetative life, organic life, or animal life, or however one wishes to 
refer to the organ-developing force; and that the same principle of life is 
the foundation for sensory life, or sensitive life, which is identical to the 
rational soul, although the philosophers strenuously resist such opinions.” 
(§185 Note, p. 879.)
Laestadius is inspired by thus Bichat’s vitalism, and he follows and elaborates on 
classical vitalist thought for his own purposes. It is interesting that Laestadius refers 
to the principle of life also as a certain kind of “genetic code” within organic matter 
(§221). He also wonders what kinds of laws pertain to the conception:
“[I]t is not known, however, what laws govern this union. It is not known 
whether it is a chemical, dynamic, or crystalline relationship, or polarization, 
but one could call the law in question a relationship of vitality (vitalfränd-
skap).” (§155.)
257 ”Although body and soul are simultaneous and neither is the cause of the other, it does not follow 
that they relate to each other as two distinct beings (väsende). The principle of life is not a being 
(väsende), [but] merely a metaphysical force (kraft). Yet the body is under the influence of many 
physical forces that the life force is unable to naturalize. A living body is supposedly lighter than a 
dead body, but the extent to which life force is naturalized by gravity has not been established. The 
forces through which matter interacts with life are physical forces; when the physical forces gain 
preponderance, the body dies (footnote 161 Bichat). If the life forces were to gain preponderance, 
the body would become immortal. The struggle between matter and spirit is a struggle between 
life and death; the physical forces are, in this regard, the adversaries of the metaphysical force.” 
(§167.) In terms of the relationship between the opposite forces of nature and the vital forces 
of life, here Laestadius indicated that the force of life could be ascended/risen by faith in a way 
could diminish the effect of natural forces. (See, §167Note.)
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Here Laestadius holds that all the “relationships are particular types of natural 
forces” which can be investigated. He highlights a classical vitalist stance that em-
phasizes the distinction between those laws pertaining to organic life and laws of 
the mere physical world: Laestadius states that a physiologist “ought not to forget 
that the force of life is of different kind than the forces of lifeless nature.” (§155 
Note.) Laestadius also holds that the soul emerges in the fetus “directly after con-
ception” (§165) which indicates that the soul and the living body are simultaneous 
and co-existing. In this respect, the principle of life genetically creates the human 
body. (§166&Note.) 
We also find reference to George Ernst Stahl (1659 – 1734) in regard to the 
principle of life as the proper notion of soul. Laestadius conceives of Stahl’s notion 
as scientific support for the popular opinion258:
”If one imagines the common life force as the foundation of the expression 
of both life forms [sensory and organic] in time and place, then the life force 
itself becomes the real being [essence] within the soul (egentliga väsendet 
i själen). Thus, the general public could be said to be correct in feeling that 
’the soul is the life of the body’. Note. Some philosophers have shared 
the notion that the soul is the life of the body. ‘Stahl posited the concept 
of a creative life force, but meant thereby the soul, which he assumed to 
unconsciously create and sustain its body’ (Heinroth 1837, 19.).” (§117.)
4.1.3  Original Embodied Soul – the Principle of Life
The most lucid description of the nature of soul is given by the expression, “the 
soul is the life of the body.”259 Using this statement, Laestadius highlights the non-
dualistic and embodied character of the soul, and this statement is continuously 
used as a heuristic depiction for a more specific explication of the “principle of life.” 
Principle of life as a vitalist indicative meta-theoretical hypothesis is a starting point 
for proceeding with the research concerning the nature of soul and the faculties of 
human consciousness.
258 Laestadius seems to propose that the common principle of life resolves the triadic constitution 
of man as well as the problem of the Trinity in God. (See, §116.)
259 Found also in Petrelli’s study book on psychology. (See, Petrelli 1845, §100)
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Despite his harsh critique of metaphysics, Laestadius has to admit that a certain 
kind of metaphysics260is necessary for proceeding in psychology261. Laestadius de-
fines the soul philosophically broadly as “existentia sine essentia et sine substantia262,” 
existence devoid of being (essence, väsen) and substance (or existence without being 
an essence or substance). Given this view, the principle of life means the event and 
process of life to a broad extent. 
Through this quite formal philosophical definition, Laestadius aims to free the 
phenomena of life and soul from its classical metaphysical fetters and deconstruct 
the metaphysical substantiality of soul. Laestadius states that 
“[o]nly the materialist mind is unable to comprehend that, what is not a 
being may nevertheless be, even though it does not consist of some sub-
stance.” (§228Note.) 
He conceives the notion of the principle of life first of all as the constitutive basis of the 
embodied life of the soul. It is not substantial or essential in the classical metaphysical 
sense that is described above. Life and soul are something that cannot be objectified 
or conceptually repossessed as such. He states that the principle of life is original 
soul, and it has “substantiality” in the psychological vitalist sense.263 Through the 
vitalist notion of this principle of life Laestadius claims to find an alternative which 
260 The term “metaphysic” is used in various ways in Laestadius’ The Lunatic. When Laestadius 
criticizes classical metaphysical rationalism and philosophical notions, the term is used to refer 
to the common philosophical way used to study and explicate the fundamental structures of 
being and Being. Laestadius use the term “ontology” in a parallel manner. When Laestadius 
uses the term “metaphysics” in the context of the vitalist philosophy that he leans on, the term 
“metaphysics” to receive a modified significance. First of all, it refers to the domain that is not 
directly present by sense perception, but is approachable by experience and perception through 
its manifestations. For example, the main concepts, such as principle of life, passions, and heart 
have this immanent-transcendental character. In a general sense, Laestadius’ own use of the term 
“metaphysic” indicates to the “psychic”, “phenomenal” sphere which receives different meanings, 
especially “psychological,” “moral,” and “spiritual.” Often metaphysical is used as an analogical 
terms for spiritual or moral.
261 “Although metaphysics has caused great offence in anthropology and theology, we are, nevertheless, 
unable to entirely dispense with it. It is certainly very convenient to proceed only by means of 
reasoning, but nobody will be persuaded by it, much less convinced of a truth.” (§185 Note, p879.)
262 “We have assumed a principle of life that does not have substantiality in the metaphysical sense, 
but in the psychological sense, as being an existentia sine essentia et sine substantia. This principle 
of life is what we consider as real soul.”(§752 Note. See also §§130, 227, 228Note, 245Note.)
263 If we conceive this as a naturalistic anthropological reduction we should note that the vitalist 
reduction differs from the common naturalistic biological reduction, as vitalism holds to the 
notion of the principle of life as being “two-dimensional” and having both organic and relatively 
transcendental independent aspects in the same notion. Vitalist naturalism is indeed a different 
from physicalist naturalism.
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would not divide soul into the “inner” (essentia, being) and the “outer” (existentia) 
spheres, nor conceive of the soul as an object-like substantiality. This means that the 
soul exists in a specific way that cannot be conceived as either a distinct and definite 
essence or a being. (§752 note.)
This presupposition of the principle of life gains various significances and mean-
ings, as Laestadius proceeds in his treaties, simply because he ends up with various 
philosophical-theological problems in different contexts. We have earlier pointed 
out that the principle of life signifies/has a divine origin, as it is a vital force given 
by God, or it is a manifestation of God’s existence within organic life. We have also 
pointed out that the principle of life offers an empirical and experiential starting point 
for Laestadius’ theorizing, as it always functions via matter that means the natural 
vital and “biological” force found within organic life. In this respect, the principle 
of life also signifies the generative creative force within organic matter, and a consti-
tutive ground for the development of organs and the functions of consciousness. In 
this respect, as I will note later, the principle of life signifies the “psychic essence” of 
the human person, and it functions through passions and faculties of consciousness 
within that embodied human person. Thus, the principle of life signifies the common 
psychological and experiential sphere of the human being and henceforth also has 
a phenomenological character. 
In Laestadius –studies the principle of life is often depicted and accentuated as 
the confluence or unifying principle of/between the physical body (organic life) and 
the capacity of the mind (neural/sensory life). The soul and the life of the soul are, 
therefore, generally seen as one and the same; body and the life of the body are not 
connected as if they were two different substances, but they do coincide in the actuality 
of the one living human being.264 This concept can be simply expressed as Laestadius 
often did by stating that “the soul is the life of the body”. These interpretations are 
helpful when approaching Laestadius’ elaborations, but they often still miss the con-
stitutive phenomenal role that the principle of life plays in Laestadius’ holistic theory. 
Kristiansen offers an illustrative view when sharpening Laestadius’ idea: “The soul 
is nothing but the principle of life expressing itself through body and mind,” thus 
interpreting that this life of the body signifies “the power to be.”265 For Laestadius, 
the vitalist notion of the principle of life, as life embedded in organic matter itself, 
signifies the original soul of human being. He adopts the vitalist idea of organic life 
as primarily being both vital and sensitive. Generally speaking, this means that the 
organic being is “alive,” it has “power to be”; it is manifested in various ways through 
embodied functions that include breathing, perceptions, feelings, emotions, passions, 
thinking, action, etc. 
264 Cf. e.g., Kristiansen 2004.
265 Kristiansen 2004.
4 The Person and Intentionality | 107
The principle of life is not a “thing” or a mere point of confluence – which actually 
sounds like quite a substantial depiction – but is rather a constitutive force, “a power 
to be”, an ability to receive action and re-act, have sensibilité266 in the classical vital-
ist sense267. To describe this unique mode of being of the soul, Laestadius insisted 
that the soul is not to be conceived as extensive, but rather as intensive, namely, a 
force. To go further with this line of thought, we could also say that the “life of the 
embodied soul” refers actually to the personal way of being or habituality of the hu-
man individual; the embodied way of being in the world does not only manifest the 
physical, but also the psychological-spiritual ensouled condition of the human being.
Laestadius elaborated on the notion of principle of life further for his own purposes 
(The Lunatic, Chapter K). In the beginning, he claims once again that the rationalistic 
ideas of soul and reason are unchristian as they do not pertain to the whole embodied 
human being (psyche, the flesh). To deconstruct the rationalistic notion, Laestadius 
draws an analogy between the principle of life and a law that is its own principle, indeed 
a necessary principle that, according to Laestadius, should be interpreted panpsychisti-
cally (§138. See also §§1208, 1218, 1244, 1601). However, Laestadius does not refer 
to panpsychism in its strict definition in the sense that all entities would be “mental” 
or “animated” in their fundamental character.268 Laestadius’ Panpsychism is restricted 
to organic life. Rather, he limits his version of “panpsychism” to the principle of life 
in the anthropological context as the “subject of ego” and an unifying living “essence” 
of all the dualities, especially the distinctions between organic life and sensory life, 
subjective and objective consciousness, “doubled” dimensions of Self (conscious and 
unconscious) and all the faculties of soul (see, §1218). In this sense, the soul signifies 
the unifying principle of the person. This holistic vitality and intentional relatedness 
of the embodied soul is exactly what Laestadius meant by characterizing the soul 
as intensivity. The soul is an “intensive rather than extensive order – that is to say, 
force269.” (§138. See also §114 Note.) 
266 Cf. Bichat on the difference between organic and animal sensibility. Being within organic life 
sensibility signifies a capacity to receive or to be susceptible to impressions. Within animal 
life (sensory life) sensibility signifies a capability to receive impressions and attach a particular 
impression to the specific center. For example, the stomach is sensitive for ingredients, the heart 
is sensitive to particular irritation of elements of blood in itself; “In the same way do the eyes, the 
membranes of the nose and the mouth, the skin, and all the mucous surfaces, at their origin, receive 
an impression from the bodies which are in contact with them, but they afterwards transmit such 
impression to the brain, which is the general center of the sensibility of these organs.” (Bichat 
1815, §3, 84.)
267 Cf. Haigh 1984; Williams 2002 and 2003.
268 However, it may be possible to elaborate on a strict panspychistic interpretation if conceiving 
Laestadius’ God as the proto-panspychistic principle that grants life to all the entities (law-like 
structures of innate bodies etc.) (Cf. e.g. Skrbina 2007)
269 Cf. Petrelli’s view in Petrelli 1845/1846, §88.
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Here Laestadius gives a constitutive directedness to the embodied soul. The soul as 
the life of the body is not described as substantiality in terms of its extensive meaning. 
Actually the soul is neither a merely stable “existence” but rather has “intensive” char-
acter as a passional force. In other words, the soul does not exist in an abstract space 
such as a whatever object-like entity, but is instead inextricably attached to organic 
matter and relates to the organic world in terms of vital forces, such as passions270. 
Generally speaking, Laestadius shifts from the objectifying thematic of soul to the 
vitalist, and thus, the soul is not extensive substance, essence or being, but rather an 
intensive force functioning in and through the human organism.
Here again, Laestadius criticizes the notions of essentia and substantia, for they 
would make the soul mortal. Essences could be destroyed when they were conceived 
materialistically (§137). In this regard, he indicates that the principle of life is an ener-
getic principle that does not necessarily dissipate when matter ceases to be271. However, 
because this aspect cannot be proven, he leaves the problem alone by concluding that
“[w]hat is certain is that the metaphysical force (life) does not stand in 
proportion to substance in a way that physical forces (such as gravity) do. 
The force of life can be as its most potent in the smallest of things, such as 
the seed, the egg, the fetus, and so forth.” (§138 Note.)
It is also worth noting that Laestadius holds the principle of life to be independent 
and free potentially (de potentia), for its power (kraft), but not actually (de actu) for 
its activity/action. This view is because the principle of life functions via matter. It
“operates freely as a force, but the law governing its activities is embed-
ded in its conductor. Matter is the conductor of the life force, but physical 
forces that inhibit the life force from operating freely are also active within 
matter.” (§195.)272
Laestadius gives an example of the relationship between the principle of life and 
its manifestation by stating that we cannot conceive the actual sense-perception of 
heat as the principle of heat itself. This illustration works well as an example both of 
the independent aspect of the principle of life and its “law-like” character: 
270 This distinction could also be understood as grounding the life of the soul and thus the human 
person fundamentally to the existential world-relation. The soul and man do not exist in the world 
as distinct objects, but instead are inextricably part of the full/entire constitution of the world.
271 Laestadius refers to the definition of existentia sine essentia et sine substantia as a possible proof of 
the immortality of the soul, and he also flirts with the physical law of constancy. I come back to 
this idea at the end of my study. (See, §228Note.) 
272 See also §167, and of unconscious activity §193–4. (the rivalry within the matter)
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“[W]hen heat is perceived, its conductor is viewed as its principle (as an 
organ), although heat is its own principle. Likewise, the principle of life is 
nothing other than life itself, but the materialist mind cannot comprehend 
that the two are one. The mind gropes for something that it can grasp with 
its sense (förståndet famlar efter någonting, som finns I sinneverlden); this is 
the real reason why the philosophers are entirely unable to imagine that the 
life of the soul and the soul itself are one and the same.” (§130&Note.)273
Thus, Laestadius holds that the principle of life can be conceived as autonomous 
and distinct “as a power”; however, its freedom is relative since its functioning and 
action is determined by matter, which actually means that matter functions as the 
“causal” mediator and modifier of the manifestations of the principle of life.274
For Laestadius, the monistic vitalist notion of the principle of life seems more 
coherent, heuristic, and even experientially a more plausible starting point. This 
experientially given, but metaphysical, notion is a necessary hypothesis for the an-
thropological-psychological context as well as for onto-theological elaborations275).
“We freely admit that the idea of a common principle of life is a hypothesis, 
but note that hypotheses are the psychologists’ only point of departure. 
Hypotheses, however, need to be such that the conclusions (slutsatser) to 
which they lead are not in opposition to sound popular opinion (folkom-
dömet).” (§118.See also §58)
273 See also §§227, 228Note, 245Note. On the soul as the principle of life, see §§153–168.
274 In §580Note, Laestadius deals with the relationship between the principle and idea: “An idea realis 
non substantialis (see section F.F.F.) is, to be sure, freer than idea substantialis. And if the idea is 
mistaken for substance, then it is as if the idea was entirely free and independent of the organism. 
However, it is merely an illusion that the idea is not dependent on its principle. Through death, 
the idea is not torn away from its principle = the soul. Thus it does not come freer after death. But 
that the soul itself, or the substance, is freed when it is torn from its bodily bonds is something 
that can be considered. See section F.F.F. wherein the doctrine of the relationship of the idea to 
its principle is dealt with. Generally in metaphysics, theologians and philosophers have skipped 
over this point and, therefore, fumble around in ignorance about the cause and foundation of 
freedom; they do not draw distinction between the idea itself and the foundation, the principle, 
of the idea. If the idea is dependent on its principle, that is to say, merely an expression or product 
of life, then the idea is not free – its principle is free. This is what the spiritualists claim: that the 
soul or ‘the spirit is free.’” Here Laestadius’ theory can be interpreted also as a certain kind of 
monistic functionalism.
275 What happens in the body happens in the soul and vice versa – the conscious or transcendental 
experience and physiological experience, which is based on sensory perception, are both different 
dimensions of the same perceptual whole wherein it is not possible to make a distinction between 
the outer and inner perception, or even draw a sharp distinction between ego and the world.
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The principle of life is a metaphysical force (Kraft) that intellect cannot com-
prehend in a similar manner as the intellect cannot comprehend all the forces of 
nature. However, feeling and emotion can grasp and experience the function of the 
principle of life:
”We can imagine that the principle of life is a metaphysical force (kraft) 
that the mind (förståndet) is unable to grasp (att fatta); there are numerous 
forces (kraft) in nature that the mind has sought in vain to understand (att 
fatta). Feeling perceives the activities of the principle of life, but the latter 
cannot itself – as hidden life – be grasped by anyone; neither with the mind 
(förståndet), nor through feeling. All our knowledge of the principle of life 
must derive from conclusions (slutsatser).” (§159.) However, principle of 
life is a necessary hypothesis for proceeding in investigation (§1420).
Thus, the ineffability of the principle of life itself becomes evident. However, 
Laestadius states that the “conclusions” – referring to the results, but also to the 
manifestation of the principle of life – opens the possibility of evaluating the truth 
about the notion of the principle of life. Laestadius wants to highlight the notion 
that there is not any kind of Idea that would generate “forms,” only the functioning prin-
ciple of life within organism creates organic forms. The principle of life as a genetic 
creative principle generates organs and the whole system of organic life, and is thus 
a creative force (§166). Furthermore, organs constitute the spirit (pneuma) in both 
time and place, and they cannot be created in any another way (§227).276 Laestadius 
emphasized that soul does not function in time and place without organs. The soul 
manifests itself in the vital organic functions.
“There is only one middle road for us to choose, between ideal and sub-
stantial [notions of ] personhood. If we follow the guidelines of nature 
itself, in the fashioning of human personhood, we find that we are given a 
principle of life in the seed, in the egg, in the fetus shortly after conception 
[…] [W]e must believe that our origins come from this obscure natural 
foundation. Yet life is not lawless; it is bound by physical necessity. […] 
psyche and pneuma are branches of common principle of life. If we now were to 
posit the principle of life in the place of the soul, we have, within this principle 
of life, the foundation, or the subject, for our self-consciousness. But since this 
276 By this notion, we can conclude that Laestadius’ notion differs from the Aristotelian hylomorphistic 
notion of soul that conceives soul as a form of the matter and the Platonic conception of soul as the 
highest Idea (§195). The soul is not a result of mere influences of sense perceptions; it is also an 
intensive force, embodied life, that reacts intentionally (via passions) to the world and existence 
as such.
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principle of life has not yet been defined by any thinker as ‘being (väsen) 
or substance,’ we are, within psychology freed from metaphysical necessity 
and thus able to move a little bit freer in the sphere of subjective person-
hood.” (§1205.) 
By this general definition, Laestadius draws the distinction between vital principle 
and the idea of ego cogito or metaphysical Idea or Being as a grounding substance. 
For him, they are intellectualistic, abstract, and thus problematic starting points. 
Laestadius sees the principle of life as a better starting point than pure Ego Cogito 
or Idea, for it resonates with lived experience and popular opinion (§118).
* * *
In the “ontological” sense, the principle of life means a vital force which is a panpsy-
chistic presupposition about all organic beings. The principle of life signifies the vital 
“psychic essence” of a human being and the “original soul” on which all the physi-
ological and mental processes of life are based. In other words, the principle of life 
is the constitutive foundation of the human person and its life. Thus, the principle of 
life is a monistic principle, embedded in organic life, but possessing the transcendental 
character, the ineffable, and the invisible dimension. This immanent-transcendental 
character is to be conceived in the following way: The principle of life as such is 
transcendental, but present in its manifestation and functions, common ground for 
the life of the body and the mind, a necessary ground for uniting all vital processes, 
the origin of the physiological and spiritual constitution, and the initial horizon for 
vitalist theorizing.277
Laestadius believed that vitalism offers a way that is between idealism and materi-
alism; the soul is the life of the body, it exists devoid of substantia as well as essentia. 
To conceive of the principle of life as a “psychic essence” of a human being and the 
basis of the vital event that is life is Laestadius’ alternative way out of the gap be-
tween idealism and materialism, the dominating currents of 1800’s anthropology and 
theology. Laestadius’ purposely leans on the vitalist tradition even though a vitalist 
critique of rationalistic mechanism was mainly superseded in philosophy by the 
1850’s. Laestadius chose to rely on this early anthropological tradition, and chose 
not to follow the problematic metaphysical rationalism or transcendental philosophy.
277 Heuristically we could refer to the phenomena of nature, which hides its processes from empirical 
perception, or to the otherness of the other person that remains infinitely something other 
than myself and never comes transparent for my experience, etc., which thus discloses the epi-
phenomenal character of the present nature or the Other.
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On the basis of the notion of the principle of life, Laestadius started to develop his 
own psychological and theology theory that included a wide range of re-definitions 
and phenomenological analyses of the faculties of the soul, their relationship to each 
other, the significance of passions in man, life, and faith, and therefore, a re-definition 
of man and God. 
The contemporary reader may wonder how to conceive the conceptual distinctions 
between the spirit, soul, and mind from this perspective of Laestadius’ theory. First 
of all, we have to recall that Laestadius wanted to hold and elaborate his views to 
coincide with Biblical notions, while he still respected the medical vitalist knowledge 
as an adequate possibility for thematizing and proofing Biblical notions as correct. 
Altogether, we can generally state that in Laestadius’ theory the notion of the principle 
of life coincides with the concept of spirit (pneuma), and its embodied manifestation 
coincides with the notion of soul (psyche) while the notion of mind (förståndet, hug 
[håg]) comes to indicate a specific faculty of the embodied soul or consciousness, 
which is inextricably dependant on the whole embodied soul (psyche). As pointed 
out earlier, Laestadius did not make sharp phenomenal distinctions and saw the 
relationship between spirit, soul and mind as being constitutive in their structure.
4.2  The Body and Embodied Consciousness and Mind
In Laestadius’ theory, the holistic notion of the human person was analyzed through 
the conceptual trinity of the principle of life, organic life278 and sensory life279. Laesta-
dius’ approach is that of the natural historian and natural philosopher in its character, 
and he views the constitution of human organic and sensory life to be developmental.280 
278 The idea that passions belong to organic life, but they impact anima life comes from Bichat’s theory 
(Cf. Bichat 1815, §3). It is often emphasized that Bichat was the one to make a sharp distinction 
between organic life and animal life. From a phenomenological perspective, it seems to me that we 
should pay more attention to Bichat’s way of trying to see these physiological domains as together 
in their activity. Then we can see that Bichat comes closer to psychosomatic thought and even a 
phenomenological view for how embodied functions and states constitute the basis of cognitive life 
and voluntary action, or seeing the wider picture, the embodied way of being in the world of the 
human being. This psychosomatic and phenomenological way of thought also pertains to Laestadius.
279 On the relationship between sensory life and organic life and the relation between the principle 
of life and physical force, see the response following §45 (note) and therein cited §§ 56, 111 note, 
214, 215, 222, 223, 246, 260, 266, 267, 275, 392. On the relationship between life force and the 
physical forces, see §§138 note, 155 note, 167 note, 185 note.
280 Laestadius’ way of theorizing was that of a strong natural historian and natural scientific ethos. 
Man is approached as a growing and developing organism (see§188 about the development of 
the faculties); all the human phenomena, such as consciousness and spirituality, are conceived in 
terms of this horizon (generally realistic and solid views, but when going to details, for example, 
with regard to the emergence of mind or moral, problems do emerge).
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This developmental approach seeks to form a psychosomatic insight on the human 
being, and it forms the theory of constitution, i.e., the principle of life as the foundation 
of organic life lays the constitutive foundation for the living organic human being, 
including sensory capabilities and the capabilities of a higher cognitive life. In this 
respect, Laestadius also constructed his theory of consciousness or the human mind281.
Laestadius saw advantages in beginning with the vitalist notion of principle of 
life both in regard to the Biblical notions of psyche and pneuma and in regard to the 
problem of body/mind dualism. He claimed that Scripture knows only two forms of 
life, namely, psyche and pneuma. According to Laestadius, “philosophers” however 
refer to three life forms; first, there is organic or vegetative life; second is animal or 
psychological life; and third is rational soul. Laestadius pointed out that philosophers 
struggle with deciding whether these three forms of life constitute one single or three 
separate beings (§47.282) Further, Laestadius claimed that the notion of rational soul 
(nuus, kr. nūs) is just the philosopher’s imaginary postulation that is not known by 
scripture or by physicians (§48).
According to Laestadius, the principle of life corresponds to lived experience as 
original soul, and thus is theoretically worthwhile and a more plausible “ontological” 
starting point. He sees that by using the means of the principle of life, the Cartesian 
and general dualism between the soul/mind and body can be overcome:
“By assuming a common principle of life (lifprincip) for both lives, most 
of the difficulties in which the philosophers have entangled themselves, 
by assuming the substantiality of both the body and the soul, disappear. 
When only one force is active in both lives (except the natural forces of the 
body) and serves as the common foundation of the life of the body and of 
the soul, none of the three hypotheses concerning the correct relationship 
between the body and the soul are needed. Nor is there any need for any 
of the three hypotheses about the creation of the soul, since the principle 
of life is present in the fetus shortly after conception ….” (§114.)
281 Methodologically Laestadius seems to have both the empiricist objectifying and the experiential 
pre-phenomenological perspective of the body. These could be referred to as organic body and 
lived body. For instance in §45, Laestadius refers to the co-existence of organic life and sensory 
life. This is not a thematization of body and soul or mind, but rather the vitalist conceptualization 
of the psychophysiological basis for the functioning of body and soul. These lives are conjoined, 
but not parallel, and the relationship between organic life and sensory life is totally different than 
the relationship between soul and body or spirit and body. Laestadius states that organic body falls 
under the laws of nature which are the same in form, e.g., gravity. Here Laestadius thinks of body 
as a matter (object), not as an organic passional life or lived body. When the analysis turns to talk 
about the original soul as the principle of life and the functioning and significance of passions within 
consciousness, it can be interpreted that Laestadius emphasized the experiential lived body more.
282 See further §§ 56Note1, 83, 85, 86, 89
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* * *
More specific analyses of human consciousness and functioning mind are dealt with 
under the concept of “faculties of soul.” Laestadius uses the term ‘soul’ to refer to the 
human mind and consciousness in a broad extent that covers both organic life and 
sensory life (which he coincided with the Biblical use of psyche and pneuma). When 
elaborating on his views Laestadius refers to the principle of life to the soul as the 
common basis and original vital principle of all organic beings283. The notion of the 
principle of life is needed to unit organic and sensory life. Further, the principle of life 
as original soul (the actual living phenomenon) refers also to sensory life at a higher 
developmental level which signifies the individual and the singular manifestation of 
soul, and thus is more personal. “Faculties of soul” is an umbrella concept for the all 
pre-cognitive-organic as well as for higher conscious and cognitive manifestations 
of a co-existing body-mind in the world. Within the faculties of the soul Laestadius 
makes several distinctions to explicate how sensitive embodied mind (encompassing 
the psyche and pneuma) dwells in the world. Such distinctions include especially 
the distinction between objective consciousness and subjective consciousness as well 
as the distinction between the faculties of subjective and objective consciousness.
4.2.1  Organic Life and Sensory Life as the Basis of Psychophysiology
The main distinction in Laestadius’ anthropological conceptions, was the one that was 
dividing the vital functions into organic life (organliv) and sensory life (nervliv, nerv-
life), both of which have their own, but interrelated, domains of organic structures. 
This conception formed the basic psycho-physiological foundation for Laestadius’ 
manner of analyzing the constitution of human existence in the world as embodied 
human being and psychological person facilitated by specific pre-cognitive, cogni-
tive, and intellectual capabilities. This distinction is adopted from Xavier Bichat’s 
Life and Death (1805) within which Bichat made his groundbreaking and influential 
distinction between organic life and animal life284. 
The relatively differentiated domains functioned as physiological seats and structures 
and they aggregated the different psychophysiological functions, faculties, vital forces, 
and capabilities into an integrated human person by the power of the principle of life. 
The triad of the principle of life, organic life and sensory life forms the conceptual and 
phenomenal basis for Laestadius’ theory of the constitution of a human person.
283 Laestadius seemed to think that we can also understand animals and their functions of soul using 
the vitalist psychophysiological perspective. Even if animals possess the undeveloped organs of 
sensory life compared to humans, they actually have the same basic structures. Animals possess the 
common principle of life, including original soul, sensitivity, perceptible relation to surroundings, 
and even higher cognitive capabilities, such as feelings, thinking, desiring, etc.
284 See Bichat 1815; e.g., Haigh 1984
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“But it is at least not unthinkable that these two life forms may have a 
common principle that operates through the organs, in both directions, in 
such a way that the organs – serving as the conductors of the life force – 
determine both lives. We may initially suppose that there is a ‘common principle 
of life’ for both lives (see §13 and §§ listed in footnote 21). The conclusions to 
be drawn from this will show whether the hypothesis is more unreasonable 
than the plethora of other hypotheses upon which psychological systems 
have been constructed.” (§112. my emphasis) 
One common principle united the trinity (§223). The whole distinction between 
organic life and sensory life rested on the principle of life, as it signifies the primary 
living essence of the human organism by being capable of sensibility for acting and 
receiving action. The principle of life functions as the creative force within the hu-
man being, and it functions as the origin of growth and development and the core 
of the “psychic essence” of a human person. 
 “[T]rinity as it exists within man’s own personhood. There we have real 
‘hypostases,’ or realities within single substance; namely, first, the principle 
of life or ‘abstract life’ which is able to subsist without organic life and 
without sensory life. Second, ‘organic life,’ which has its foundation within 
the principle of life; one cannot say that organic life is absolutely necessary 
for the existence of principle of life, but the principle of life is absolutely 
necessary for the emergence of organic life. The principle of life relates to 
organic life as foundation relates to effect or as cause relates to consequence …” 
(§1408. my emphases added)
Thus, the principle of life functions as the constitutive origin of the unity of an 
embodied conscious human being. 
As noted above (Chapter 4.2) the principle of life functions as the generative force 
affecting first movements, vital functions, growth, development and the life of the 
human organism, but as a general hypothesis and a “law-like” constitutive basis (and 
“subject”) of human existence, it gains various meanings depending on what kind of 
vital process is in question. This animated organic function signifies a physiological 
constitution and the development of organic as well as a sensory life. It lays the basis 
for a conscious life and the individual personality of the human being. Laestadius 
calls organic life and sensory life different life forms, and they are the branches of the 
principle of life as psyche and pneuma (spirit). 
Laestadius saw that physicians agree that man has no more than two forms of life, 
“that is, the vegetative soul – also known as the organic or vegetative life – and sensory 
life, also referred to as animal, psychological, or sensitive life (See Bichat [1805], p. 3).” 
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(§56.) Laestadius saw the possibility to explain the Biblical notions of the psyche and 
pneuma in terms of organic and sensory life, as “psychae corresponds most closely to 
what is nowadays referred to as organic or vegetative life, while pneuma corresponds 
to sensory life and denotes the immortal spirit.” (§56Note1.) According to Laestadius 
“psychae originally denoted organic life,” and the life of the senses ought to be con-
sidered as being synonymous with sensory life. (§56Note2.) Similarly, as organic life 
and sensory life are vital developmental aspects of the principle of life, Laestadius also 
viewed psyche and pneuma as separate branches of the common principle of life285.
Thus, it is obvious that Laestadius did not see the relationship between body and 
mind as simply correlated with the relation between organic life and sensory life. 
Rather, we should interpret the body/mind –relation as analyzed using the notions 
of the principle of life, organic life and sensory life to expand the notion of mind and 
cover the embodied organic and even unconscious sphere of human being as well. 
These domains have their own organic structures, but they also form a whole and 
specific functional totality together. Indeed, an embodied physiological organization 
and vital functions lay the groundwork for the emergence, constitution, and functions 
of mind. Thus, mind is conceived as embodied phenomena, inextricably attached to 
the totality of corporeal and organic processes. The mind is not an independent cogni-
tive faculty, for Laestadius refers to whole vital processes and functions of the human 
organism as “psychic”, and it becomes evident that “mind” also has to be conceived 
as a particular embodied [panpsychistic] emergent phenomena of organic functions. 
Laestadius actually accused Petrelli for not demonstrating the basic terms of a 
conjoined existence of the body and soul. (§45.) 
“The relationship between body (kropp) and soul (själ) is commonly confused with 
the relationship between organic and sensory life, yet the relationship between 
the two former is wholly different from that which obtains between the two 
latter. The body is under the influence of homogenous and constant laws 
of physics, such as gravity. The relationship between body and spirit (ande) 
would therefore be the same as the relationship between physical forces and the 
force of life, whereas the relationship between organic and sensory life is of an 
entirely different nature.” (§45Note. emphasis added)286
Proceeding in terms of psychophysiological constitution is crucially significant, 
as the temporal order of creation, growth, and development of organs radiates also 
285 See, e.g. §§1205, 1172
286 For the relationship between organic and sensory life, see §§ 56, 111Note, 214, 215, 222, 223, 
246, 260, 266, 267, 275, 392. For the relationship between life force and physical force, see, for 
instance, §§ 138Note, 155Note, 167Note, 185Note. 
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to the relationship between the psychological faculties of the mind. The temporal 
precedence of the creation of organic life in relation to sensory life and the organic 
connections formed during the creative process and development determines the 
hierarchical order of the functioning of organic life and sensory life. It follows then 
from the temporal precedence of the formation of organic life that sensory life has 
to function under both the dominance and influence of organic life and its vital 
impacting forces287. (§436, 437.)
The domain of organic life contains all the internal organs – heart, lungs, liver, 
kidneys, genital organs and so forth, which belong to organic life and form an or-
ganic basis for organic vital functions. What is characteristic is that humoral activ-
ity, neural and blood vessel connections between different organs, and their varying 
activity relate to each other to constitute the total structural basis for vital functions 
and phenomena. 
For Laestadius, Bichat’s theory serves as scientific proof that animal or sensory 
life – the seat of the mind and the individual soul that the brain is – functions under 
the dominance of the organic functions. The neural impulses directly and different 
combinations of humoral “matters” mediated through blood vessels via the heart to 
the organs of sensory life affect and dominate its functioning. Thus, the sensory life 
is submissive to the organic life already because of both genetic and anatomical devel-
opment. Generally speaking, the organic functions and vital forces, such as passions, 
instincts, and drives are brought to the organs of sensory life by nerves and blood 
where they manifest as feelings, emotions, and cognitions. This same physiological 
structure has remained in the creation, formation, and development of sensory life. 
* * *
The sensory life then is divided into two interlocking spheres – inner and outer – 
according to their physiological relationships. The center of sensory life (nervliv) is 
our two brains:
The little brain (cerebellum) receives stimulation from the inner “world” of organs 
and passions and is, therefore, the organ of subjective consciousness. The big brain 
(cerebrum) receives influence and impressions from the outer objective “world” using 
the five senses, and is, therefore, the organ of objective consciousness288.
287 Laestadius is highly interested in developmental theory and its perspective which reveals his 
natural scientific and natural philosophical character.
288 “We may call the part of the brain affected by red blood the organ of subjective consciousness or 
the organ of the inner senses (inre känslornas organ); while the objective part of the brain may 
be called the organ of objective consciousness.” (§ 181. See also §§ 180, 239).
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Thus, the experiential sphere of the sensory life (consciousness) is a manifestation 
of the totality of organic functions and vital influences based on the principle of 
life, the ineffable and basically undefined totality that is also called the original/real 
soul, indicating that it covers all the original functions and forces of the organic life. 
The conscious sphere of the sensory life (nervlif ), is called the genuine soul, which 
indicates the individual aspects of the life of the soul, and has to be conceived of and 
viewed as the “higher developmental stage” of the original soul.
 “[S]ensory life defines the individual[ity] (bestämmer individualiteten) 
while organic life defines personality.” (§473.) “Sensory life is apparently 
fashioned for this world, and may rather be called individuality, than per-
sonhood.” (§711.)
This whole of these organic and sensory vital functions constitutes the organic and 
neural foundation of the psychological-physical existence of man, a fully embodied basis 
of experiential life. At the formal level we have then Laestadius’ idea of the common 
principle of life, which is the shared animated and constitutive basis for all organic 
beings and the idea of a more individual sphere of soul as the manifestation of the 
organic functions that exist within the sensory life.
With regard to the sensory life as a genuine individual sphere, we have to be more 
precise. The sensory and neural life has its physio-neural basis within the body func-
tions, but the sensory life refers also to the whole psychological sphere of conscious-
ness. Moreover, the sensory life covers both subjective and objective consciousness, 
as it is not only (a domain of ) the manifestation of inner organic passions, but also 
receives influences and impressions from the objective sensory world.
“The passions belong to organic life: thoughts, or intelligence, reason, 
memory, will, and so forth belong to sensory life. Yet the activities of sen-
sory life depend on vegetative life; that is to say, the will is dependent on 
the heart, or the passions. The passions have their organs in the sphere of 
organic life. We refer to the passions as subjective faculties of the soul due 
to the position and nature of their activity; not because they are subject to 
the will, but because their organs are located beneath the organs of sen-
sory life. Intelligence, reason, will, and others, we may refer to as objective 
faculties of the soul, similar to the objective senses that receive impressions 
from the sensory world in a more direct way.” (§222.)
The sensory life is simultaneously both a domain of outer impressions moving 
through the senses and the receptive domain of inner influences coming through 
nerves and blood. Objective consciousness is made up of sense perceptions’ receiving 
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impressions from the outer world and simultaneously modified and influenced by 
the states of subjective consciousness289, namely, organic functions such as passions. 
Thus, the individual manifestation of the soul (principle of life) is always a matter 
of (or due to) how the individual in question relates to his/her particular surrounding 
world with his/her subjective characteristics based on his/her unique organic con-
stitution and vital organization. Generally speaking, the individual soul that covers 
both subjective and objective relatedness (body, world, and vital forces) refers in a 
way to the structure and constitution of the individual and personal habituality or the 
[vital] personhood. I later come back to discuss the “individual soul” and the process 
of perception in more detail when I discuss the subjective and objective faculties of 
the soul (Chapter 4.2.3).
From a vitalist perspective then, it becomes understandable what Laestadius 
meant when he stated that the relationship between the faculties of the soul 
coincide/equate with the relationship between the organs in responsible of their 
faculties. He indicated especially the relationship between the subjective and ob-
jective faculties of soul. Because of the developmental precedence of organic life 
and its vital dominance, the organic life and thus its subjective faculties dominate 
the objective faculties of the soul or objective consciousness as a whole. Further, 
Laestadius also held that the relations between the faculties of objective conscious-
ness, such as reason, will, and understanding, were related to each other in an 
analogical way as their organic seats. This aspect pertains especially to the order 
of the influences of passions to the sensory life with the primal principle here be-
ing that passions that function through same organs cannot have conflicting impacts on 
the objective faculties of the soul. Only when the passions originate from different 
organs that are opposite to each other in their influences, can they manifest op-
posite and conflicting cognitive states in the mind (or in the faculties of objective 
consciousness). Further, the primal principle is that the stronger passion gets its 
impacts through to the sensory life.
“These physiological observations prove that the faculties of the soul 
operate through the organs; that the capacity of the organ give rise to a 
corresponding capacity of the faculty of soul. Or, to put it differently, that 
the capacity of each faculty of the soul has a corresponding capacity in the 
 
 
289 Sometimes Laestadius equated subjective consciousness with the subconscious sphere or 
unconsciousness. It can also be assumed that Laestadius inherited his notion of the unconsciousness 
from Carl Gustav Carus. However, the states of subjective consciousness are not self-conscious/
aware in a sense that they are reflected or lifted up to awareness by the faculties of the objective 
consciousness. 
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organs, whereof the faculties of the soul are related to each other in the 
same way as their respective organs are related.” (§26290.)
Here Laestadius followed the physiological theory of Bichat and constructed a 
psychosomatic theory of the relation between organic functions and operations of the 
soul and mind. Laestadius thought that dualist philosophers would argue the soul to 
be some kind of entity which modifies the organs, but according to Laestadius, the 
relationship ought to be understood the other way around. He provocatively stated 
that organs are modifying the soul. Laestadius simply wanted to highlight the pri-
mality of organic functions over the condition of “embodied soul” namely, that “the 
activity of the soul always corresponds to organic activity.”291
Here it is enough to point out the physico-psychic triadic constitution of man 
as an initial constitutive ground for the possibility of higher conscious activity and 
functions.
“[In] this treatise it has been shown that the principle of life is the actual 
being of the soul (egentliga själs väsendet); that it is free as an active force; 
that the force of life is not dependent on man’s will. We have also shown 
that organic life is not dependent on man’s will. We have also shown that 
organic life existed prior to sensory life or the rational soul; that sensory 
life springs forth from organic life and has its foundation therein, and that 
the activity of sensory life is dependent on organic contingencies: that man 
thinks through organs, will through organs, and so forth.” (§436.)
4.2.2  Subjective Consciousness and Objective Consciousness
In The Lunatic, the more detailed analysis of the whole of experiential sphere is 
worked through using the interlocking notions of subjective consciousness and objec-
290 According to Laestadius, the precedence of the organic functions pertains also to the supernatural, 
as the Devil and Holy Spirit must “work in man through the organs.” (§26. reply to Dahl.) I do 
exclude the last sentence of §26 because there remains some doubt whether it was written by 
Laestadius. The sentence is not found in Mustakallio’s Finnish translation (1968), but it does 
emerge in Strindberg’s English translation (2015) with a note that the sentence was added later, 
“probably by Laestadius.” This sentence states that “Beyond this, they are not related.” Laestadius’ 
view on the relations between the faculties is ambiguous; even if his vision is based on organicist 
manifestations, it does not signify that the states of the faculties would not have influenced each 
other. What he meant is that the relationship between the faculties is always based on physiological 
processes. These will be further analyzed later.
291 With regard to the primal importance and even the precedence of organic functions with respect 
to higher functions of the mind and soul, Laestadius’ views can be analyzed in terms of the James-
Lange –theory. This analysis falls out of the framework of this study, however. See for further 
comparison, e.g., James 1890/1950; Cannon 1927; Perry 1935; Redding 2001; Lang 1994.
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tive consciousness (medvetande). The distinction belongs to the sphere of sensory life 
(nervlif) and pertains to the phenomena of mind as a domain of embodied conscious-
ness. Generally speaking, it refers to the rather problematic distinction between the 
inner and outer spheres of experience and is deconstructed from a medical vitalist 
basis.292 Thus, the two consciousnesses naturally have a physiological foundation and 
are conceived as particularly sensible capabilities of the human person.
Subjective and objective consciousness (medvetande) as phenomena are psycho-
physiologically intertwined, and they form the undivided whole of human experiential 
reality. Usually, the notions of “experience” are properly disclosed by combining the 
subjective and objective consciousness. This means that all the experiences are always 
constituted of both subjective and objective consciousness conditions. Thus, the 
distinction indicates that there is never a mere empirical sense perception that is 
independent of the conditions of the subjective consciousness. Also, the subjective 
conditions are always stimulated by sense perception, as will be seen in more detail 
when analyzing the functions of passions.
 Objective consciousness is first of all responsible for the [sensory] relationship 
to the world outside, or objective surroundings, from where it takes on influences or 
impressions for the organs of objective consciousness via the five senses.293 Objective 
consciousness refers to the realm of consciousness known as cognitive awareness, 
which is based on the organs of sensory life, namely, the big brain [cerebral].
Based on the grounding principle of the subordination of sensory life to organic 
life, objective consciousness is seen as conditioned (subordinated) by subjective 
consciousness. Subjective consciousness is not directed outside in the first place, 
but “inside” – or rather it is open to organic life – as it takes its influences from the 
organic life and passions through the blood and nerves.294 This thus emphasizes the 
292 Pressured by a rational-mechanistic worldview and rationalistic-metaphysical theology Laestadius 
sought for better fitting views to use to approach the phenomena of life and faith. Laestadius 
realized that matters of life, such as sorrow and joy, as well as matters of faith could not be 
understood by simplifying and objectifying reason, but rather by using the heart (subjective 
consciousness, passions and emotions). (See, §§100–104.) In a sense then, Laestadius thematized 
a distinction between the mathematical natural scientific approach and the more hermeneutic 
experiential approach. Heart came to signify the whole field of inner and existential experience 
and perception. The phenomenological-existential field of inner experience and perception 
differed also from the outer and empirically direct experience and perception. On the other hand, 
Laestadius was trying to find an alternative for empiricism and a materialistic explanation and 
also for idealism and spiritualistic explanations. Through applying the notions of subjective and 
objective consciousness Laestadius thematized his holistic theory of experience and perception.
293 See, §239.
294 For the subjective consciousness [SC] see, §§ 242, 627 [SC is a domain of red blood, mere senses, 
and the inner eye], 744 [SC is the receptive organ of good and evil], 745, 753 [the whole soul 
constitutes the person, SC is the organ of conscience], 1207 [SC as an authentic self ], 1211 [SC 
as a feeling self ], 1582 [SC depends on the organs and covers the emotions of the heart].
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common vitalist scheme of things where the domain of consciousness (cognitive 
life or “mind”) does not restrict/delimit or demarcate only to the animal/sensory 
life or brains, but rather is intertwined with the internal organs and the whole of 
the embodied vital organic functions as well295. For Laestadius, this way of thought 
signified the emphasis of the functions of the internal organs, their relation to each 
other, and the influences of the vital forces of passions over the entire consciousness. 
In this sense, both the subjective and objective consciousnesses are constitutive mani-
festations of the physiological organization and functions of the organic life and the 
sensory life. However, the relation between subjective and objective consciousness 
cannot be analyzed and depicted without paying attention to the mediating func-
tions and actions occurring between the relatively distinct physiological structures. 
All physiological impacts, such as sense perception and the functions of susceptible 
organs, are based on neural activity, as well as the organic activity of the humours, 
especially excited by the passions. 
The distinction between subjective and objective consciousness is comparable 
to the physiological organization in such a way that the organs of sensory life are 
subordinated and passive in relation to the organic life. They have to receive the in-
fluences awakened by passions and mediated for the organs of consciousness by the 
blood and nerves. For this reason also, the faculties of soul have to remain in relation 
to each other as their respective organs also do: 
“And insofar as the brain is always physically in a passive relationship to 
the heart, then the metaphysical brain – sensory life, or the rational soul 
–must also be in a passive relationship to the metaphysical heart296, that is 
to say, the objective faculties of the soul – intellect, reason, will, conscience, 
memory, imagination – must be passive in relation to passions.” (§437.)297
When referring to the “metaphysical brain” and “metaphysical heart” Laestadius 
actually focused on the phenomenal and spiritual experiential sphere, which was a 
manifestation of the functions of the named organs. I come back to this idea later in 
the chapter on the psychophysiological foundation (Chapter 5). The idea, however, is 
that the experiential manifestations are also based on the physiological constitutional 
295 Cf. e.g. Haigh 1984; Williams 2002.
296 Thus, the moral and the spiritual are regarded as based on organic life, namely, on the moral passions, 
but their actualization emerges in the manifestations of the sensory life. Sensory life and the 
objective faculties of soul are important for executing moral thought and action and directing 
whole intentionality of the human being, but they still remain subordinated to the passions of 
heart, which is herein named the “metaphysical heart” to emphasize that heart’s central role as 
the sensible-susceptible center of passions.
297 “This is the foundation of the passivity of the will.” (§438.)
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asymmetrical relationship between the subjective and objective consciousness. In the 
wider picture, the embodied Self (jaget/ego) is under the influence of direct empiric 
sensory influences and the mediated influences of the organic functions.
In this way, Laestadius thought that the influences of organic life and its vital 
forces manifested and “interpreted” in the subjective consciousness were crucial for 
the emergence, constitution, and functioning of whole consciousness, awareness and 
experiential phenomena.
In Laestadius’ theory, the experiential core (existence and faith) is moved from 
autonomous intellect or reason into the holistic organic and embodied subjective 
consciousness and its faculties. This experiential core is also called the heart, genuine 
self and sometime the unconsciousness, referring to Carl Gustav Carus’ (1789–1869) early 
invention of the psychoanalytic notion of unconsciousness298 that Laestadius saw as 
coincidental to his own idea of subjective consciousness (§194Note,§423Note).299
4.2.3  Subjective and Objective Faculties of the Soul
At the beginning of his treatise, Laestadius states that normally all people are aware of 
the existence of the faculties of soul and that all the faculties of soul have been named 
while the people were still “inexpert in these matters, long before the philosophers 
began speculating.” (§4&reply.) By this statement, Laestadius indicates that facul-
ties of soul, such as reason, will, understanding, and imagination, rather than being 
imaginary postulates, are real and genuinely experiential phenomena. However, he 
also notes that there is still no agreement on the functions of each particular faculty, 
and that each is not defined precisely because the psychology still had an insufficient 
discipline (§4). Laestadius then proceeds to depict these faculties in vitalistic terms 
and in their critical relationship to their rationalistic and intellectualistic defini-
tions. In general, the re-definitions of the faculties of soul are based on the critique 
of intellectualistic300 definitions of these faculties as far as they are grounded on the 
metaphysical notion of soul as substance and essence (distinct faculties of transcen-
dental subjectivity without any physiological basis).
Within the conceptual distinction between subjective and objective consciousness 
Laestadius also differentiates the spheres of subjective from the objective faculties of 
298 Cf. Carus 1989. (Psyche: on the development of the soul. Part One, The unconscious.) In Laestadius’ 
use: Carus: Psyche zur Entwicklungsgeschihcte der Seele, Stuttgart 1851. See further Bell 2010. 
Cf. Sundén 1956, 21–36. (Sigmund Freud och Lars Levi Laestadius: vid hundraårs-minnet av Freuds 
födelse.)
299 As an idea, this one is not original, but its explanatory and interpretative pre-phenomenological 
formulations make it philosophically interesting: The core of metanoia, conversion, is not in the 
human intellect but in the heart – the entire embodied human being.
300 I use the terms “intellectualistic” and “intellectualism” to refer to the metaphysical rationalism 
and transcendetalism that Laestadius criticized.
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soul (själsförmögenheterna). In this respect, the sphere of consciousness is structured 
by fastening the classical faculties of soul – memory, reason, understanding, will and 
imagination – using the vitalist psychophysiological basis. Thus, the faculties are 
redefined within vitalist psychophysiological framework. It signifies that these facul-
ties are depicted as more or less organicist receptive and perceptive capabilities which 
are related both to outer empirical influences or impressions and internal organic 
influences. Overall, the faculties of soul human being are conditioned and situated 
in the midst of the world. Faculties are sensory capabilities (senses) rather than mere 
distinct cognitive faculties of “mind” or “intellect”. Laestadius emphasized especially 
the passions as embodied subjective faculties, which function through organic life 
driving the forces of human life and laying the ground for certain specific objective 
faculties and functions of consciousness or mind. 
In Laestadius’ theory, the faculties of soul are derived from the relation between 
subjective and objective consciousness. Further, he states that faculties are both “dis-
tinct and specific.” (§246.) Naturally, faculties are based on the vital sensibility and 
power of the principle of life, which functions as the “the fulcrum of all faculties of 
soul,” and is thus a constitutive basis for the unity of man. (§246Note.) Laestadius 
defines the faculties of soul as follows: 
“By objective faculties of the soul are meant memory, reason, will, and 
imagination, all of which have their corresponding organs in the objective 
part of the brain. Subjective faculties of the soul are those of the heart; the 
passions.” (§30Note2.)301 
Later Laestadius adds juridical conscience, which signifies the knowledge of right 
and wrong, to the objective faculties.302As well he adds emotions, instincts, character 
and passions into the subjective faculties. Passions is said to signify heart in spiritual 
meaning (later spiritual conscience) (§246).303
301 For objective faculties, see Sections N-Q and W-Ö. For subjective faculties, see sections Q-V. Cf. 
§§ 181, 246.
302 ”Juridical conscience” as an objective faculty contrasts with the “spiritual conscience” which 
belongs to the subjective sphere. With this distinction, Laestadius seems to indicate that man has 
a natural moral capability objectively, but it is insufficient, as it could turn into moral calculation 
and does not function on the basis of moral emotions and experiences as spiritual conscience 
would. This distinction naturally relates to his later distinction made between juridical and psychic 
reconciliation, which I will analyze later in Chapters 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 and 5.5.4.
303 Juridical conscience as a reflective sense of right and a concept of right and the subjective faculties 
is said to include “all kinds of feelings, instincts, desires, temperament, and passions; or the heart 
in spiritual sense.” (§246. See also §246Note: On the unity of man and the principle of life.)
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The faculties of objective consciousness are memory, understanding (förstånd) reason 
(förnunft304), will (önska), imagination (inbillning) and juridical conscience (seat: 
brains).305 As objective consciousness relates to the world outside or objective sur-
roundings through the five senses, faculties such as reason, will and understanding 
are also attached and directed toward the present outer objectified world. Objective 
consciousness indicates the realm of cognitive awareness and factual directedness 
of a human being (mind and action) that pertains to the phenomena of sensory life, 
seated on the cerebral.306
Faculties of subjective consciousness are passions, instincts (instincter), drives (drift-
er), character (temperament), emotions (känslor), and moral-spiritual conscience307. 
They refers to the influences and impacts of organic functions and indicate the inner 
pre-cognitive sphere seated in the cerebellum, which as the receptive organ, functions 
as the seat of the manifestations of subjective impacts. We can thus interpret that 
Laestadius refers using the faculties of subjective consciousness to the lived and own-
most pre-reflective and pre-cognitive dimension of experience on a phenomenolog-
ical-existential level which have also their own particular physiological constitutive 
basis. As far as Laestadius states that subjective consciousness is primal within man’s 
relation to existence, that experience is not conceived as a cognitive representation in 
the first place, but rather as an intimate feeling within the psycho-physiological body 
 
304 Laestadius differentiated the notions of reason and understanding, holding that reason is a 
“faculty of ideas” (§596) and understanding is a “faculty/capability for thinking.” (§625); however, 
Laestadius also stated that the distinction is relative. For mote on the faculties of soul and their 
organs, see §§30, 33, 34, 97, 98, 112, 139; notes 1, 2, 145, 146, 222, 246. By combining the vitalist 
notion of heart and Biblical idea of heart as the source of good and evil; see §§ 62, 88, 124note, 
128 note, 147, 202, 218 note, 267note, 318, 413, 437, 455, 458, 478, 539, 619, 622, 713, 715–739, 
744–747. Sometimes, Laestadius refers to the heart as having “physical, metaphysical and moral 
significance”; see §§267, 202, 753. Juntunen points out that Laestadius used “metaphysics in two 
different significances ( Juntunen 1982, 56): Classical parallel to ontology; §§40, 43, 56, 78&note, 
79, 90, 185 note, 229, 1179. In this classical philosophical use, metaphysics usually has a negative 
meaning. On the other hand, “metaphysical” is seen as necessary and indicates an anthropological-
psychological constitutional level as a “heart in metaphysical significance,” referring to the whole 
sphere of subjective consciousness and psychic-physiological sphere: §§407, 425 note, 437, 595, 
619, 677, 748, 753, 1177a, 1185 note. Dahlbäck (1950, 36) interpreted what Laestadius meant 
by the “metaphysical heart” principle of life. 
305 Cf. Juntunen 1982, 53–56.
306 In regard to what man is aware of, objective faculties play the dominative role in everyday 
life. Principles of reason, desires of the will and concepts, ideologies, views and theories of 
understanding together and in many combinations structure our daily relationship with the world, 
ourselves and God. In a sense, the contents and intentions of these objective faculties constitute 
the public sphere of everyday human existence.
307 Laestadius did not make a clear distinction between the moral and spiritual, as he conceived both 
of them as being awakened by the physiological moral passions.
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and thus a presentation of something “touching,” indeed, an embodied relationship 
with the world with both objective and subjective aspects.
Subjective and objective faculties are interrelated and interactive, but they also have 
an asymmetrical relationship with each other. The first principle is that all faculties 
function under the influence of organic life and passions (psychic necessity). Laes-
tadius’ quest for the organicist description of faculties began by insisting that inner 
experiences must also have a receptive organic basis similarly to what outer senses 
have with their respective organs (§30). Faculties of objective consciousness have 
specific relations to each other, depending on their position in the organic structure 
(physiological order). These relationships between the faculties depend also on the 
influence of different passions on particular faculties.
“We have also shown … that the organs of sensory life are in a passive 
relationship to organic life, so that the brain must receive impressions 
from the blood and the nerves. For this reason, the faculties of the soul 
must be in like relationship to each other, as their respective organs are to each 
other, wherefore also sensory life is in like relationship to organic life as 
the brain is to the heart. And insofar as the brain is always physically in a 
passive relationship to the heart, then the metaphysical brain – sensory life, or 
the rational soul – must also be in a passive relationship to the metaphysical 
heart, that is to say, the objective faculties of the soul – intellect, reason, will, 
conscience, memory, imagination – must be passive in relation to the passions.” 
(§437. my emphasis) “This is the foundation of the passivity of will. How-
ever, these pieces of evidence are only physiological, and are not binding 
to the philosopher who demands mathematical, logical and metaphysical 
evidence.” (§438. emphasis added) 
Faculties have their respective organs as seats, but theoretically/phenomenally 
they are described indicatively; their functioning, character, and content vary in re-
gard to the driving passions and situation they function (these expand the notions 
of objective faculties into the experiential-phenomenal sphere as will be seen later 
in the analysis of the notion of passion). Faculties of soul encompass the whole 
domain of conscious and unconscious activity that forms the basis for the expanded 
notion of person. 
As will be seen, Laestadius struggled with thematizing the complex and ambigu-
ous relationship between subjective and objective consciousness. The challenge lays 
in depicting and defining particular objective faculties as distinct capabilities and 
simultaneously keeping them subordinated to the impacts of organic life. For instance, 
spontaneity does not pertain to the objective faculties of soul but rather to subjective 
faculties (§30Note). Given this circumstance, Laestadius highlights the point that a 
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human being is first of all susceptible – by the nature of having a “sensitive soul” as 
a principle of life – to the influences of outer sense perceptions and the impacts of 
inner passions, drives, instincts, and feelings. Objective faculties do not possess the 
capability for action and re-action and spontaneity within themselves without sensory 
and organic passionate impacts. They also lack moral quality in and of themselves, 
and they only have capability for receiving qualitative influences and functioning 
according to them. In other words, a human being is subject to sensory impacts and 
forces of life, known as passions, which signify actual and real activity within human 
existence. Whatever human act and action is possible and determined by this fun-
damental susceptibility, the autonomous activity that resides in the human mind has 
only a capability for re-action (receptivity) to the sense perceptions, impressions, and 
influences and impacts of organic life.308 The whole sensory life, including subjective 
and objective consciousness and their functions, rest on the basis of the organic life 
and its functions.
4.2.4  The Passions as Vital-Intentional Correlates (nexus)
Passion is a classical philosophical and psychological term, which refers to movements 
of the soul, suffering, instincts, emotions, desire, agony, etc. It is a term that has a long 
philosophical and theological history. Within theology, “passion” is often used for 
the analysis of the sinful character of man, suffering and also the manifestations of 
original sin. Overall, “passion” is a term used in philosophy and theology to denote a 
pre-reflective and pre-cognitive sphere of human existence, conceived to disturb the 
use of reason and higher cognitive functions. Passions are also conceived as more or 
less fundamental affective conditions that manifest within a human being’s actual 
relationship to the world and existence. The passions are thus seen as more funda-
mental forces that precede emotions and feelings. Because of their fundamental and 
uncontrollable character, these passions are most often seen as irrational forces of 
human life which should be subjugated and controlled by reason. However, passions 
are also seen as the grounding and necessary forces of action, thought, and human 
life in general, and they are sometimes viewed as having important significance for 
morality and religiosity.
Together with the principle of life (lifprincipe) passion is the main concept of Laes-
tadius’ anthropology and psychology. The notion of passion is the most important 
“faculty” indicating a vital power and the moving force of subjective consciousness, 
308 Later when dealing with the degrees of freedom from sin (Chapter 4.2.7), Laestadius makes 
a distinction between acts (handling) and deeds (gerning) in the following way: “[D]esires and 
thoughts are acts for which man is responsible since he has the power or capability to struggle 
against his wicked desires. On the other hand, a deed is what man does with the members of the 
body, which are subject to the will.” (§823.)
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and it is central to Laestadius’ psychological, moral, and religious thought309. Even 
if the notion of passion belongs to the group of other subjective faculties, including 
instinct, drive, temperament and emotion, it remains the most central aspect of the 
subjective sphere, and thus I mainly focus on passions here.
Laestadius tells that he abandoned the prevailing theories of passion because he 
could not find what he needed – namely, the notions of “grace” or reconciliation – 
from them, as they erred into objective speculation and depicted man mainly in the 
natural state. Laestadius indicated that objective speculation of the passions lost the 
experiential phenomena of the movements of soul. He preferred to lean on the Bib-
lical authors310and compared their views with “the experiments of the unprejudiced 
physiologists and the reformers’ doctrine of the corrupt nature of man.” (§264) He 
also claimed that physicians who “base their opinion on physiological discoveries 
agree with the Biblical authors.” (§1002) Laestadius especially found Bichat’s insights 
to be important and fitting his own views311.
309 Cf. Englund 1881; Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982; Kristiansen 2004. The term 
passion was commonly used in anthropology also in 1800’s Sweden. Petrelli uses the term 
‘passions’ as part of the analysis of will ( Juntunen 1982, 59). Juntunen assumes that especially 
Descuret’s conception of passion influenced Laestadius’ notion of it. Descuret particularly dealt 
with passions and conceives of them as a human being’s affected and influenced state. Human 
being was the subordinate to the passions. Descuret also drew a distinction between passion and 
affect. so that the former indicated the fundamental needs (boisons) of exsistential modes (or 
ways of being) and the later referred to reactions. (Descuret 1841, 1–9.) The notion of passion 
was central naturally for Bichat; he used passion as a founding vital force and function of human 
beings. Laestadius interpreted Bichat’s common idea as that “passions determine the moral 
character of the human being,” (§§ 258, 260, 261, 405, 771s, 1233, 1243) the thought that is 
central in Laestadius’ philosophy of mind, morality, and analysis concerning freedom of will. 
(Cf. Juntunen 1982, 59, footnote 31.) Åberg stated that Laestadius adopted the notion of the 
dominating position of passions and the heart from Bichat (Åberg 1997/1964, 23–26). Juntunen 
stated that the distinction between philosophy and theology sat inside the notion of passion; 
while they were anthropological, Laestadius simultaneously brought in the notion of God and 
evil which functions via passions in the organic life; for Laestadius then, God and Evil manifested 
and signified as a personification of the passions. 
310 Regarding the philosophical interpretations of Paul’s insights on action and passions; See, Engberg-
Pedersen 2008 and Aune 2008. For Augustine’s and Luther’s theory of passions, see Knuuttila 
2010b, McGrath 1985. Even if Laestadius attached his theory to vitalism, he freely modified the 
concept in relation to late antiquity, Biblical and later discussions of passions.
311 Especially, Bichat was one who proved that passions have their seats within organic life, and he 
viewed the senses as “conductors of the passions” (Bichat 1805, p. 25, 83, 22; cf. §1002.) “Yet one 
can perceive through immediate feeling that the passions do not belong to the sphere of sensory 
life.” The desires of reason do not arise in the mind, but rather in feelings. Also, curiosity as a 
desire (to acquire knowledge) belonged to organic life. Laestadius thus held that there are no pure 
intellectual passions. (§265) “Just as the senses are the conductors of the passions, they [senses] 
become their instruments when the passions impact intelligence, reason and will.” (§266)
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Passions have both theological and philosophical-psychological dimensions. Overall 
Laestadius’ intention was to thematize and rationalize – or even radicalize – the 
fundamental basis of the sinful character of a natural human being using the theory 
of passions. By indicating the evil nature of man, Laestadius sometimes referred to 
passions as “devils” or “spirits” which coincided or resonated with Bichat’s idea of 
passions as the destructive forces of death. Albeit, Laestadius preferred to use the 
scientifically more acceptable term “passion” in this respect (§249) as that term has 
become a most important notion for thematizing the whole of human action, thought, 
mind, morality, spiritual perception, faith, and relation to God. In this respect, Laes-
tadius had to define the existence of passions within which they then could receive a 
broader psychological-philosophical meaning according to Laestadius’ theory. Still, 
passions cannot be defined in classical metaphysical-substantial terms: 
”If we refer to these ’powers and forces’ as beings (väsenden), […] we 
must return to metaphysics and ontology, which is so complex (benig) 
that modern thinkers must go around metaphysics like the cat around hot 
porridge. Nor it is our intention to determine the substantiality of these 
‘spirits’ (andars), [...]” (§914.) 
Instead, passions have to be conceived in a similar way as the principle of life has 
been conceived, namely, defined as existence without essence and substance:
“[w]e assume only their ‘existence’ just as the life force or the principle of life 
is an ‘existentia sine essentia et sine substantia’ (section N.). Since we hereby 
assume the existence of these spirits as a universally valid truth, we have a 
certain foundation for our judgment about the reality of these forces. We 
may then, aided by testimony of feeling, examine the effect of the passions on 
the living human being.” (§914. emphasis added)
With regard to these citations, passions ought to be understood in the mode of real 
“existences” that commonly in contemporary popular language were called “living spirits.” 
“But since life is nonetheless real, then the spirit must also be something 
real; an existentia sine essentia et sine substantia. It follows that all spirits 
are real existences, or ‘living spirits,’ and in this sense we can say that the 
passions are real existences, or ‘living spirits.’” (§914Note.)
By highlighting the experiential “testimony of feeling” Laestadius referred to the 
existence of passions as “idea vitalis” and an “existential relationship” (existential 
förhållande). 
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“In the doctrine of personhood (F.F.F.), we have proven that the idea is 
not absolutely unconditional, that the idea must depend on its principle. 
Consequently, the idea must always have its foundation in something that 
is not the idea itself. This something, in which the idea as its foundation, is 
commonly called spiritual life!! But life cannot be called substance or being, 
although most philosophers claim that spirit = the rational soul – possess 
substantiality. But since we have proven in numerous places in this treatise, 
that life and the rational soul or the spirit constitute one and the same basic 
force, then also the spirit loses its substantiality. But since life is nonetheless 
real, then the spirit must also be something real; an existentia sine essentia et 
sine substantia. It follows that all spirits are real existences, or ‘living spirits,’ 
and in this sense we can say that the passions are real existences, or ‘living 
spirits.’ And this existential relationship must also be applied to the devil, 
who is something real, a life, an ‘existentia sine essentia et sine substantia.’ But 
if he is life, or something living, then he is not merely an idea or an empty 
concept, but a life to which the idea can be ascribed as predicate. It is ‘idea 
vitalis’ and thus a personhood, something that the ‘cosmic principle’ is not.” 
…”A metaphysical existential relationship (existential förhållande), ‘idea 
vitalis,’ is not an empty concept that can only be actualized and become 
something real in the material world.” (§914Note. my emphasis added)
This existential emphasis of vitality indicates that passions were conceived as 
founding psycho-physical moods312 that lay the ground for the intentionality of body 
and mind in relation to the world and existence. 
Given the analysis of the notion of the principle of life that formed the unifying 
constitutive basis – “psychic essence” – for the body and mind, the passions are equally 
important phenomena, as they function on the basis of the principle of life. It could 
also be argued that passions function as correlates of the principle of life [soul] and 
signify there is a nexus of passional human beings and existence. By the power of 
the principle of life, the human body is sensitive and “alive,” in its basic character. 
The notion of passion thus play a crucial role in both the grounding notion of the 
principle of life and the faculties of objective consciousness.313
In relation to the notion of the principle of life, passions signify the primary 
psycho-physiological functions and primary forces (first movements) in the body-
mind and constitute the intertwined relationship between human beings and the 
312 Here we can refer to Heidegger’s notion of mood (befindlickeit der stimmung), which together 
with language and understanding, is an existential-ontological constitutive structure for the 
disclosedness of Being (das Sein). (Cf. Heidegger 1992, §§29,34, 38–40, 68)
313 As usual, the discussion concerning passions overlaps with the notions of organic life and sensory 
life
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world. In this respect, passions condition all the higher faculties of the soul and thus 
are the basis for their intentional directedness.
Even if the concept of passion was used by Laestadius in various ways, the follow-
ing common points should be recognized. First of all, passions signify the forces and 
powers that a human being is susceptible to, and through which that human being lives. 
In this sense, the passions signify more fundamental and broader phenomena than, 
for instance, emotions and feelings, and they indicate the fundamental affectivity of 
human life. Secondly, passions are always awakened by sensory stimuli. Thirdly, passions 
influence the human organism and person through organic functions. However, they 
are not simply reduced to the physical plane, as they also signify a particular kind 
of psycho-social relatedness to the objective world. In this sense passions314 actually 
situate the human being in the concrete social and material world. They pertain both 
to the objective sensory and the susceptive inner physiological organs, illuminating 
the dynamic relatedness between the experiential-psychological and the physical 
domain. Thus, passions are simultaneously outer and inner, social and private, and 
fasten human life to the world and other human beings. Fourthly, passions character-
ize the relatedness with an objective perceptible world by being awakened by sensory 
perception and the [imperceptible] subjective psycho-physiological sphere by having 
specific and different organic receptive centers or seat-organs for different passions 
in the physiological organization315. Thus, a human being is under the influence of 
passions from both outer and inner spheres. To state it more precisely, in regard to the 
phenomena of passion, the embodied man dwells in the tension of a passional world, 
and therefore, the notion of passion overcomes the dichotomy that exists between 
man and the world.316
Also, the primacy of sense perception illuminates the fact that Laestadius did not 
reduce passions to the organs. Laestadius wrote, for instance, that
“It is a physiological fact that the passions alter the components of the blood 
and affect the disposition (sinnelaget). The passions are awakened by external 
stimuli and in turn alter the components of the blood; and this change 
impacts the disposition (sinnelaget).” (§305Note. emphasis added) 
314 In Bichat’s theory, passions are not simply located in the organs in the reductionist sense; they 
are viewed as “something” that affects and influences and “becomes” into the body, or they are 
something that relates to the body. In this sense, passions are vital forces that “belong” to the 
organic life, and their origin may vary and pertain to the whole of the various organization of 
different organs. (See, Bichat 1815, §4, 76.)
315 These structures are cleared up by the concepts of subjective and objective consciousness.
316 The passions posit the sensitive human organism in the world. Passions are the basic vital functions 
of a human organism, and they mediate the interaction between organic life and sensory life, as 
well as the human individual and the surrounding world. In this respect, the notion of passion is 
an important phenomenon to examine to understand Laestadius’ way of conceiving human life.
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It could also be noted, with respect to the question of “how experience is consti-
tuted”, that the notion of passion broadened Laestadius’ way of thought over mere 
empiricism; sensory perception and experience are always mediated through sensory 
impressions as well as subjective feelings and emotions that are stimulated by the 
passions (always experientially given existential-social phenomena).
The psycho-physic-social extent of the passions becomes evident in all of Laes-
tadius’ text. This is understandable as the passions – together with the notion of the 
principle of life – are the constitutive ground for all of humane life. The influence of 
passions thus has to be understood in such a way that the physiological body is at the 
core or center of the happenings of life, and passions awakened by sense-perceptions 
influence the re-directing of the sensory and organic life in a circular way317. Gener-
ally speaking, sense perceptions as well as passions are crucial for the functioning of 
the faculties of the soul; perceptions (and factual experiences) awaken the passions, 
which in turn agitate and stimulate the subjective and objective consciousness that 
then re-directs the senses again. 
Laestadius’ psychosomaticism or pre-phenomenological thinking does not seem 
to entail mysticism. 
”We must now consider the immoral element as a substance, of which 
sin consists. Sin is not the substance of either the body or the soul, but 
contingency; originally, it may have been, for instance, an idea or a percep-
tion that was actualized within organic life, just as immoral perceptions 
truly are able to awaken passions, such as the perception of a beautiful 
woman is able to awaken love, the perception of ‘actus venereus’ is able to 
awaken a slumbering drive to procreate, the perception of red wine is able 
to awaken a desire within the drinker, and so forth. Thus, a rational idea 
can be actualized in the sphere of organic life and become a passion. …” 
(§ 995. Further, see Chapter ÄÄ.)
Senses are thus conceived as the conductors of passions:
“The effects of wrath and hatred on the heart are well known. We note that 
wrath is awakened, like other passions through the senses, which are the 
conductors of the passions318. A stimulating perception, a taunt, or some 
other injury, has a stimulating effect on the fibers of the heart (through 
317 This circularity characterized Laestadius’ way of depicting the human dynamic and interactive 
relation to their surroundings, world, and existence. I come back to this later when dealing with 
perception in e.g., Chapters 4.2.9 and 5.3.5.
318 Cf. Bichat 1805, 22. See also The Lunatic §286.
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nervus sympatheticus?). The heart beats faster and propels the blood toward 
the head; the angered person becomes red in the face. Why is your skin 
transformed? …” (§1002.)
Altogether, passions intimately pertain to the physiological body as its sensitive 
core. Passions can be interpreted as vital existential constituents of those humans who 
are dwelling in the world. Rather than signifying reductionism, passions indicate the 
existential phenomena that exist through organic susceptibility:
 
“The passions actually belong to organic life and have their basis therein, but 
are perceived (uppfattas) in sensory life as emotions and desires. They impact 
the living brain through the circulation of blood and the stimulation of the 
nerves. Not only the different components of the blood, but also its stronger 
or weaker circulation, awaken different emotions.” (§310. emphasis added)
As we see later, Laestadius aimed using this perspective to establish the psycho-
somatic co-existence of the bodily and “spiritual” feelings:
“We imagine that all bodily feelings (känslor) are also the feelings of the 
soul, and vice versa; that all the feelings of the soul are also those of the 
body. ‘Because the ego that perceives through the senses is the same ego 
that thinks.’ Petrelli §100.” (§306.)
Here it is already evident how Laestadius sees passions as a constitutive element 
of higher cognitive functions. The passions are actually primal phenomena that relate 
the whole embodied human person to the world and its surroundings. We can thus 
posit a general interpretation, namely, that the individual and sociality co-inhabit in 
passions, and passions constitute a psychophysiological common ethos.
For Laestadius, passions were vital-ontological facts of being in the world. In this 
respect, passions could be heuristically compared to the existentials319 in the sense 
that they describe human relatedness, intentionality, or emotional disclosedness of 
the world and existence. 
Altogether, passions also have to be conceived as vital-existential constituents of 
human life. In the general sense, passions function as intentional correlates between 
the subjective consciousness and objective consciousness as well as between man and 
the world. This mediation of passions constitutes the holistic psychosomatic whole 
of the human person, and intertwines the body and mind in an inextricable whole.
319 Cf. e.g. Heidegger 1992, §§4,9.
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In the end, it is important to mention that Laestadius was not precise in his use 
of concept while reaching toward phenomena. He used the notion of passion in a 
broad sense and did not mention when using it in a narrower sense, especially when 
seeking its physiological seats. Also when he proceeded to thematize and analyze 
the “psychic” organization of human subjectivity in psychophysiological terms, the 
concepts often overlap. For instance, Laestadius often uses the term heart as the 
synonym for passions, mainly because the heart is conceived as the center of passions; 
passions are intimately attached with the heart physiologically because the blood, 
which mediates the passions to the mind, goes through the heart. In the psychologi-
cal sense, the heart functions also as a susceptible domain, or “organo lepticon,” for 
the passions. Such a “moral,” “spiritual,” or “metaphysical” meaning of the heart is 
not distinct from the physiological heart, but its indications were more significant 
for Laestadius. 
Heart in its psychological (moral, spiritual) meaning also signifies that the “condi-
tion of heart” can modify, change, and even resist the influences of the passions that 
it mediates to the sensory life or mind. The condition of the heart is stated to be 
the “result of the prevailing passions.” In this respect, the heart is also conceived as 
determining the moral character of the human person. I later discuss the heart and 
its moral/spiritual role in chapter 5. Now it is enough to have a general understand-
ing of the definition and function of the notion of passion and the part it plays in 
Laestadius’ theory and also highlight that Laestadius conceived of the heart as the 
center of passions in the sense that it is an inner experiential core for the matters 
of human life.
4.2.5  Classification of the Passions
Despite his broad definition and notion of passion, Laestadius sometimes was lo-
calising tone when he roughly referred to the seats within which the passions reside 
or through which they function. These localistic tones are particularly present in 
Laestadius’ classifications of passions within which he in following physiological 
emphasis of medical vitalism points out the particular organs that are susceptible and 
sensitive to specific passions320. Certain localizing tendencies are present also when 
320 Passions are closely attached to the physiological organs and organization. Sometimes Laestadius 
had a localistic tone and wrote that particular passions “live” in specific singular organs. This tendency 
is undoubtedly a part of Laestadius’ vitalist theorizing. However, Laestadius also conceived of 
particular organs more as a susceptible seat for the functions of passions. Thus, the saying that 
passions “live” in a singular organs does not indicate merely a reductionist way of thought, but rather 
emphasizes the organic vital functions grounded in organic life. This emphasis is understandably 
present in the whole treatise, as Laestadius does clear up the difference between his approach and 
the dualist and idealist positions. However, passions are indicated also as “spirits” when referring 
to the moral and spiritual character of passions, thus using them for their metaphysical or pre-
phenomenological significance.
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considering the manifestations of the humoral and the neural impacts [in conscious-
ness] stimulated by passions in different parts of the brain321. It is not just the whole 
organic body or merely the brain that receive influences from sensory perceptions 
and the passions, but the various and particular corporeal organic seats as well.
Laestadius goes into more detail and seems to hold that the human organism is 
rather pluracentric: it is not only its brain that is responsible for human thought and 
action, but the whole organism as well as different centers that are susceptible to 
different passional stimulations. All passions have their respective susceptible organ 
or set of organs through which they work. This physiological order also lays the 
groundwork for the relationship and hierarchy of different passions. 
The sensory life receives impressions and influences from the objective world and 
its center is the cerebrum. Brains as organs of the sensory life receive the influences 
and impacts that passions have aroused in the inner organs. However, this does not 
mean that cognitions simply have their foundation only in the sensory life or mind: 
“Every organ has its particular functions, which are perceived by con-
sciousness as either feelings or desires. But should one thereof imagine 
that desires and feelings have their foundation in sensory life? When the 
passions impact the heart or the liver (organic life), we perceive the effects 
through the brain (sensory life) where the passions manifests themselves 
as feelings, thoughts, and desires. This is the reason why an organic defect 
in the heart may impact the mind and cause madness.” (§208.)
The center of passions and emotions is the heart (§202) because all passions are 
mediated via the heart to the sensory life. Thus, the condition of the heart is of pri-
mary importance for the cognitive state of mind. The explanation for that connec-
tion is that the heart can actually change and modify the passions that influence the 
sensory life and also modify the cognitive state of mind. However, the heart also has 
a broader than a mere physiological meaning. It has a “psychological,” “metaphysical”, 
and “spiritual” significance. To put it briefly, depending on the context, the heart 
refers also to the whole domain of subjective consciousness and in this sense to the 
inner psychic life. In this respect, Laestadius uses “heart” to signify a receptive organ 
that is able to receive impressions and influences of the passions without a conscious 
awareness of objective faculties (unconsciously). Laestadius highlights the fact that 
in Biblical language moral emotions are also attached to the heart rather than just 
to the intellect.
321 Cf. e.g, §606. Also, faculties of the soul are said to have specific organs within the sensory life 
(nervliv).
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The passions awakened by the sensory perceptions agitate and stimulate different 
organs (such as egoism/liver, etc.) which are in different ways susceptible to differ-
ent influences, impacts, matters, and passions. Simultaneously, particular organs host 
certain passions and secrete “passion elements” to the blood which then influence 
the cerebrum as the receptive organ to the passions elements. The cerebellum is also 
the receptive organ for the subjective consciousness.
Based on physiological organization Laestadius classified particular passions and 
assigned them to their susceptible organs322. Generally, the passions and their re-
spective organs are divided by their particular nature and specific status/capacity into 
different categories as follows323:
First, the three primary passions are 1) egoism (egoismen, egenrättfärdighet, gerighet/ 
liver324), 2) selfishness or greed (egennytta/ gastric system), 3) ambition or lust for 
honor (ambition/ spleen). 
Four other passions that are independent, but often support and serve the first 
three primary passions are: 4) hatred and wrath (vreden, hämngerighet, hat / gall 
bladder); 5) sexual drive or fornication (hordomsdjefvull/ genital organs); 6) jealousy, 
envy (afunden/ svartsjuka/ liver); and 7) the spirit of lying (lögnenes and/ liver)325. 
Laestadius held that leading and primary passions, which he called chronic passions 
(§255), serves natural vital functions like, for example, surviving but manifesting 
within the human organism in various ways. However, these main passions are con-
ceived as physio-psychic “vital-existential” constituents and have the characteristics 
of a human person. Chronic passions (§§211, 255, 268,399–402) are defined as those 
passions that are perceived through the impact or reactions of nerves, by which they 
322 To learn more about the organic seats of the passions, see The Lunatic, chapters O., U. and V.
323 See §909, §250
324 The main principle is that the primary passions have their seat in the liver. To locate the natural 
evil passions into liver (§199, 201), certain physiological observation of corpses showed that the 
liver was most often damaged, and thus its concluded that it was a main organic cause for the 
death (also the spread liver of the horny ox was a sign of the effect of the natural passions, §200). 
Laestadius seemed to think that after the fall when the human being was driven from Paradise into 
the world, death became the fate of human life, and thus, he concluded that primary destructive 
passions as deathly forces have their seat in the liver. Passions are also able to cause death (§244) 
325 “The seven deadly sins or the seven primary passions (huvudpassionerna), are the following: 1. 
egoism, 2. ambition, 3. selfishness (egennytta), 4. fornication, 5. wrath (vreden), 6. envy, 7. the 
spirit of lying. Of these, egoism, ambition, and selfishness are devils of the first order, since, as 
“devils”, they possess natural man from the beginning of life to its end. Wrath, envy, and lying 
are devils of the second order, since these are the servant spirits (tjenste andar) of the former. The 
devil of fornication is a singular passion, but it recedes with age. We must now, with respect to 
the organs and effects of these passions, refer the reader to previous sections, in particular, section 
QQ., in which we showed, on physiological grounds, that the liver is the organ of egoism, the 
spleen is the organ of ambition, the stomach is the organ of selfishness, the genitals the organs 
of fornication, and so forth.” (§909.)
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differ from periodic passions, “which arise through the circulation of blood or its various 
components (olika bestånds delar).” (§210) Further still, Laestadius distinguished 
those passions that are acquired/learned by habits and ways of life or are congenital 
(§§211, 251). Some of these are less vicious/depraved, such as love, sorrow, joy, fear, 
boldness, friendship, etc. 
Some of the acquired passions are also able “to destroy both body and soul, such 
as, for instance, drunkenness, desire for dancing, and desire for gambling.” (§251) 
Laestadius tells us that these passions, especially love, grief, wrath, jealousy, and 
drinking are “comparative examples”, used to examine the relationship of passions 
to the objective faculties of the soul in which experience shows that a human being 
is not able to nullify these passions (§251). The founding idea, therefore, is that pas-
sions do affect through the functions of organs, and thus vital organic functions play 
a primal role regarding the functions of mind or the objective faculties of sensory life.326
Naturally, passions strive for their satisfaction. In a natural state, sensory life, includ-
ing their faculties – such as reason, understanding, will, imagination – and sensory 
capabilities try to find ways to satisfy and thus serve the passions. Therefore, the 
sensory life is not only submissive, but in a psychosomatic sense is related to the 
organic life. Especially, the senses function as servants of passions. I later show how 
sensory-passionate relatedness is circular327 in character.
The basic psychophysiological principle is that the stronger passion suppresses 
the weaker one:
“The conflict between passions is perceived within subjective consciousness 
as a stronger impression on the receptive organs by the stronger passion, 
compared to that of the weaker passion.” (§280.)
As far as primary passions do impact the sensory life, they are in a dominative 
relationship with other passions (also their seats have a hierarchical relation).328 Thus, 
Laestadius also holds that periodic and habitual-based passions are in a submissive 
relationship to the primary/chronic passions, and most of all, they function as “serv-
326 Here it could be further studied whether – in Laestadius’ thought – the primary passions are 
based on neural life, reactionary, and thus more important in the vitalist sense; while other servant 
passions are humoral.
327 In my interpretation, this circularity signifies that passions and sense perceptions are existential-
ontologically equally original. There could not be sense perceptions without the principle of life, 
and no passions without sense perceptions. (Subjective consciousness and objective consciousness 
are the necessary aspects of human existence and also lived experience.
328 For the conflict of passions, see §§276–281. “From these discoveries of experience, we are able to 
draw a rather important conclusion within the doctrine of passions; that is, ‘that one passion can 
overcome another.’ This is the foundation of the well-known vodka cure (see §§370–374, 376).” 
(§278.)
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ants” for them. For example, jealousy serves selfishness and egoism; the idea is that 
certain “habitual” or serving passions can reinforce the leading primary passions.
Laestadius uses love and jealousy as examples and highlights the view that man is
“unable to think in ways that are contrary to the inspiration of passion. 
Man cannot think away passion, nor can he dull it through will power. 
Passion forces the intellect to think in ways that are entirely opposite to 
that which had previously been thought.” (§520b.)
Altogether then, the essential character of passions is that they signify a certain 
psycho-physical law, a vital-existential relationship, which continuously lays down a 
new foundation for human life, action, and thought:
”If a new discovery on the firmament of the stars is able to bring us new 
insight into matters that were previously unknown, then it cannot be beyond 
the realm of possibility that some new discovery within the human heart could 
bring us a new foundation for thinking about everything that concerns out in-
ternal, spiritual or moral properties. New and previously unknown passion 
must be to subjective consciousness what new discoveries in the world of 
the senses (sinne verlden) are to objective consciousness. Every new passion 
within the human heart is a new foundation for thinking, giving the activities 
of the intellect a new direction. Passion convolutes the thoughts and forces 
man to think in ways that are directly contrary to what had previously been 
thought.” (§520. emphasis added)
And further, 
”When we consider the elements of passions from a physiological perspec-
tive, we find that these elements are strained from the organs of the pas-
sions in the stomach, liver, the spleen, the kidneys, and the genital. These 
elements of the passions, infused into the blood, first affect the heart, which 
is the governing principle within man. From the heart, the elements of the 
passions travel with the blood to the brain and awaken in it the many feel-
ings and desires that we perceive. Just as, for instance, alcohol fumes have 
a particular effect on the heart and another effect on the intellect, so, too, 
has the spermatic blood a particular effect on the liver and another effect 
on the heart; also the blood mixed with bile has a stimulating effect on the 
fibers of the heart, and so forth, just as gastric fluids mixed into the blood 
exercises a particular effect on the heart and the brain. If this approach to 
morality produces a bad smell in the nose of the philosopher, then at least it has 
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the advantage of making man’s physical, psychic, and moral nature understand-
able to the intellect. Thus, we cannot in this be accused of mysticism. We are 
able to understand the reason why an old crone does not blush and why 
she does not fall in love, and so forth.” (§1022. emphasis added)
Passion can be interpreted as a border-concept, which comprises both the 
experiential-existential (psychic/conscious) and a physical aspects. As a particular 
passion, for example, love is taken into focus, and it is evident from the beginning 
that it has an experiential-sensory dimension (seeing or hearing something beautiful) 
and also a physiological dimension as it causes certain physical, neural, and humoral 
changes in a particular organ and thus in both the organic and sensory lives. Often 
passions are depicted as “coming into a human organism” indicating the outer ob-
jective surrounding, and simultaneously depicting passions as “in the organs” and 
positing them as subjective phenomena. This “doubled” extension of the concept of 
passion, covering the immanence and transcendence, is important for Laestadius, as 
he goes on to discuss how passions – whether greed awakened by sense-perception 
or spiritual emotion having no sensory object – affects and lays the ground for the 
human intellect or the individual soul. 
4.2.6  On the Objective Faculties
Laestadius thematizes his conception of the human soul and consciousness within 
a vitalist psychophysiological framework, drawing a conceptual distinction between 
the subjective and objective consciousness. Further, the Laestadius’ endeavor is to 
revise and re-define the classical faculty psychological notions of the faculties of soul 
from the perspective of physiological vitalism329. Laestadius’ critical redefining of the 
faculties of soul is motivated and based on his broader critique of the metaphysical 
notion of soul as thematized in terms of substance and essence330. Beside the critique 
of the general metaphysical approach to the human soul as being (essentia, essence), 
Laestadius is critical also of the intellectualistic categorization of the faculties of 
that soul.
329 In my view, Laestadius struggled with this endeavor partly because he does not have a specific 
analysis of social constitution, but rather two different, often contradictory, theoretical frames 
within which his analysis was moving. These are classical faculty psychological doctrines 
which are constituted on the basis of metaphysics (and epistemological interests) and vitalist 
psychology, which does not primarily have epistemological interests, but rather has descriptive 
and fundamentally anthropological (and in this sense also ontological) aims. For Laestadius, it is 
not as big a question for how consciousness or mind is able to know the objects, world, and God 
transcendent to itself (epistemological interest), but rather, it is an endeavor to show how the 
faculties of objective consciousness are submissive and attached under the power of the “higher” 
forces of passions in the present world (fundamental anthropological or ontological interest).
330 See Chapter 4.1.
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Even if he sees that within classical faculty psychology the faculties that are often 
depicted as senses (sinne), Laestadius still indicated that faculty psychology narrows 
the objective faculties into mere faculties of abstract or immaterial soul (substance 
and essence). In Laestadius’ thought that objective faculties were not the capabilities 
of a distinct and autonomous soul, but rather the inextricable parts of the physi-
ological and corporeal constitution of humans. Thus, Laestadius assumed that faculty 
psychology most often dismisses the fact that objective faculties also function under 
the dominance of the organic life and especially the natural passions. In other words, 
Laestadius wanted to show that the objective faculties of soul also function under the 
influence of subjective faculties and cannot be ignored if we are willing to conceive 
of the objective faculties in their proper nature. In terms of re-definitions Laestadius 
naturally had theological motifs and intentions to posit human reason and the will 
in a captivity that was organic life, namely, the flesh, and the passional world. Within 
this tension between classical faculty psychology and the physiological vitalism 
notions of reason, will, understanding, imagination, and memory were re-defined. 
Laestadius’ theme has two main characters. First he holds that insofar as neither 
soul can be conceived as autonomous and independent with respect to its physi-
ological basis and passions, nor can any of the objective faculties of soul be conceived 
as independent from organic life331. He insisted that the objective faculties are not 
independent and autonomous from organic life and from the faculties of subjec-
tive consciousness. Secondly, the character of the faculties of soul are viewed and 
evaluated from the perspective of everyday life with respect to their manifestations and 
functioning within the lived experience, history, politics, morality, legislation, and its 
relation to religion (Cf. §559). These two aspects – vitalist psychophysiology and the 
perspective on everyday life – leads one to conceive all the objective faculties of soul 
as psychophysiological embodied intentional phenomena. Instead of conceiving these 
as absolute and stable intellectual capabilities, they are deficient embodied capabili-
ties that function under the dominance of organic life and varying living conditions 
and situations. As embodied capabilities are closely related to unstable and varying 
organic functions and passions, the faculties are also viewed as relative and having eas-
ily corrupting capabilities contrary to the intellectualistic ideas of substantial reason, 
will and understanding that Laestadius criticized. He argued against the prevailing 
glorification of “divine reason,” or “moral will.” He also fought against the idea of 
freedom of will, and tried to show that self-will, as the “composition of all dominant 
passions” (§1013), is insufficient with respect to morality and faith. All the objective 
331 Laestadius’ critical redefining of the notions of the faculties of soul was based on his broader 
critique of the idea of autonomous soul as defined in terms of substance and essence. Beside the 
critique of the general metaphysical and rational approach to the human soul and being (essence), 
Laestadius was critical also of the intellectualistic categorization of the faculties of soul.
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faculties are thus conceived as particular higher organic functions, but yet what is 
definitely common to them is that they all depend on passions.
Despite leaning on the faculty psychological categorization, Laestadius conceived 
all these faculties as an interrelated unity, a domain of human consciousness through 
which man exists in the world332. With respect to his holistic approach, Laestadius had 
a clear intention to show how the faculties constituted the whole of human consciousness 
and its intentionality based on the vital principle, passions, and subjective conscious-
ness. Since both subjective and objective consciousness are not distinct categorical 
domains, but rather a psychophysiological relatedness to the existence, Laestadius also 
depicted the particular faculties of soul holding that their relations to each other can 
derive from the physiological constitution and order. With respect to the analysis of 
the notions of the principle of life and passions (as a constitutive ground and an 
intentional basis) the specific objective faculties of soul are conceived as interrelated 
and as the higher order cognitive capabilities through which human beings relate 
to existence. Thus, the objective faculties signify the experiential-intentional ways of 
relating to the world, nature, existence, and God333. 
With regard to the objective faculties, Laestadius’ basic problem was how the 
faculties in a sphere of objective consciousness or mind related to each other and in 
what sense the objective faculties can either accept or reject the impact of the organic 
influences of subjective faculties, especially passions, and henceforth prevent them 
from erupting into actions or modify them at the organic level334. Thus, the whole 
analysis of the relationship between objective faculties was in one way or another 
related to the question of freedom of will. In a broader picture, it could be interpreted 
that the problem was a quest for how objective faculties could remain in accordance 
with the intentionality of the original soul, the [uncorrupted] principle of life335. 
4.2.7  Freedom of Will and the Degrees of Sin
As mentioned above, Laestadius’ theory of passions, beside of its fundamental an-
thropological function, was simultaneously a rationalization of the basis of sin and a 
radicalization of man’s sinful nature as far as man was seen to exist in a natural state 
332 Moving in this phenomenological direction, Laestadius struggled to hold the objective faculties 
together and address the particular frame for each faculty. This problem derived from his 
physiologically emphasized grounding theory and holistic organistic stance.
333 I will analyze how Laestadius conceived, defined and characterized especially the objective faculties 
that constitute the particular capabilities of human intellectual awareness. 
334 Cf. §365. See also §§428–429 where Laestadius refers to the negation of heinous passions as a 
“negative virtue.”
335 Cf. e.g. §§848–852. Laestadius blamed the philosophical geniuses of this world (Goethe, Voltaire, 
Tegnér) for believing in the power of reason and the will, but being, however, immoral in their 
hearts. These concrete examples from the intellectual history of general history are Laestadius’ 
typical rhetoric, which he used to support his views.
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under the dominance of natural passions. To show how the theory of passion laid 
the ground for the theory of the degree of sin and highlight how natural passions 
and sin actually condition or characterize the fundamental of the objective faculties 
of soul, I briefly take a look at Laestadius’ thematization of the freedom of will and 
the degrees of sin. The degrees of sin are an inextricable part of Laestadius’ analysis 
of the freedom of will. 
Faculty of will received understandably much attention in Laestadius’ treatise, for 
it had dogmatic significance336. Will is one of the objective faculties of consciousness 
and thus receives influences from the outer world and the inner subjective conscious-
ness. It is generally conceived as the faculty that sets thinking (understanding) and 
action into motion and also directs senses and action. The will is closely attached to the 
notion of self, and it is defined as the organ of the spirit which has only a limited 
possibility for freedom.
“It is lamentable that the state of psychology is still so weak, that noth-
ing can be proven apodictice. But if by spirit is here meant organic life 
(psyche), then the every schoolboy is able to prove, based on experience, 
that this has never been, and never will be the organ of the will. On the 
contrary, with the help of physiology, it can be proven that ‘the will is the 
organ of spirit’ (§465). But if by spirit is meant sensory life, or ‘pneuma,’ 
then we admit that this spirit is, to some degree, the organ of will, in 
that the will is able to control the intellect, fysice and metaphysice, non 
vere absolute. …” (§1191b.) 
However, will is not an independent faculty and has no determining power in and 
of itself337. First of all, the will functions under the influence of subjective conscious-
ness and is also related to other objective faculties. Laestadius saw its importance in 
that there remains only one will in man (e.g. §459). That will can receive conflicting 
passions and manifest itself as varying desiring states. Any desiring, appetitive or 
the irascible/resistant state of will cannot be in opposition to the organic life or the body 
 
336 See, Dahlbäck 1950; Zidbäck 1937; Juntunen 1982. In §624 Laestadius refers to Luther as the one 
who pointed out how important it is to have a correct understanding of the relationship between 
the faculties of soul. In a sense Laestadius’ elaborations anticipated the doctrine of justification 
and his evidentialistic affirmation of Luther’s Theology of the Cross which will be dealt with 
later here in Chapter 5.5.
337 Laestadius held that the principle of determination is not found in the will itself. Only power 
within the will itself is a capability to be determined by the higher powers (passions) (§ 416). In 
terms of “higher powers” Laestadius mainly meant the susceptibility of human beings to organic 
functions, passions, and the physical laws of nature.
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because the will itself is determined by the same organic and subjective states. That is 
to say that the resistant power of the will resides in the passion itself, and competing 
passions precede the acts of will.
Laestadius differentiated between the aspects of freedom of will to show, on the 
one hand, the fundamental responsibility of man through a particular positive and 
the negative freedom of will within the sensory life. On the other hand, he wanted 
to show that will as such is passive in relation to the organic life which necessitates 
awakening of the organic level as a fore stage of spiritual justification (reconciliation).
Positive freedom pertains to the sensory life, but not to organic life, and it signifies 
the common freedom to have power over all members and actions of the mind that 
are psycho-physiologically under the volition of one’s own will. Positive freedom 
pertains to the objective faculties of soul. (§§357–364.) Laestadius also used the 
terms objective and subjective will in such a way that the former indicated the will 
within the sensory life and the latter, the heart and passions (e.g. §405).
Negative freedom means the capability to resist letting passions manifest themselves 
as action. This capability is, however, relative given that the voluntary resistance to the 
manifestations of passions is determined by other natural passions. The foundation 
of negative freedom is in the combination of passions (§412). However, the nega-
tive freedom of will (together with positive freedom) is the initial condition for the 
freedom of action. Man is forced to have desires and inclinations, in a word, to feel, 
but he is not forced to satisfy the passion that urges fulfilling a certain desire (§413). 
For this reason, a human being has a responsibility if he lets his thoughts and actions 
be determined by an evil natural passion (§424).
Laestadius stated that negative virtues are possible, but that they are rare (§428). 
Furthermore, negative virtues do not constitute genuine inspired morality, and they 
actually mean a certain kind of natural relativism because they are based on the rivalry 
between natural passions. For example, ambition can weaken the passion for alcohol, 
which nevertheless does not make it moral in the genuine sense because morality 
demands the passionate heart on that basis. Laestadius also thought that original 
negative freedom of will, and thus freedom of action, can be corrupted when, for 
instance, alcohol/drunkenness becomes a passion (§447). 
Active freedom signifies man’s capability to prevent (and struggle against) pas-
sions on their own organic level. Active freedom actualizes only if the sensory life 
has moral passion as its basis. This notion includes the thought that consciousness 
does not have power over organic life; the will cannot by its own power prevent338 
passions and drives or cause any organic and subjective state to be awakened and 
influence the objective faculties of soul. Active freedom does not signify any kind 
338 Here Laestadius holds that there is no active freedom in the natural state because human beings 
cannot by their own powers prevent evil thoughts within the heart. (§425)
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of positive freedom in the sense that the will can dominate and govern the organic 
functions and passions. Because there remains no active freedom in a human being, 
and natural passions do rule, man is responsible for everything that pertains to organic 
life and sensory life. (§418.) 
Passive freedom (§390–405) signifies that the will remains in a passive relation-
ship to organic life and the passions. For instance, the will is unable to forestall 
the blood and neural impacts to influence the organs of intellect (reason). Human 
beings do not have freedom of choice between passion or non-passion, and they 
cannot nullify/vitiate passions because a human being does not have power over 
the organic life on which these passions are based. For example, an “alcoholic” is 
able not to drink, but he cannot nullify the passion for drunkenness (§365). The 
will is in a passive relationship with the influences of the Holy Spirit and also 
evil spirits (natural passions). Laestadius interpreted that reformators (Luther) 
referred to the relationship of the will and heart with the term “pure passive” as 
the capability to receive the influences of passions (§430). In this sense, good and 
evil do not belong to the essence of the will (§459). Laestadius also referred to 
Luther and Paul for confirming his conviction that the human will is rather evil 
in its natural state (§§431,432). Passivity of the will does conform to the logic of 
the Fall (§448Note). The freedom of will in the sphere of the organic life is void 
or insignificant (§§454–457). The power to fight against evil, or a moral passion, 
emerges through the work of grace of the Holy Spirit (den helige Andes nådeverkn-
ingar) (e.g. §403), and necessitates the religious experience of awakening in the 
embodied organic level.
Despite of the passivity of this freedom of will, a human being can voluntarily 
let himself exist under the higher power of passions because of the positive and 
negative freedom of will. Through a negative freedom of will, man can either resist 
the eruption of natural passions or go along with their provocations. Fundamental 
passivity of the will as such does not entail any irresponsibility, but rather expands 
and radicalizes human responsibility, so it pertains to the whole personhood:
”It is precisely this passivity that is the being (väsende, essence) of the will. 
But now, then, can someone be responsible for his actions? The answer is 
accountability (tillräkneligheten), which encompasses the entire human 
person, not only the sphere of sensory life or the rational soul. He is first 
and foremost responsible for all willful sin involving all members of the 
body. He is responsible for thoughts, inclinations, desires, drives, and in-
stinct, for feelings, and for temperament. This is so because he has abused the 
positive freedom in Adam and the negative freedom in himself. The positive 
freedom of the will [power over organic passions] can never be regained 
in this world, but he does retain the negative freedom, and he acquires 
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active freedom through awakening, conversion and rebirth339. Note. Pas-
sivity in the sphere of sensory life consists in the inability of the will to 
shut out all desires; that it cannot liberate the intellect (förståndet) from 
all evil thoughts and imaginations. Passivity in the sphere of organic life 
consists in the fact that the will cannot annihilate all passions, drives, and 
instincts, nor the deformities of the temperament that rule organic life. 
[…340]” (§448&Note. My emphasis.) 
Laestadius highlighted that the will can become good only as active, negative, and 
passive significance, but never as positive significance (§459). Laestadius summarized 
his conclusions by stating that the will is passive in relation to passions:
“The positive freedom of the will in the sphere of sensory life is negative in 
the sphere of organic life. Active freedom of the will is achieved through 
awakening, which constitutes a moral passion. The will has no freedom 
of choice in the sphere of organic life, only in the sphere of sensory life. 
Moral responsibility includes the entire human person. The will has lost its 
capacity for self-determination through its own determination unto evil. 
The principle of determination – the motive for man’s actions – is not found 
in the will, but in the passions. No salvation from guilt and punishment 
of sin through self-righteousness, only through reconciliation with God, 
in Christ, through grace.” (§482.)
And further:
“With the assistance of psychology we will show that the wicked self-will 
(egenvilja) is man’s own substantial will (väsendtliga vilja, essential will) 
for which he is responsible (ansvarig);not because he has somehow cre-
339 Generally speaking, the changes have to happen at the level of passions in order for Spirit (pneuma) 
to be free.
340 “We have assumed that the metaphysical composition and internal relationship of the faculties 
of the soul have not been disrupted by the Fall. We must, therefore, assume that the will was 
passive also before the Fall. However, before the Fall, Satan had not entered into her. Her passions 
were at that time ’moral passions,’ which constitute the active freedom of the will. The Fall thus 
consisted in the woman, as deceived by the serpent’s cunning intimations and promises of ‘spiritual 
wisdom,’ of abusing the positive freedom of the will in the sphere of sensory life looking at the 
enticing fruit. Through this perception, a desire was awakened within her = an irresistible and 
unstoppable desire to taste of the forbidden fruit, she delivered her members into the service of 
sin. Adam did not have quite as ’burning a desire to taste’ as Eve, but he was ’deeply in love’ with 
her, and wanted to share good and bad with her. He wanted to partake of her misfortune, if he 
believed that death was approaching.” (§448Note.)
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ated his own evil nature, which is counter to revelation, but because he 
has abused his free will by allowing himself to be seduced by the devil. 
We admit that man originally had a free will in spiritual matters, but not 
only the will claimed by the philosopher – that is, the rational (objective?) 
will, which belongs to the sphere of sensory life – but also the subjective 
will, which belongs to the sphere of organic life, originally had positive 
freedom.” (§424.) 
In this passage, Laestadius refers to his own Biblical interpretation according 
to which the faculties of soul and their relationship to each other are maintained 
despite the Fall. However, the grounding passions were corrupted or changed in the 
Fall. After the Fall, all evil passions, such as egoism, ambition, and greed, became 
the founding characteristics of human flesh and thus embodied life in the world. In 
Laestadius’ view the condition of Fallenness is maintained when a human being lets 
himself be led by natural immoral passions. Therefore, an evil nature is not created 
by man himself, but it is a manifestation of natural passions.
Here it is enough to point out that Laestadius saw that man possesses a naturally 
positive and negative freedom of will within sensory life, but he does not possess 
a positive and active freedom of will over the organic life. This naturally signifies 
that every human being has freedom of action.341 In this way, man is free to move 
his body as he wills and also to resist thoughts and desires to actualize them into 
actions. However, man is not able to control or resist the influences of passions to 
be manifested in sensory life. That signifies that man has to feel and experience ac-
cording to his passions. This incapability to control one’s own passions makes positive 
and negative freedom relative (as, they are based on organic passions). Man’s will 
receives its power to resist passions from organic passions as well. However, from the 
perspective of the doctrine of will, we can see that Laestadius based his doctrine of 
responsibility on a particular conception of will. He does not deny absolute moral 
responsibility but rather radicalized it, and furthermore, through his theory of the 
degrees of sin, he tried to makes awakening and reconciliation necessary to gain 
genuine morality and spirituality.
Laestadius’ theory of sin was based on the theory of the passions: 
“Nevertheless, it is with the aid of physiology that original sin may 
most reasonably be explained, if one necessarily wants to understand 
how innate wickedness has come about, and of what it consists.”(§892.
341 Dahlbäck (1950) points out that Laestadius held on to the negative and relative freedom of will 
to highlight the possibility of protecting the faith, the eternal [principle of life] in man.
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Note.)342Henceforth, the degrees of sins are determined by the theory of 
passions:
“If we were to replace the immoral passions in the place of sin, it is easy 
to see the different degrees of sinfulness that may attach to man. When 
then detect 1: a sinful disposition, or original sin, 2: passion in the sphere 
of organic life, 3: thought and desires in the sphere of sensory life, 4: the 
eruption of passion into action, willful sin. A sinful disposition, or original 
sin prober, may be present in the fetus shortly after conception, long be-
fore any organ has developed. ‘I was shaped in iniquity; and in sin did my 
mother conceive me.’ (Psalm 51:5) If we assume that a principle of life is 
present in the fetus shortly after conception, and that there is an interval 
of time between the beginning of the principle of life and the beginning 
of organic life, then we have here the first degree of sinfulness, within mere 
disposition. The second degree of sinfulness may begin with organic life, 
which implies activity, a movement of matter; that is to say, something that 
not merely is, but also does. At that point it is already a matter of sinful act, 
which goes beyond mere disposition. The sinful act in the second stage of 
the fetus is presumably ‘unconscious,’ but bodily and spiritual deformities 
are nevertheless developed in this period.” (§892.)
Laestadius classified sins into four degrees: 1) Disposition (anlaget, [inclination]), 
which signifies original sin; 2) sinful feeling (syndiga känslan) or passion which oc-
curs in the heart; 3) thoughts and desires (tankarne och begären [lust]) which occur 
in the intellect and the will; and 4) the deed itself (sjelfva gäringen, som sker med 
kroppens ledamötter [sinful act]), which occurs through members of the body. Laes-
tadius states that these degrees of sin correspond to four degrees of freedom from sin 
in the following way: a) ‘God’s law demands the absolute purity of the heart’, which 
presupposes the positive freedom of the will; b) holiness of the will and detestation 
of sin, which presupposes active freedom; c) to master one’s sinful desires within the 
will, and struggle against the wicked thoughts within the intellect, although without 
detesting them, which presupposes active freedom; and d) external decency, behind 
which desires and thoughts are allowed to roam free, which implies a positive free-
dom, provided that the will is suppressed by the passions and powerless to struggle 
against wicked desires. (§822.) 
Laestadius highlighted that the last degree of freedom from sin (d) implies willful 
sin, insofar as man in this state loves sin and allows it to rule the intellect and the will, 
although not the body. In this respect, Laestadius drew a distinction between acts and 
deeds. The former indicates desires and thoughts for which man is responsible since 
342 Cf. also §893 how Laestadius followed Descuret’s view.
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“he has the power or capability to struggle against. The deed is defined as something 
what man does with the members of the body, which are subject to the will.” (§823) 
According to Laestadius, “man’s will has a positive freedom in the sphere of sensory 
life (nervliv), wherefore also thoughts – which for the most part are subject to the 
will and belong formaliter to the sphere of sensory life – must be considered as vol-
untary acts when man allows them to roam free. Realiter and essentialiter, thoughts 
belong to the sphere of organic life.” (§823.) Here Laestadius struggled to posit the 
thoughts: They should belong to the sensory life and to objective consciousness, but 
as they receive their power (vital force) from organic life, they have to be posited 
also to the organic life. From the vitalist perspective, Laestadius should not say 
that thoughts within sensory life are “formal” as they are close to physiological vital 
phenomena; still by using the terms, formaliter, realiter and essentialiter, Laestadius 
falls into metaphysical language. What he is trying to say, is that a human being is 
responsible for thoughts and desires if he allows the influences of natural passions 
and their manifestation to ”dwell” within or to suffuse in one’s mind because he 
could voluntarily quit thinking in a passional way. Thus, Laestadius is trying here to 
argue that thoughts based on passions are voluntary acts. However, elsewhere, he 
emphasizes the dominative power of passions on the cognitive life in various ways, 
thus indicating that thoughts are not voluntary acts. The basic concept is that man 
has to think according to passions, and feel according to his prevailing passions until 
the passion ends (Cf. § 610).343
With regard to degree (d) Laestadius is conflicted on in making up his mind on 
whether there remains voluntarity within “subjectivity” or whether man’s [negative] 
freedom of will plays any role in the matter of responsibility or faith because they both 
reside based on passions. Laestadius cannot solve the metaphysical problem between 
freedom of will and responsibility. On the other hand we can interpret Laestadius’ 
intention as choosing to seek a more fundamental initial condition of freedom and 
responsibility in the first place and not seek a solution for the classical categorical 
dilemma of freedom and responsibility. In regard to the power of restricting the influ-
ence of sin[full passion] over the mind, he seems to hold that man has a relative, but 
not absolute, capability to struggle against the immoral impacts of natural passions. 
This fight against immoral representations in the mind, however, demand moral 
passions, or in other words, deeper motivated conditions of subjective consciousness 
(heart) so as to restrict the imaginaries or representations already conceived to be 
immoral. In this sense, the struggle against sin does not take place initially at the 
level of the sensory life or mind. We can thus see that Laestadius’ analysis sought 
343 Here I do not analyze the problematic distinction between acts and deeds further, nor address 
Laestadius’ contradictory statements. It was typical for Laestadius to draw distinctions and produce 
definitions for the specific purposes his system needed.
4 The Person and Intentionality | 149
to thematize the initial conditions of the possibility of freedom and responsibility 
through certain vitalist and theological elaborations. However, Laestadius claimed 
that “man has the ability to struggle against the desires and inhibit the flights of 
wicked thoughts” by using the power of the positive freedom of sensory life. Laestadius 
then shifted to vitalist psycho-physiology and emphasized that “the moral element 
proceeds from the heart to conscience, and from conscience to the will, and then to 
reason.” (§824) In this way, Laestadius aimed to highlight the view that a “moral 
element” does not proceed from reason to the will, and thus, the “’moral will within 
reason’ is a great psychological error.” (§824.)344
Augustine believed that human beings cannot fix their corrupted will, and the 
only voluntary decision concerns the denial or acceptance of the grace which can 
lay a new passional ground for the will345. This idea is present in Laestadius’ theory 
as well as a human being can abstain from acting according to evil passions, and 
man can also deny the receiving of grace. Actually, Laestadius tried to resist the 
thought that man could be able to reach a moral life through positive and negative 
freedom within the sensory life, and in the same way, he resisted the idea that man 
could stand against grace. Altogether, Laestadius states that it is not the man who 
stands against grace by his own will, but rather the natural passions that can make 
him unable to receive that grace. However, while struggling with the dogmatic and 
anthropological significance of the problem of will, Laestadius holds that a positive 
freedom of will within the sensory life – i.e., a voluntary cognitive life and action – is 
in certain sense necessary capability for making space for the emergence of moral 
passions and a work of grace; In a sense, voluntary restraining of the provocations 
of natural passions is needed in order to make space for moral passions and their 
influences on human life (§§454–457).
Laestadius’ analysis of the freedom of will and degrees of sin are inextricably at-
tached to his psychophysiological theory of passions. His views can also be analyzed 
in relation to earlier philosophical theology and the history of doctrines. In terms of 
the notion of pro-passion, which was used in 12th -century philosophical theology to 
indicate involuntary desires and applied in the analysis of will and sin, it is notable 
that Laestadius considered love as the “original passion” (urpassion), and thus a first 
motive principle. 
344 Because there is no positive freedom in the domain of organic life and only negative freedom in 
the domain of sensory life (nervlif ), the human being cannot execute genuine good or virtuous 
work or act self-determinatively (by his own self-power); Good could be done only negatively, 
thus by restraining oneself from doing evil acts. The origin of positive Good acts are, therefore, 
always necessarily somewhere outside the agent/subject; awakened by moral passions, as an effect 
of the Holy Spirit, etc.
345 See, Knuuttila 2010b, 170–171.
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It would indeed be interesting to compare Laestadius’ insights of passions, free-
dom of will, and degrees of sin, for instance, to Abelard’s, Augustine’s and Aquinas 
views as there are several points of contact even though Laestadius’ account does 
differ in its anti-intellectualistic character. Unfortunately these analyses are out-
side the framework of this study346. Here we can only note that the general idea in 
Laestadius’ theory seemed to highlight the role of passions as grounding the “first” 
feelings that direct human thought and action. Laestadius seemed to think that in 
an uncorrupted state, human beings exist under the original passion (urpassionen) 
that Laestadius called Love.
“We are not able find any signs of faith in a higher power within the animals. 
We are, however, able to find signs of love, for instance, love of children, 
parental love, love of equals, love of benefactors, self-love, from which all 
other forms of love are derived. Thus, love seems to be the original passion 
(urpassion), the first feeling that awakens in all living beings; this feeling 
may thus have been the foundation of faith in the first man.” (§1495.)
This original passion of love signified that human beings existed in an original 
relationship with God in the beginning. After the corruption of the Fall, original 
passion (urpassion) turned into self-love, which signified that egoism became the 
dominant primary passion in human life: 
“And if love, after the Fall, had been directed toward God, then it would 
certainly be the right motive for all our actions to this day. However, the 
right motive for the actions of natural man is not the love of God, but 
love for the world. If we seek the motive for the actions of natural man 
in other passions – egoism, selfishness, ambition, wrath, hatred, envy, the 
desire to procreate, and so forth – they are nevertheless derived from one 
single principal passion, which is the root of the others; this passion is 
called self-love, which is the same as egoism within the heart. This passion 
is deeply rooted in all of the nature; it awakens together with self-feeling, 
and continues to the end of life.” (§1494)
* * *
346 For a detailed analysis of the history and significance of the notion of passion, pro-passion, and 
their application in the history of philosophical theology, see Knuuttila 2010b, 179–193, 239–254. 
To compare Laestadius’ medical vitalist notion to earlier medical theories, see Knuuttila 2010b, 
213–218. See also Fizgerald 2008.
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The argument of sinful individuality: Sin as passion is the category of individuality:
1. The vices and unique con-figurations of the fetus are developed in the 
womb and in the later development of a child in the world
2. Sensory life (nervlif ) and its manifestations signify the individual and the 
personal life of the soul
3. Individual passion-life affects the individual genuine soul
4. Passions are common vital-existential correlates of natural human inten-
tionality
5. Manifestations of the combinations of passions are awakened in world-
relation to signify the individual life of the soul
6. THEREFORE, Sin is the vital-existential category of individuality
4.2.8  The Faculties of Reason, Understanding, and Imagination
Laestadius’ strongest criticism was aimed at the notion of reason insofar as it was 
believed to be the highest governing part of the human soul within the prevailing 
rationalistic and idealistic thought of the 1800’s. Laestadius doubted the whole exist-
ence of the distinct rational soul, and pursues it to ground it in the psychophysiologi-
cal basis, which would show that reason and understanding are also necessarily the 
result of organic growth, development, education and their functions are dependent 
on subjective consciousness and its impacts. (e.g. §§186–191.)
“I believe that it is far more useful for the friends of religion to allow the 
rationalists to keep their old reason with the definition that Kant has given 
it. Then we have a certain point of departure for our researches. We know 
that the rationalists are spiritualists; that they proceed from assumed hypotheses 
that lack every foundation in physiology; that they entangle themselves in 
contradictions; and that from some rationalist hypotheses, one is able to 
draw conclusions that are unreasonable. For instance in the doctrine of 
harmonia praestabilita in the doctrine of substantive [substantial] nature of 
soul, in the doctrine of the free will, etc.” (§646. emphasis added)
In line with the psycho-physiological approach, Laestadius conceived reason as a 
particular “sense”347 with an organic foundation that can be developed by education 
and practice348. Laestadius re-set reason in between feelings and understanding in order 
to expand the notion of reason to cover the organic emotional and passional life also.
347 For reason as a sense, see e.g. §§588, 589, 591 [cannot create ideas of good, beautiful or truth on 
its own but must receive them from outside], §596 [sense in the physical, psychic and metaphysical 
meaning; can be influenced by good and evil; can be inspired by God or Devil].
348 Laestadius was convinced that reason was a result of exercise and education.
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“Proceeding from the physiological principle that all activities of the soul 
are transmitted by activities of the organs, we must seek the organ of rea-
son in that part of the brain that is located in between the cerebrum and the 
cerebellum. […349]The organ of reason should be located at the bottom of 
the cerebrum, in the lower-most region of the ability to think. This location 
would accord with the philosophers’ notion of reason’s capacity of ideas; 
it is not a capacity of thought, nor is it a capacity of feeling, but something in 
between feeling and thought.” (§629.) 
This citation indicates that the faculty of reason is a natural function of animal 
organism, which encompass both the organic conditions and intellectual capacities. 
Setting the organicist concept of sensory life in the place of the philosophical notion 
of the rational soul, and then discussing the relationship between animals and human 
beings, Laestadius stated that the animals lack reason350 because of their deficient cor-
responding organs of reason. Then Laestadius proceeded to define his own organicist 
notion of reason. Human reason is dependent on the organs of reason...
 
 “_______which can be molded, through which the rational soul emerges, 
not as being separate from sensory life, but as an increased ability to exercise 
the organs and thus rise above animals. The animals lack reason because they 
lack the corresponding organs of reason. The rational soul is an organic 
activity developed through exercise, the imagined automation, autonomy, 
freedom, or spontaneity of which is in fact based in the common principle 
of life…” (§309. See also §§146, 221, 243–244.)351
349 “Perhaps the organ of reason is located in that part of the brain that has caused a professor in 
Uppsala [Boström?] to separate mankind from animal kingdom.” (§626)
350 See §630 about animal passions, emotions, and faculties. See also §639 where Laestadius states 
that for a philosopher this sound materialism and the philosopher “neither wants to admit, nor 
can admit that all activities of the soul are also organic activities, or that the force that operates is 
connected to an organ. The spiritual force at work is the capacity of the soul, and certain spiritual 
or metaphysical capacity is connected to each organ.” See further polemics concerning the 
relationship between reason and faith e.g. §642 [Ignell and rational religion], §646 [Heinroth’s 
confuses reason and the heart], §647 [Kant and the correct limits of practical reason], §648 [critic 
of immaterial and non-substantial ego], §649 [passions cannot be destroyed], §631 [natural reason 
has some higher ideas, but they are not satisfactory and correct in regard to the life, supersensory 
matters, faith and they are not compatible with Divine truth],§662 [Bichat’s insight indicating 
that upbringing cannot change the passions.], §667 [kinship between man and God].
351 Here Laestadius is not precise with his statements, as he elsewhere emphasizes that autonomy 
and spontaneity do not belong to the sensory life; however, we can be generous and interpret 
that here Laestadius indicates with “spontaneity and autonomy” to the submissive position of 
reason in respect to organic life and principle of life. Cf. “reason is not an autonomous faculty of 
the soul, but dependent on the heart.” (§633.)
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Reason is not a distinct independent essence separated from sensory life (nervliv). 
It can be exercised and enlightened, but its autonomy, freedom, and spontaneity are 
grounded on the common principle of life. Its power of functioning lays on the vital 
principle and passions. Thus, reason, or rational soul, is conceived as a developmental 
continuation of principle of life, which is, furthermore, conceived as “real soul, or life in 
its entirety, operating as organic and sensory life.” (§309. my emphasis)
In this way (See also §§125, 725Note.) Laestadius radically “pulls down” reason 
into the organic corporeal foundation, and principle of life comes to signify a real, 
proper, and authentic soul which is the receptive capability of sensory life and which 
replaces the philosopher’s abstract notion of rational soul. (See §1205, §752.)
Laestadius holds that reason is not the actual capacity of thinking, but rather a 
capacity of ideas. The ideas of reason originate from sense perceptions, inner perceptions, 
and partly from the passions:
“Insofar as the will cannot exterminate the idea of reason, it seems that 
reason is also incapable of being educated or re-educated; much less so 
since most philosophers claim that not only dispositions, but also the ideas 
of reason themselves, are innate, which is a claim that is subject to much 
doubt. Rational ideas (förnunfts idéer) may emerge through perception 
– be they outer or inner – and through rational deduction (förnunftsslut), 
which is a department within logic. They also emerge through the influence 
of the passions on reason. […] The question of whether the idea precedes 
and awakens the idea cannot be settled without help from sophisticated 
reflection – which shows at least in terms of morality, that feeling comes 
from the heart and precedes the ideas. But since ideas can also emerge 
through external perception, such an idea often remains unactualized; that 
is to say, without corresponding feelings. On the other hand, feelings always 
result in an idea.” (§849 Note. my emphasis) (cf. idea without experience 
is blind.)
Laestadius holds that understanding is the capability for thinking, and reason 
comes closer to subjective consciousness and is a receptive faculty, or precisely, a sense 
(sinne). According to Laestadius, philosophy does not accept the notion that reason 
can relate to the passions passively because philosophy demands an independent and 
free faculty of reason. (§626–628.)
In §596 Laestadius refers to Kant’s definition that says that “reason is a capacity 
of ideas” (from Heinroth). When he starts to analyze reason as a “sense”, he refers 
again to “the philosopher’s” definition: “reason is a capacity of ideas and the intellect 
(förstånd, understanding) is a capacity of thought,” noting that the philosopher draws 
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a distinction between intellect (förstånd) and reason.352 (§625.) Laestadius indicates 
that only intellect (förstånd) is actually thinking, and within reason itself, there is 
not actually any [pure] logic. (§625–626.) 
Laestadius seemed to indicate that reason produces the objects for calculations, 
and understanding processes them through calculations and thinking (cf. §18). For 
Laestadius, reason was neither an independent organ nor a force separated from pas-
sions, but rather a “receptive organ, sense” (perceptions och receptionorgan, sinne), 
which can be influenced by both moral and immoral elements: 
“But experience shows that the intellect, reason and the will must yield 
to the power of the passions. From this it follows that reason is not an 
autonomous organ, or a power that is independent of passions. Its organ 
must be sought in the brain, not in the heart. Thus it is an organ of per-
ception and reception; a sense that can be darkened by heinous passions, 
and it can also be illuminated by moral passions.” (§611.) “Reason cannot 
awaken passion, nor can it moderate passions; as a sense, it can receive 
impressions by moral and immoral elements. If the passions are immoral, 
then the perception itself will be immoral, and the reason, too, is demonic; 
if reason is a capacity of ideas, then those ideas are immoral when man is 
governed by immoral passions, and in this way all his faculties of the soul 
are immoral. In other words, since reason in not an autonomous capacity, 
then it must be subservient to the autonomous power (the passion); if the 
autonomous power is wicked, then reason, the intellect and the will must 
be the instruments of that autonomous power.” (§612.)
Laestadius expressed the view that the idea of “pure reason” as such is an illusion. 
He moved to consider the organ of subjective consciousness as reason: 
“The organ that receives impressions from subjective feelings is nothing 
other than subjective consciousness, the organ of which is the subjective 
part of the brain, which is primarily affected by red blood. If the organ of 
reason were the same as the organ of subjective consciousness, then reason 
could be an organ of feeling. But subjective consciousness is only a sense 
that must receive impressions from the heart; it must receive both that 
which is sweet and that which is odious, both good and evil. It is affected 
352 Laestadius also refers to the “subset of logics” as the “logic of reason/conclusion” which seems to 
be a reference to Kant’s antinomies within which Kant drew a sharp distinction between the logic 
of pure reason and empirical perceptions, thus holding that they are in contradiction, as these 
and anti-these. Thus, Laestadius may have had Kant’s transcendental philosophy on his mind.
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by moral and immoral elements; it is a sense for good and evil, for truth and 
lies. It is the inner eye that sees both light and darkness; it can be inspired 
by the spirit of God and by the spirit of darkness. It has no light in itself.” 
(§628. emphasis added) 
Criticizing the natural law on which legislation is grounded (§876–877), Laes-
tadius stated that
“Reason only contains the idea of that which ought to be done, but does not 
contain any force to oblige the will. However, if it is God’s voice within the 
conscience that says ‘you ought’ with a claim to obedience within the will, 
the this command – which is unconditional and positive – can be actualized 
in the sphere of sensory life, as soon as the sense of justice or conscience is 
intensified into a passion through the inscription of the law on the heart’s 
tablets of flesh. Through the moral passion, a holy desire is awakened within 
the will, without which no fulfillment of the law is possible,” (§871.) 
According to Laestadius, natural reason becomes evil while one is searching for 
the ways to satisfy natural passions: 
“Although the passions are not based in intelligence, reason, or will – that 
is, in sensory life – the organs of these faculties are nevertheless affected 
by the element of these passions, so that none of them is free from its 
impact. Will stimulated by the passions aspires to that which is evil: the 
satisfaction of the passions in the natural state. Intelligence ponders how 
the desire may be satisfied and devises instruments for doing so. Reason 
approves of the act by understanding; reason approves of that which man 
strives for the most; that which he wishes for the most is that which he is 
inclined to believe. This is the normal state of affairs.” (§275.)
Evaluation of the significance of natural reason in morality and religion is thus 
highly skeptic and pessimistic: “Reason then emerges as, first, incorrigible; second, 
changeable; third hostile; fourth, false…” (§560.) However, the re-defined organicist 
notion of reason can also work as a receptive capability for spiritual enlightening 
and guidance353: 
“If the Holy Spirit thus affects the heart, then reason is certainly a sense 
on which the Holy Spirit’s effect in the heart can make an impression, 
353 “The subjective foundation of the activities of the sensory organs is in the heart.” (§627.)
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through which an idea of a higher power, an idea of that which is holy, an 
idea of the righteousness of God is awakened as a result of the testimony of feel-
ing. Feeling, however, is not born within the reason, but within the heart, and 
without preceding feeling, no other idea would emerge other than those that are 
transmitted from the external senses, or through external observation.”(§637. 
emphasis added; the English translation is provokingly deficient354.) 
The reason is not independent from the will. Stating that man can exercise and 
refine his understanding (förståndet) by his own will, and giving a mathematical 
calculation as an example of a voluntary act, Laestadius claimed that the “will has 
power over the faculty of understanding (förståndet). Further, he claimed that “it is 
also the will that puts thoughts in motion; […] man generally thinks in the context 
of wanting.” (§334) With this analysis, Laestadius clearly entered the phenomenal 
domain, as he conceived the idea that conditions of faculties are psychologically in-
terrelated. For example, understanding and reasoning are always conceived as taking 
place in particular passional and emotional conditions or within the states of wills 
and desire. Passions agitate reason to action either through a cognitive impact of the 
desires of will or directly through the mediation of humoral influence (e.g. §207). 
Laestadius listed some general ideas which are possible for natural reason such as 
“the idea of a higher being, the idea of good and evil, the idea of right and wrong” etc. 
(§864) However he does not consider these ideas as “fixed ideas,” self-given, stable 
and unchangeable truths because they can be “argued away” by false conclusions of 
reason derived from contingent passions. (§864) For instance, the “idea of personal 
God can be transformed into an idea of an impersonal God” or “the idea of virtue 
and vice can be transformed daily.” (§864) However, Laestadius also stated that the 
“idea itself, that there is a higher being, that there is a difference between good and 
evil, cannot be exterminated. To that extent, reason is independent of the will.” (§864.)
354 §637 lacks the following clause, which was in the original manuscript of the Dårhushjonet : 
”Sålunda äro förnufts idéerna om moders hjertats ömhet, om kärleken om sorgen o.s.v. ingalunda 
menniskan medfödda. Det är endast genom egen eller andras erfarenhet, som man kan få en 
idé om sådana föremål.” (§637) Mustakallio’s Finnish traslation in Hulluinhuonelainen (1968) 
goes as follows: ”Siten ideat äidin sydämen hellyydestä, rakkaudesta tai surusta eivät ole ihmisellä 
syntyperäisiä. Sellaisten asioiden aate saadaan vain oman tai toisten kokemusten perusteella.” 
Here is my free translation: “Thus the ideas of the tenderness, love and sorrow of the heart of 
the mother are not self-born/emerged in human being. The ideas of those kinds of matters will 
be reached only through the experiences of one’s own or the others.” I see this lacked part very 
important, as it reveals Laestadius’ anti-intellectualistic conviction that there are no self-emerged 
ideas in the sensory life. Laestadius pursued the naturalization of the emergence of ideas that 
drew on the testimony and evidence of feeling. Also, religious ideas are reached through religious 
experiences. Laestadius resisted mere metaphysical emotions and postulated ideas whatsoever. 
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Laestadius admitted that natural reason possesses certain higher ideas of good and 
evil and right and wrong but they are founded on passions and are derived (extract) 
from man’s noble feelings (känslor) and, therefore, are not pure (rena) “since the sense 
of justice itself, in the natural state, is clouded and mixed with sinful feeling.” (§631.) 
Laestadius sought an extended notion of reason that would “include” or be related 
to passions and would in this manner signify there was an ontological relatedness 
with existence and God. This view became apparent when he accused rationalist 
priests of the common blindness of reason; they did not stimulate and awaken the 
moral passions on the basis of reason of interlocutors, but rather followed their own 
natural passions to support the natural interests in people:
“It is certainly lamentable that the priests have enjoyed too much success in 
fettering reason, in keeping the masses in darkness and spiritual bondage. 
But do you know wherein the problem lies? In the fact that the priests, 
regardless of their philosophical upbringing, have not heeded the voice 
of reason but rather listened to the dull murmur of the stomach and the 
small intestines, which they have been unable to silence with philosophy. 
[…355]” (§1116.)
What then is managed by this re-definition? In this way, Laestadius argued that the 
proper notion of reason has to be intimately attached to the influences of subjective 
consciousness, while a part of the objective constitutive of the mind. Reason is not an 
independent faculty, but rather a sensitive capability that receives impacts from both 
the outer world (conventional-cultural, language etc.) and subjective pre-reflective 
states, which are ambiguous, multifaceted, and variable combinations of the organic 
vital functions overall. 
Understanding (förstånd) is neither independent of the organic life and its varying 
influences, nor independent from the other faculties and contents of the soul. Under-
standing is a faculty of thinking, and Laestadius wanted to highlight the distinction 
of reason, which is only receptive and a perceptive capability and the capability of 
concepts356. As reason is posited in between objective and subjective consciousness, 
understanding is conceived as a thinking capability that seems to contain or re-collect all 
the varying contents of the subjective and objective faculties of soul. In this sense, it covers 
355 “Thus, they have seen it as necessary, in their sermons, to sympathize with the passions of the 
people. They have found a reason to caress the people’s natural passions, and to soften their natural 
feelings in order to thus make them cooperative with regard tithing. But the philosopher does 
not know how to do that. When the philosopher wants to teach people to think and to speculate, 
he wraps his thoughts in a cloud, so that the masses must stand dumbfounded in amazement at 
the incomprehensible wisdom flowing from the depository of reason.” (§1116)
356 (Objects §18?)
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the aware sphere of the mind. Understanding makes a calculative process of the objec-
tive concepts of reason. (Cf. §18) Thus, understanding forms ideas, views and insights 
from all the input it receives [in its empirical-experiential relatedness to existence]. In 
this sense then, understanding is the primary/main capability of a functioning mind, 
but it cannot go along by itself, for it receives its power from other faculties. 
Laestadius stated that the capability of understanding and memory can be devel-
oped by practice, and because it pertains to the brains, it is called “brain-work” (§§22, 
25), emphasizing that thinking is an embodied organic function (as are all the facul-
ties of the soul that function by means of the organs). Memory and understanding 
can be developed by exercise that depends on the power of will (§227). However, 
the functions of memory and reason are dependent on the will except when passion 
dominates the memory and puts such thoughts into motion: 
“It is known that both memory and mind (förståndet) are refined through 
exercise, but such exercise depends entirely on the will of the individual. 
Thus, the activities of both memory and mind (förståndet) are depend-
ent on the will, with the exception of cases in which passion sustains memory 
and puts thoughts in motion. From this one is able to draw the significant 
conclusion that the mind, memory, and imagination do not possess spontaneity, 
insofar as their activities depend on the will and the passions. That memory 
and mind can be refined through exercise proves that what takes place is 
organic activity. It is the organ that acquires greater capacities through 
exercise; man’s ability to receive instruction and education depends on it. 
Also animals can be trained and tamed.” (§342.)
And further still,
“Physically and metaphysically, the powers of sensory life are not entirely 
corrupted. Through the power of the will, intellect (förståndet) and memory 
may be trained to a high degree of perfection. Yet the heart cannot be 
refined through the powers of the will. The will must succumb to evil, and 
this is why man’s will is, in its natural state, evil.” (§458.)
With regard to the faculty of imagination357 Laestadius was not so strict with the idea 
of subordination of the sensory life to the passions. While denying the independency 
357 Dahlberg asked in his comment to Laestadius (§4) whether imagination is a separate faculty of 
soul, to which Laestadius replied that “all the faculties” received their names early when people 
were uncivilized. However, he also admitted that psychologists do not agree on what functions 
belong to what faculty.
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of an objective will, Laestadius also seemed to consider imagination as a perception 
that is able to awaken activities – even passions –at the organic level. This view raises 
a question on whether man can control his organic passions using his own imagina-
tion. However, imagination also as an objective faculty that functions under the will, 
which is, nevertheless, still dominated by passions: 
“[B]ut we have already shown that it is the passion that awakens desire, the 
idea, and the concept, once perception has awakened the passion. Imagina-
tion is also a form of perception, which is able to awaken activities in the organs 
of the passions.” (§941. emphasis added) 
* * *
Altogether, Laestadius held that all faculties function under the influences of pas-
sions, and reason is seated in between feelings and understanding; understanding is 
the capacity of thinking; and will receives varying depictions depending on how the 
sphere of its operations are delimited. Will is only one united faculty, but its freedom 
is delimited to the domain of the sensory life within which it has negative and positive 
freedom. Thus, volition has power only on voluntary organs, and cognition within 
sensory life, namely, that man has the freedom to choose what to do, act, and live 
the life the person in question chooses to live. However the freedom of will is also 
relative, not absolute, because the will functions under the dominance of passions.
Laestadius depicted the relations between the main objective faculties, so they had 
their own phenomenal character, but were not separated into distinct domains be-
cause first of all, they function under the embodied passions. Reason is the capability 
of ideas, incapable itself of thinking, and characterized as an objectifying capability. 
While it receives impressions from the subjective consciousness, reason directs its fo-
cus to some being or entity, thus forming ideas. Henceforth, reason “delivers” its ob-
jects (supposedly by some psychosomatic interaction) for understanding or intellect 
(förståndet) [sometimes “mind”] which finally receives the objects of reason. It has 
the genuine capability of calculating and dealing with objects of reason. Understand-
ing also receives and possesses the desires of the will, aptitudes and poetical images, 
representations, fantasies of imagination358, recollections of memories, occasionally 
awakened by passions and sense perception. Even if Laestadius struggled with the 
 
358 ”But imagination or abstract thought does appear to have its seat in the organs that distinguish 
natural aptitudes. For instance, the aptitude for mathematics, music, language, order, and so forth, 
are better developed in some than in others.”(§280Note.)
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notion of imagination359 giving it the capability to modify and influence the organic 
passions, he finally did set imagination under the dominance of will and the ego360 
which are dominated by passions. By this means, Laestadius was able to hold with 
his leading idea that all the functions of objective faculties are conditioned by the 
organic life and thus rest under the passions and most often remain under the 
dominance of the natural passions or sin. However, understanding (förstånd) or 
the mind has an enormous perceptual, sensual, imaginary, and objectified universe 
made up of the objectives of reason, unconscious inclinations, desires of the will, 
and re-presented/vitalized memories, etc., so as to calculate, form ideas, concepts, 
combine them into ideologies, think, meditate, direct its own action (relatively, 
depending on the desires of will, passions) and so forth. Actually, understanding 
forms a domain for all the manifestations of man’s passional temporal-spatial re-
lations to existence. Altogether then, we can argue that Laestadius conceived the 
mind as being inextricably attached, not only to the organic body, but also to the 
organic and cultural world around it.
4.2.9  Intentionality of Mind and Perception
The above section analyzed Laestadius’ way of dealing with the subjective and objec-
tive faculties of consciousness. We have seen that all the objective faculties receive 
their motive force from the subjective sphere of consciousness, especially from 
passions [that are awakened by sensory stimuli]. Subsequently, we moved onto the 
sphere of embodied intentionality and paid attention how Laestadius emphasized 
the pre-reflective factors of passions, will, memory, and imagination as constituents 




359 “Imagination is generally dependent on the will, because imagination is a representation one 
makes by and for oneself; a product of active will. Nevertheless, the imagination is not always a 
product of that will, which one is conscious of as being one’s will. Imagination generally depends 
on a passion, which man cannot make by and for himself. Within a person who is afraid of the 
dark, fear can cause imagination that the ghost is following him around. In many, jealousy is able 
to conjure the imagination that the spouse is being unfaithful. And so forth. In such cases, the 
imagination is dependent on a dominant passion. But in other cases, such as poetry, drawing, and 
other fine arts, the imagination is dependent on the will.” (§340.)
360 Also the subordination of the imagination to the ego restrict its capability to modify organic 
passions freely: “The ego is independent within the sphere of sensory life, insofar as it is able to 
command all its members, the will, intellect and memory, the power of imagination; but since 
the ego is right in between organic life and sensory life, of which the former is the higher power 
that has brought for the ego, and the latter, sensory life, is subordinate to the ego, then the ego 
is unable to control the will and the intellect to the point that no desire enter into the will, and 
no thoughts,...”(§1206.)
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general level to show that Laestadius actually had a philosophically interesting theory 
of embodied intentionality of mind.361
As Laestadius was quite precise in arguing that the human “psychic essence” is 
given in the experiential realm of the faculties of consciousness and noted that the 
whole notion of “existence” of an organism could be defined as the “capability to 
receive action and to be active,” (derived from the vitalist notion of sensibility), one 
can see that there are similar emphases with the stance of the first person perspective 
elaborated on later in phenomenological philosophy362. Given that phenomenology 
formed its theory of the constitution on the basis of transcendental ego, but also on 
the insights of vitalism363 the connection can be conceived as historically genuine.364 
Altogether then, we can recognize that there is a certain kind of “mineness” or “first 
person givennes” of experience, as the human being finds himself always conditioned 
by feelings and passions – or a specific situation in general – that then directs his 
psychic-physiological orientation toward the world and existence.
However, reason, will, and understanding are not absolutely free and independent 
faculties, for they are attached to subjective faculties and thus receive influences from 
organic life. The objective faculties of consciousness are independent “de potentia non 
vero de actu” (§609), as they are themselves autonomous, but nevertheless, always 
dependent on a force not found in the organ [faculty] itself:
“This is supported by experience and does not need to be proven; much less 
so since it can be felt. But if a passion – whether it is a passion for vodka 
or a passion of love – can twist the thoughts and intensify the power of 
imagination, then it is surely a fact that man’s objective faculties of the soul 
are independent ‘de potentia non vero de actu.’ They are in and of themselves 
autonomous, but nevertheless always dependent on a force that is not found 
in the organ itself. The objective foundation for their activity depends on 
the qualities of the organs, but the subjective foundation depends on the 
blood.” (§609. See also §§608, 610)
361 Here we can draw a relative distinction between the intentionality of will and the intentionality 
of mind (förstånd) which is related to organic life but pertains to more cognitive awareness and 
its intentional directedness with the world and existence as such. For comparison see Shapiro 
2012, 194–216. Shapiro analyzed passional perception in Descartes and Spinoza, and interpreted 
that they both view the perception as affective and situational.
362 See e.g, Zahavi 2006; Taipale 2009; Bernsen 1986; Heidegger 1992; Steinbock 2009 and Steinbock 
2014.
363 Especially seen in the phenomenology of embodiment in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Cf. 
Merleau-Ponty 2002 (The Phenomenology of Perception. [Phénomenologie de la perception. 
Gallimard, Paris 1945] Routledge Classics, London and New York). See further of the 
phenomenological elaborations on embodied intentionality in Lingis 1971, 75–90.
364 See Spiegelberg 1982 for a broader presentation of the history of phenomenological movement.
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Laestadius often depicted the objective faculties of soul as “senses” and described 
them in organicist terms as receptive “organic” capacities. This focus indicates that he 
also conceived of objective faculties as having a certain kind of sensory and sensible 
directedness to the world. Reason, will, and understanding are different modes of 
the human organism to be related to the world and existence and they are based on 
varying passional conditions and situations.
Laestadius stated explicitly that the faculties of objective consciousness “are not 
independent and autonomous but are submissive faculties of soul.” (§1516.) Intellect 
or mind (förståndet) must function according to a particular or certain combination 
of underlying passions. Therefore, the affective states of the subjective consciousness – 
such as passions, instincts, and drives – constitute the contents of the concepts of reason, 
desires of will and ideas of understanding (§317). Laestadius highlighted especially the 
fact that understanding is always affected by emotions. 
An examination of the relationship between emotion and cognition is important 
when clarifying Laestadius’ psychology. Catholic intellectualism emphasized the 
human being as a “rational animal” and elevated human reason and its capabilities to 
the basis of God-relations. The Reformation emphasized the Grace of God and the 
awakening and reconciliation received “only by faith and grace” and thus accentuated 
the passive condition of human beings in redemption/salvation. Consequently, the 
heart as the center of experience and emotions was elevated to a more important role 
than human intellect. For Laestadius, this thought was present, as he stressed that 
natural reason is not pure from sinful passions, and awakening and reconciliation are 
the initial conditions for proper reasoning and genuine moral action.
Laestadius thought that passions that direct human action are not identical to 
cognition or thoughts, but rather lay the basis for their content and directedness. 
Passions manifest themselves in different affectual and emotional states, which 
in different combinations, henceforth emerge as varying cognitions. In this sense, 
passions, emotions, and thoughts are relatively different and distinct aspects of the same 
intentionality. Here, it is essential to note that Laestadius seemed to advocate for a 
negative freedom of will, which signifies that a human being does have the possibility 
to abstain from the actions agitated by natural passions and emotions (heinous feel-
ings). From this perspective it is possible to interpret that thoughts belonging to the 
sensory life or mind are relatively independent, at least in their negative significance, 
and thus, humans are able to restrain from action. If so, reflection, self-constraint, 
and religious contend are voluntary actions.365Altogether, Laestadius discusses (in 
365 Juntunen (1982, 85) noted – presumably referring to the fundamental subordination of sensory 
life to organic life, which indicated that cognitions are subordinated by passion-life – that it 
should not be possible to conclude a negative freedom from Laestadius’ principles (the stance 
that Zidbäck also holds). Actually, Laestadius was not precise with his analysis, but conflict is 
possible to understand and even overcome through interpretation; human beings can be open to 
the mystical experience of reconciliation and grace.
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relation to Geijer) the central problem, which is the relationship between emotions 
and cognition (scholasticism and reformation): 
“Geijer also says: ‘Modern Pietism, then, came out against reason, declared 
philosophy to be bankrupt, and that feeling was the only right thing. It 
took it as a given that thought could go no further, and feeling proclaimed 
its sovereignty’; (although the author has nowhere shown the nature of 
the relationship between thought and feeling; he has assumed that it is 
settled, that thought is dominant, although proof of this is lacking. Our 
claim is that this proves that ‘thought is not dependent on feeling.’ We 
have proved that thought is not autonomous, but dependent upon feeling; that 
is to say, the intellect, reason, and will are subordinate faculties of soul and their 
activities depend on a dominant passion. This passion is, in the rationalist, 
self-righteousness, which is the foundation of his slanted opinion about 
Pietism. These psychological principles are supported by the proofs that 
have been previously offered in this treatise. Moreover, Pietism has never 
claimed anything other than that which Luther has already said, namely that 
‘old reason, of glorious memory, is not adequate as a judge in spiritual matters, 
since natural reason is darkened, blinded, yes made demonic by infernal passion.’ 
Section F.F. §538.” (§1516. emphases added)
The basic idea then is that the stronger passions366 have an impact on the sensory life: 
“The conflict between passions is perceived within subjective consciousness 
as a stronger impression on the receptive organs by the stronger passion, 
compared to that of the weaker passion.” (§280.)
This emphasis on the influence of passions and organic functions on the content 
of conscious and cognitive acts, was the reason for Laestadius to shunt over the 
intellectualistic emphasis on philosophical reflection that leans on logical rules and 
formal laws. Contrary to the idea of rational-transcendental reflection Laestadius 
highlighted the (vitalist) view that “the laws of understanding (thinking)” are rather 
based on the “organs of understanding” (§126); with this statement, Laestadius again 
wanted to emphasize that autonomous or pure reason, as well as freedom of will are 
illusions and imaginary postulations because they exist and function under the domi-
nance of passions. From this perspective then, we can question Laestadius’ insight 
into the intentionality of mind and perception.
366 Compare Bichat’s analysis of passions, affections, and their origin and relationship to cognitive 
life (e.g. Bichat 1815, Chapter 6, p.60 à)
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The functioning whole of consciousness encompasses both a relatedness to the 
outer sphere (surrounding world) given to senses and the faculties of objective con-
sciousness, and the relatedness to the inner sphere (body world) given to subjective 
consciousness and mediated for the subjective faculties. Here we have to say “medi-
ated”, as the “subjective”/prevailing passions and instincts that cause emotions and 
feelings are always awakened by sense-perceptions and channeled to the cerebellum 
or cerebral for “interpretation” where they then combine. Grounding his ideas on such 
physiological insights, Laestadius’ structuring may sometimes appear as an awkwardly 
peculiar “systematization.” However, here Laestadius does formulate an interesting 
circular and interactive insight into the actions of consciousness and perception. 
Cognitive or conscious states are phenomenally interrelated (in actual experience). 
As the human organism is itself animated by the power of the principle of life, it 
can receive influences by organs; both outer and internal organs are receptive, and 
particular influences and impressions do resonate with certain organs. For example, 
the cerebral can receive influences, but the liver and heart can also receive influences 
(directly) – the cerebral by means of sense organs, and the liver and heart via nutrition 
and colliquation, and the heart by experiencing something emotionally upsetting 
(“touching”). This immediate influence passes through the intellect and agitates 
the passions, instincts, and drives, which henceforth stimulate humoral activity and 
influence the sensory life. Altogether, sense perceptions agitate and awaken passions 
and the faculties of subjective consciousness which then influence the formation of 
states of mind, such as the desires of will, concepts of reasons or rationale, and ideas 
of understanding, which then co-operate/function together by re-directing the senses, 
the intellect, and human action.
“Just as the senses are the conductors of the passions, they become their instru-
ments when the passions impact intelligence, reason and will.” (§266.) In this way 
Laestadius depicts the dynamic and reflective structure of man/world relationship. 
It is earlier indicated as being the circular character of perception.
“While the passions have their foundation in organic life, they neverthe-
less impact sensory life through the blood and the nerves, so that there is not 
a single passion, instinct or drive that does not impact the mind, reason, 
and the will; first a bodily impact, in the organs of these faculties, and 
then, so to speak, a spiritual impact on the mind, reason, and the will; an 
impact on the spiritual powers active within these organs (see §1266). Thus 
the mind (förstånd), reason, and the will are affected by the elements of 
the passions, so that the passions awaken a desire in the will, a concept in the 
mind (förstånd), and an idea in reason, all of which accord with the dominant 
passion.” (§317. emphasis added) 
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Circularly, this passionate orientation of objective consciousness (the awareness of 
mind) and perception continuously re-awakens the passions and states of subjective 
consciousness, thus laying the re-passional basis for a temporal-spatial directedness 
of mind and action. Thus, the human mind is intimately attached not only to the 
organic body, but also to the temporal surrounding environment and the world. 
Laestadius further held that the will is not passive only as it relates to the heart and 
conscience, but also to “sensuality” (§820). These elaborations seem to be adopted 
from Bichat367. It is basically the general constitution and structure of what is here 
interpreted as being the intentionality of mind and perception.
Even if Laestadius from first glance had quite a deterministic vision of human 
life as dominated by passions, nevertheless, he seemed to hold tight to the idea of 
man’s capability to act in accordance with his will and decisions:
“As the passions awaken desires within the will, the mind (förstånd) must 
think in accordance with the dominant passion and eventually make a deci-
sion to act (fatta ett beslut till handling), which, insofar as this decision is a 
product of the activities of the mind (en product af förståndets operationer), 
may be called will or desire of reason, ‘voluntas consequence’; not because this 
is the ‘substantial will’ or man’s ‘free will,’ which determines its own objects, 
but because the mind – as a consequence of its being thus prompted by 
the passion, or the real will – must think in accordance with the dominant 
passion. It is precisely the ‘self-will’ (egen viljan) that sets the thoughts in 
motion (see §812–813). And this ‘self-will’ is truly man’s own will – in-
sofar as man has any will of his own – since the real power or force that 
dominates man’s will is to be found in the heart, or the passions.” (§318. 
emphasis added)
This structure and the relationship between the faculties of objective and subjec-
tive consciousness can be interpreted as Laestadius’ conception of the mind and his 
theory of embodied intentionality and perception.
”Insofar as man has an organic life and sensory life, we must first draw a 
distinction between organic feelings and sensory feelings; it is a difference 
between the passion itself, which belongs to organic life, and the impres-
sion of the passion on the sensory organs, which belong the sensory life. 
The latter is generally seen as the soul and corresponds to the philosopher’s 
rational soul, although the public most often considers the heart to be the 
real organ of the soul. However, because the philosopher draws a substan-
367 Cf. Bichat 1815, §2, pp. 61–63.
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tial distinction between sensory life and the rational soul – although this 
distinction must be proven before we can be convinced of it – then we can 
assume, on behalf of the philosopher, the rational soul as ens simplex, or a 
being (väsende), that is supposed to be something entirely different than 
sensory life. This is approximately what the philosopher believes.” (§752.)
We can also notice that Laestadius elaborates on the view that replaces the clas-
sical constructivist idea of “theory biased perception” by “passion biased perception.” 
From Laestadius’ theoretical perspective, it seems evident that passions and emo-
tions have cognitive significance, as he purposely emphasizes the meaning of the 
passional pre-reflective subjective sphere. What he wanted to stress was that the 
pure transcendental sphere of reason, will, and understanding are incomprehensive 
and also false postulations368.
We can assume then that this elaboration is directed generally against metaphysical 
rationalism and particularly against Kantian transcendentalism, which was influential 
at the time369. Laestadius wanted to draw the transcendental domain back to the 
ground of the organic body and lived conditions in the world. As I show later, instead 
of the Kantian transcendental sphere of pure reason, for Laestadius, the spiritual 
level, particularly conscience, worked as a basis for value-moral or spiritual judgment. 
Further, it seems that Laestadius elaborated on the view that the experiential world is 
not constituted or constructed by intellectual-conceptual means, but instead is based 
on a passional experiential constitution within which the definition of life as such is 
left open for the dynamic events of life (life as such is but a mystery to appreciate). 
From examining Laestadius’ positions, it is definitely impossible to construct such a 
schematic view, namely, that things and the world would be first of all perceptible and 
experienced merely via concepts and the ideas of transcendental intellect because the 
mind would then lack a psychophysiological constitution. Instead, Laestadius seems 
to construct a certain kind of physiological transcendentalist stance that emphasizes 
the view that organic passional relatedness, pre-conceptual and pre-reflective in its 
character, fundamentally precedes all the conceptual, intellectual, categorical and 
ideological relationships with the world.
Subjective consciousness is also the sphere of spirituality, as it is the domain of 
genuine spiritual conscience. It always has something to do with “what” and “how” 
things are revealed for lived experience. In this respect, it becomes visible how 
Laestadius saw the physiological, moral, and spiritual as being dealt within the same 
368 To make Laestadius’ idea more comprehensible, we can refer to the phenomenological notion that 
the scientific definitions of concepts and theories also get their significance from an interpretative 
organic and passionate basis; in other words conceptions must also have their constitution. Mere 
calculation using abstract concepts does not grasp these phenomena whatsoever.
369 Cf. Dahlbäck 1965.
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psychophysiological plane. (Actually spiritual man does not signify anything else than 
the mode of existence disclosed into the psychic sphere through a recognition of the 
influences of passions.) It is clear that in Laestadius’ thought embodied pre-reflective 
intentionality laid the basis for the “higher” cognitive life, action and human life as 
a whole370. In this sense, the embodied human life was not under the authority of 
human intellect in the first place. Altogether then, subjective consciousness – or the 
heart as the center of passions – was posited as the fundamental constitutive basis 
for the whole intentionality of objective consciousness. 
Laestadius stated that there is only negative freedom of will in the conscious sphere 
(sensory life), which means that human beings can only abstain from acting according 
to their passions. However, this freedom is relative because the desires of the will are 
also based on variable natural passions. The basic vital principle or law is that stronger 
passions always get through their impressions to the sensory life and thus the whole 
intentionality of mind. In this way, the natural passions do not offer a valid basis for 
judgment, but instead actually reveal the relativist human condition (there are no 
moral values and valid judgments in matters of moral, faith and truth). Applying 
this emphasis of “subjectivity” or intentionality of heart, Laestadius’ thought comes 
close to Sören Kierkegaard and Max Scheler’s existentialistic-phenomenological 
philosophies371 if from another, vitalistic, angle372.
The mind is conceived in vitalist terms on the organic ground, not as an essence/
being, but as an active manifestation of organic and sensory lives (relational). The 
mind functions and is directed toward the present world and beyond it to the exist-
ence and God via reason, understanding, will, and imagination. 
Especially, imagination caused problems for Laestadius because it seemed to create 
a possibility to influence the organic passions while functioning under the passions 
and organic life and all the faculties of the soul. Imagination plays an important role 
because Laestadius holds that preaching can awaken images and moral passions. 
370 In this sense, the embodied human life is not under the authority of human intellect in the first 
place. He also refers to unconsciousness, indicating there is a subjective consciousness and its 
faculties that “sleep in the flesh”. Laestadius perceived his concept of unconsciousness coinciding 
with Carl Gustav Carus’s notion of subconsciousness. For Laestadius, unconsciousness did not 
refer to immaterial subconscious historical experiences as in modern psychoanalysis, but rather 
to organic and embodied pre-reflective states of the human body that grounded both awareness 
and the cognitive life.
371 Cf. Kierkegaard 1974; Scheler 1973. Comparative analysis between Laestadius’ notions of 
spiritual/moral intentionality and personhood and Scheler’s ethical personalism may be a valuable 
philosophical task.
372 In this sense, the embodied human life is not under the authority of human intellect in the first 
place. Laestadius stated that “all perception that is not given directly or immediately, is out of the 
reach of reason because reason belong to the faculty of objective consciousness” everything else 
has to be understood by the heart, inner perception, because matters of life and faith belong to 
the domain of subjective consciousness.
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It could be further analyzed whether imagination differs from the other objective 
faculties of soul in its position, i.e., is imagination a mediating faculty between the 
mind and organic passions?
* * *
The importance of the distinction between the organic life and the sensory life can-
not be emphasized enough, as it lay the groundwork for Laestadius’ idea of man and 
insights concerning intentionality. This physiological distinction indicates relatively 
different anatomical structures, but it also pertains to the foundation of the human 
person, as it has experiential significances and implications as well. What does this 
distinction then mean from the experiential or phenomenological perspective? 
First of all, the distinction expands the notion of intentionality over the mere 
sensory life or awareness of consciousness through which man relates to an objec-
tive surrounding world. The distinction clearly indicates that the whole intentional 
relatedness of man can be conceived as being twofold. Man is related to the world 
through the sensory life (neural life), both with its subjective and objective conscious-
ness (and their faculties), but also through the organic life as such, meaning there is 
an intimate corporeal attachment of human beings to the world. We can thus view 
the organic life as a constitutive basis or prerequisite for the sensory life; without 
organic life, the intentional relationships of the sensory life would not be possible. 
What is important to point out as well is that a human being is also directly attached 
to nature and the surrounding world. The corporeal human being is not distinct, but 
rather a part of the common laws of the organic life of nature through its organic 
constitution. Laestadius seemed to be well aware of this human intimate relationship 
with organic nature. 
The idea of a twofold intentional structure of human beings can be radicalized by 
stating that man is simultaneously and intentionally directed through the sensory 
life and the organic life. It is well known even in modern medical thought that some 
empirical sense impressions affect directly the functions of organic life without me-
diating the cognitive processes at the higher conscious level. Some sense perceptions, 
for instance, smell of something contaminated, may affect the organic functions and 
bypassing cerebral activation and thus cognitive awareness. This aspect is supposedly 
neurologically possible, as all the neural connections from sensory organs do not 
go through the cerebral; sensory impressions may have a more direct relationship 
to organic life, which henceforth mediates the information of the perceived to the 
cerebral and thus creates higher cognitive awareness and thinking. 
Altogether, it seems obvious that the organic life is related to the world and sur-
roundings directly without having any conscious awareness of what is given to the 
embodied/corporeal experience in the first place. Can we conclude from this assumed 
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immediate man-world relationship that intentional relatedness is also unconscious, 
that something that is given directly through organic life precedes the higher con-
scious intentionality of the sensory life? However, this direct organic relatedness seems 
also to have been in Laestadius’ mind, as he repeatedly highlighted the founding, 
dominating, constitutive and preceding position and role of organic life in the vital-
personal existence of human being. For Laestadius, it was mainly the functioning of 
passions that operate via the organs that thus mediate sensory intentionality. 
However, it is also a matter of [empiric] sensual-sensuous (sensory) experiences, 
for example, smell, voice, and vision that affect the organic body without consciously 
being aware of the substrate and influence of what is given in [empiric] sensuous 
impressions and experiences. From an experiential perspective, it is always this 
organic-sensory relatedness that is at work and which signifies that intentionality 
is constituted of both an organic-subjective embodied intentionality and sensory-
objective intentionality. This ambiguity does not necessarily mean that these in-
tentional ways are distinct from each other, but simply that this holistic embodied 
intentional relatedness always is constituted of organic-subjective elements that are 
not transparent to the human itself. We could very well talk about tacit embodied 
knowledge and habits, of intentionality that is always a constitutive part of a human’s 
intentionality and sensory life. Basically, this twofold constitutive structure of human 
intentionality is what Laestadius thematized in more detail using the concepts of 
subjective and objective consciousness and faculties of soul noted above.
4.3  An Embodied Vital Personhood
In Laestadius’ analysis, the faculties of soul are closely related to his notion of the 
Self373 (jaget, ego), which has a specific conceptual position in his theory. Based on 
the relationship between organic life and sensory life, Laestadius insisted that the 
notion of Self must cover both the subjective and the objective consciousness and 
373 I use the term ‘Self ’ (capitalized as a concept) to denote Swedish “Jag” (I, me, and in English 
translation, ‘ego’) while aware that Laestadius’ may have had a critical attitude toward the term 
“själfet” as he once indicated that it would signify “personified egoism.” (§1174) However, the 
Self (själfet) works theoretically better to denote the core of the substantial vital personhood that 
Laestadius wanted to distinguish from the philosophical notion of ego, which he also criticized 
harshly. Even if in the English translation, ‘jag’ is translated as ‘ego’, I still use the term ‘Self ’ as the 
translation for ‘Jag’. However, I do not change the translations in the referred citations. The word 
‘Self ’ functions better for my interpretation, as it fits together well with the first person perspective 
of ‘mineness’ without excluding the significance of outer sphere (or “aboutness”) of intentionality. 
In Laestadius’ vitalist and pre-phenomenological use, ‘jag’ also indicated the emphasis on first 
person experience and its embodied character even though the experiential core of the Self has 
its proper constitutive subject, not in-itself but, in the principle of life.
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their faculties and functions. Thus, the Self is more specifically “located” in between the 
organic and sensory lives and he took the position of the Self having both a subjective 
and objective consciousness. The Self is the subject of experiences even if the Self 
itself has its constitutive subject in the principle of life. Laestadius’ notion of Self 
differed from the mere ego-subject. Laestadius claimed in various contexts that the 
especially rationalistic notion of ego enclosed unto itself, thus indicating a certain 
kind of solipsism or “self-closeted” personified egoism (e.g. §108, 233). The critique 
of the rationalistic notion of ego follows a similar line of thinking with his critique 
of the rational soul determined in terms of substance and essence. For Laestadius, 
the Self was not a subject, but a predicate; in general this means that the Self is em-
bodied and susceptive to outer impressions and the inner influences of subjective 
consciousness. Its existence is defined as a self-consciousness that “is acted upon 
and is being active,” (cf. §37, 170) in such a way that the consciousness of the Self 
does not possess the motive power (moving first principle) in itself. The Self is not 
absolutely autonomous, but still it has relatively directive re-active capability because 
of the negative and positive freedom of the will (self-will, which, however, does not 
have power over organic life or the heart). The Self (jaget) signifies the experiential 
core of embodied subjectivity, which has its proper grounding in the psychophysiological 
constitution in the principle of life and in the moving principles of passions.374 From 
this perspective, none of the faculties of objective consciousness are independent and 
free with respect to the functions of organic life and the powers of passions. 
The faculties and phenomena of reason, understanding, will, and imagination are 
inextricably attached to the organic functions, or in other words, to the embodied 
subjectivity or the selfhood. It is always the I or the me who thinks, feels, and acts 
even though the power for these acts resides outside the Self. Thus, Laestadius had 
to include in the notion of the Self something that was not the Self or “ego” and 
under its control. Laestadius aimed to expand the notion of the Self (jag) to cover 
the whole psycho-physiological constitution of a human being and its passionate 
relatedness to the world that forms the Laestadius’ holistic conception of personhood.
4.3.1  The Critique of Pure Ego and Ideal Personhood
Laestadius’ critique of the concept of person within enlightenment and romantic meta-
physics derived from his critique of the philosophical ideas of substance and essence. 
(§1203–1204.) Laestadius generally criticized the wide range of philosophical elabo-
rations that conceive of the ultimate being (God) as substance, the anthropocentric 
postulation of God as mere “intellect”, and the idea of the distinct and autonomous 
individual soul as well as the concept of person as a derivation of that principle.
374 In Descartes’ philosophy, the ego is the basis for the topic on the certainty of knowledge. See, e.g 
Alanen 2003 (Descartes’s Concept of Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.).
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It is obvious that Laestadius’ conception of the Self is broadly thematized in 
critical opposition to the prevailing dualist and rationalistic notions of the self (ego). 
Laestadius stated that the rationalists’ “ideal personhood” was “hypermetaphysics”, 
seemingly referring to a certain kind of imaginary speculation (§1227). In this respect 
Laestadius viewed the classical rationalistic notion of ego cogito as a more limited 
notion of the self, and accused it to drive the nature of sensory consciousness and 
supersensory consciousness in one of dualism (See, §§191Note, 192, 233).
“The ego is, within ideal personhood, an ‘ens liberrimum’ sed ‘indeterminatis-
simum’; there are no ‘attributes,’ no defined characteristics, no laws, there is 
only incorrigibility and capriciousness.” (§1204.)
Further, Laestadius’ notion of the Self differed from the beginning for both the 
substance dualist and the function dualist concepts within which the soul and the 
notion of self were distinctively conceived as belonging to the distinct domain of 
the intellectual-reflective and often inorganic sphere of the soul with functions dis-
tinct from organic functions.375 In this respect, Laestadius’ notion does not imply an 
ontological dualism because organic life and sensory life are seen as only branches/
emanations of the common principle of life. However, the conflict between the lived 
corporeal body and the spirit is experienced within the Self, and hence, Laestadius 
struggled with the dualism within the Self/personhood. Once he stated that “the 
closest self ” and the “second self ” seemed to indicate that different activities existed 
within them. Nonetheless, Laestadius finally did argue for the unity of Self and mind 
using the panpsychistic argument.
As Laestadius repeated the claim that “what happens in the soul, happens in the 
body,” he also repeated the claim that “the ego (jag) that feels is the same ego that 
thinks.” With these claims, Laestadius highlighted his conviction of the unity and 
embodied character of the Self and simultaneously emphasized the difference of his 
stance with the rationalistic and idealistic conceptions of ego and personhood that he 
conceived as metaphysical. (§185Note, §185.) Laestadius saw that these mentioned 
philosophical conceptions drove into several dualities which were not correct and 
do not help us understand the experienced unity of personhood. Such a problem-
atic duality was found first of all within the consciousness, will, feeling, or emotion. 
Laestadius seemed to claim that substance dualism leads to “dual consciousness,” to 
the problem of two wills, and to distinct emotions that turn into sensory and mere 
metaphysical feelings. (See, §§191Note, 192, 748, 752.) Here it is elucidative to give 
voice to Laestadius’ words:
375 On substance and function dualism, see Wright 2006, 237–254 (Substance dualism versus Function 
Dualism in Eighteenth-Century Medicine. Oxford: Claredon Press, Oxford University Press).
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“Reason itself stands in bewilderment when faced with the notion of dual 
consciousness. Immediate feeling testifies that the ego ( Jag) that perceives 
through the senses is the same ego that thinks. Yet the philosopher does not dare 
to trust his own feelings because he fears the consequences. His beloved 
freedom would perish if the soul were dependent on organic contingen-
cies. Ergo, he makes a logical leap, declaring: ‘Cogito, ergo sum.’ I think, and 
thoughts are free and the will is free, and cannot be dependent on organic 
contingencies. […] His beloved freedom would perish entirely if the rational 
soul was not autonomous and free. But what is the origin of this rational 
soul? Does it emerge through speculation? Or does it create itself? Has it 
emerged in an instant or grown like the flower from a seed? We suggest 
that the rational soul is concealed already within the principle of life; that it 
develops gradually in proportion to the organs. It is one and the same force 
that shapes the organs and propels the thoughts, although it may appear 
to us as if the soul and life are two different beings376 (väsendet).” (§192.) 
Even if there are tensions and conflicting states within the embodied experience 
of the Self, Laestadius wanted to view them within a single and united holistic psy-
chophysiological experience. Generally speaking, Laestadius saw that the biggest 
mistake of philosophical ego-philosophy was that it narrowed the notion of the Self 
by excluding and denying the organic functions from the sphere of personhood. (See, 
§404. Cf. §§641, 347.) According to Laestadius, “philosophers” tore themselves away 
from the sensitive or sensory nature of the Self (§307), and the consciousness of the 
ego became but an “abstract consciousness.” (§233)
Again, Laestadius expressed his polemics against the idealist and rationalist no-
tion of soul377 by which he now paved a way for his own re-definition of the Self. 
 
376 Here Strindberg points out in a footnote (210) that Heinroth emphasized the unified 
“developmental force” from which an entire being emerges (summation in Heinroth 1837, §27), 
as well as the gradual development of the entire being, within which there is a constant identity 
between this force in terms of its outwardly phenomena and its inner foundation (Heinroth 
1837, §45). Heinroth rejected “the contradiction between matter and spirit founded purely on 
abstraction” and sought instead to posit life as the unifying force that maintains a unity between 
the outer and the inner. (See, Strindberg in The Lunatic 2015, Footnote 210, p. 98.) 
377 On the harsh critique of the rationalistic notion of ego, seen as the power in itself that maintains 
the faculties and the whole life of human. (See §647, 648.) On the notion of the ego of the 
philosopher who believes it is possible to negate passions; “The philosopher has no instinct to 
procreate, no instinct to produce nourishment, no egoism, no ambition.” The philosopher has 
forgotten the body. (§649.)
On the further implication of the way rationalistic faith turns into virtue ethics within which one does 
not need to conceive itself as being subordinated under the ”higher powers,” thus lay people 
become seduced and awakening is made unncessarily. (See, §650.)
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The rationalistic emphasis on pure ego is seen as the manifestation of the passion of 
egoism378. Thus he polemically wrote: 
“Egoism reveals itself within reason as an idea of the abstract ‘ego’ or the Self, 
an emptiness resting on nothingness, without object or subject. This great ego 
has, within the reason of the philosopher, transformed itself into a great 
whale that strains at gnats but swallows camels. Within reason, the ego ap-
pears in all its universality: the ego comes, through reason, divine. Through 
reason, the ego becomes a sun unto itself, its own star. The ‘divine ray’ within 
reason is the sun of the ego, the fixed star around which the ego revolves. 
Furthermore, through reason, the ego becomes a freely operating entity, 
independent of outer and inner forces of nature, and through the free will, 
the ego acquires self-determination. Moreover, all of this is worked out by 
the intellect, the organ of which is continually swimming in the element 
of egoism.”(§1023. emphasis added)
Laestadius also thought that it was mainly because of the influence of the passion 
of egoism that the Self was conceived as unconditional and autonomical (§1025). 
Further still, Laestadius claimed that the influence of egoism presents itself in Western 
rationalism particularly in its manner of positing pure “thinking ego” (ego cogito) as 
the core of thinking and anthropology.
As noted here in Chapter 3, Laestadius thought that Idea and a philosophical 
abstract ego was not a plausible starting point for anthropology and theology. Ego 
as an Idea is not given directly within lived experience, or at least in its pure form as 
philosophers assumed. Instead the Self is given as corporeal, passional and feeling 
the flesh:
“[I]deal personhood cannot become a fixed idea, a necessary thought, even 
though the idea is given within abstract consciousness. Ideal personhood 
is a possibility. But how can it become reality, when the idea cannot ex-
ist without substance, without foundation. The ego cannot exist without 
subject, without principle. Existentia sine essentia et sine substantia, non 
exsistit.” (§1203.) 
The metaphysical and rationalistic notion of the soul lay the ground for the idealistic 
notion of ego, which in turn led to the notion of ideal personhood. Within an ideal 
378 On egoism and its consequences, see, §§ 1024, 1025 [social-political violence], 1026 [egoistic 
emphasis of one’s own rights], 1027 [ambition manifests as an illusion of high moral value of 
oneself ], §1036 [summary].
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personhood, the ego [itself ] is conceived as the highest power in the full sphere of 
personhood (§§1182, 1183). 
Against both rationalism and metaphysicians, Laestadius argued that it is not 
correct to exclude the subjective faculties of soul from the concept of Self and per-
sonality. The philosophical analysis has to accept those powers of passions that are 
not in control of the Self into the notion of personality (§§1183, 1188). From this 
critical perspective Laestadius then sought to elaborate on an alternative for the 
rationalistic and idealistic notions of ego and personhood.379
4.3.2  Deconstruction and the Vitalist Notion of Self
Following the vitalist way of thought, the “emergence” or manifestation of the Self 
is naturally grounded on the creative and evolving basis of the principle of life that 
functions via organic life. Thus, Laestadius viewed the Self (jag, ego) also as a mani-
festation of developmental380 processes. The Self is grounded in the physiological basis 
of inherited characteristics, such as temperament and unique passional sensitivity 
that is specific for every unique human being. 
The Self or awareness of the “I” or “me” requires a development/gestation of the 
sensory life for the phenomenon of Self to be reached by intentional consciousness.381 
Only when the organs of sensory life, the brains, are developed, and only when there 
is an experiencing sensory activity (object consciousness), is the Self able to become 
aware of its own existence382. Thus, Laestadius conceived of an emergence and level 
of self-consciousness from the developmental perspective. Self-consciousness was 
naturally the initial condition for the existence of the Self as such:
“The first sign to announce the existence of such a substance [the self/
rational soul] should be self-consciousness. A soul that does not possess 
self-consciousness, nor exists in the consciousness of someone else, does 
not exist. To exist is the same as being active and being acted upon (agere 
379 Presumably Laestadius’ critique is aimed at Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Laestadius emphasized 
the organic subjective consciousness instead of a mere transcendental consciousness.
380 We can also see “the emergence of the Self ” as an evolutionary process. See the “developmental 
law of personhood” (§1189).
381 Laestadius also argued that the principle of life preceded the idea of the concept of self (§1196). 
There is no Ego before vital powers and, therefore, no pure starting point for philosophy. The ego 
is genetically born from the principle of life (§1189).
382 Laestadius thought that the fetus already had a self-consciousness after the sensory life was 
developed, but he claimed that a fetus is able already in the womb to experience (sensibility), and 
there was a short discussion of the emergence of self-consciousness in the fetus. Altogether, the 
notion of the self is possible to position between the organic and sensory functions only after the 
human organism reaches a certain developmental stage. Laestadius does not further discuss the 
self-consciousness of the fetus. 
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et existere idem est). But that which can neither act nor be acted upon does 
not exist. Substantia non existit ante existentiam suam (a substance does not 
preexist its own existence); a being (väsen) cannot exist until it is capable 
of acting and being acted upon.” (§170.383)
Furthermore, based on this definition, Laestadius seemed to hold that “existence 
precedes essence” also highlighted in existentialistic philosophy as a different meaning. 
Any being or essence of the ego has its psychophysiological, but also vital-existential 
pre-requisites; the Self cannot be a vital substance or possess any essence before its 
“power to be,” before its actual existence by the power of the principle of life, and 
before existing in the world (of passions). The Self does not have its foundation in 
and of itself, but rather in/on the principle of life that is conceived the real subject 
of the ego. (e.g. §§1196, 1218)
For Laestadius, the principle of life signified a “psychic vital essence”, a holistic 
organization of sensibility384, and its experiential existence was revealed through a 
passional nature to the human being itself. This principle of life has to be seen also 
as the core of the vitalist concept of personhood; however, in a way that is a creative and 
directing totality of the vital forces that create organic life and modify its action, for 
example, constituting the sensory life, which as seen above, does signify a genuine 
individual soul.
Hence – recalling the thematic whole of organic life and sensory life and inter-
twined experiential spheres of subjective and objective consciousness – Laestadius 
posited the Self (jag) in “between the organic life and sensory life.” This signifies 
that the notion of self is fundamentally attached to both of the embodied organic 
functions of subjective consciousness and objective consciousness, and also lays the 
ground for the holistic notion of the Self.
Thus, Laestadius shunted over the idealistic and transcendental notions of ego as 
vague and etheric, and highlighted again the needed shift into the vitalistic paradigm: 
“There is only one middle road for us to choose, between ideal and substantial 
[notions of ] personhood. If we follow the guidelines of nature itself, in the 
fashioning of human personhood, we find that we are given a principle of life 
in the seed, in the egg, in the fetus shortly after conception […] [W]e must 
383 In footnote 168 of §170, Strinberg suggests that Laestadius opposed Leibniz’s definition and 
agreed more with Fichte, and thus Laestadius denied the rationalistic idea of the substantiality of 
soul because it presupposed a point of time within which it does not act or is not acted upon. For 
Laestadius, that which properly exists has to act and receive action (susceptibility) (Cf.§72Note). 
Laestadius seemed to reject Leibnizian monadology because it drove into dualism; however, he 
did refer to the harmonia praestabilita as an endeavor for monistic thought. 
384 E.g., the irritability and receptivity of organs and sensory life that interact and function together.
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believe that our origins come from this obscure natural foundation. Yet life 
is not lawless; it is bound by physical necessity. […] psyche and pneuma are 
branches of common principle of life. If we now were to posit the principle 
of life in the place of the soul, we have, within this principle of life, the foun-
dation, or the subject, for our self-consciousness. But since this principle of 
life has not yet been defined by any thinker as ‘being (väsen) or substance,’ 
we are, within psychology freed from metaphysical necessity and thus able 
to move a little bit freer in the sphere of subjective personhood.” (§1205.)
The embodied subject-ground of the human Self is the principle of life that is 
conceived as something that “receives action and can act in-itself ”.385 This fundamental 
starting point derives from the vitalist notion of sensibility, as vitalists argued against 
Cartesian and the transcendental notion of a pure ego and distinct immaterial soul386, 
namely, that “to feel is to exist.”387
Laestadius made a distinction between the Self (ego) and its foundation (§1195); 
the principle of life is able to exist without foundation and independently but the 
Self is not. The Self and its “subject ground” are not identical. Rather the Self is the 
predicate of its foundation, a functioning of principle of life and other vital forces 
within organic life. 
When the Self is seen as in between organic life and sensory life, it is obvious that 
it can never exist as pure ideal ego, but instead manifests itself as a developmental, 
relational, and dynamic occasion or event of life. The Self is relational first from the 
embodied internal perspective that is the core of the carnal unconscious variable 
processes of organic life and functions of mind, and secondly, in relation to the influ-
ences of an outer objective surrounding that is directly affecting the organic body. 
The Self being the experiential core of both outer and inner influences and impres-
sions388, it becomes evident that Laestadius did not conceive of the Self simply as a 
capsulated subject of experience, in the sense that the Self would be the active ground 
for occasions of [personal] life. This emphasis was a very important for Laestadius, 
and he highlighted it in the following way (the destruction of abstract subjectivity): 
”Certainly we have noted that these metaphysical definitions are more 
physical than metaphysical once we have grasped the principle of life, 
which is ’existentia sine essentia et sine substantia.’ However, if the principle 
of life were an idea, then not only would the crow be able to be a person, 
385 The self (ego) cannot exist without a subject (§1192).
386 (within which the intellectual cognition [ultimate doubt] becomes an initial proof of existence)
387 See e.g. Williams 2004; Rey 2006.
388 I/the self as the developmental predicate of the principle of life and subject to the influences of 
passions and world.
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but the caterpillar (larven) and the straw of grass on the ground would be 
able to be a persons. The materialist and the pantheist are unlikely to go 
that far in personification. We must therefore remain within the limits of 
the possibilities of human thought: the idea and the principle of life are not 
identical; the ego is not a subject, but a predicate. The ego has a foundation for 
its being, and this foundation is not the ego. ‘Existentia non est substantia’. 
[…389].” (§1229. my emphasis added)
According to Laestadius, the Idea and [principle of ] life are not identical, and life 
precedes all ideas (§§1228, 1229). In regard to a human being, this view signifies 
that the human self (jaget, ego, Person) cannot be conceived as an ideal capsulated 
subject founded on itself or lying on its own subjectivity. The self has its foundation 
in the principle of life and its worldly embodiment (as a tension between objectivity 
and subjectivity). As a consequence, the Self is not the subject – the foundation and 
cause of its own action and activity – but rather an object of action, a predicate. For 
this reason, proceeding toward the notion of personhood cannot begin with pure 
ego, but instead begins with the principle of life and proceeds from there into the 
[vital]idea, to the Self and personhood (§1187).
This view means that the idea of ego or the Self emerges and is constituted within 
a vital lived experience. The inscribed critique within Laestadius’ alternative notion of 
Self is aimed at Cartesian and the idealistic notion of the ego. According to Laestadius, 
a distinct and autonomous ego is simply not possible. Even if it could be imagined, 
it could not be a genuine and proper Self. The substantial notion of the ego, as well 
as the soul, do not have any existence (existentia non est substantia), and the whole 
notion of substantiality and the notion of essence (essentia) derived from it are only 
empty, ideal and abstract (Cf. §1203).
In regard to earlier discussions on Laestadius’ view on the functions of mind, we 
can question what the Self is. What does the phenomenon of Self embody and how 
does the Self function in the world?390 Furthermore, what indications did Laestadius’ 
389 “Since life within man is concurrent with the body, we could, in accordance with common laws of 
thought, conclude that life and substance within God are concurrent. But we are unable to formulate 
even a fraction of the concept of the emergence of this, the first idea. We are unable to say that 
idea realis came before idea substantialis, especially since idea substantialis is, to us, unthinkable. 
Idea vitalis is more possible, insofar as the idea cannot exist without life. Here, too, we [are] met 
by the contradiction of nature, that the life and idea are not interchangeable concepts and cannot 
be counterpoised.” (§1229)
390 How does the experienced self relate to one’s own body, others, and to the world? How would 
Laestadius’ “self ” answer the question, “who am I?”, or how was the problem of identity to be 
conceived in Laestadius’ theoretical frame? A hint toward a Laestadius’ answer is given in the 
theological statement that the self has to encompass both the “old and a new man,” which signifies 
that the actualized redeemed self is conceived as a “redeemed devil” (§1378).
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notion of the Self have for the understanding of personhood, moral responsibility, 
or religiosity?
“Once we have been liberated, through the principle of life, from ontology 
and metaphysics, we only need the given axiom, the dynamics of life, in 
order to uncover the elements that belong to the sphere of personhood. 
Through this logical trick (life), we have moved away from the being of the 
idea [ideväsénde, idea of essences] to the life of the idea[s] [idelif ]; from sub-
stantiality to vitality, from the unthinkable idea substantialis to the more 
thinkable ‘idea vitalis’; and even if the idea is not in the principle of life, 
as Heinroth claims, it is nevertheless present in formed life. We are only 
able to proceed through experience from the principle of life to the idea-
less (idélösa) (organic) life; we arrive at the idea-full (idéfulla) life through 
the same experience, from the idea-less life.391 But precisely because the 
philosopher is unable to prove it (Petrelli), we are able to arrive at a liv-
ing personhood, within which the ego, as the center point of personhood, 
must acknowledge its dependence on ‘psychic necessity,’ and its independence of 
metaphysical necessity. The ego is independent within the sphere of sensory life, 
insofar as it is able to command all its members, the will, intellect and memory, 
the power of imagination; but since the ego is right in between organic life and 
sensory life, of which the former is the higher power that has brought for the ego, 
and the latter, sensory life, is subordinate to the ego, then the ego is unable to 
control the will and the intellect to the point that no desire enter into the will, 
and no thoughts, which do not proceed from the ego, are able to enter into intellect 
(förståndet). Daily experiences show that wicked desires really sneak into the 
will, and the ego is unable to prevent this since/ [similarly as] (äfvensom) 
foreign thoughts (främmande tankar), which the ego cannot instantly expel, 
also sneak into the intellect.” (§1206. emphasis added)
But how then is the demanded unity of the self thematized and argued in Laes-
tadius’ theory? With regard to the notion of person, Laestadius now interpreted 
the constitutive principle of life as a panpsychism that would constitute the holistic 
notion of personhood and unite the dualities. (§1218.)
391 In these statements, Laestadius seems to indicate that organic life can be researched only through 
lived experience, and furthermore, he claims that only through the same lived experience is it 
possible to proceed to the study and explication of ideas. This pre-phenomenological approach 
is clearly based on his fundamental starting point, namely, that life precedes ideas whatsoever. 
These statements are illuminative in order to understand how Laestadius conceived the way that 
pre-reflective and pre-cognitive experiences could be studied and how concept, ideas, and theories 
could be formed in such a way as to coincide with the lived experience.
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Laestadius mentions “panpsychism” directly in five contexts in The Lunatic: §§ 
132, 1208, 1218, 1244392, 1601393. In these contexts, he refers to the Swedish philo-
sophical and psychological scholar, C. M. J. Petrelli and his book, Om Människos-
jälen Natur – Försök till Psychologie (1845)394, wherein he found many discipline and 
general definitions, e.g., panpneumatism and pantheism. Laestadius’ panpsychism is 
actually defined by distinguishing his own position from that of dualism, pantheism, 
and panpneumatism. His refusal of the rationalistic-mechanical and metaphysical 
tradition395 and the notions of “panpneumatism, dualism, naturalism, and fatalism” 
(§1601), becomes clear as he saw them threatening the proper understanding of the 
human being, life, and Christian faith and God.
When questioning Laestadius’ panpsychism, it is important to notice that Laesta-
dius re-interpreted panpsychism by offering a philosophical-theological interpretation 
of the vitalist notion of the principle of life. Thus, the principle of life comes to signify 
the fundamental-ontological and living psychic essence of organic matter itself. In 
this respect, Laestadius’ panpsychism differs from the classical concept of panpsy-
chism known in the classical history of philosophy.396 Laestadius is not arguing – as 
classical strong panpsychism proponents do – that all matter whatsoever or things 
are “mental” from their fundamental character. Laestadius delimits panpsychism to 
pertain to only organic matter, holding that all of living nature and thus organic life 
is “mental” or vital in the sense that it is grounded on the vital principle. 
As pointed out elsewhere as well, it is a task of another study to formulate an 
argument for Laestadius’ radical panpsychism397. Laestadius did not seem to be 
interested in such a philosophical project, but rather leaned toward the notion of 
panspychism within the anthropological and psychological framework. For Laes-
tadius, panpsychism pertained only to organic life. For him, the panpsychistic way 
392 Here Laestadius draws a distinction between his interpretation of panpsychism and 
panpneumatism. 
393 Here Laestadius resists idealism and materialism in favor of his interpretation of monistic 
panpsychism, which is fastened back to the Biblical (early antique) notion of a transformative 
vital force.
394 Petrelli’s book [engl. On the Nature of Human Soul – Research on Psychology] was a widely used 
study-book for psychology and philosophy in 1800’s Sweden, and it spread the rationalistic and 
Hegelian metaphysics and classical ideas of philosophical psychology.
395 It is necessary to reconstruct the idea of an historical background to thematize Laestadius’ 
theoretical positions, formulations, and intentions. Laestadius’ panpsychism is possible to define 
in its relation to the views and doctrines to which he objected. Laestadius’ elaborations can be 
interpreted against the dominating dualistic, rationalistic, idealistic, and growing mechanical 
explanation of man and the world.
396 See, Skrbina 2007 for the history of Western panpsychism. 
397 Such an argument may be possible to form if we go on and interpret Laestadius’ idea of “living 
God” as a proto-panpsychistic principle that organizes all physical matter and gives life to organic 
beings.
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of thought offered a more correct and coherent view when considering human 
organism, the emergence of consciousness, and the whole person and avoided the 
problems of dualism, emergentism, idealism, materialism etc. To avoid the panpneu-
matist idea of the presence of an abstract spirit or God in everything seems to be 
crucially important. Human consciousness and personhood should be conceived 
from the ground up in such a way that the principle of life as a restricted panspy-
chistic notion constitutes the more complex functions of life and thus through 
growth and development constitutes the higher functions of consciousness and 
finally the holistic notion of a person.
He calls the personality that includes both the soul and the body a panpsychism, 
and conceives that the panspyschistic substance of the person unites the “dual con-
sciousness” and the doubled wills and emotions (§1218).
“Petrelli oscillates between ’pansychaeismus’ and ’panpneumatismus.’ But 
since these two lives cannot be counterpoised, it is clear that they are 
determined by nature in a way that does not allow for them to be inter-
changeable concepts. But ‘panpneumatismus’ does not exist, since sensory 
life only falls within a certain sphere; that is to say, it does not extend to 
whole body (Cf. Petrelli, §87. 47.) However, ‘panpsychaeismus’ does exist since 
organic life extends even into the hair and the nails. We do not claim that 
man’s personhood extends that far. We only claim that pansychaeismus fills the 
entire sphere of man’s personhood, in accordance with universal consciousness, 
which is man’s general ego. This ego is voluminous in terms of its compass 
and contains all of man, both body and soul. Panpsychaeismus is thus the 
real personhood, such as it has been given by the Creator; it is of no avail 
that concentrated egoism wishes to tear itself loose from its subject, from 
its principle, from its being, that is to say, from its life, which here appears 
as being, because metaphysical necessity applies also here: ‘each and every 
one must act according to the nature of his being.’ This is a universal law 
in all of nature, and man is subject to this law in physical, psychic, and 
metaphysical respect. He is bound by physical, psychic, and metaphysical 
necessity.” (§1208. emphases added)
The passive relationship of the ego to feelings is a psychic necessity. The ego must 
now acknowledge feelings, passions, drives, instincts, temperament, and so forth:
”But the ego that feels is a passive ego. It is an ego of the kind that must 
receive what is given to it by higher power. It cannot say to the feelings: 
I do not know you. The relationship of this ego to the feelings is psychic 
necessity, which forces the ego to receive both the sweet and sour from the 
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heart, both evil and good, both love and heat, both grief and joy; … Psychic 
necessity is a higher power, which is embedded within human nature. And 
from this fatalistic power, no egoism is able to liberate itself. The ego must 
now acknowledge feelings, passions, drives, instincts, temperament, and 
so forth.” (§1212.)
Laestadius used the condition of child as an example to contrast the way of being 
the vital Self with the philosophical abstract ego, and simultaneously gave his vitalist-
existentialistic definition for ”universality.” For Laestadius “universality” – rather than 
signifying formal ideas and a formal logical generality or applicability – signified the 
vital-existential fullness of life indicating some ”generality” and ”naturality” that was 
common to all embodied human beings: 
“Our consciousness speaks clearly on the behalf of the psychic truth that 
the ego that feels is the same ego that thinks. But the ego that feels is pre-
cisely this subjective consciousness, which is natural and real, not merely though: 
abstract self-consciousness is merely thought, it is self-made. And although 
it may be fun for the philosopher to live in the abstract, it is nevertheless 
the case that a child has even more fun, living in the universal, in the con-
sciousness of the fullness of his being. Even if the philosopher likes to live 
in the prison cell of egoism, in which he believes himself to be truly free 
and loosened from the world, he is nevertheless, on the whole, miserable, 
since he does not have anyone other than himself to thank for his bliss. He 
suckles his own empty teats, while a child suckles the teats of the mother, 
from which he derives a sense of bliss. If the child begins to cry easily, it 
also begins to laugh as easily, and generally, joy is predominant within the 
child. If the philosopher wishes to state his true and sincere conviction, 
then he must agree that his childhood was the happiest time of his life.” 
(§ 1211. my emphasis) The full life of childhood means the natural and 
real life of subjective consciousness.398
Laestadius’ elaborations on character and personhood seem to be indebted to 
Bichat’s theory. For instance, Bichat states about the human characteristics and 
personhood that
“It is this influence of the passions over the actions of the animal life, which 
composes what is named the character. Character as well as Temperament 
depends upon the organic life; possesses all its attributes, and is a stranger 
398 Moral necessity is founded on psychic necessity (§1214).
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to the will in all its emanations; for our exterior actions form a picture of 
which the ground and design do indeed belong to the animal life, but upon 
which the organic life extends the shading and colouring of the passions. 
The character of the individual is constituted by such shades and colours.” 
(Bichat 1815, 78.)399
The classical basic clause of philosophical subject-ontology Cogito ergo sum 
(Descartes) can be translated anew – insofar as its founding concepts are wide in 
their indication – to correspond with the Laestadius’ vitalist-existential thought: I 
experience feelings, therefore I am. Existence and life are not given, only and in the first 
place, within mere reflective thinking (cogito), but instead they are within experiential 
passions and “psychic phenomena” which are the [self-]given initial condition.
4.3.3  The Self and Unconsciousness
Laestadius’ deconstruction and re-definition of the ego made the phenomenon of 
selfhood multifaceted. One interesting aspect is that Laestadius’ theory of the Self 
seems to include a specific notion of unconsciousness. It is present for instance when 
the notion of Self is expanded to cover spheres that the Self cannot be fully aware of, 
particularly as Laestadius has to talk about the “me” and the “non-me”. 
We already have pointed out the relationship between the lived Self and its foun-
dation principle of life, which functions as the ground and cause of the Self. In this 
respect, Laestadius held that it is impossible to grasp conceptually that dimension 
of the Self which is unknown and conceptually ineffable, for instance, the organic 
functions of subjective consciousness. When the Self is conceived as a vital corporeal 
phenomenon, the notion of the Self coincidentally covers dimensions that are and are 
not the Self. The problem of the unconscious dimension is also that of the relation 
between the Self and its foundation and the subjective and objective consciousness. 
The relative distinction and unity within personhood is dealt with also as follows: 
First of all Laestadius, held that the fact that pure ego without [vital] substance can 
399 Bichat writes (1815, 6, §4) ”That man enjoys the happiest constitution in whom the two 
lives are balanced, in whom the cerebral and epigastric centers exercise the one upon the 
other an equal action, whose intellect is warmed, exalted, and animated by the passions, 
but whose judgement makes him at all times master of their influence.” (Bichat 1815, 
78.) According to Bichat, passions and understanding are more in balance within man 
than within animals. Laestadius may have received some evidence from these thoughts 
for his idea that religious moral passions and emotions bring balance to human life. 
Bichat mentioned Plato, Markus Aurelius, Bacon, Augustine, Paul, Leibniz, von Helmont, and 
Buffon as examples of those who have two different and changing sides of human personhood, 
according to which the human being sometimes governs his own moral actions and on other 
occasions action is contrarily immoral. Bichat was interested in the unity of these two principles. 
(Bichat 1815, 78.)
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be imagined proves that the principles of life and Idea are not identical. Therefore, 
it seems obvious that pure unconditional ego is also self-made or a postulation. Ac-
cording to Laestadius, this is a happy possibility for idealists even though nobody 
can actually tear away and be from one’s own embodied foundation (principle of 
life). However, the possibility of an abstract Ego and Idea based on the idea of un-
identicity opens up the question for whether man created a God, or in other words, 
whether the Idea of God was actually constituted by the human mind. This question 
is left unanswered, just like the question concerning the precedence of Life and Idea 
within God. Laestadius, however, claimed that the idea of absolutely transcendental 
ego and an absolutely transcendental God as an Idea or abstract intelligence had a 
similar origin: 
“The question whether God is a self-made personhood, originating in 
the same way as the philosophers persona abstracta, independent of his own 
principle of life, independent of all psychic, metaphysical, and moral ne-
cessity, ens liberrimum sed indeterminatissimum; this is a question that we 
must leave unanswered, along with the question of whether the idea and 
the principle of life within God are identical.” (§1196Note.)
What is possible to conclude here, as Laestadius holds, “is that the idea and the 
principle of life within man are not identical.” (§1196Note) Laestadius highlights 
the idea that the principle of life is the same thing as the [vital] soul. Thus, he sums 
up by saying that “the ego-subject, that is me; but it is not me, because the principle 
of life and the idea are not identical.” (§1196Note) By this statement Laestadius 
throws the ball to the idealists, urging them to be “free to prove that there is an idea 
substantialis,” but then simultaneously claims that “Idea realis non substantialis exists 
in the abstract consciousness of the sharp thinker.” (§1196Note.) More heuristically, 
Laestadius states that
“[t]he real reason why substance = being of the soul = the principle of life 
is not the same as the ego, is based on the fact that ego, in a more narrow 
sense of the word, is a ‘concrete consciousness,’ [Cf. object consciousness] which 
includes the rational soul, or sensory life; while my other ego, organic life, 
which, by emotional people such as the Hebrews, was understood as the 
real being of the soul, really is, in the form or in the nature of its activity, 
separate from my closest ego = sensory life. […400]” (§1196Note.)
400 “But when the sharp thinker can abstract himself also from sensory life in its entirety, and retain 
only self-consciousness, then this self-consciousness is an abstract consciousness; an ego that is 
torn loose from being, and the mere possibility that such an ego, without substance, can exist, even 
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Because life as a grounding and an idea was constituted within and through the 
life are not identical concepts, Laestadius ended up holding that the Self has also a 
dimension or sphere that does not belong to the experiential conscious/aware core 
that “the I” could simply call “me” or “mine”. This ambiguous nature characterizes 
the Ego-substance or embodied subjectivity.401
How should we then interpret Laestadius’ notion of the ambiguous-multifaceted 
and unity of the self? Does his conception entail an actual dualism? We find that the 
distinction between the me and the non-me is drawn within the personhood: 
“[T]he ego-substance is me, but it is also not-me, because I myself am not the 
being of the soul, but rather a product of the being, ‘genetically’ brought forth 
by the substance, which, with help of physiology, can be proven. Within 
man, the principle of life preceded the idea, but the principle of life was not 
the work of the idea. Rather, the other way around. Such is the relationship 
between the ego and the subject of the ego within the created being.” (§1196. 
emphasis added) 
if only in the imagination, proves that the substance is not the ego, or that the principle of life 
and the idea are not identical. […] However, it is now clear that the abstract ego is self-made, and 
were one thereby to draw a conclusion as to the greatest personhood, one can certainly suppose 
it possible that His ego is self-made: ‘Idea realis non substantialis.’ But, although all spiritualists 
would be glad to assume idealism as the firm foundation, for the sake of their own comfort, 
they are nevertheless unable to tear themselves loose from their being (väsendet) and, thus, they 
must assume ‘ens simplex’ or the substantiality of the soul, non tantum idealis. If the adherents of 
idealism were able to prove that the idea itself is a substance, not merely an effect of substance, 
then idealism within the doctrine of God would be a given. God would then become a persona 
idealis substantialis. However, for the sake of ironclad metaphysics, he must now be a persona 
substantialis, not merely persona idealis, not merely persona realis non substantialis, but a persona 
idealis, realis, substantialis. The question whether God is a self-made personhood, originating in the 
same way as the philosophers persona abstracta, independent of his own principle of life, independent 
of all psychic, metaphysical, and moral necessity, ens liberrimum sed indeterminatissimum; this is 
a question that we must leave unanswered, along with the question of whether the idea and the 
principle of life within God are identical. The only thing that we must now consider as proven is 
that the idea and the principle of life within man are not identical. (Here, the principle of life is 
the same as the being of the soul.) The sum of these investigations is: the ego-substance, that is 
me; but it is not me, because the principle of life and the idea are not identical, at least not within 
man. The adherents of idealism are free to prove that there is an idea substantialis. Idea realis non 
substantialis exists in the abstract consciousness of the sharp thinker.”(§1196Note.)
401 Because Laestadius refers to the Hebrew understanding of self as separate “in its activity” and 
distinct from the aware part of the Self experienced within sensory life, we should ask whether 
there remains a relative function dualism within Laestadius’ notion of self. This notion, however, 
in Laestadius’ thought, seems to refer to what he earlier stated about the relatively autonomous 
nature of the will and self-will within the sensory life, and further, the subjective consciousness 
as genuine self.
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However, within the same personhood, Laestadius established a unity between 
the Self and life: “[…402]We only know that man possesses life prior to possessing 
self-consciousness, and if the soul is life, on which the concept of being (väsendet) 
can hardly be applied, then this life is nevertheless necessarily united with the ego, 
insofar as an ego without life cannot be imagined.” (§1196.) 
Furthermore, Laestadius holds that the personhood is constituted not only of mere 
self-consciousness, but also the “object-consciousness” or “concrete consciousness” by 
which he refers to the intentionality of the sensory life or the intentionality of an 
objective consciousness. Laestadius saw the lack of object consciousness or concrete 
consciousness, and thus saw a lack of intentionality of mind, which became the reason 
why “a child in the womb is not considered to be a person; even after birth, the child 
is not considered to be person until it has attained full consciousness.” (§1196. See 
also §1196Note. emphasis added)
In general, the pre-reflective Self, i.e., the “non-me” or the “second ego”, is called 
the subjective consciousness and subjective personhood “which has predominance 
within the sphere of personhood.” (§1207.) The unconscious dimension of the Self 
is something that Laestadius assumed that philosophers did not take into account 
in anthropological theory and morality: 
“Subjective consciousness is the real ego (jaget), or man’s second ego, which 
egoism wishes to reject, since it is not subordinate to the objective ego. 
It may rather be proven, with the assistance of anatomy and physiology, 
that man has an objective and a subjective consciousness, [than that the 
philosopher’s rational soul actually exists].”(§1207.)403
The problem with the notion of unconsciousness is that we can always ask whether 
we can know and thus be conscious of something which is by definition unconscious 
and thus something of which we are not aware. However, the way to set the problem 
remains from an ontological perspective at least within the epistemological frame 
and emphasizes the limited/confined notion of consciousness and knowledge. From 
the perspective of Laestadius’ psychology, it is obvious from the beginning that 
objective consciousness does not cover nor the govern all that exists. Especially, the 
creative force of principle of life and organic functions within man and nature are 
aspects that are not empirically perceptible, but however, they are reachable by their 
manifestations through lived experience. 
402 “But we are unable to draw any conclusions about the deity on the basis of man.” (§1196)
403 Herein Laestadius refers also to classical vitalist examples of somnambulism, animal magnetism, 
visions, and revelations for giving evidence to the claim that subjective consciousness can operate 
and be active even while objective consciousness is inactive. (§1207.)
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Thus, Laestadius’ solution for the problem of consciousness would simply be that 
man can recognize in everyday life the consequences of varying passional states and 
actions which then clearly indicate that there is a much more than autonomical 
[self-conscious] Self that does determine the cognitive, habitual, and intellectual life. 
This cognitive recognition of unconsciousness by its manifestations and emanations 
is possible through the lived experiences of passional conflicts and dissonant states, 
and in its full extent, by the religious experience of awakening insofar as it signifies 
affirmation of a revealed passional awareness/consciousness of the Self. Altogether, 
it seems to me that Laestadius suggested that a human being is able to recognize 
unconscious states through the conflicts of passions, drives, and instincts as they also 
manifest as certain dissonances within the realm of human awareness. 
Laestadius’ notion of the mind, which was based on subjective and objective 
consciousness (organic life and sensory life), can be interpreted as having both 
conscious and unconscious dimensions. In this regard “the Self ” is posited within 
psycho-physiological organization in a way that the subjective or unconscious side 
is emphasized and the Self paradoxically receives its power and character from what 
is not “me” or the “objective ego”. Thus, it seems that Laestadius does not want to 
regard the Self only as a mere conscious phenomenon or state, neither a distinct 
immaterial faculty of mind (reflection, thinking, imagination, memory etc.), nor as 
a pure and ideal abstraction.404
Instead Laestadius conceives of the Self as an emergent phenomenon which 
has physiological and developmental prerequisites. Following the basic idea of the 
asymmetrical relationship between organic and sensory lives as well as objective and 
subjective consciousness, holding precisely that the organic vital functions and pas-
sions determine the functioning and intentionality of the mind, Laestadius aims to 
include the subjective passional aspects – which he sometimes calls “the unconscious” 
functions within the Self or person. Thus, the mind of a self is always conscious of 
itself to a certain degree, but as the Self is constitutively grounded on organic life, it 
can never be transparent to itself. Thus, the lived self cannot reflect transparently on 
its own roots that constitute and direct its own intentionality. This ambiguity of the 
nature of Self also entails that absolute autonomy is not possible. Within experience, 
the self is manifested as both familiar and unfamiliar to itself; self-knowledge seems 
to be always in the midst of a dynamic process, depending on the variable passional 
condition and the situations.
Laestadius’ concept of the Self is based on the idea of the principle of life in the 
way that Self ( Jag) is seen as a tension between the organic “unconscious” and the 
sensory “conscious” life. In a sense, the Self functions as a tension between the partly 
ineffable and unconscious powers of passions and the conscious awareness of objec-
404 However, he holds that the Self is in a sense the core of the experience no matter what. 
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tive world; the condition of tension constitutes the way of being of the Self. In contrast 
to “ideal personhood” Laestadius is seeking a notion of the person that would also 
include the embodied emotional and passional selfhood, and in the vitalist sense, the 
“substantial” concept of the Self. For Laestadius, the subjective consciousness is “real 
and natural” – might we say, authentic and genuine – self. Objective consciousness 
refers to self-aware consciousness (§1207) but it is not, nevertheless, the core of the 
human person and moral character. 
This kind of pre-phenomenological analysis does not take on being – whether in 
a materialistic or an idealistic sense – for its objects and does not posit the human 
being as a subject (immaterial soul as the essence of a human being). The ego cogito 
does not form a grounding for man; rather the Self is seen as “substantial” in the 
holistic vital constitution. It is a psychic phenomenon and emerges as tension between 
organic passions or subjective consciousness and conscious awareness of objective 
consciousness. In this sense, the Laestadius notion of Self signifies the embodied 
worldly self of personhood.405
This is how Laestadius grounded his philosophy of embodied personality. From 
the tacit life of flesh and from unconscious passions, drives, and instincts, emerges 
and develops the primal ambivalent and ambiguous Self. The Self means the tension 
between an embodied pre-conscious level and conscious reflective level, as well as 
the body situated in between the perceptual world and an “inner”, passional world-
relation. This is also how sin (the natural passions) comes to signify the pre-reflective 
ground of individuality rather than moralistic normative doctrine (in the original 
Biblical definition, sin signifies the separation from God). Therefore, personal selfhood 
in the sense of “Me or I am” is an event or process that is tension between embodied 
pre-cognitions and the conscious objective states of “I”.
Here, it is satisfactory just to point out what Laestadius meant to indicate by the 
notion of Self, namely, that in this general sense, the identity or continuity of the 
self[hood] is based on a certain kind of holistic embodied mineness, the sensible core 
of vital psychic essence, which covers both the organic unconscious functions and 
the faculties of objective consciousness that man is capable of knowing. Laestadius’s 
concept of the Self can, therefore, be interpreted as a kind of destruction of the ideal 
ego-subject.406
405 It is possible to interpret Laestadius’ intentions further. For me, it seems that Laestadius foretell 
that the self is in fundamental dissonance before a reconciliation that sets subjective and objective 
intentionality in same “directedness”; also “carelessness” is the immoral consistent condition of 
intentionality but it is blind to its immorality.
406 We can easily see how Laestadius’ notion opposes the rationalistic idea of the soul and self by 
seeing the self totally as the phenomenon of embodiment and having a dynamic relatedness with 
the world and existence (similarly as the mind does).
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4.3.4  Personhood, the World, and Responsibility
Because of the passivity of the Self407 the passions have crucial importance, as they are 
mostly in charge of what the Self is and how it manifests itself in a spatial-temporal 
situation. The Self is not only a predicate, but also tension between the subjective 
and the objective, and finally, it produces tension between passions that lay the 
ground for the will, the action, and the intellect. This ambiguous nature of the lived 
selfhood can also be expressed as a fundamental tension between the Self and the 
non-Self, between consciousness and unconsciousness, or between the influences of 
the surrounding world and the effects of a subjective consciousness. Thus, the vital 
substantial personhood is always in an intimate dynamic relationship with the world 
through the passions that agitate an embodied human being. 
Laestadius does not explicitly elaborate on the social constitution of the person, 
but instead has a specific psychologisizing tendency in the sense that certain con-
stitutive elements are inscribed into the notion of a person. This focus signifies that 
the social constitution is viewed from an inward psychological-religious perspective. 
The approach opens a vital-existentialistic view toward the constitution of the shared 
world and also the possibility of responsibility. Laestadius seems to suggest that not 
only is social world, but also the world’s institutional and governmental structures 
are understood as being constituted through the mediation of prevailing passions. In 
this sense, the lived world is conceived as being an intersubjective world.
* * *
The relationship between the organic and the sensory life has been interpreted in 
earlier studies as a monistic parallelism in the general ontological sense, but without 
analyzing the relation between the two in more detail.408 Roughly, the functions of 
the sensory life and the faculties of soul are said to be in a similar relationship to 
each other as are their respective organs in the physiological body (organic life). This 
thinking is present in Laestadius’ theory, and it definitely alludes to a parallelism or 
a certain kind of dualism for the level of functions of the different domains.
However, instead of a simple parallelism, the described analogical relation could 
also be interpreted as a psychosomatic relatedness. To support this view, we find 
several statements where Laestadius emphasizes the simultaneity and correlativity of 
organic functions and sensory functions. To describe the relationship in this way – the 
407 The Self is a predicate (§1229).
408 Similarly the whole material/spiritual or man/God relation is usually conceived as being 
parallelistic. (See e.g. Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982.) Parallelism is a relatively 
plausible interpretation as Laestadius had to describe the relatedness in organicist terms by 
stating that the “faculties of soul” have their respective organs in the organic life, and from another 
perspective, the susceptible organs have their particular receptive organs in the sensory life.
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beginning of the emphasis on reciprocal and simultaneous actions in “both lives” and 
also highlighting the chant that says, “what happens in body happens in soul” and 
vice versa – does indicate psychosomatic thinking. Psychosomatic thought is present 
also in the statement, “the Self that feels is the same Self that thinks.” (Further the 
self that perceives is also the same self that thinks.) The Self functions as tension or 
a tendon between feelings and thoughts or perceptions and experiences, and thus 
functions as the core domain (basis) of both thoughts and experiences. 
What I want to argue here then is that Laestadius’ position could be more fruitfully 
interpreted as being psychosomatic. Laestadius’ intention was to describe an embodied 
personhood and world-relation that is closely connected to what happens in the mind 
and body. The psychosomatic relatedness of the body and mind is especially present in 
the core analysis of the senses and sensory impressions that are conceived as holistic 
embodied processes as far as they do awaken the passions. Furthermore, as the whole 
domain of consciousness is thematized as a subjective and objective consciousness 
which covers both organic life and sensory life (with their functions) it becomes more 
accurate to interpret the relationship as a constitutive and psychosomatic structure 
rather than a parallel relationship: Subjective and objective consciousness and organic 
and sensory lives are thus equal constituents of each other and the whole human person.
Interpreting Laestadius’ theory as psychosomatics also constitutes the personalist 
notion of man. This views provides insight into how the whole socio-cultural world 
and human beings are interrelated. The relation between the organic life and the 
sensory life is constitutive in a genetic-developmental and psychophysiological sense; 
this constitution emphasizes the physiological409 basis more but it does not exclude objec-
tive socio-cultural world, which is the constitutive aspect as well. The social-cultural 
world is part of the constitution of the organic, habitual, mental, moral, and spiritual 
manifestations of the person from the beginning. Passions, as intentional correlates, 
are also constituents of a shared world and social and governmental institutions; they 
are not distinctly the personal and communal interests of human beings. Laestadius’ 
“human being” does not exist outside of the factual world; in terms of organic and 
sensory lives, passions and sensuous feelings, emotions and experiences, the human 
person is posited into the body in the midst of a passional world. 
However, the social constitution of a person is not dealt precisely, but rather frag-
mentarily when Laestadius points out the corruptive influence of prevailing worldly 
interests in church and society, thus alienating the character of modernization and 
intellectualization of the theological doctrines of man, God, and faith. However, the 
constitution of the world is included in Laestadius’ analysis. Herein the notion of 
409 Organicist emphases do not signify the allegorical way of thinking, but instead emphasize that the 
basis of vital forces resides in specific organs (see e.g. §891). Laestadius stated that the condition 
of the organ is crucially important for the proper functioning of its respective faculty (e.g. §29).
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passion as a constitutive element of the human person, habit and morality, and the 
social-cultural world as such, is central. In general, Laestadius believes that prevailing 
passions constitute not only human action and moral character, but the underlying 
force of a whole intentionality, and passions do signify the personal origin of the 
cultural-political world. The idea is that passions as an intentional nexus of the man/
world relation also constitute a social and institutional ethos through the actions of 
man. Laestadius emphasized that intentionality of consciousness is determined by the 
prevailing passions, which indicate that social action also derives from a passional basis.
The social part of constitution culminates actually in a vitalist and family psycho-
logical analysis of “psychic reconciliation” wherein the authentic relation to others 
and God is disclosed as a mutual recognition of each other’s suffering. Giving this 
circumstance, it can be concluded that the proper analysis of a social constitution 
actually begins with the notion of reconciliation. The analysis of a social constitution 
signifies the phenomenological analysis of how natural and moral passions, or in 
religious terms, God/Good and Evil, actually function and direct the events of a socio-
cultural being-in-the-world. In a sense, Laestadius’ idea of reconciliation encompassed 
a vertical immanent-transcendence and a horizontal social-others-world dimension.
* * *
The notion of Self has naturally a theological and dogmatic significance. Especially, 
Laestadius had in mind a question concerning the freedom of will and moral respon-
sibility. Laestadius sought to extend the notion of Self to cover the whole body and 
make the Self responsible also for its pre-reflective and pre-cognitive states and 
inclinations. Laestadius’ way of thematizing the corporeal notion of Self aimed, 
first of all, to highlight the captivity of will410 and simultaneously to reveal his own 
Christian conviction of the corrupted nature of a human being411. While doing so in 
physiological-vitalist terms, Laestadius went on to demand the total responsibility 
of the entire corporeal being in the world. Thus, the concept [or the birth] of the 
authentic self is closely attached to the idea of responsibility (which later was reveal 
to be impossible for human nature). Once again, Laestadius criticized simultaneously 
the notion of the ideal ego, for it does not cover all responsibility: 
“The proof of psychic responsibility for the entirety of personhood depends 
on whether the philosopher, within the sphere of his personhood, admits 
410 Cf. Luther, Martin 2005. The Bondage of the Will. Written in Answer to the Diatribe of Erasmus 
on Free-Will. (De servo Arbitrio). Transl. Henry Cole. Texas: RDMc Publishing, Forth Worth. 
In Finnish see Luther 1952.
411 See e.g. Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982
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all faculties that, according to the law of psychic development, naturally 
and ‘genetice’ belong to the sphere of personhood. With assistance from 
physiology, it can certainly be proven that the principle of life, corresponding 
to the philosophical substance of the soul (själsväsendet), or metaphysical 
substance, is related to the ego (jaget) as cause (orsak) is related to effect (verkan), 
or as foundation (grund) is related to consequence (följd); for which reason the 
ego cannot exist without a subject, that is to say without its own principle. But 
if the ego deludes itself that it is not subject to this higher power, then it 
cannot be responsible for the effects of the principle of life; it cannot be 
responsible for what the principle of life does and affects, for which rea-
son ideal personhood does not have a ‘subjective responsibility,’ before the 
ego (jag) itself assumes the [vital] substance (ikläder sig substansen) and 
becomes the ‘substantial personhood.’ Because, although the philosopher 
usually assumes the substantiality of the soul, he is, however, in certain 
moments able to tear himself loose from his own substance, and thus move 
around even more freely in the transcendental sphere, as merely an ideal 
personhood; there the ego is torn loose from its own principle. But it can 
never in this world be proven, that man is an ‘ideal personhood,’ and much 
less, since no thinker has hitherto been able to do without the substance 
or the being of the soul (själsväsendet). Thus, philosophical personhood 
must be a ‘substantial personhood’ and, as such, he must be responsible for 
the substance in its entirety.” (§1192.)
Considering the Self as a vitalistic substantiality is to accept responsibility for the 
whole domain of embodied personality. This shift entails a problem of moral and 
absolute responsibility, and later the necessity of awakening and reconciliation.412 
Here the Self does not mean that it forms the ground of personality, but rather 
that personality is considered as belonging under the influence of the organic life. 
Pure ego cogito is a false imaginary starting point in fundamental anthropological or 
ontological sense, as it pertains only to the epistemological question regarding the 
basis of knowledge. For Laestadius, ego was already embodied and passional and in 
the world – therefore, the beginning of philosophy had to include both the passional 
and emotional aspects of the Self.
Laestadius was strict about his [restricted panpsychistic] idea that the Self has 
to be conceived on the basis of a vital substance, which then shows that there is no 
incorporeal soul and thus no incorporeal causality. Thus, there is no ego or reason 
that is distinct from its dirty passional and worldly roots. Instead, the human being 
412 I will come back to the problem of responsibility later in this chapter to examine the necessity 
of awakening (5.4.) and reconciliation (5.5.)
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has to be held responsible and has to take into account the whole embodied vital 
personhood with all its unconscious passions and drives and emotions, violence, 
bad thoughts and action so agitated by the passions. Responsibility has to be taken, 
not only of the intellect and immoral actions, but also of the underlying passional 
inclinations that direct the cognitive life and human action. Responsibility is not a 
matter of intellectual calculation or becoming convinced of one’s guiltiness or in-
nocence; human responsibility is ultimate and absolute and there is no such a “pure 
ego subject” that would be free from responsibility. 
In a sense, Laestadius radicalized and absolutisized responsibility by bringing 
transcendental ego back to its corporeal situation and elaborating on his holistic 
notion of personhood. Individual and social morality and responsibility does not 
seem to be possible using rationalistic moral imperatives. They would be intellectual 
moral demands, and important as such, but Laestadius also argued that they do not 
awaken genuine morality. According to Laestadius, morality has to “spring” from 
the heart, meaning that moral motivation has its source not in the intellect, but in 
the subjective consciousness, in the passions, and in the heart. 
Laestadius thought that rationalism and metaphysical transcendentalism leads to 
the doctrines of virtues and virtue ethics, which are problematic in many senses. First 
of all, their force is based on the natural passions of egoism and ambition, and these 
do not motivate people inwardly for morality. Secondly, and this is more important 
for Laestadius, virtues may often lead to a “dead faith” and they make awakening 
and reconciliation seem unnecessary. Here Laestadius’ idea was to urge an authentic 
morality of the heart; morality and righteous life should originate from the heart. 
Laestadius was also somehow disappointed that virtue had become an unconditional 
rationalistic idea, or “fixed idea” by which as he indicated a necessary thought, which is 
hard to destroy. (See, §§1216.) Altogether, Laestadius insisted that the idea of virtues 
should be destroyed (§652). These thoughts could be understood from examining 
Laestadius’ intention “to show the corrupted nature of man” and make awakening 
and reconciliation necessary. 
However, he seemed to offer a common social critic against the “virtuosity” of 
people, as he viewed that mere following of the virtues did not achieve the demanded 
full responsibility and may have lead to egoism, inequality, and common carelessness, 
and only an outer morality. Laestadius also realized that rationalistic philosophical 
moral maxims do not give a proper account of human life. Laestadius polemically 
stated that moral systems based on rationalism and the idols of the virtuous life of 
people were “fit for angels, not men.” (§879.)413
413 Polemical questions on where does the transcendental abstract ego receive its power. (See 
§§647–649.) The vitalistic notion of Self leads to holistic responsibility (§1197) and it receives 
it power from organic life (§1198).
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4.3.5  The Passional Self and Impossible Responsibility
Overall, Laestadius saw the passions as intentional correlates of man’s world relation. 
To conceive of passions, not only as “inner” organic functions, but also as an intentional 
relatedness of man and world, meant that the embodied man is fundamentally situated 
in the world and discloses the holistic view regarding the notion of passion. (Heart 
was the center of passions and the psychic mediating core of subjective consciousness). 
Laestadius stated that passions are always stimulated by sense perception, and thus they 
also have this objective “outer” aspect. Given this phenomenological-existential extent 
of passion in regard to Laestadius’ idea of natural passions that dominate human life 
in its natural state, signified that man is fundamentally and psychologically immersed 
or fallen into the present world in which he lives.414 In a sense, the passional nature 
of man characterizes the ways of human beings in the world: A human is always in-
extricably attached to the world via senses and varying affective-passional conditions. 
Now, if we question the influences of passions on human life and consciousness, 
the attention extends and turns into a question about what kind of passional world 
one dwells in. In this wider sense, passions seem to depict the worldliness of man’s 
existence, thus opening the question about what kind of passional relations we live in. 
Doesn’t the fundamental role of passions make identity, autonomy, and responsibility 
impossible? This question arises, if the organic soul is susceptible to the influences of 
passions and man dwells in the world, so does there remain any possibility still for 
change or moral progress? How can man reach and maintain a reflective distance 
from the passional world, and if so, how can that be possible? What are the prereq-
uisites of moral responsibility if man is absolutely involved in the relative tensions 
and conflicts of the natural passions of the world and flesh? 
For me, it seems that Laestadius faced this kind of aporetic situation when he 
was considering the possibility of morality and spirituality in the vitalist terms of 
passions and organic life. I interpret that for this need Laestadius basically went on 
to elaborate on his insights into the religious experience of awakening and the psy-
chological conception of reconciliation as initial conditions for both moral progress 
and genuine spirituality. Laestadius saw that without moral passions and a dissonant 
and conflicting state of awakening, man would remain constantly attached to the 
contingent present world (without self, freedom, and identity). 
Laestadius’ theoretical starting assumption was that the correct idea of man pre-
cedes the correct understanding of God and faith. Using vitalism, Laestadius perceived 
that he had reached the proper notion of the self and person, as he returned back to 
414 For further comparison with Hobbes’ philosophy see, Hobbes 2010: The shift from the state of 
nature (in foro interno (conscience)) into the governance of state (in foro externo (action)) through 
political decision/resolution is authorized by the highest personal sovereign; the constitution as 
reconciliation through reason.
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the necessities that show how a human person is inextricablly part of the physical, 
organic, passional, and spiritual world:
“Thus, man is [a] thinking, feeling, and willing being, endowed with self-
consciousness, reason, conscience, memory, imagination. These faculties of 
the soul are not self-made, but shaped by the Creator through formative 
organic life, which develops from the principle of life embedded within 
matter. And insofar as the activities of these faculties of the soul are depend-
ent on their respective organs, then, in his activities, he will encounter: first, 
‘physical necessity,’ which forces him to remain on earth; second, ‘metaphysical 
necessity,’ within the sphere of sensory life, which forces him to think in 
accordance with fixed laws of thought, which he has in no way instituted 
himself; third, ‘psychic necessity’ within the sphere of organic life, which 
forces him to feel both the sweet and sour, both evil and good, both joy and 
sorrow, happiness and unhappiness, bliss and wretchedness; thus he is, in 
a physical, metaphysical, and psychic respect, not as free as he would wish. 
Along with these necessities comes also the ‘moral and immoral necessity,’ 
which forces him to feel evil and good in a moral respect, forces him to 
desire evil more than good; forces him to think more evil than good: how 
much freedom, then, does he have left?” (§1219.)
Here Laestadius can be viewed as opposing Kant, who made the moral imperative 
necessary. Laestadius, on the other hand, tried to show how living faith is necessary.
With respect to the rationalistic and idealistic tradition, it is worth noting here that 
Laestadius did not talk about necessities as intellectual-metaphysical necessary postu-
lates of reason, but rather as vital-existential necessities within which a human being 
must exist. Laestadius’ necessities are not necessary “theoretical” pre-requisites; they are 
rather fundamental psycho-physiological initial conditions within which man always 
exists. Thus, Laestadius tries to thematize psycho-physiological and vitalist-existential 
necessities as a foundation for human life that also has its moral, normative and spir-
itual implications; such as the necessity of awakening and necessity of reconciliation. 
These necessities actually reveal Laestadius’ main motif, which was to shift from 
transcendentalism or rationalism to vitalism. By establishing the vital-existential 
necessities, Laestadius believed he reached his goal of showing the corrupted nature 
of man and the necessity of reconciliation as the way out of a moral and spiritual 
relativism. His intention was to show that the notion of Self as the experiential core 
of personhood must include an organic subjective consciousness and a subjective will, 
and henceforth responsibility for all of embodied existence down to its very roots. 
Because the Self cannot control passions, the absolute human responsibility and 
moral subject both become impossible [possibilities]. As such absolute responsibil-
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ity to fulfill the moral and spiritual law is impossible, the human being is driven to 
search for reconciliation.
In the broader picture, awakening (kr. metanoia) as the initial condition for rec-
onciliation does not signify only a “change of mind”, but also a change in the whole 
embodied intentionality or being in the world. Metanoia as a religious experience 
primarily concerns the level of subjective consciousness, not simply a mere change 
of mind, but also a change of heart and the whole organic body. 
4.4  Summary: The Personal Psychophysiological Intentionality
Laestadius’ theoretical thought belongs to the post-enlightenment era, and is espe-
cially attached to the vitalist tradition via Xavier Bichat’s medical vitalism415. Laesta-
dius’ vitalist approach and its elaborations are relate to later philosophical prevailing 
currents, such as rationalism and transcendentalism, which dominated the intellectual 
and spiritual life in Sweden in the mid- nineteenth century. Laestadius was especially 
reading French medical physiology and psychology and the romantic psychology of 
Carl Gustav Carus, and he was well aware of romantic natural philosophy as well as 
Kant’s transcendental idealism. 
Laestadius’ anthropology or philosophical psychology was constructed based on 
the tenets of physiological medicine, a limited panpsychistic interpretation of vital-
istic monism, and the theory of passions.416 He especially followed Bichat’s ideas 
415 A valuable overview of vitalism is given in Normandin, S. and Wolfe, C. T. (eds.) 2013 (Vitalism 
and the Scientific image in post-Enlightement Life Sciences). See also Haigh 1984; Williams 2002.
416 Laestadius’ stance was panpsychistic, which in Laestadius’ case simply means that he interpreted 
a vital force or the principle of life and the passions of the organism as “mental”/vital in their 
basic character (a restricted panpsychistic view because Laestadius made a distinction between 
organic living matter and physical “death” matter (See, §1218). He did not want to take a stance 
on the rationalistic concepts of soul that he saw as abstract because it did not have physiological 
(and experiential) grounding. In contrast to the rationalistic-mechanical tradition, passions 
were not interpreted as mechanical carriers of moving particles, but rather as vital forces, such 
as the living primus motor of human beings and organic life. Therefore, he interpreted vitalistic 
concepts like vital force and passion in phenomenological-existential and theological directions: 
Anthropologically vital force signifies the living essence of the human being (this view becomes 
clear with Laestadius’ saying the “soul is the life of the body”). Vital force manifests itself 
in fertilization, growth, and development of the human organism and in the emergence of 
consciousness. Organic passions based on the principle of life signify the ontological basis for 
human consciousness, action, and the cognitive life as a whole. The rational soul or “intellect” is 
seen as being developed through practice and education, and it is re-defined as the original soul 
(for organic and sensory lives) or life in its entirety (§309). Theologically, the vital principle means 
the spirit (kr. pneuma), interpreted as the blow of God’s breath into Adam that gave human beings 
life; mankind is also interpreted as a continuation of the main principle of life. See further of the 
restricted notion of panpsychism in Aristotle, Whithead etc. and panpsychistic philosophy of 
religion in Clarke 2003. (Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude. New York: SUNY Press.)
196 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
on the principle of life and the theory of passions. However his interpretation and 
use of the “principle of life” was indeed unique and needs to discussed further, as 
he combined his own vision with Biblical vitalism and continuously returns to the 
notion in different contexts. 
From the vitalist position and by elaborating on a panpsychistic interpretation 
of the principle of life, Laestadius formed a physiologically emphasized theory for 
the constitution of human beings and life; it pertains especially to the physiologi-
cal and vital part of the constitution, as he approached the human organism as the 
developing entity constituting the embodied seat for a higher manifestation of vital 
functions, capabilities, faculties of soul, and finally the possibility of morality and 
living spirituality. Thus, consciousness and the faculties of mind as well required 
certain physiological and vital prerequisites; the developmental stages of organs, their 
physiological relations, physiological functions like neural and humoral connections 
and interaction, sensory and sensitive stimulations, and the activity of passions were 
the vital primus motor of the human organism and life.
According to Laestadius, the rationalistic and metaphysical interpretation of soul 
conceives of the soul as a distinct abstract substance or essence from a physiological 
and worldly constitution. Laestadius saw that the “philosophical notion of soul” led 
to problematic dualisms between the body and soul and the body and mind into 
the problem of dual consciousness, and thus considered non-sensory perceptions or 
religious feelings as purely metaphysical. Also, the objective faculties are separated 
from embodied functions, and reason and will are conceived as dominant forces 
within personhood, and thus, the whole notion of the ego becomes totally abstract 
and a immaterial transcendental entity. 
What is the most problematic aspect of the metaphysicalization of the human soul 
and personhood is that it seems to lead to conceiving the human person as having the 
power for a virtuous and moral life within itself. According to Laestadius, this was a 
false idea of human beings and life. Laestadius’ own intention was to expand, first of 
all, the notion of soul as pertaining to physiological vital functions, which then led to 
the idea of vital-existential necessities for corporeal human life. Thus, man becomes 
attached and responsible for the whole totality of life that encompasses passions, etc. 
Laestadius elaborated on a dynamic circular view of the process of perception and 
intentionality. Naturally, because of his vitalist-physiological beginnings, the whole 
idea of embodied personhood and its passional, corporeal, and worldly situated direct-
edness constituted an insight into personal embodied intentionality. The human person 
and life was fundamentally conceived as embodied intentionality, however much it 
was deficient and corrupted in its nature and inextricably attached to the world and 
worldly interests that excluded the possibility of [proper] moral responsibility.
According to Laestadius, the shift from metaphysics of substance into vitalism had 
theoretical advantages: Now the notion of personhood would be brought back from 
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idealistic and immaterial abstractions to embodied life in the world. The Self was 
now seen as a tension between subjective consciousness and objective consciousness 
– namely, a tension between unconscious passions and conscious states of mind and 
worldly intentions417. Also, reason was re-defined as a faculty between understanding 
and feeling [in the root or basis of subjective consciousness].
The soul is not a being (essence) as a distinct entity, but rather it is conceived as a 
dynamic vital force (karft) inextricable from organic matter. The principle of life is a 
real subject of the Self, and it relates to the consciousness as a cause and grounding, 
and thus it functions as a constitutive basis for the emanation of consciousness and 
intentionality. Rather than being a simple cause, the principle of life is a necessary 
hypothesis for the unifying energetic original fundamental soul of the psychophysi-
ological and cognitive life of living man. Laestadius’ idea of man was “pluracentric,” 
having the whole organism as its domain, having the heart as the center of organic 
life, and brains as the center of an animal or sensory life. Thus, the soul has both 
conscious and unconscious spheres and is relational in terms of its elemental-
phenomenal character. 
The body is not simply a substance – a being or a thing – in the sense that it consists 
of mere matter or mere spirit, but yet a non-dualistic elemental (quantity/quality) 
contingency or event that is conceived as both dynamic functional and relational 
with regard to organic, physical, and transcendental/spiritual spheres of existence. 
The physiological body, organic life, is a constitutive basis for the sensory life and 
thus a domain of the cognitive life. Laestadius had two perspectives about the body 
– as a corporeal entity subject to physical laws, and a lived body as the human being 
experiences the self through an organic life and a sensory life in the world.
As the principle of life signifies “existence” devoid of substance and essence and 
forms the constitutive core of the embodied human person, the passions instead 
signify the particular psychophysical founding of those vital-existential structures 
that attach a human person to the world and actual existence. The passions destruct 
the idea of the Self as an independent and autonomous subject; the human self is 
not unconditional, for it actualizes in the world always already found in the ten-
sion of passions, meaning that man is inextricably a worldly being. Passions are not 
temporal as affects and emotions are, but rather more fundamental vital-ontological 
constituents. 
When Laestadius held that passions lay the groundwork for the content of the 
faculties of mind (ideas of understanding etc.) he seemed to think of the functioning 
mind in a general and longer temporal scale. He did not focus on the processes of 
the mind as such (distinct from the temporal-spatial world), by speculating how a 
417 In a sense, Laestadius’ analysis returned closer to the experiential origin of religion, embodiment 
and the factual life-world.
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temporary state of mind or cognition in question is constituted in a given temporal 
situation, and what passions are based on a certain contingent cognition. Rather, he 
states that in general, passions that affect the human organism always influence the 
functions of the mind; in the long run, the passions in question may be seen as the 
grounds for one’s way of thinking, so that even ideas of understanding, concepts of 
reason, and desires of the will are formed/shaped by the passions (already prevailing 
in one’s life). If so, Laestadius was thinking about a habitual way of being or passions 
as intentional relatedness rather than a problem of mind as such, and tried to emphasize 
the meaning of passions for the functions of the mind in the longer temporal period (in 
its vital-ontological constitution). He does not state that certain ideas, concepts, or 
desires, etc., are a direct corollary/consequence of the passions that arbitrarily present 
when cognition is present. Instead, passions indicate fundamental vital-existential 
existences or moods within which human life will actualize.
What I want to stress here is that Laestadius surely was familiar with conceptual 
thinking and the way that scientific concepts and theories were defined in their 
extension and in relation to each other (as he himself was doing that continuously). 
However, his idea of the grounding passions of all cognitive life pertained to a wider 
constitution of existential ways of thinking or formations of ideologies. As his treatise 
was written for apologetic purposes for pietism, it seems evident that Laestadius was 
also trying to show how the theological views of his time missed the existential basis 
of faith and thus become abstract and idealized formulations. Laestadius thought 
that if priests had experiences with the order of Grace, their formulations would 
become more correct (§1278. Cf. §1061, 1065, 1068). In this respect, Laestadius’ 
general aim was to highlight the primal importance and necessity of lived experience 
for any metaphysical or theological theoretization. The origin of faith as well as the 
origin of theology resided in the lived religious experience.
The body-mind is not conceived as indicating the distinction between conscious-
ness and body; the mind is conceived in psychic-physiological and vitalist terms as 
a manifestation of organic functions. Thus, mind and body cannot be conceived as 
opposite because organic vital functions and embodied passions ground and direct 
the mind. The mind is part of the organic constitution. The conflict remains, however, 
between organic body and the spirit (physiological and moral-spiritual). The spirit 
is conceived as the highest manifestation of the vital functions of the sensory life, 
and so is a branch of the principle of life. Spirit is the element of the vital functions 
that transcends the flesh itself. It becomes comprehensible from the perspective of 
constitution theory; the principle of life as a common basis and a vital force is embed-
ded into matter itself to form organs and functions through vital passions. It finally 
manifests itself as a consciousness, a human embodied mind reaching toward spirit. 
The spirit is the perennial correlate of the principle of life, but in a circular way; the 
principle of life is simultaneously the origin of the physiological body and the mind 
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through which it then reaches toward the spirit, which is coincidentally the high-
est manifestation of the principle of life itself. This partially ineffable relationship 
between the nature of human beings and God (kinship) is thematized within the 
analysis of reconciliation; abstractly, God becomes Itself (heart satisfied) in the same 
reconciling occasion and manner as a human being becomes itself.
Laestadius’ pre-psychoanalytic notion of unconsciousness structurally paralleled the 
present day understanding of the influence of the embodied habitual and un-conscious 
activity of the mind. 
At the beginning of the chapter titled Person and Intentionality, I tried to explain 
why I want to bring the concept of mind into an analysis of Laestadius’ psychology. 
Generally speaking, this focus is a way to thematize for the modern reader how 
Laestadius’ psychology expanded the notion of mind to cover both embodiment and 
holistic intentionality. Laestadius further highlighted the fact that Scripture knows 
only two life forms, the psyche and the pneuma, and stated that psyche correlates 
with organic life and pneuma correlates with sensory life. In the English translation 
“understanding” (förstånd) is sometimes translated with the term “mind”; correctly, 
insofar as “understanding” (Förstånd) is referred to as the capability of thinking and 
it thus encompasses most of the cognitive content of which is man is aware. However 
as “understanding” (förstånd) is only one faculty of soul that belongs to objective 
consciousness, it would be restrictive to refer to the entire domain of the mind with 
just the term “understanding”. Laestadius made a distinction between the objective 
and subjective domains of consciousness, indicating that the objective dimension of 
the mind, which signifies awareness –part of the consciousness, also has its shadowy or 
gloomy basis/roots that also belong to the holistic sphere of mind. Laestadius referred 
to this “gloomy” part in various ways, namely, as heart, passions, un-consciousness 
and precisely, the subjective consciousness. In general, the mind is seen as a natural 
embodied phenomenon. Altogether, the idea is that understanding or mind and all 
the faculties of soul receive their driving powers and forces from the organic life and 
subjective consciousness which are never transparent in terms of the states of objective 
consciousness (reason, understanding, memory, imagination and will). 
Thus, Laestadius’ notion of mind extended beyond mere “understanding” and 
“objective faculties”: The mind, that man is actually living, exists and functions on 
the basis of infinitely variable vital forces and functions such as passions, instincts, 
drives, affects (that are always awakened by continuously varying sense perceptions). 
On the basis of such subjective consciousness, man cannot be fully aware of his own 
existence. The unknown dimension derives from the fact that objective faculties 
cannot transparently reflect and objectify subjective driving powers, because they 
and their functioning are constituted by “gloomy” pre-cognitive conditions. As mind 
itself is constituted by organic functions and forces, it cannot have a transparent 
reflective relation to its own grounding vital forces. Therefore, Laestadius’ concept 
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of mind included the sphere of subjective consciousness that he also referred to as 
unconsciousness, and which was a crucially important part of the constitution of the 
human embodied consciousness, thought, and action. 
Therefore, Laestadius’ notion of mind did not produce a closed (solipsistic) total-
ity, as the human mind/soul is always in a relationship with the states of subjective 
consciousness and the infinitely variable influences of the outer world (and passions). 
Mind is a vital emergent phenomenon. However, mind is embodied of the dy-
namic, and the relational phenomena that is open and continuously formative for 
temporal-spatial existence. Mind has both subjective and objective dimensions: 
Laestadius was writing during a time when there was no distinct domain for the 
philosophy of mind other than the transcendental philosophical elaborations that 
drove to separate the phenomenon of the mind from organic and physiological 
functions and processes418. As a natural scientist, Laestadius grasped these preceding 
medical theories of human consciousness (or soul), but them jumped over the tran-
scendental philosophical current and criticized it because of its speculative method 
which leaned, according to Laestadius, on mere reflection, and thus, did not have a 
proper physiological grounding. 
The Self and person is not an idealized re-presentation, an independent and distinct 
essence/being, but a manifestation of an emerging embodied and worldly situated 
occasion between organic life and sensory life, and thus, it is essentially conceived 
from the perspective of a body-in-the-world that is continuously under the tensions 
of vital forces that are functioning through the “outer” and the “inner”. Laestadius 
held that the notion of ego cogito or the soul of metaphysical rationalism does not 
have a concrete basis and does not resonate with the lived experience and popular 
opinion, and thus is idealized and abstract in its relation to the vitalist notion of a 
passional and worldly organism. The genuine Self exists and functions in between 
organic life and sensory life as the object or predicate of varying passional impacts 
and is thus actualized, not as a stable self-identical pure ego, but rather as a conflict-
ing and dissonant dynamic and embodied self.
The notion of Self having the principle of life as its genuine subject and passions as 
its intentional correlates, laid the groundwork for Laestadius’ philosophical definition 
of the person. This definition emphasizes that “existence precedes essence.” We can 
note here that Laestadius came to actually define the later common existentialistic 
conviction and definition of human existence. We can easily recall how Sartre’s 
claim that “existence precedes essence” became the popular slogan of existentialism. 
However, Sartre’s definition constituted an idealistic ethos within which human 
essence was more often attributed to metaphysical characteristics, such as freedom. 
Laestadius, holding tight to the psychophysiological basis, did not fall into the short-
418 Cf. Hagner 1992; Kant 1998 (orig. 1781).
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comings of existentialism. Sticking with the conviction that the Self is by no means 
unconditional, but rather attached fundamentally to the necessities of being in the 
world (physical, psychic, metaphysical, and moral), Laestadius’ notion of personhood 
can be conceived as a realistic and a-metaphysical notion.
Monism or dualism? With regard to the metaphysics, we can conclude that 
Laestadius’ idea of the principle of life did not rely on ontological dualism.419 For 
Laestadius, there remained only one creative and unifying principle of which all the 
organic nature was a part. There was neither a divide between mind and body, nor 
organic matter and the consciousness or spirit, as the latter was conceived as a vital-
ist emergence referred to also as panpsychism. Laestadius found a way out between 
materialism and spiritualism/idealism by conceiving the principle of life to be both 
independent and free based on its potentiality (de potentia) and simultaneously not 
autonomous and free actually (de actu) because it has to function and operate via 
matter. Therefore, in the level of cause and origin, Laestadius’ stance can be seen as 
a monistic vitalism. (He distinguished between the mere laws of nature and the talk 
about inert nature, and thus, we cannot conceive of his stance as being panpsychism 
in a strict sense, but rather as being panvitalist, by limiting the notion of “mentality” 
only to organic nature420.) 
Laestadius’ vitalist notions and distinctions drawn between original soul (the 
principle of life) and the genuine individual soul (sensory life) produced classical 
philosophical questions. When Laestadius began with the notion that there exists 
a certain kind of common principle of life to all organic beings and thus a common 
soul, did that view indicate that all organic beings – whether animals, plants or hu-
man beings – share an existence within the same soul? And if so, how should we 
comprehend that soul and what would it signify? Would this shared original soul 
serve also as a basis and a possibility, for example, for shared communal experience, 
understanding, and sympathy between different organics, such as between animals, 
plants, and human beings? It seems that this view is what we should conclude if 
we begin with Laestadius’ principles. But how does the common principle of life 
serve as a connecting bridge between organic beings, or does it just a given as an 
ontological initial condition in principle only? Even though this questioning could 
be conceived as highly speculative, we do find support for this kind of thinking as 
Laestadius himself – referring to (Room. 8:19–23) pointed out that “even animals 
419 For heuristic comparison one could refer also to Haeckel’s monism which offers an illuminative 
example of biological monism applied to religious thought. Some points of contacts could be 
seen with Laestadius’ vitalism. See Haeckel 1895 (Monism as Connecting Religion and Science. 
London: A. and C. Black).
420 However, the research concerning Laestadius’ possible panspsychism is a task of other philosophical 
research that focuses on the concept of God as a probable panpsychistic principle.
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yearn for the becoming of Kingdom of God”421 when animals would then be released 
from the egoistic dominance of humankind.
What I find advantageous in Laestadius’ vitalism is first of all his way of attaching 
the concept of the principle of life to the lived experience and popular opinion. This 
is already budding or under development in the classical definition of the principle 
of life that is being conceived as the “psychic essence” of a human being. However, 
in Laestadius’ use, the principle of life was altogether emphasized simultaneously as 
a physical and experiential notion. His use of and explication of the principle of life, 
passions, and vital forces traced the experiential existential-psychological phenom-
ena. They illuminate the experiential dimension and (contextual) life world in the 
phenomenological sense. Thus, Laestadius occupies and bridges the still problematic 
gap/divide between the natural scientific and the mere physical and experiential 
psychological domains422. Thus, we can interpret Laestadius’ notion of the principle 
of life as covering both immanent and transcendental phenomena. As far as there 
are no distinct spheres of mind and body, there is also neither a sharp distinction 
between man and the world or immanence and transcendence – the concept of the 
principle of life as theoretical “transcendental” term is thus inextricably connected to 
the phenomena of life and nature as both empirically and experientially reachable. 
The same conclusion pertains to the concept of passion.
Altogether then, faculties of soul, such as reason, understanding, will, and con-
science (§596–887), were not conceived as independent domains of immaterial soul 
or mind but instead as organically seated functions and capacities based on their 
susceptibility, sensitivity and reactivity. Therefore, Laestadius seemed to bring home 
the basic phenomenological idea of human embodiment as a holistic basis for all the 
functions of mind, action, and intentionality. “Faculties of soul” are only conceptually 
relatively distinct spheres, but as phenomena, all faculties are more like the phenom-
enological depictions of the variable ways of embodied intentionality. In other words, 
they depict how a human organism is related organically and experientially to its own 
corporeality and surrounding environment, as well as to all of existence [and to God]. 
It is interesting that Laestadius used all the conceptualizations of the mind, self, and 
faculties of mind in a formally-vitalistically indicative manner: They were organically 
seated in a human embodiment and world relationship, but as theoretical concepts 
they were also mere concepts [of reason and thus, ideas], which indicated the phe-
nomena formally, but received their content and manifested themselves uniquely for 
the person in question in a particular life-situation. Thus, life itself remains something 
421 Laestadius 2006, 178, see also 353. (Huutavan ääni/Röpande Röst/The Voice of One Crying in 
the Wilderness)
422 However, the prevailing physiological analysis was rough compared to modern medical knowledge, 
and thus raised a question about whether it still ended up with the problem of emergence; the 
problem of emergence emerges always when one looks closer into the details.
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conceptually unreachable and ineffable. For Laestadius stated on many occasions, 
“there are matters that cannot be reached by reason,” and highlights that matters of 
life and faith can only be understood by heart, indicating a lived experience of one’s 
own (§100–103).
The reconstructed argument of Laestadius for the vitalistic concept of the Self as 
the grounding for the concept of personhood:
1. Principle of life is a single and common original soul for all organic beings
2. Principle of life is not distinct from organism, but rather characterizes its 
way of being and significance; “the soul is the life of the body”
3. Human being is organic being, thus the soul is the life or way of being of 
the body
4. The mind and thus the phenomena of Self is not distinct from the body
5. Organic passions manifest themselves in the subjective and objective con-
sciousness of the sensory life (nervlif ) as varying cognitions
6. The experience of Self is both an objective and a subjective cognition
7. The Self is neither distinct from organic passions nor is it pure immaterial 
cognition
8. THEREFORE, the Self exists as a tension between the subjective con-
sciousness of organic passion-life and the objective cognitions of sensory life
9. THEREFORE, the concept of personhood has to take the vitalistic concept 
of embodied Self as its basis
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5  The Psychophysiology of Moral and Spiritual 
Intentionality 
In this chapter, Laestadius’ theory is analyzed and interpreted in more detail with 
respect to the specific question regarding the possibility, origins, and emergence of 
morality and spirituality. In a sense, this chapter brings to this analysis the central 
themes of Laestadius’ philosophy of religion that were purposely set aside in the 
previous chapter. This chapter analysis and interpretation examines the approaches of 
Laestadius’ theory, ranging from its philosophical perspective on keeping the vitalist 
psychology, and especially the vitalist conception physical/moral, which was pursued 
to replace Cartesian body/mind dualism, as a horizon.
Insofar as the basic ideas of the vital principle as original soul and intentional person-
hood have been analyzed above, the psycho-physical basis of the possibility of the moral 
and spiritual is analyzed here by paying attention to the notions of the passions, heart, 
conscience, awakening, non-sensory perception and reconciliation so as to disclose a view 
on Laestadius’ vitalist insights concerning the phenomena of faith and God. Here the 
particular question is how Laestadius explained the spheres of morality and spirituality 
on a physiological plane, and how the constitution of moral and spiritual was thematized. 
In this chapter, the vitalist-psychological notion of faith as well as Laestadius’ ontothe-
ological reconstruction of the relationship between the Persons of the Trinity of God and 
the constitutive “parts” of the “threefold” human person (the principles of life, organic life, 
sensory life) are discussed to examine the intentional character of faith [found] in God.
5.1  From Practical Virtues to the Morality of Conscience
When Laestadius moved to analyze reason and its significance for morality and 
ethics, he seemed to give full authority to the faculty of reason in morality. At first 
glance, this focus may sound contradictory in terms of Laestadius’ previous analysis 
where he had a totally critical attitude toward the rationalistic and transcendental 
philosophical idea of independent and autonomous reason. Once again, however, 
he comes back to the subject and deals with the problem of whether reason should 
be admitted as a outer practical competence for morality and legislation. He refers 
to Petrelli’s study book and the thought of Professor Jacob Boström (1797–1866) – 
known as one of the leading philosophers and the successor to rational idealism at 
the university of Uppsala in the 1800’s. 
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“Yet in matters of sound public morality, the divine right of reason must 
surely be acknowledged. Here, reason manifests itself as a principle for 
everything noble and good. The moral element belongs exclusively to rea-
son, and manifests itself in the forms of ideas; more precisely, the idea of 
truth, the idea of goodness, the idea of beauty, and the idea of perfection 
(Petrelli §202). Reason has such a wealth of ideas of about truth, beauty, 
goodness and perfection that it cannot be exhausted by the intellect, which 
gathers the most wonderful elements of sound morality from this divine 
source of wisdom. Note: Professor Boström admits that ’all our rights are 
interests.’ May not also the legislation that is meant to secure the rights of 
every man have its foundation in interests? Legislation belongs to practi-
cal reason (the intellect), which ‘gathers the elements of legislation from 
theoretical reason (ideas about right and wrong).’ But if theoretical reason 
contains false ideas about right, then practical reason cannot correct these 
false ideas, but must legislate according to the idea of justice; that is to say, 
in accordance with that passion or ‘interest’ that governs the personality 
of the legislator. This may be concluded from Boström’s doctrine on mo-
narchical statehood.” (§572 and Note.)423 
This kind of celebration of human reason sounds almost like the irony coming 
from Laestadius. For sure, he faced here a challenging problem and a gap between 
individual morality and public normative moral principles, which he also viewed as 
important for communal human life. However, after giving his affirmation to the 
importance of [natural] practical reason and natural law, Laestadius goes on to argue 
for its insufficiency: Natural law, as based on duties, rights, and “just talionis”, justifies 
wars between states and “they also justify wars of religion and revolutions through 
natural right to defend himself (moralist), even when it is done at the expense of 
the life of another.” (§574)
Laestadius calls this problematic self-justification “self-righteousness” (egenrät-
tfärdigheten) meaning that legislation, if based on the pure principles of reason, 
and the dismissal of its grounding “interests” or passions, turns into a totalitarian 
jurisdiction that is unable to reflect and change its own premises and stand points 
even if they turn out to be immoral, unjust and wrong. “[T]he practical reason [it-
self ] cannot correct … false idea, but must legislate according to the idea of justice.” 
(§572.) Thus, law itself is locked into the principle/idea of justice. From this stance, 
Laestadius goes on to show that reason may be the organ of good but of evil as well; 
this fact depends on the “interests” or passions that lay the basis for morality as well 
423 Cf. §§713–14; the concept of right/justice is based on passions. Laestadius may refer here to 
Boström 1859.
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as for legislation. In a sense Laestadius here is facing the problem and indeed the 
danger of the totalitarian constitutional state, but he does not go further to elaborate 
on his theory in that direction. (see, §574.) His objectives are instead fundamental-
anthropological to find a moral foundation for reason and reasoning. With respect to 
morality, natural reason based on “practical reason” is only negative freedom, which 
does not motivate or constitute any possibility for moral action: 
“If anyone was ever able to live up to the sort of law that the moralist 
construct in the light of natural reason, then keeping this law would be a 
matter of a negative virtue, since the freedom of the will in its natural state 
is only negative, as we have shown above.” (§575.) 
Practical reason is thus only able to restrict and limit the life of citizens and cannot 
create new possibilities and motivate citizens to undertake moral action. Laestadius 
also highlighted the point that “practical reason” and natural law are not able to 
develop practical reason in the masses: 
“As long as the philosopher cannot show that the world has hitherto been 
governed by rational principles; as long are we justified in claiming that 
the philosophers’ talk of divine nature of reason is subterfuge and banality, 
empty bluster and self-deceit based in self-righteousness.” (§586.) 
Here “self-righteousness” (egenrättfärdigheten) is used in the context of the leg-
islative process to indicate a form of self-justification within which the legal system 
justifies itself by its own ideas and interests, thus holding that reason as such is a 
Divine principle. Laestadius seems to indicate here that legislative interests are not 
innocent because they are not free from the natural passions and indeed seem to be 
determined by contingent principles of justice and legislation.
Interpreting Petrelli’s definition that reason is ‘a force that is united to the su-
persensory principles, and which, within itself, carries and moves these principles’424, 
Laestadius concluded that the philosophical concepts of reason were believed to have 
contained “within itself [a] supersensory, moral or spiritual force, which is confirmed 
by the statement: through reason, we are universal (that is to say, divine).” (§588) 
Laestadius could not find any evidence to support such a philosophical idea of rea-
son, and thus conceived of it as simply a dogmatic belief or wish (§588). According 
to Laestadius, reason was not a Divine principle. Further still, Laestadius claimed 
that the “divine power of reason is destroyed” if man cannot exist according to the 
imperative of the “ought to be” of practical reason, and thus “help man out of abyss.” 
424 Petrelli 1845, §247, 2, p. 126.
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(citations here?) Laestadius claimed that reason in and of itself, as conceived as an 
“independent power”, was a “psychological error.” This was simply so because reason 
was only and solely “a sense that can be affected by wickedness and goodness”, and 
thus has a capability to receive impressions and the influences of good, evil, beauty 
and truth:
 
“Reason is thus able to receive ideas about what is good, what is right, 
what is beautiful and what is perfect, but it cannot on its own create these 
ideas; these ideas are transmitted to reason from somewhere else.” (§591.) 
Laestadius’ purpose here was to highlight the idea that intellect is not independent 
and closeted/capsulated pure faculty, but rather, it functions through the body and 
amidst the varying interests and passions of the world. Here Laestadius also seemed 
to have a twofold insight about reason and its meaning for morality. He did not want 
to deny the meaning of “practical reason” (fronesis) in “public morality”, science, and 
aesthetics as such, as reason could also be the source of all the noble ideas about truth, 
beauty, and goodness. However, his analysis goes deeper to the roots of reason by 
claiming that reason has not helped human beings out of the abyss of immorality, 
thus causing a real threat to the legislative process, and further, reason did not seem 
to be adopted by masses through education. 
For this reason, Laestadius returns to his critique of the “rational soul” and “abstract 
reflection”, now pointing out that reason and the whole intellect, when seen from 
the organic ground as a sensitive capability, could actually execute immoral, unjust, 
wrong and ugly acts and decisions, even through legislation. This is how natural reason 
usually proceeds, as it is always colored by one-sided interests and passions. While 
respecting Boström’s depiction of the significance of practical reason, Laestadius also 
brought up another perspective by obviously indicating that natural practical reason 
is not enough, or it is insufficient, as it always needs correct, truthful, un-egoistic – 
in a word, moral – passions for its active basis and motivational ground. In a sense, 
Laestadius was demanding deeper moral experience and empathy for the tenets of 
practical reason.
Laestadius had a firm conviction that ethics and justice do not have their founda-
tion in reason or in the law itself. Actually he had a quite contrary vision, claiming 
that the common virtues and rights are often based on natural passions. Again, when 
dealing with the influence of passions on the intellect, Laestadius now returned to 
the problem of natural law: “[I]t is evident that man’s heinous passions have been 
refashioned into rights in the distillation machine of reason. Natural reason contains 
ideas about right, but these ideas are not pure … A natural right does not imply 
the suppression of egoism, ambition or selfishness,” and thus natural law, demand-
ing a punishment (an eye for an eye) is unable to reach to the Christian ethics (to 
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turn another cheek) because it is simply more than practical reason demands. (See, 
Chapter R.R.:§876.)
And further, he believed that passions have blinded natural reason, so that man 
knows only partly what is right, and there is no Idea of the corrupted nature of man. 
Man believes that he can lift himself from the corruption by the light of own reason. 
(§§592,593.)
”Since reason – in its physical, and also a psychological and a metaphysi-
cal context – is a sense that is affected by both good and evil, it can, from 
one perspective, be understood as the organ of everything great and noble, 
and from another perspective the organ for everything base and heinous.” 
(§592. emphasis added) 
This shifting between perspectives indicated especially the shift from the naturalistic 
descriptive perspective to the moral philosophical, or spiritual, perspective. As the 
shift to moral perspective became part of Laestadius’ apologetics and moral philoso-
phy, we can note as well that a quite similar shift was common also for the classical 
medical vitalists in the 17th and 18thcenturies. Vitalists often used the term “moral” 
in order to indicate something that was irreducible to the mere “physical” but not 
to mere consciousness425. As mentioned above, the vitalist use of “moral” indicated 
a certain kind of psychic and internal sphere that was needed to produce a certain 
kind of distancing or reflective capability of human beings. Thus, this “perspective” 
indicates an experiential and psychological dimension that also had moral and social 
aspects. This manner of dealing with the notion of reason seems to have been Laes-
tadius’ way as well. To view reason in a broader fundamental anthropological and in 
this sense “ontological” context would necessarily bring the question of morals and 
spirituality forward.
From the position of arguing for the deficiency of the notion of independent rea-
son, Laestadius was moving toward an analysis of religious awakening as a necessity 
of moral experience that would lay the proper passional basis for a formal “practi-
cal reason.” The question is whether Laestadius was trying to argue that practical 
reason would have to be based on a moral or spiritual conscience to be understood 
properly, or whether he wanted to re-define the whole notion of practical reason 
and replace it with the notion of conscience. Altogether, considering all the options, 
practical reason would then signify the manifestation or form of the moral conscience 
that would constitute the vitalist substantial ground for its action and functioning. 
425 See, Azouvi 2006; Rey 2006; Williams 2002. Williams pointed out that the whole idea of “moral” 
in the context of medical vitalism is just a question of “perspective”. This idea was discussed at 
the end of the eighteenth century. See also my introductory Chapter 2.4 in this current study.
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What would this mean? Did it indicate that Christian moral thought should lay the 
groundwork for practical reason? If so, what would the morality of conscience mean 
and how could it then be explained? How would the public and private dimensions 
of morality to be dealt with in such a scenario? What also were the moral passions 
that could lay the precise moral basis for practical reason?
Later, Laestadius drew a distinction between compliance with the law and ful-
fillment of the law and between external and internal deeds. Now the problem of 
natural law and practical reason became attached to theological contexts, so that 
“fallen man can never progress farther in sanctification than ‘compliance with the 
law’ in the sphere of sensory life, or if one wished, ‘following the law’ (conformitas 
legalis); [but] never ‘fulfillment of the law’ as long as the law is spiritual and demanded 
the perfect purity and obedience of the heart, while ‘man is flesh, sold under sin.’” 
(§1545.) The same viewpoint was actually stated about morality; the highest that 
natural reason could achieve was the negative virtues, that is to say, restrict human 
life, but not motivate moral action and thought. At the core of Laestadius’ thought 
was a strict moralskepticism:
”The natural man, whose foundation of salvation is virtue, acts according to 
his best sense and conscience, honestly and uprightly, does not imply good 
deeds, since the awakened person –who acts even more conscientiously than 
the unawakened – feels that the law is not fulfilled by acting in accordance 
with one’s best sense and conscience. This is because the conscience does 
not contain the noblest motive for human action. If, for instance, a person 
helps his suffering neighbor out of pure love; another does so based on 
good will; a third, based on the demands of conscience; a fourth, from 
natural compassion; a fifth, out of fear of being seen as stingy if he fails to 
help; a sixth, because of honor or to reach some worldly goal, for instance 
Aristides (explain in brackets?) and a seventh helps, for instance, a poor 
girl in order to be able seduce her with greater ease, then one soon discov-
ers that only the one who helped out of pure love has fulfilled the law.” 
(§685.) Therefore, “Natural virtue is primarily based on self-righteousness 
and ambition.” (§689.)
Laestadius’ moralskepticism entail that deprived moral and spiritual condition of 
man could not be overcome and changed by the outer teaching of virtues or outer 
governance by power, whether that power be ethical, political, or religious. From this 
perspective, Laestadius criticized the prevailing instruction of anthropology and theol-
ogy according to which man could then suppress his destructive and immoral passions 
through intellect and thus lead himself by a rational moral will. Laestadius rejected 
the intellectualistic ethos common to metaphysical rationalism and transcendental 
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philosophy, which derived its roots from Cartesian dualism. Against these currents 
he demanded more fundamental moral and spiritual teaching that pertained to the 
whole embodied human person. Arguing and justifying his views, Laestadius tried 
to overcome simple soul/body dualism, while coincidentally he created a new dual-
ism between the natural and moral or spiritual [aspects/spheres]. His views were argued 
in terms of vitalist theory, mainly adopted from Xavier Bichat, but yet interpreted 
and combined with the Biblical ideas [of sin] and the classical faculty psychological 
conceptualizations.
The following chapters here go on to explicate and interpret Laestadius’ notions of 
conscience, his spiritual and moral perceptions, the religious experience of awaken-
ing and the notion of faith that are closely attached to his physiologically grounded 
vitalist psychology. I show how Laestadius, by his endeavor to explicate the possibil-
ity of morality and spirituality in vitalist terms, tried to find an alternative or initial 
condition for “practical reason”, as a genuine spirituality of heart that would indeed 
overcome the mere formal use of practical reason.
I further give a brief presentation herein of how Cartesian soul-body dualism is 
replaced by physical/moral dualism in French Enlightenment discussions [and early 
modernity] to lay the groundwork for my own interpretation of how the physical/moral 
theme is also present in Laestadius’ vitalist psychology and philosophy of religion. From 
this perspective, I proceed to offer a philosophical interpretation that points out those 
aspects in Laestadius’ theory, which constitutes his own insights with regard to the 
relationship between the physical and moral or spiritual. Here it is worth remem-
bering as well that Laestadius did not draw a sharp distinction between the moral 
and spiritual, as he conceived proper morality to be always spiritual based on its core 
experiential and psychophysiological character. The general distinction between the 
physical and moral is restated usually as a distinction between the “natural man” and 
the “spiritual man,” and in theological studies this distinction is often interpreted as 
“old man” versus “new man.”426
5.2  The Vitalist Conception of Physical/Moral as a Horizon
Roughly speaking, in the Cartesian rationalistic tradition, mind came to signify the 
opposite of the body, and the classical holistic notion of soul (âme) as embodied 
phenomena was thereby marginalized. The prevailing problem was to constitute and 
explicate how “soul” and body could be related, and how a subject’s relationship to the 
world outside was constituted. Later in transcendental idealism, especially in Kant’s 
philosophy which derived its roots from Cartesian dualism, the matters of “soul” or 
426 Cf. Dahlbäck 1950.
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mind became more radically (at least in the methodological sense) separated from 
the organic life of the body and also from the actual world.
It has also been pointed out that at the end of the 18th century the Cartesian 
distinction between body and mind had been replaced in medicine with a new 
dualism expressed by the terms “physical” and “moral”427. The term “moral” meant 
for vitalists that something was distinct from the mere physical. The term was often 
attached to neural activity and conceived to correlate with the “psychic” or “inner 
man.” This development culminated in the publication of Pierre Cabanis’s Rapports 
du physique et du moral de l ’homme in 1802. Generally the dualism that was physical/
moral served in a way that the concept of mind/body could not. It encompassed 
both the “mental” phenomena that was irreducible simply to consciousness and the 
“physical” phenomena irreducible simply to mechanism. Azouvi pointed out that the 
region of “moral” covered those phenomena that later in the nineteenth century were 
combine under the category of the “psychological” within the boundaries of the new 
discipline of that same name.428
Altogether, thematizing the mind/body problem as physical/moral was consist-
ent with the medical vitalist concept; the vitalist starting point was grounded in the 
physiological investigation of the physical organism that was embedded with vital 
functions and forces, especially the metaphysical notion of the principle of life. 
The theme of the physical/moral set broadly at the core of vitalist writers and 
their thinking, and it colored their analysis of morality, habit, character and per-
sonality, all phenomena dealt on the physiological plane. This line of thought was 
present also in Xavier Bichat’s work, Physiological Researches on Life and Death 
(Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort, 1800), which Laestadius leaned on 
as his main source in The Lunatic. For instance, Bichat held that the moral and 
spiritual character were constituted on the organic life and sensory life and thought 
that social phenomena and its structures were rooted in this psychophysiological 
constitution of man.429
Laestadius was familiar with the medical vitalist tradition and later developments 
in vitalist and romantic psychological theories (e.g. Bichat, Heinroth, Carus, Descuret, 
Combe), so he was presumably also aware of the general vitalist endeavor to overcome 
Cartesian body/mind dualism with a physical/moral dualism. Laestadius’ theory was a 
combination and application of the different vitalist and psychological theories from 
the enlightenment and romantic eras, and it had many conceptualizations that were 
similar to vitalist and romantic psychology. There was an emphasis of physiological 
organization (organicist stance), the concept of passions, vital forces, a distinction 
427 Azouvi 2006, 267–279.
428 Azouvi 2006, 267–279; Wright & Potter 2006, 11; Williams 2002.
429 See, Bichat 1815.
212 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
between the organic and sensory life. All indicated the general vitalist framework. 
Further, Laestadius’ endeavor was to overcome Cartesian and transcendental philo-
sophical mind/body dualism and create an alternative approach to the problem of 
dualism. Laestadius’ re-definitions of the faculties of soul, his re-interpretations 
of passions, neuro- and humoral psychology and the terms “psychic”, “moral” and 
“spiritual” were all intended to destruct/reset the dualistic distinction of the mind/
body, even though largely for religious-apological and theological purposes. In this 
medical vitalist framework, Laestadius elaborated on his own theory, which was 
his explicit application of the ideas of medical vitalism, but also partially original 
elaborations of his own creation.
Here I discuss Laestadius’ elaborations on philosophical directions and analyze 
his themes, including the natural and moral passions and humoral and neural 
functions within the organic life and the sensory life, heart, conscience, and the 
possibility of spiritual perception that Laestadius explicated to lay down the ex-
planatory psycho-physiological basis for the phenomena of the religious experiences 
of awakening (väckelse), repentance (metanoia) and possibility of reconciliation. 
In doing so, I want to give a philosophical and psychological interpretation of 
Laestadius’ emphasis of the necessity of the religious experience as the initial con-
dition for the emergence of “spiritual man,” and to show how this idea constitutes 
even the basis for a “moral/political man.”430 It was typical for Laestadius’ thought 
to demand moral passions for the basis of action and for the initial condition for 
correct legislation, positive political action, and moral sociality. In other words, 
Laestadius’ theory of the constitution of moral and spiritual culminated in his idea 
of a living faith which could be a constitutive foundation for both the communal 
and the political human life.
Offering the general view on the core idea of vitalist moral philosophy above, I 
interpret Laestadius’ vitalist thought from that perspective. I examine Laestadius’ 
insights toward the vitalist background that formed the direct intellectual historical 
roots for his elaborations. To do so, I lean mainly on The Lunatic and support my 
interpretation with contemporary research concerning classical vitalism and its re-
interpretation of mind/body dualism.431 I want to show how Laestadius’ thought, 
on the one hand, followed the classical vitalist ideas, and yet on the other hand, 
interpreted and elaborated on the vitalist ideas for his own anthropological and 
430 To this end, Laestadius’ idea of morality and spirituality can be attached to J. J. Rousseau’s further 
transformation of general physical/moral dualism as Rousseau expanded it to pertain to “natural 
man” and “political man” in his treaties on the Origins of Inequality (See, Azouvi 2006, 275). 
Rousseau saw the social contract as the only possibility, but Laestadius saw the awakening of 
moral passions as the initial condition for any social contract whatsoever [because ruling passions 
even determine the public structures and interests of society].
431 See especially Williams 2002; Azouvi 2006; Haigh 1984.
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religious purposes, thereby combining the vitalist notions with his own interpreta-
tions of the Biblical idea of man, the pietistic notions of a “living faith”, and his 
pre-phenomenological emphasis on a “lived experience” and “popular collective 
understanding”. My purpose is to offer an interpretative analysis and highlight the 
original vitalist character of Laestadius’ explanations and to discuss whether they 
offer any heuristic phenomenological views on the phenomena of spirituality and 
the criticism of general Western metaphysical stance inscribed to The Lunatic. In 
this way I aim to show that Laestadius’ philosophy of religion actually formulate 
an original insight on God/man relationship and elaborate on the idea of faith as 
an un-objectifying intentionality.
5.3  The Psycho-Physiological Foundation
In the following subchapters, I analyze the psycho-physiological foundation that 
is the explanatory ground for the moral and spiritual of Laestadius’ thought. It is 
worth mentioning that the medical vitalist explication of neural and humoral im-
pacts, notions of heart, conscience and non-sensory perceptions, actually belongs 
to the broader context of religious experience of awakening and the possibility of 
reconciliation. My analysis could begin by analyzing the phenomena of awakening 
at the start, but it does not; instead I want to take first a closer look at the themes 
that are crucial for understanding Laestadius’ notion of awakening and reconcilia-
tion. This “problem of order of the analysis” derives from Laestadius’ thought insofar 
as he held the physical, psychic-moral, and metaphysical together, but simultane-
ously moved them to relatively distinct “phenomenal” domains. Therefore, it is a 
challenge to choose whether to begin the analysis with the psychological, and thus 
more social, phenomena of awakening, or use the founding physiological plane. This 
order of addressing the more specific natural scientific explications was chosen first 
out of respect to Laestadius’ own way of trying to explain and analyze the psycho-
physiological constitutive basis to reach the phenomenal and experiential domain 
that was psychic, moral, and spiritual.
5.3.1  Moral Passions as the Source of Morality and Spirituality
As shown in Chapter 4, Person and Intentionality, the notion of passion played a 
crucial role in Laestadius’ theory. I have not yet analyzed what Laestadius meant by 
these moral passions and what role the notion of moral passions played in the wider 
context of his thought. However, here I offer a short analysis of Laestadius’ notion 
of moral passions.
With regard to the question of “moral” as a possible re-definition of the sphere 
of “psychic” or “mind”, it is important first to highlight that Laestadius divided the 
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passions between the natural and the moral432. Purportedly referring to general 
French vitalism and medicine, Laestadius elaborated on his own insights regarding 
the “something” that was opposite or “differentiating” from “mere physiological”. 
While being aware that to bring “moral passion” into the picture would not easily 
be acceptable in most philosophical discussions, Laestadius referred to those gen-
eral French discussions within which “moral passion” was generally in use (§705). 
However, Laestadius was also critical of materialistic and mechanistic vitalism, and 
“psychological materialism” because of their anti-religious character. (See, §137Note.)
Naturalization also characterized Laestadius’ approach in this respect; his explica-
tion remained in the physiological plane, starting from the vitalist notion of a hu-
man person. However, the notion of “moral passion” was needed when Laestadius 
wanted to explicate the possibility of morality or spirituality – especially to explain 
the religious experience of awakening and the moral emotions (See, §704) – and 
thus, something distinctly the mere physical (natural functions and passions) or the 
co-existence of the physical and spiritual to be more precise. Laestadius insisted that 
moral passions were natural and not merely metaphysical functions or faculties in a 
human embodied life. In this sense, Laestadius seemed to elaborate on something 
that was parallel to the physical/moral distinction as his explication of the “psychic” 
or “something irreducible to mere physical”.
To depict the concept here briefly, moral passions are in their[formal] character 
similar to natural passions, as they are philosophically defined as an “existence with-
out substance or essence,” a specific phenomenon of human life that can be proven 
by the “testimony of feeling”. They function as intentional correlates of human life 
(towards which and to which human intentionality is directed). They are conceived 
as the driving forces of embodied motion, thought, and action, evoked or awakened/
stirred by perceptional stimuli. Each particular passion has its particular respective 
susceptible organ or center through which it functions and affects a human life. Being 
simultaneously an organic function and a subjective faculty and a phenomena awak-
ened by (sensory and non-sensory) perceptions, moral passions are also conceived as 
 
 
432 Moral passions do not actually have an organic seat in the human body in the way natural passions 
do. More precisely, moral passions are located in the sphere of heart, especially the metaphysical 
heart. Thus, there is only a capability, based on the sensitive character of human organism, for 
moral passions to be awakened in the subjective consciousness or human heart. In this sense, moral 
passions have more of a transcendental character even if they function through an organism. The 
heart as the susceptible and receptive center of passions can thus change and fight against the 
natural passions; for example, sorrow and humility which laments the influence of the natural 
passions (e.g. egoism). 
5 The Psychophysiology of Moral and Spiritual Intentionality | 215
experiential-transcendental and organic-immanent phenomena433. In general, these 
passions function by directing an embodied consciousness and attach to a human 
being in relation to the world, others, surroundings, existence, and God. 
What characterizes moral passions with respect to the natural passions is that 
they are first of all conceived as something opposite to the prevailing natural pas-
sions. Natural passions direct human life by affirming certain vital functions, such as 
surviving, re-production and rivalry in social life, and these moral passions disturb 
and break down the prevailing dominance of natural intentionality (as constituted 
by natural passions). (Moral passions thus appear to have a psychophysiological 
transformative function.)
The grounding idea here is that when moral passions are awakened by a percep-
tion or religious experience, they set against the natural prevailing passions (egoism), 
signifying the presence of conflicting (ambiguous) embodied condition434. At this 
(existential) level of abstraction, Laestadius’ insight was very comprehensible. Let me 
give a simple heuristic example to explain. when facing the situation of hunger of the 
other and hunger of one’s own, the natural passion of egoism and the moral passion of 
helping that other (empathy and sympathy), may easily conflict and cause a dissonant 
psychic condition that manifests itself as a disturbance of the mind. However, the 
conflict of moral and natural passions is stimulated through perception or experience 
and is thus related to the present world, and any experiential confrontation with 
the conflicting situation. In this sense, passions signify the intentional relatedness 
of human beings. One can consider the varying moral dilemmas within which such 
passions are conflicting and cause “natural” awakening. Conflicts of passions is the 
natural human condition as a human being lives in an ambiguous world and thus 
exists within varying rivaling influences on such passions. 
433 This two-dimensional nature of passions – as they belong to the shared experiential world and 
are simultaneously natural characteristics of human organism – gives one reason to interpret that 
the line between philosophy and theology in Laestadius thought resets inside the concept of 
passion ( Juntunen 1982). This view is a plausible one because Laestadius conceived passions both 
as the fundamental basis of sin and simultaneously as the natural driving vital forces of human 
life. However, Laestadius conceived passions also in a theological context as vital-ontological 
and existential-intentional constituents of human life, and thus, they could be interpreted fully 
in both the philosophical and psychological sense. As seen above, these passions could also be 
interpreted as “correlates of human intentionality.”
434 This means generally a dissonant embodied state within which the passions cannot be satisfied. The 
dissonant state in any organic level of passions also causes dissonance in the levels of the sensory 
life and mind. This dissonant state-- within which passions cannot be satisfied – Laestadius called 
awakening (väckelse). Laestadius’ depicted this stalemate/aporetic/impasse existential condition 
in various ways, but clearly stated that it is most often an uncomfortable, unharmonious, agonic, 
and even torturing embodied state that drives the human being to search for satisfaction of the 
psychic condition, namely, a reconciliation in religious terms. (This line of thought culminates in 
the re-conception of faith and reconciliation in vitalist and psychological terms in the end.)
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Given that moral passions do not constitute the prevailing natural condition of 
human existence, moral passions are depicted as something “different” that penetrates 
the intellect and touches directly the subjective consciousness, or the heart. Deep 
or strong occasions and events of life pass through the reflective capacity of the 
mind, so that natural organic functions (natural passions) are challenged and may 
lose their dominative influence on the mind. For example, sorrow is such a moral 
passion (§§101, 100, 102.). To remind once again, Laestadius shunned the dualistic 
way of thinking and formulates a psychosomatic insight for the co-existence of soul 
and body. Sense perceptions directly affect passional body (organic life) awakening 
immediately feelings and emotions. Especially, moral passions awaken the embodied 
awareness of the soul within joy and sorrow, when, for instance, seeing a significant 
other, the infinite meaning of the other person is revealed. In this sense, the moral 
passions disclose the psychic reality, meanings, self-recognition, and the whole of the 
psychological existence. In this sense, it could be understood to what sense “moral” 
as disclosed by passions signifies the psychological sphere of human existence. Still 
further, imagination can awaken such passions.
Basically, events that awaken moral passions are such that they penetrate the intel-
lect causing a psychosomatic conflict and dissonance. Thus, the awakening of moral 
passions signifies an awakened condition of the psyche that indicates a destruction 
of the ego-subject; the prevailing egoism, ambition, greed, and their servant passions 
lose their dominative disposition, and “something” outside of the ego-totality, or 
transcendental is disclosed for the ego. In a sense, something that is experienced can 
move/influence the human’s subjective consciousness without conscious realization. 
Laestadius refers to this subjective sphere as “heart” [in the moral and spiritual sense] 
and as unconsciousness. This psycho-physiological order is important in Laestadius’ 
theory as he realized that morality does not proceed from the intellect and practi-
cal reason in the first place, but instead proceeds from the organic life, subjective 
consciousness, and the heart.
Laestadius stated that the state of awakening also signifies the emergence of 
self-awareness, a condition where one can first recognize prevailing passions within 
their own embodied existence. In this sense, awakening also signifies a certain kind 
of individuation.
In general, Laestadius dealt with the problem of moral dilemmas, looking for a 
solution for a fundamental level of passions. However, as the rivalry between natural 
passions does not reach the depth of religious experience, he proceeded to a deeper 
analysis of the religious experience of reconciliation and non-sensory perception 
which would disclose the ultimate character of the change in moral intentionality 
in the level of subjective consciousness or conscience. Before going to that aspect, I 
want to analyze the psychophysiological basis within which the moral and natural 
influences of passions do take place impact the human intellect.
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Laestadius used the term “passion” with dual meaning to have both physical and 
experiential-psychic aspects. Often Laestadius used passions and heart as synonyms 
(as well as passions and world), which is understandable, as both physic-psychological 
in character and thus disclosed simultaneously the co-existence of both physiological-
immanent and spiritual/moral-transcendental domains435. 
5.3.2  Humoral and Neural Impacts on the Functions of Soul
On the existential level, the emergence of the psychic-existential condition within 
the conflicting state of awakening is more or less comprehensible, but Laestadius 
wanted to explain it in terms of physiological vitalism which could confuse the 
contemporary interpreter. Now the question is how does a “moral” or “spiritual” 
quality emerge from a “mere physiological” plane? Does the possibility of morals 
and spirituality belong to the physiological domain of the flesh only? As we have 
seen, the emergence of consciousness or mind did not cause a problem for Laestadius 
because he relied on the panpsychistic interpretation of the principle of life, which is 
itself conceived of as a “psychic essence” or the original soul of each human person. 
However, to have a consciousness does not necessarily mean that one also has moral 
or spiritual self-awareness.
Laestadius’ physic-psychological explanation is interesting, and it seems to have 
been his own modification of the medical vitalist notions436. On the physiological 
plane, the whole idea is based on the existence of passions that stimulate and awaken 
vital functions and action in their respective organs via sense perceptions. 
”It is a physiological fact that the passions alter the components of the 
blood and affect the disposition (sinnelaget). The passions are awakened 
by external stimuli and in turn alter the components of the blood; and this 
change impacts the disposition (sinnelaget).” (§305 Note.)
Because passions functions via organs, Laestadius’ position indicates his organicist 
stance; all motion and activity are stimulated by sense perceptions which set the 
passions functioning in organic life. 
435 The transcendentality of passions becomes clear for Laestadius’ use of the term “passion”: they 
“reside” in organs, they come to a human being, they are evoked by sense perceptions, and they 
influence the organs and cognitive life, they refer to heart and subjective consciousness, they 
contentually signify everyday experiential phenomena, such as joy, sorrow, agony, love, torment, 
hunger etc., and passions affect organs, indicating that they are transcendental to mere matter… 
the fundamental character of existence of man is that man is passional, which was presented in 
the vitalist theories in a general sense by the statement; “to exist is to feel.” 
436 I did not find anything similar coming from either Bichat or Descuret.
218 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
“The passions actually belong to organic life and have their basis therein, 
but are perceived (uppfattas) in sensory life as emotions and desires. They 
impact the living brain through the circulation of blood and the stimula-
tion of the nerves. Not only the different components of the blood, but 
also its stronger or weaker circulation, awaken different emotions.” (§ 310.)
When taking a closer look at how these passions (are explained and how they) 
function and influence the human body, mind, and life, Laestadius leaned on two 
principles: First, passions affect the sensory life and mind in two ways, namely, the 
distinction between the sensual element of passion and the moral element of passion. 
This distinction lay a path for the possibility of morals and spirituality together on 
the physical level; Second, the stronger passion always gets its impact through to the 
brain and mind. Therefore, if the moral passion is stronger, it will dominate a sensuous 
natural passion and get its impact to the mind and action (on either the psychological 
or moral level). Laestadius offered an example of the influence of the passion of love:
”The foundation of the chronic passions may be found in certain bodily 
organs, but their impact on the brain takes place in two ways: through the 
reaction of the nerves and through blood. We call the former instance the 
sensual element of the passions and the latter, which takes place through the 
blood, we call the moral element of the passions. For instance, the sensual ele-
ment (sinliga element) of love is a strong fluid that stimulates the mucous 
membranes of the genitals; the impression thereof is transmitted to the brain 
through the reaction of the nerves and arouses a sensory desire (det sinliga 
begäret). But the moral element of love consists of the same fluid infused in 
the blood; its impression on the brain occurs through the blood and arouses 
a blissful feeling in the heart called the pleasure (njutning) of pure love. If 
the moral element makes a stronger impression than the sensory element, 
then the latter (sinliga begäret) will be suppressed.437” (§211. emphasis added)
This citation illuminates Laestadius’ physiological argumentation concerning the 
nature and functions of passions in general and particularly the physical explana-
tory ground of morals, which interests us especially in this chapter. First, we found 
that the sensual element physiologically functions through a neural impact and af-
fects the brain directly by arousing impressions in the sensory life (mind), namely 
“sensory desire”. This direct neural influence on the sensory life seems to indicate a 
more primitive instinctual or drive-based process, as it also indicates an immediate 
437 “But he who runs after women cannot have any real love since he channels the substance of his 
love into the realm of the sensual (kärlekens ämne på den sinliga vägen).” (§211)
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response to neural/sensory impact. Also, we found that the moral element functions 
through humoral activity in the blood influencing heart first of all438 where it arouses 
“a blissful feeling.” Both ways are agitated by the “same fluid” (samma vätska) in the 
first instance, but they also function simultaneously through different canals. 
Overall, the sensual element is here seen as a neural process, while the moral ele-
ment is the humoral effect with subjective consciousness through heart. Secondly, 
Laestadius thought that the moral element, which is based on the humoral secretion, is 
able to make stronger influence than neural-sensual impact, and thus outweighs (defeat, 
conquer) the sensual element. If so, that signifies that the effect of moral element is 
manifested through consciousness. The effect of the moral element can thus domi-
nate and lay a vital basis for the activities of the faculties of mind/consciousness. 
That would signify that the faculties of soul – both subjective and objective – have 
a moral passional ground.
What is interesting here as well is that what is manifested in human cognition and 
action is based on two distinct ways439, namely, consciousness if effected simultane-
ously by the neural channel and blood vessels through the heart440. For this purpose, 
Laestadius gives another example of hunger to explain the bipolar effect of passions on 
the consciousness (§212)441, which also serves as an explanation of how the individual 
438 Also, here we recognize that Laestadius followed Bichat’s distinction between animal life and 
organic life. It is also revealed here that there are different centers; brain as a receptive organ of 
sensory life (nervliv) receives stimulation through the nerves, and the heart as the receptive organ of 
organic life mediates stimulation through the heart. Thus, the neural media is direct and immediate, 
but humoral media has heart as a mediating center/principle that “brings forth” influences to the 
brain. However, this aspect also raises a question for whether Laestadius’ conceived the neural 
deterministic and humoral centered to heart as an initial condition for voluntary motion?
439 “The mother’s heart is an inexhaustible ocean of love, which brings both bliss and pain. Natural 
love also does not have its foundation in the heart, but in the genitals.” (§720.) Should we conceive 
this idea as a distinction between carnal emotions and the opposite spiritual emotions that are 
transformed through the conscience?
440 Laestadius may have had a contradictory notion because later he made heart the center of passion 
and a more important role; the “condition of physiological heart” determined the moral character 
of man. We can also notice that Laestadius was in real trouble when he later gave the role of 
“morals” to the conscience or subjective conscience, and then onwards to the awakened mind, a 
problem of moral emergence. However, Laestadius, even while recognizing that the faculties of 
the objective consciousness (reason, will, understanding) that are the final faculties that execute 
action and thoughts, backed up and insisted that religious awakening pertained to the physical 
level, namely, touch the heart and subjective consciousness, which would disclose/”bring forth” 
the possibility of morality. Thus, his idea was indeed relatively coherent when emphasizing the 
constitutional perspective and not the explicit use of concepts. 
441 “Hunger is a sensation that arises when the gastric juices stimulate the mucous membranes in 
the stomach, whence the impression is transmitted to the brain through nerves. When man is 
very hungry, he is also stingy and gluttonous; this is the purely sensual element of hunger. But 
in some people, these gastric acids mix with the blood more than usual. Man then becomes so 
stingy that he cannot bring himself to eat, because the moral element of stinginess cancels out 
the purely sensual elements. That is, the impression transmitted through the blood is stronger 
than that [impression] which is purely sensory.” (§212.)
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characteristics of a person may vary and/or be determined. The human organism 
functions by its neural life and organic life, so habituality is determined by both a 
more immediate neural response and mediating humoral activity. Humoral activity 
brings a certain kind of irregularity or un-deterministic principle into the picture.
It is thus important to highlight that conflict between the passions happens in the 
physical-organic plane first; if the moral passion is stronger, it suppress the influence of 
the natural sensitive passion and puts its influence on the sensory life. The “winning” 
passion then is “interpreted” in the sensory life or is more effective and manifests itself 
as moral thought or action (if the issue is a moral situation). Here we need to remind 
the reader that Laestadius saw the possibility of natural morality, but conceived it as 
relativistic, as it is most often the mere consequence of varying natural passions, and 
their rivalry is the basis for the sensory life (individual soul). However, based on the 
physiological constitution, there is only negative and positive freedom442 in the level 
of sensory life, which means that human being/mind can either resist or consent to 
the agitations (inclinations) that appear from the influences of the passions443.
5.3.3  Heart as Mediating Organ of the Vital Forces
Laestadius conceived the physiological heart444 as the center of the passions and held 
it as a synonym for passions, “subjective consciousness” and “unconsciousness”. The 
heart is physiologically posited as a mediating center between the organic life and 
the sensory life (brains), and it plays a crucial role in transmitting vital passions [and 
their influences] to the sensory life. 
The heart is an
“’organonleptikon’, or susceptive organ; that is to say, the sort of organ that 
conceives and brings forth; …; it is a principle of good and evil, of right 
and wrong, of light and darkness. On the other hand, subjective consciousness 
442 In the general picture, this subordination of consciousness to passions is called psychic necessity: 
The human person must function in accordance with physiological and vital laws and is not free 
from the impacts of organic life. See Chapter 4.2.7.
443 For freedom of will see, Chapter 4.2.7 above. Cf. Juntunen 1982; Dahlbäck 1950; Zidbäck 1937. 
There also remains a disagreement about Laestadius’ stance; Juntunen holds against Zidbäck and 
Dahlbäck that from knowing Laestadius’ principles there should not be another but negative 
freedom in the sensory life. My interpretation is that such confusion results from Laestadius’ 
own inaccuracy in his general statements, as even though he states in on the general level that 
sensory life is subordinated to organic life, he does not mean that man cannot restrict or direct 
his actions and thoughts. Elsewhere, Laestadius clearly states that man’s thoughts and actions can 
make space for reconciliation (limited ascetism). What he wanted to emphasize in more detail 
was that religious experience has to pertain to the heart and subjective consciousness because 
these awakened passions lay the ground for a moral and prober spiritual cognitive life and action.
444 See §718 for how Laestadius thematized and coincidentally struggled with the multidimensional 
notion of the heart. See also §719.
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is merely a sense, or ‘receptive organ,’ which receives impressions from the red 
blood that streams from the heart. Subjective consciousness is primarily the 
receptive organ of the moral and immoral elements, but these elements are 
not brought forth in subjective consciousness itself, but in the heart, whence rise 
both good and evil, spreading to the other organs.” (§744. emphasis added)
The heart is also the domain where the “conflict of passions” is felt445 first. From 
this physiological basis Laestadius elaborated on a broader notion of the heart that 
included all the passions and thus go beyond the mere physiological heart:
“[A]ll natural and unnatural passions taken together, which we refer to as the 
heart in a more extended sense. All passions that are based in organic life must 
pass through the heart; through the moral element of the passions. Because 
the heart is the central organ of the passions, it is the nature (beskaffenhet) of 
the heart that determines moral character.” (§718. emphasis added)
Laestadius also stated quite technically that the “physiological heart is the organ of 
metaphysical heart,” meaning that the domain of the “psychic”, “moral” or “spiritual” 
is derived from the experiential core that physiologically is the heart. Laestadius saw 
the sensory and organic lives as correlative with a relationship between the physical 
and metaphysical, and thus, the physiological and spiritual: 
”The moral purification that takes place during the struggle to repent 
reaches deep into the human organism on account of the close relationship 
between body and soul, sensory life and organic life, and the physical and 
metaphysical organism.” (§783)
Heart is the metaphysical and spiritual name for the “subjective” experiential 
core in the organic and unconscious plane. For this reason, the heart is conceived as 
determining the “human personhood,” the “moral character of a human being” and 
the core of spirituality. Thus, the heart is conceived as a “dual-concept”, covering both 
the physiological-immanent and the spiritual-transcendental spheres.
Genuine morality needs moral passions as its basis, and that is why we have to 
highlight that the inspired condition of the heart446 plays a crucial role; heart is the 
center of passions, for it delivers passions to the sensory life and thus is the center of 
moral character. “[I]t is the heart, not intellect, reason or memory that determines 
man’s moral character.” (§717.) Here again Laestadius had to conceive the concept 
445 Feelings belong both to the organic and the sensory life. (§747)
446 “’The good heart refers to moral character.”(§715)
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of heart as having a dual-meaning, as it simultaneously indicated the physiological 
organ and the organ of the “metaphysical heart”447, namely, the center of morality 
and spirituality.448 The basic dilemma seemed to be how to combine experientiality 
or mind with organism. 
However, there was no such positive or active freedom in the sphere of the sen-
sory life that could influence the organic life and thus change the conditions of the 
heart (organic life) by its own power. In other words, a change does not originate 
from the mere physical, but it can be explained by passions, heart and conscience, 
by the “transcendental” aspects of the organic life itself. The change in the condition 
of heart would demand a change in the organic level through the moral passions, 
which necessitated the religious experience of awakening.
But how does moral passion or the spiritual influence of religious experience 
affect the physiological constitution of the human being? How are experiential 
phenomena and sensory and non-sensory experiences attached to the physiological 
body? In this regard, Laestadius needed to elaborate on the dual-meaning of heart. 
Laestadius argued that moral and spiritual experiences pertain to the “metaphysi-
cal” or “spiritual” heart and can awaken moral passions at the organic level or in the 
subjective consciousness itself. These “metaphysical” experiences have naturally similar 
physiological effects on the human organism, as whatever the natural perception or 
influence of natural passion is. In this sense, the human being is not living only as 
“mind” or distinct soul, but instead the soul is the principle of life and thus has to 
cover both the spiritual (pneuma) and the embodied (psyche) domains in order to 
cover both the organic embodied functions and the “psychic” or spiritual influences. 
The Soul is “the life of the body”. Here, even though Laestadius’ writing can hard 
to follow at times, it seems that his idea was both coherent and plausible within the 
vitalist framework: The heart as well as all the other organs were conceived as “mental” 
from the beginning; they were animated organs that could receive action and act by 
themselves, and were thus related to the physical and transcendental spheres from 
the start. In a sense, the extended notion of sensitivity of the heart and conscience 
indicated that the “moral” or spiritual” is physical, and vice versa. Thus morality is 
found in the elemental flesh.
447 Elsewhere Laestadius states that the physical and metaphysical are one and the same thing.
448 States of objective consciousness need states of subjective consciousness, such as emotion, for the 
basis of their action: Mere concepts, or will without desire (matter), will not lead to the matter 
of subject whatsoever. This psychosomatic conception (of mind) also highlights the point that 
aroused/excited organic functions affect the content of the faculties of objective consciousness. 
Laestadius also referred to heart and passions as the pre-reflective basis.
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5.3.4  Conscience As the Sphere of Moral and Spiritual Experience
With respect to the extended notions of heart and passion and their central role in 
subjective consciousness, Laestadius was able to elaborate on his notion of conscience. 
For Laestadius, conscience and the voice of conscience were the original phenomena 
of human life, and they preceded all ideas and concepts whatsoever (Cf. §§1277, 
1318, 1320). In this sense they played the primary role in regard to intellect and the 
intellectual theoretical doctrines of God, faith, and morality.
“By conscience, we mean the sense of justice itself, which preceded the idea 
and the concept. Neither the idea, nor the concept, is able to awaken the 
conscience. The idea is unable to awaken sorrow, love, or hate, for which is 
required either an immediate perception, or an occurrence that touches the heart. 
This is so clear, and confirmed by general experience, that whoever claims 
that he is able to make himself fall in love will give rise to ridicule. It is the 
same way with the awakening. It always presupposes the some occurrence 
that goes to the heart.” (§1318. emphasis added)
Actually, conscience refers to a certain aspect of subjective consciousness, par-
ticularly the receptive domain of organic influences. The cerebellum is the organic 
seat of subjective consciousness and thus also the organic seat of the conscience. 
Conscience is particularly specialized to be able to receive and “interpret” moral 
and immoral elements, so it has more to do, for instance, with the evaluation of the 
moral an immoral influences coming from the heart. Thinking so, Laestadius held 
that the “conscience is a result of the ruling passions,” (§691) which, furthermore, 
indicated that conscience was susceptible to the varying influences of those passions 
that determine the condition of conscience.
Laestadius undertook an extensive analysis of the varying conditions of con-
science449, and naturally, he came to focus on the “awakened conscience” within 
which the founding dilemma of human existence was faced (later with a need for 
reconciliation). Altogether, conscience receives wicked and moral influences from 
the heart450, which in turn impacts the faculties of objective consciousness. This line 
of thought reveals Laestadius’ way of explaining the emergence of human motion, 
action, cognition, morality, and spirituality as having a vertical direction from the 
bottom to the top:
449 See § 695 and further e.g., §§ 693, 694, 696, 697.
450 We can interpret this receptive capability in that conscience is only a “rationalizing” faculty of 
the passions, while the heart hold its primary position in what pertains to faith and morality. 
Conscience is the sphere of the struggle concerning moral and religious thought and action.
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“[T]he law manifests itself, first in the heart as a sense of justice, and 
proceeds to conscience, which has its organ in subjective consciousness, 
“syneidesis,” whence it proceeds to the intellect in the form of thoughts 
and concepts. It is easy to realize that this order for the ascent of the moral 
element from the heart to the intellect has its foundation in the construction 
and position of the organs, once one is convinced that each faculty of the 
soul has its corresponding organ in the body.” (§676. emphasis added)
According to Laestadius, this psychophysiological order coincided with the Bibli-
cal views:
 
“As far as conscience is concerned, the apostle shows us that the law has 
first been written in the hearts of the heathens, where it manifests itself as 
a sense of justice. Thence the moral element has proceeded to conscience, 
or the subjective consciousness (syneidesis) and finally to thought (logis-
moi).” (§682.)
The phenomenon of conscience extends the conception of subjective consciousness 
into a transcendental dimension. Conscience indicates something that is transcendental 
to the organic functions of the subjective consciousness (heart, passions, conscience) but 
in such a way that the “indicated itself ” is included in the constitution of their physical 
disposition/composition from the beginning (empty intentionality, God as force). This 
puzzling intertwinedness of the physical and the non-physical shows up as Laestadius 
depicted precisely how the physical feelings transcend the Self ( Jag) in “the call”:
“[O]ccurrence that goes to the heart, for instance, when [the] drunkard is 
awakened by the reproach of conscience. Here, it is not merely the exaggera-
tion of evil causing a ‘reaction’ within organic life, a weakening (förslappn-
ing) within sensory life, but God’s own voice within the conscience calling for 
repentance. But this voice of God within the tormented conscience did 
not proceed from the ego, or the ego-will. Rather, there is a higher power, 
the moral necessity, which awakens within the will a desire for salvation; 
in fact, the rational awakening, of which the philosopher speaks, is not the 
work of the ego-will, since man, the ego, is called upon by moral necessity 
to actualize its freedom.” (§1318. emphasis added)
While this citation reveals that actual freedom is depicted as negative and “free 
of something”, it also deconstructs the dualism. Conscience neither signifies a mere 
“inner” or “outer” experience or condition nor a mere “bodily-physical” or simply a 
“mental-spiritual” experience; rather it unites both spheres in such a way that there 
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remains no simple dualism neither in human beings nor in the existence of God. 
Rather man’s psychophysiological existence indicates a fundamental relatedness to 
the “outer” existence or God as such. The phenomenon of conscience seems to refer 
to a capability of having an experiential holistic “understanding” of one’s being in the 
world as such which then co-ordinates the subjective and the objective. Conscience 
is explicitly interpreted as the capability for having inner and outer insight:
“In subjective consciousness, the feelings of the heart manifest themselves 
as insight, ‘syneidesis,’ or as an awareness of good and evil. Syneidesis comes 
from the Greek word eido, which really means ‘to see,’ but just as the Swedish 
word is used to denote both outer and inner vision, so, too, was ‘eido’ used 
to denote both. It means ‘to see’ when one speaks of the external world, 
but it means to see when one speaks of internal vision (inre seendet); the 
perception of what goes on within ourselves (förnimmandet af det som föregår 
innom oss). …” (§745. emphasis added)
As a phenomenon, conscience characterizes the capability for having a “subjective” 
experience of one’s own-most personal embodied condition in the world. Conscience 
seems to hold a domain within which the outer world and one’s subjective lived ex-
perience, both the subjective and the objective, coincide, i.e., what is going on in the 
world around us, and how do I “take up residence” with myself in the world (dynamic 
relation). Overall, one’s physical embodied state is coexisting with the calling voice, 
with the outer dimension, and thus seems to constitute a certain kind of expanded 
notion of sensibility (based on the principle of life). Laestadius indeed argued that 
sensory perception is always extrasensory-perception as well.
Furthermore, this immanence-transcendence problematic spreads all through 
Laestadius’ conceptions; as man is a sentient vital organism, Laestadius had to posit 
all phenomena conventionally conceived as simply “mental” or “spiritual” distinct 
from “body”, to both immanent organic life and the relatively transcendental capacity 
of sensory life (nervliv). On the notion of conscience, Laestadius elaborated on his 
explanation of religious experience of awakening and his quite detailed non-dualistic 
theory of perception.
5.3.5  Non-sensory Perception Within the Conscience
In Chapter 4, I examined Laestadius’ general analysis of the subjective and objective 
consciousness and theory of intentional perception. Now, in the context of morality 
and spirituality, we can offer a wider view of what purposes the elaborated insight 
can serve, especially for Laestadius’ religious thought and psychology. The embodied 
unity of mind played a crucial role when Laestadius went on to argue for the natural 
embodied character of religious feelings and internal perceptions: 
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“If one can prove that the soul, or life, is dependent on organic conditions, or 
that ‘all supersensory perception is also sensory,’ or that ‘the ego that perceives 
through the senses is the same ego that thinks’ (Petrelli, §100); then I hope that 
both spiritualism and materialism may collapse, and a new foundation may 
be laid for a correct psychology that more closely agrees with reality.” (§245.)
And further still, 
 
“All spiritualists have considered Descartes’ forceful assertion (cogito ergo 
sum) to be an axiom. But the claim that man thinks without mediation of 
organs now require proof (see §192). The spiritualist must pause to ponder 
dual consciousness, the physical and the metaphysical. The materialist must 
pause ponder physical and metaphysical activating force. I believe that, 
eventually, they will meet half-away.” (§245Note.)
In addition to finding a way out from spiritualism and materialism, Laestadius’ 
more particular interests were to elaborate on an insight to show how emotional 
experience (moral) could be seen at the same time as natural and spiritual, or in other 
words, both immanent and transcendental.
Particularly, moral and spiritual feelings or emotions were in Laestadius’ focus as he 
saw that metaphysical rationalism could interpret religious emotions as being merely 
metaphysical, thus creating a dualism between natural and metaphysical emotions:
“Because all activities of the soul are also activities of the organs, the feel-
ings belong to both body and soul; they belong to both organic life and 
sensory life. It is the whole person that feels, not the soul only. The feelings 
have their origins in organic life but effect sensory life. From this it follows 
that the ego that perceives through the senses is the same ego that thinks. Petrelli, 
§100. Cf, §§48, 191.” (§747.)
However, dilemmatic dualistic ethos was difficult for Laestadius, especially when 
he then interpreted “philosophers” separate physical feeling and metaphysical feelings, 
so that the latter is conceived to occur and function without organs. This threatening 
dualism caused him to radicalize his stance:
”In reality, the physical and metaphysical feeling is one and the same feel-
ing, just as physical and metaphysical consciousness are one and the same 
consciousness.” (§748.)451
451 See also §750 eccentric feelings [wrath, love, ambition] and concentric [fear, grief, envy] feelings.
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Laestadius fought against the insights that divide the unity of experiential sphere. 
Here he also drew a distinction between two kinds of feelings – organic and sensory 
– that pertain to the passions themselves within the organic life and the influence of 
passion on the sensory life452. The feeling is organic when it signifies the passional 
state itself, but the feeling is sensory when it is the result of the influence of passion 
on the sensory life453.
Laestadius wanted to argue using analogy that as feelings belong to both do-
mains (organic and sensory), moral feelings must also be simultaneously physical 
and metaphysical. Here he had a clear religious purpose, namely, to argue against 
the assumed idealistic rationalism (transcendentalism or Hegel); Laestadius held 
that moral or spiritual emotions can be understood in natural-physiological terms, 
and moral feelings have as equal an influence on organic life as natural feelings do. 
This is why embodied religious experiences and perceptions, as Laestadius seemed 
to claim, should be taken seriously as natural phenomena.
“In so far as all feelings are simultaneously physical and metaphysical, moral 
feelings must also be simultaneously physical and metaphysical, but it is an 
impossibility for the philosopher to admit this. He assumes the existence of 
only a sensory feeling, perceived sensorily, such as cold, heat, physical pain, 
and other. But he considers all moral feelings to be metaphysical. Neverthe-
less it is clear to see that moral feelings affect the organism as powerfully 
as natural feelings, when they are intensified into passions.” (§751.)
This co-existing, sensory-embodied feeling pertains also to the whole constitu-
tion of perception; there cannot be two distinct sensory centers, ego subjects or dual 
consciousness, that experience. Laestadius most favorite chant was “the ego that 
thinks, is the same ego that feels”. Using the example of the influence of alcohol on 
the body and the rational soul, Laestadius concluded that
“We imagine that all bodily feelings are also the feelings of the soul, and 
vice versa; that all the feelings of the soul are also those of the body. ‘Be-
452 This distinction coincides with the distinct way of how influence is mediated to the organs of 
sensory life either through the blood via heart or via nerves directly to the organs of sensory life 
(See above). This view also relates to the above distinction with respect to the moral-humoral 
and sensuous-neural.
453 ”Insofar as man has an organic life and sensory life, we must first draw a distinction between 
organic feelings and sensory feelings; it is a difference between the passion itself, which belongs 
to organic life, and the impression of the passion on the sensory organs, which belong the sensory 
life. The latter is generally seen as the soul and corresponds to the philosopher’s rational soul, 
although the public most often considers the heart to be the real organ of the soul. [philosopher 
distinct soul from sensory life].” (§752)
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cause the ego that perceives through the senses is the same ego that thinks.’ 
Petrelli §100.” (§306) 
Thus, Laestadius came to hold a psychosomatic view of experiential phenomena: 
No matter whether it is physical sensory perception or non-sensory “inner” percep-
tion, both are experienced by means of organs and received by the “Self ” that is the 
organic-physical and sensory-transcendental core [predicate]of experience (See e.g. 
§§ 206–308). What was important for Laestadius was that the phenomenon of the 
body had to be carried all along because the body both mediates and modifies all 
our experiences. 
Laestadius used the expanded notion454 of conscience (moral element) as a mode 
of sensibility to explain the effect of the religious experience of awakening that can 
occur via the influence of a “heart breaking” life experience, via a touching spiritual 
sermon or the effect of the Holy Spirit: Through subjective consciousness based on 
dispositions of organs, and thus having no conscious awareness or activity of the 
emergence of such an experience, the human organism is able to experience moral 
emotions. The moral element springs from the [metaphysical-physical] heart and 
flows to the conscience (cerebral) where it is manifested as moral emotions and is 
equally effective on the organs (heart) and organic life, as are the natural passions 
and sensuous feelings. Religious emotions and spiritual “supernatural” perceptions 
evoked by moral passions affect equally in their power the human organism and life 
as sensory perceptions evoked by natural passions.455 In this way, Laestadius fought 
against the dualism between natural and metaphysical perception that he seemed to 
find in Petrelli’s Psychologie (1845).
The overcoming of the distinction between subjective and objective is constructed 
through simultaneity of empirical sensory perception and extrasensory “transcen-
dental” perception. This means that sensory perception (sinlig förnimmelse) relates 
to extra-sensory transcendental perception (översinlig förnimmelse) in a particular 
way: Objective or outer perceptions are based on the passional basis of the vital forces 
of passions and drives; perception is first of all possible because organism is sensible 
or animated in its vital nature and thus capable of receiving stimulation and react-
ing on it. However, all the passions are in an intimate relationship with surrounding 
influences, as all passions are “awakened by sense-perceptions”. Here it is important 
to notice that by using the term “transcendental” or “transcendentality”, we cannot 
refer to something absolutely “beyond” or “otherworldly” but just something that is 
not given indirect empirical sense-perception. In Laestadius’ case transcendentality 
454 Rey (2006, 260) has pointed out how Fouquet elaborated on a non-conscious experience, which 
goes beyond what is conventionally conceived as organic function.
455 Cf. Laestadius 2006, 86, 54–66. [Spiritual perceptions, inner perception, “inner eye”, spiritual world.]
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signified those inner perceptions based on the dynamic relations of passions within 
the organic life; thus Laestadius’ psychophysiology of religious experience becomes 
a particular kind of physiological transcendentalism.456
Laestadius’ view constituted a dynamic theory of human/world relation. It distin-
guished itself from rational-mechanist explanations and also from the constructivist 
idea within which the concepts of mind schematize the objective world (Kant). Rather 
a passional interactive and dynamic relatedness with the world and all things in it 
– whether material or cultural-ideological – constituted the whole dynamic relation 
of the human/world or the existence relationship. The relation was simultaneously 
linguistic and pre-linguistic. We can assume Laestadius’ view; preaching of law and 
poetic evangelical preaching can awaken the moral passions and affect the subjective 
consciousness wherein they evoke moral and religious feelings and “images” that lay 
out the subjective motivational ground for both mind and action.
Altogether, transcendental spiritual perception or experience does not derive from 
an immaterial spiritual or metaphysical world, but to the contrary, from embodied 
carnal passions that bridge the relationship between embodied subjectivity and the 
world457. Here “the spiritual perception” may contain real everyday feelings of dislike 
and also more normative principles or personal values revealed by one’s own con-
science. Developing the connection between sensory perception and extra-sensory 
perception (moral emotions) belongs to Laestadius’ apologetic intentions to explain 
the pietistic religious experience of awakening (väckelse) and conversion (metanoia) 
that he wanted to interpret as a twofold embodied physiological and transcendental 
experience.458
456 The fact that Laestadius stated that Christianity is based on images and ideas duly awakened in 
the religious person, does not mean an emphasis on intellectual mind but rather that the “religious 
message” (a call emerging in dissonant passionate-cognitive state) or existential experience that 
passes reason and touched immediately the heart will stimulate high images, ideas, and hopes in 
the consciousness of a religious person.
457 Laestadius was trying to explain how all physical or natural sense-perceptions (immanence) are 
at the same time transcendental non-sensory perceptions (transcending the physical); and vice 
versa, that all movements of the soul or movements of passions in the subjective consciousness 
also influence the objective consciousness. Thus, Laestadius formed a psychosomatic connection 
and simultaneity of sense perception and transcendental subjective perception (passions). This pre-
phenomenological idea is explained in terms of the early psychosomatic elaborations of Heinroth. 
Laestadius seemed to recognize how the constitution of meaning (in thus perception) is always 
constituted by the objectively given data of sensory perception – that is (in his interpretation at 
least) the direct, immediate, immanent and empiric part – and subjectively given pre-cognitive 
or extra-sensory data – that mediates the organic, passionated, non-empirical and transcendental 
part of perception/experience.
458 However, Laestadius’ endeavor to discuss the transcendental dimension of perception can also be 
attached to the phenomenological problem of constitution of meaning. Laestadius (2011) stated 
in Mythology that it is hard to draw a difference between inner and outer experience. Also in 
Voice of One Crying (1988) Laestadius discussed a problem of inner and outer experience in the 
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Theoretically he tried to explain God’s spiritual effect (“imputation”) as part of 
the “natural” experience – for example, the experiences of grace or moral disgust that 
are based on the organic passions and their influences. For instance, the dissonant 
state of awakening is experienced as disgust for bad and evil (avsky för det onda). In 
regard to this “naturalization” of moral passion and its influence on organs and thus 
on human action and thought (intentionality), it is worth noticing that Laestadius 
followed and elaborated on common vitalist philosophy in order to discuss the physi-
cal, moral and spiritual in the same plane459.
Laestadius saw that the sharp distinction between natural (empirical) and meta-
physical (spiritual or transcendental) emotions is artificial, that is not affirmed within 
a psychosomatic lived experience, and that moral passions have an equally powerful 
effect on organic life as natural feelings and emotions do. Instead, Laestadius seemed 
to suggest that the distinction between the natural and the metaphysical experience 
has to occur inside an embodied experience (§752§Note).
For Laestadius, it was necessary to hold that there remains a possibility for inner 
religious-existentialistic experience and perception grounded on physiological body. 
(See, §§751, 752.) Otherwise, all of faith would be conceived as an intellectual matter. 
Again, Laestadius explained how the “imputation” of God was holistic non-sensory 
perception (or a sensitive experience) that passes the objectifying [gaze of ] reason, 
will, and understanding. For him, the phenomenon of Love worked as a heuristic 
example: Love is awakened on the pre-cognitive level of subjective consciousness in 
the first place – not on the level of objective consciousness of the sensory life (there 
is difference between natural and spiritual love, and the former loses). Similarly, all 
genuine moral and spiritual passions are felt directly in the heart or the subjective 
consciousness. Thus, a moral and spiritual (transcendental) experience and percep-
tion are found originally in the vital forces of passions and their relationship to each 
other in the Heart/conscience. Religious experience is explained in vitalist terms 
as the conflict between natural and moral passions in the living organism itself. To 
put this view phenomenologically on a more general level, we can say that religious 
experience is based on the transcendental character of the flesh (which proved for 
Laestadius that moral emotions and experiences are not merely metaphysical or 
context of religious experience: he saw that revelations and religious experiences are possible to 
explain through medical physiology as aroused passion life. In religious extasis, for example, the 
inner life is lifted up, so that the human is turned into an inner life while the outer world loses 
its significance. Laestadius tried to explain and understand how the inner subjective life is primal 
in relation to the world and God. In The Lunatic he tried to sharpen his theory for explaining 
how supernatural or transcendental experience is as plausible and real as objective perception; 
that was done justifying spirituality and pietistic religiosity. See, Laestadius 2011 and 2015 and 
1988. 
459 Cf. Williams 2002.
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transcendental, and morality and spirituality can be understood and explained in 
terms of vitalism.460 (as an embodied intentionality)
Religious transcendental perceptions exist as events that are based on conflicts 
of the passions (and varying continuous sensory data). Also, religious and moral 
phenomena, such as good and bad, can be perceived within experience based on the 
conflicting relations of the passions (natural and moral). In other words, dissonance 
on the pre-reflective organic level causes cognitive dissonance on the objective level 
of consciousness.
Through this naturalizing explanation of moral and spiritual emotion, Laestadius 
tried to argue that moral and spiritual experiences are not merely mystical-meta-
physical imputations. He blamed philosophical theologians for holding that only 
sensory perceptions are natural and religious emotions are metaphysical (§751). For 
Laestadius, moral emotions could be understood in terms of passions and emotions 
that were awakened on the pre-reflective and pre-conscious organic level.
Laestadius wrote about moral emotion from a new significance: The transcendental 
dimension of experience were to be found in the carnal passions of organic life (and 
life-principle), and he even equated the relationship between organic and sensory 
lives with the pair, physical and metaphysical (§783). This was how Laestadius in a 
sense naturalistically and hermeneutically explained the transcendentality of “inner” 
human experience and vital essence as such. 
On a more general level, Laestadius seemed to recognize how the constitution of 
meaning in perception is simultaneously constituted by the objectively given data of 
sensory perception – that is, the (for his interpretation) direct, immediate, immanent 
and empiric part – and subjectively given pre-cognitive or extra-sensory data – that 
is, the mediating, organic, passionate, non-empirical and transcendental part. These 
subjective and objective domains were ontologically intertwined into meaning-
perception. Laestadius did not want to separate the intellectual and organic spheres 
460 Animal instinct or sensuous passions are not necessarily immoral. Laestadius hold that genuine 
love is able to sanctify purely animal instinct. Thus, the condition of heart has transformative 
significance for morality: “In the uncorrupted state of man, his passions may have been so 
ordered, that the sensual element was always blocked by the moral element. Thus it is, at least, 
with the moral and sensual elements of love: the purely animal drive is sanctified by pure love. 
Pure love in a lawful marriage is not a sin, does not wound the sense of justice, does not conflict 
with conscience, neither with the reason; but dog’s love, the purely sensual, the animal drive, is 
indecent and irrational. But because man senses a ‘ferocious rut’ (Luther), a burning desire for the 
pleasures of the lust of the flesh, marriage has, after the Fall, become a remedy against our frail 
nature (Luther). ‘It is better to marry than to burn’ (Paul: 1. Chorintians 7:9). Just as a greater evil 
must be cured by means of a lesser evil, since there is nothing better, then also marriage ought 
to prevent general whoring, which is so widespread in the world at large. However, the more the 
world congratulates itself on account of enlightenment and civilization, the less conscientious it 
becomes. Marriage is despised, while the life of a bachelor – more properly, ‘the life of a whoremonger’ 
– is praised.” (§980.)
232 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
from each other but rather examine them together. It was not a parallelistic, but 
rather a pre-phenomenologically formed, theory of a psychosomatic whole that was 
also an extension in the direction of “transcendental philosophy”, as it was meant to 
explain the spiritual and transcendental perceptions and experiences. Laestadius tried 
to evade the spiritualistic and pantheistic notions of pure metaphysical perception 
as well as any materialistic and idealistic explanations.
* * *
Classical vitalist tradition offered me a philosophical perspective of the vitalist ac-
count of morals. However, we can now conclude that Laestadius elaborated on the 
partly similar idea of “moral” and the “spiritual” by his analysis of the dual-sense 
conception of heart– including the expanded notion of conscience – as it was the core 
of a human being, given that it signified “something distinct from the mere physi-
cal” which enabled spiritual experience and perception (the domain of conscience/
subjective consciousness). 
Such non-conscious psychic activity that does not originate in the intellectual 
functions in the first place, but models itself in humoral activity as a “moral element 
[in conscience]” goes beyond what is conventionally recognized as organic function. 
Insofar as Laestadius elaborated on the notion of conscience to explain the psycho-
physiological effect of religious experience and a religious awakening sermon, the 
notion could be seen as a unique conception within both philosophical psychology 
and theology.
Before the analysis of the concepts of religious awakening and reconciliation, it is 
enough for now to discover that Laestadius had to think of moral action as psychic 
conscious intention springing from the physical plane in the first place, but this 
emanation or “emergence” also included transcendental influences, such as moral 
passions and the influence of the Holy Spirit. This physiological transcendentalism 
is possible only by interpreting the heart and conscience as having extended imma-
nent-transcendental meaning – having a physical organic basis and a phenomenal 
transcendental domain of conscience – as the true core of the human person and 
human moral character461.
461 Laestadius’ emphasis on blood is sometimes associated with religious blood-mysticism in 
theological studies (e.g. Zidbäck 1937). However, I can only point out that Laestadius is 
rationalizing the religious views and forming his own scientific theory rather than postulating 
mystical or occult notions, while keeping in mind that his theory seeks for a scientific-philosophical 
explication and justification of pietistic spirituality.
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5.4  Awakening and the Emergence of Morals and Spirituality
5.4.1  The Phenomenon of Awakening
Awakening (väckelse) is the main concept of Laestadius’ thought and refers to reli-
gious experience. It pertains and interlinks to both the physiological and psychological 
aspects. In Laestadius’ use of the term, awakening also has Christian-pietistic horizon 
and an emphasis on one’s own-most or the subjective experiences of penitence and 
contrition as a prerequisite for conversion and rebirth via a physic-psychological event.
The phenomenon and experience of awakening is conceived holistically as a 
vital-existential condition for repentance and, furthermore, it lays the ground for the 
possibility of reconciliation. Awakening can be broadly interpreted as a psychological 
event (having a physiological explanatory ground), but first of all seen as an event 
that discloses the human condition in its relatedness to one’s own way of being, to 
others, and the world, existence, and God. In this broad phenomenal extent, the 
awakening is closely related to the notions of the principle of life as original soul, 
passions as an intentional correlates/nexus, the notion of Self as an experiential core 
(in-between the organic life and sensory life), and as a “tension between passions;” 
therefore, this awakening concerns the very problem of human existence, morality, 
and the possibility for authentic spirituality. 
In a theoretical context, the notion of awakening is first of all needed to break 
the way out of the impossible moral and spiritual condition of human life (that 
Laestadius often calls the “dead faith”). When recalling the condition of human 
life thematized as the dominance of organic life and the natural passions, which 
signify the deprived moral and spiritual condition, it becomes a crucial question to 
know how proper morality and spirituality is even possible. Especially when viewed 
from Laestadius’ vitalist perspective, which held that intellect or mind has no power 
over passions in the sense that it could change, modify, or govern them, then reason 
and will do not have the power within themselves to lead human beings to proper 
morality and spirituality. How then is genuine freedom, being the Self and moral 
intentionality, even possible?
If natural passions determine the human condition, then life seems to be doomed 
to the captivity of fatalistic immoral forces and contingent interests of the prevailing 
world. In this respect, awakening is thematized in Laestadius’ thought as a psycho-
logical event that marks the possibility for a change of the human way of existing in 
the world and in the human relation to God.
Generally, Laestadius’ approach and proposed settlement for “moral impossibility” 
was theoretically constructed on the notions of the human person being a sentient 
vital being and on the notion of passions that can awaken, inspire, evoke, and re-
direct the human embodied existence. On this constitutional ground, Laestadius 
insisted that religious awakening must also happen at the level of organic life, in 
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the heart, and in vital functions in the first place, not in the mind or intellect that 
belongs to the sphere of sensory life. By the power of the principle of life and pas-
sional/vital nature, a human person is capable of feelings and experiences. From a 
vitalist perspective Laestadius elaborated on the view that awakening is based on 
vital-existential functions and experiences; also spiritual experiences were viewed 
from the perspective of vitalist psychology.
At the core of the event of awakening is the emergence of moral passions which 
arise against the prevailing dominant natural passions, causing a conflict within the 
embodied consciousness. Awakening is not pure inner experience, but also related 
to the present world and social context as far as the moral passions are awakened 
by sense perceptions and inner experiences that originate in the lived world. In a 
more general sense, the emergence of moral passions means that awakening signi-
fies the conflict or rivalry of good and evil and moral and natural passions within 
the human’s psychophysiological essence. Moral passions may be stirred/risen/
sprung up (awakened) both through the experiences of life – by recognizing the 
influences of natural passions or fear of death462 – and through mediation of the 
spiritual experience of grace. The stirring of moral passions is particularly what is 
referred to as awakening. 
5.4.2  The Positive Psychopathology of Awakening
Given the physiological-physical basis of the moral and spiritual, we can now ask how 
are the moral passions and thus the moral elements in humoral activities awakened 
and stimulated? How is the religious experience of awakening explained in terms 
of existential vitalism? What kinds of experiences are needed for the moral passion 
or a spiritual impact to be awakened? What are the “objective” conditions for a/this 
religious experience? Does Laestadius manage to explain the moral and spiritual of 
man’s relating to the surrounding world and existence? We are here thus interested 
in what kinds of religious awakenings Laestadius was talking about and especially 
how he explained them and tried to justify them. What does awakening signify both 
existentially and psychologically?
Analyzing the embodied basis of morality and spirituality, Laestadius leaned on 
the philosophy of Bichat. According to Laestadius, Bichat was “much closer to the 
psychological truth, on physiological and anatomical grounds, when he offered his 
thesis stating ‘that passions determine man’s moral character’ (Bichat, p. 59f ).” (§701.) 
Bichat offered a key insight, namely that intellectual activity cannot properly change 
man’s moral character because mind has no governing power over the organic life and 
the passions that determine moral character. Laestadius interpreted Bichat’s thought 
462 Cf. Laestadius 2006, 39 (Huutavan ääni/The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness [Laestadius 
1988])
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as coinciding with Luther’s theological idea that “man cannot refashion his heart, or 
make himself good, when he is by nature wicked.” (§702.)463
Because Laestadius recognized that organic life dominates the mind, moral and 
personal character of human beings, he moved toward a more experiential means of 
moral and spiritual education, such as spiritual preaching464. The question then rises 
where does the changing power originate, if not in the body itself?
Laestadius held that “there must be a force that is not within man himself465, 
which accomplishes a change in man’s moral character, regardless of how learned 
he is. This cannot happen in any other way than through an awakening of moral 
passions through which the immoral passions are dulled and suppressed, albeit not 
entirely destroyed.” (§704.)
When Laestadius moved to discuss the influence of the “moral element” in conscience, 
his analysis is not as specific as when he is explaining the physic-psychological processes 
in the organic plane, and indeed, it seems to turn to more experiential phenomena, to 
the psycho-social situation where the awakening takes place. Then Laestadius writes that
463 “Similarly, Bichat has come closest to revelation in the doctrine of the passions, when he says: 
‘upbringing, which noticeably modifies the actions of animal life [Laestadius’ sensory life/nervliv], is not 
capable of changing man’s physical temperament or moral character’ (Bichat). This truth was articulated 
by Luther long ago, but in other words, man cannot refashion his heart, or make himself good, when 
he is by nature wicked. … How can the rationalist overthrow physiological and anatomical truths 
without being embarrassed about his own stupidity? That which can be proven physiologically or 
anatomically cannot be overthrown by empty speculations.” (§702.) See also §703: “Bichat further 
states [that] ‘to seek through upbringing to change the nature of someone’s character; to dull or 
excite the passions, the interpreter of which is the character; or to enlarge or lessen their sphere, 
is as impossible as stopping the movements of heart on whim of the will.’ From this [view], it 
follows unconditionally that man cannot change his moral character, regardless of how learned 
he is. He cannot annihilate his immoral passions, or awaken moral passions, by his good will.”
464 Rey (2006, 263) pointed out how vitalists conceived mental and physical states as part of the 
same continuum. Also, mental illness was approached by using cases wherine the mind and 
the body each play a particular role, where the physician acts upon the one in order better 
to reach the other. Rey states that already vitalists were on the way toward developing a 
‘moral treatment’ of the disorders, systematized and amplified by the alienists at the end of 
the eighteenth century (Ménuret). For ‘moral treatment’ it was typical to think that causing 
a sudden disturbance will cure one of mania (Cf. ‘universal delirium’, Crapula mundi). 
Laestadius’ emphasis on torment and agony of religious awakening is thus explained and 
justified by vitalist theory: Law and grace, destruction of heart by subjective passions and 
images are needed for a genuine psychic change of mind, conversion, and repentance. It seems 
that Laestadius really believed in strong preaching, also for scientific reasons. (Cf. §796.) 
An awakening sermon aims to evoke a person to his personal passionate state, but simultaneously 
to the condition of the world, and thus, to deconstruction and re-vitalizing the dynamic world-
relationship. During that time, it was common to think also within psychiatry that religious 
passions and care would balance the patience psycho-physiological condition. 
465 [The principle of life, the calling voice of God in conscience, the uncorrupted part of the principle 
of life]
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 “wickedness is born in the heart and spreads from there, first to subjective 
consciousness – the conscience, which is dulled by the immoral passion – 
onward to the will, which becomes wicked, and finally to reason and the 
intellect, which are thereby darkened. Rational ideas about goodness, and 
the concept of justice, are altered by the passions, […] The concept of right 
cannot be stable as long as the sense of justice can be dulled and excited 
by the different passions.” (§713)
From this physic-psychic order, Laestadius proceeded to emphasize the nature 
of awakening in psychopathological466 terms. Laestadius conceptions of religious 
experience are viewed as psychological disturbance and genuine reconciliation, 
depicted in terms of “psychic” reconciliation. My general thesis here is that the 
vitalistic theory and specific literature that Laestadius was reading influenced his 
theory and insights more than before have been noted. The central role of the 
vitalist-psychological description of subjective consciousness or unconsciousness is 
seemingly the one main reason why Laestadius emphasized “strong sermons”, high 
emotions awakened by lyrical “images” which could touch the human psyche deeply 
and thus awaken genuine experiential faith. Laestadius’ description of the experience 
of awakening emphasizes its embodied character almost without exception. That 
emblematic description is the following: 
“In the beginning of the awakening, the heart feels hard, cold, swollen, 
painful and heavy to bear. This is most often accompanied by a fear of 
death; secret shivers chill the entire organism. Occasionally there are 
sharp tremors, during a sermon when a word from the law has hit Old 
Adam where he is tender. Some complain that the heart rises up towards 
the throat. After some time one begins to feel that the heart burns with a 
real feverish glow. This period signifies the approach of the signs of grace. 
One is also able to feel hunger that cannot be satisfied with food, and a 
thirst that cannot be quenched with anything other than the water of life. 
But at this, the mighty reason gets heart burn yet again; the snake venom 
brings to sputter in the pit of the heart in all of them who have virtue or 




466 Laestadius tells us that in the Bible, the human heart is described as a “heart of stone”, which 
has to be “pounded until it is tender, with the hammer of law. … have to be broken and thus be 
prepared to receive grace and reconciliation.” (§725)
5 The Psychophysiology of Moral and Spiritual Intentionality | 237
with a normal share of sound reason can believe such madness?’ And now, 
everyone shouts in union: to hell with the enthusiast!” (§796.)467
Here Laestadius depicts the raising of spiritual and moral passions and the needs 
that cannot be satisfied. The religious experience is the precise actualization of the 
inner conflict that causes the unsatisfactory condition of both the natural and moral 
passions:
“[P]assions that can be satisfied cause no torment, but rather satisfaction 
… But when the passion cannot be satisfied – such as love – then grief, 
sorrow and discontentment spring up. Life becomes difficult, unbearable... 
if admonishment of the conscience or the wrath of God is added, then 
emerges agony of conscience, and anguish of the heart.” (§729.)
This kind of conflict is constituted when conscience – the sense of justice – is 
awakened. In this condition, the natural passions cannot be satisfied freely because 
the sense of justice (law) and the moral passion of justice (law) cannot be satisfied. 
It remains impossible for a human being to “fulfill” the law that would signify the 
demand for absolute purity down to the ground of organic functions, passions, 
drives, instincts, etc. In this respect, such an awakening indicated a particular kind 
of psychological conflict. This fundamental-existential and spiritual dead end, the 
aporia that man feels in his “psychic essence” is precisely what Laestadius indicated 
as the awakened condition of conscience. 
”The heinous passions cannot be satisfied because the law, or the moral pas-
sion, prevents them. But neither can the moral passion, the law, be satisfied 
as long as the law cannot be kept or fulfilled, because the law demands the 
absolute purity of the heart. Thus, awakening is truly a torment;” (§739.)
Laestadius’ vitalist account of awakening had a psychopathological dimension. 
In no means did it signify any negative aspect, but rather it emphasized the radical 
embodied manifestations that an awakening might include. This pathological state is 
depicted in various ways, all of which have in common the conflict of passions that 
can find no satisfaction. Within this agony and despair of conscience, emerges “a 
conflict between the passions, and this conflict is always a torment. This anguish of 
467 The description of the process does not seem to depict Laestadius’ own experience, and thus, it 
must be read as a general description which has also a persuasive tone to accept these “awakenings”. 
Because many religious awakenings happened during sermons, it can be assumed that Laestadius 
depicted exactly what he saw during his sermons. The citation also shows us how Laestadius 
justified the meaning of a shaking sermon by leaning on his vitalist insights. 
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the heart that arises through this conflict produces a real trauma on the fibers of the 
physical heart. (Only then does one feel the dreadful torments of the Devil.)” (§728)
Setting aside the idea of the Devil as a personification of natural passions, it is 
worth noting that for Laestadius, “agony”, “torment,” “despair,” “anguish”, etc., were 
not experiential only in the existential sense, but more fundamentally, they grasped, 
rousted and tightened the human organism and organs, and thus he emphasized that 
embodied condition. The awakening constituted a “real trauma” not at the cognitive 
level of mind alone, but also at the physical level and “to the fibers of the physical 
heart”.
Laestadius saw the breakdown of the heart as a necessary condition for a change 
in moral and spiritual intentionality. Even if he simultaneously could admit that 
carelessness (sorglöshet) did not indicate any pathological sign and might manifest 
itself clearly in a vital and healthy life, he still viewed awakening as necessary. Why? 
In Laestadius’ terms, the “moral” and “spiritual” are evoked by the physiological 
influence of moral passions that, through the conflicting and dissonant state in the 
heart, awaken moral thought, action, disgust at evil at the conscious level. (§211.)
Laestadius’ idea of awakening must be understood then in terms of both moral and 
spiritual significance; people and modern culture seemed to him to be un-healthy in 
their moral character, as men are primarily egoistic, ambitious, and greedy. Despite the 
fact that common life might seem rational and wellbeing, which caused moral and 
spiritual deprivation, it was amoral lunacy468 from which people have to be awakened 
to recognize their real moral character and the real condition of the world. Moral 
lunacy, the reason for the agony and delirium of the world (Crapula mundi) could 
be cured only by spiritual lunacy, by an awakened living faith of the heart that had 
no outer or objective “rational” proof or justification, only an experiential evidence of 
heart (fides subjectiva, conscience). For this need, and through evidence of a physical-
psychological order that indicates the primacy of embodied awakening, Laestadius 
demanded more fundamentally moral and spiritual teaching and education:
468 Cf. §§685, 689: “Natural virtue is primarily based on self-righteousness and ambition.” 
An awakened conscience is not able to approve any of our actions because it feels that Love is 
lacking. This is why Luther held that the best motive for action is a living faith. “Christian is 
due to the fact that he was unable to find better motive, since love, which ought to be better 
motive, is so meager and feeble after the Fall, that it is no longer a good enough motive; not 
since self-love gained the upper hand.” (§686.)à reason and moral will are not sufficient even 
if a philosopher claims so.
 “A sleeping conscience is entirely indifferent.”(§690) This view is based on the natural rivalry of 
natural passions; the awakened heart or subjective consciousness or conscience does not delimit 
their effects and cannot bring forth the active moral action inspired by moral passion or faith. The 
other condition of conscience is referred as being hardened. “Hardened is he, who acts contrary 
to his conscience, contrary to better feelings, or contrary to his inner conviction.”(§694)
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”The preeminent concern of teachers of religion should be first [to] 
awaken the dulled sense of justice, which is the law [already] written in 
the heart. Through this, man must be awakened to contrition, where he 
learns to rightly know his profound depravity; when he tastes the bitter-
ness, torments, and agony of conscience that is spiritual death. Only then 
is a longing for reconciliation awakened, and the gospel of God’s grace 
and the forgiveness of sins should be preached to such contrite, penitent, 
despairing souls. […] No foundational awakening is achieved thus; rather, 
the law should be carved with a point of steel.” (§724.)
5.4.3  The Meanings of an Awakening
From a psychological perspective, awakening signifies psycho-physiological distur-
bance and dissonance that has several consequences or meanings: individuation, 
self-awareness, morality and identity.
The meanings and dimensions of the notion of awakening469 (väckelse) in Laes-
tadius’ theory could be divided and analyzed as follows: 1) the emergence of moral 
passions, 2) conflict and the dissonant condition, 3) emergence of self-awareness, 4) 
freedom of will and morality:
1. Awakening means the stirring of moral passions within the man
The natural and moral rises in itself from the lived embodied religious experience. 
Actually, Laestadius holds that natural passions govern the human body before moral 
passions do, but the natural passions are hidden and thus not recognized. So, we 
can conclude that there is always a certain kind of reflective chiasmatic relationship 
between man and the world, but awakening radicalized the question of how the Self 
in question actually exists in the world.470 In a sense, man’s awakened condition indi-
cates the emergence of reflectivity and thus a certain form of capability for judgment.
2. In an awakened condition, the moral passions are placed against the natural 
passions and create a conflict or dissonance, both within the somatic organic 
level between passions and the sensory life’s cognitive level existing between 
the faculties of soul and their cognitive states, contents, and intentions.
469 See, §§ 369, 372, 376, 403, 724, 727, 737, 739, 817, 1076, 1077, 1045, 1477, 1478, 1512.
470 Knowing that Laestadius lived close to a powerful manifestation of awakenings, varying in their 
character, he did not see them as psychologically harmful, but most often as re-vitalizing and 
important in terms of moral and spiritual “progress” or good consequences. However, he does 
suggest that some awakened ones should be lead to the supervision of the rational spiritual leader.
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As “natural” and “moral” are opposites, conflict and dissonance will signify a dis-
turbance both in the organic and the sensory level of consciousness. This relation is 
not parallelistic, however, as often interpreted, but rather psychosomatic and based 
on the constitution of experience analyzed above. Cognitive dissonance is seen as 
fundamentally based on organic disturbance, which brings forth or affects subjec-
tive consciousness with conflicting variable impacts. Laestadius clearly indicated 
this awakened state of mind was a certain kind of confusion, agony, torment, and 
breakdown of the natural psycho-physical order and condition (dead faith) which 
pushes the human being to search for peace and harmony of the soul (psyche). This 
“search for better condition” or reconciliation fits well with the common pietistic 
ideas of awakening and the possibility of reconciliation.
3. Awakening prepares the way and signifies the emergence of an essential 
self-consciousness and self-awareness (or self-knowledge) because the 
conflict itself discloses the existence of the natural passions and their actual 
character in human life. It is particularly the conflict caused by an awaken-
ing that reveals the different passions, their characteristics, relationships 
and connections, and thus places the human being in its own situation. 
Therefore, awakening becomes also a question of individuation471.
The dissonance of passions is actually what Laestadius meant by religious awaken-
ing (väckelse) and the emergence of self-awareness. A dissonant psychosomatic state 
reveals the passional substantial personhood of a human being for himself, which 
signifies the emergence of genuine self-awareness within which that human being 
is able to recognize his own passional fundamental character that then grounds his 
whole intentionality of being-in-the-world and his relation to God.
Laestadius indicated that it is possible for a human being to recognize the varying 
passional states and impacts with a disturbance of awakening in the organic body, in 
the flesh. This is so because without conflict at the somatic plane, there are neither 
conflicting “poles” or any contents of conscious states; and thus it is not possible to 
compare and distinguish anything [both experientially and conceptually]. 
In the fundamental existential-spiritual aporia, none of the conflicting passions 
can be satisfied. Laestadius stated that “passions show up” or appear, and thus they 
become objectified, and one can then become aware of one’s own dominating inter-
ests, and subjective states that secretly lay the grounds for one’s action and thought. 
In this sense awakening also signifies the ability to become more aware of one’s own 
unconscious states. 
471 For the dimensions of individuation and spiritual uniqueness of human beings, see especially, 
Steinbock 2009, 178- 209.
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Moral perceptions within a subjective consciousness underlay also the states of 
objective awareness. In other words, dissonance in a pre-reflective organic level causes 
cognitive dissonance in the objective level of consciousness. This dissonance of pas-
sions is what Laestadius actually meant by religious awakening and the emergence 
of self-awareness. To free the reason, will, and understanding from the natural pas-
sions, a morally motivational experience must happen in the sphere of the subjective 
consciousness and in its center, also in the heart. In this respect, religious experience is 
not merely intellectual enlightenment, but rather a fundamental change in the organic 
passions that direct reason, the will, and understanding. For this reason, Laestadius 
sensed that awakening, which primarily means a birth of moral passions, produces 
a conflict between the natural passions.
This conflict in the organic passion-level also reveals a self-awareness; man will see 
himself as passional and most often dominated by natural passions – namely, sins (the 
pre-condition of regret/repentance, awakening, and the possibility of reconciliation). 
The human being will see himself, not as autonomous and independent and, being 
led by pure reason and moral will but as an organic human being who as a whole is 
under the authority and powers of the passions (inclinations, instinct, drives) under 
the control of Good and Evil and the world (indeed, the higher powers of immoral 
and Heavenly passions).
To a certain extent, Laestadius’ depiction of awakening as an existential aporetic472 
condition indicated the similar individuating phenomena of anxiety emphasized 
in the existential-phenomenological philosophies (Kierkegaard, Heidegger etc.). 
In general, individuation is defined as a “dissociation or delimitation – internal or 
external – that makes this thing this particular thing, individual thing; what makes 
this organic being this singular being; what makes this person this unique person.”473
It seems obvious that both the existentialistic and Laestadius’ vitalist accounts of 
awakening – indicate the same multifaceted phenomenon, which is based on the specific 
472 Again, Laestadius emphasized the organicist stance: “A sense of justice cannot suppress or 
annihilate sensual desires because they are based on different organs.” (§736)
473 Steinbock 2009, 178 (Phenomenology and Mysticism. The Verticality of Religious Experience. 
Indiana University Press). See, about “thisness” as a simultaneity of individual and particular 
constituting concrete actuality. p.183. “Organic beings are not merely ‘objects’ for human beings 
who make external differentiations; they also have a being in and for themselves; they are 
self-differentiating, self-limiting in both spatial and temporal respects. This level of being, to 
follow Husserl’s and Scheler’s analyses, coincides with what is called, in general, the ‘vital’ level 
of existence or ‘psychic life’. The vital or the psycho-physical sphere spans plants, animals, and 
human beings, and as such they partake in their own way in the vital impetus (Lebensdrang). 
Scheler identifies four forms of psycho-physical life that I find particularly helpful as a way 
of organizing my exposition of singularity: vital feeling or drive, instinct, habit, and practical 
intelligence.” (Steinbock 2009, 183–4) Here Steinbock refers to the work of Edmund Husserl in 
Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Zweite Buch, ed. 
Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952); and Scheler’s, “Stellung,” p. 12.
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individuating and intensifying experience and in Laestadius’ case, the conflict between 
passions. Existentialistic accounts may emphasize the individuation of existence in a 
more general sense, while Laestadius’ view emphasized both spiritual and moral indi-
viduation. For existentialists, the question is about personal existence as such on a more 
neutral ontological level, while Laestadius’ analysis of awakening was elaborated within 
the religious context; however, they both still share a common constitutive significance. 
The major difference between existentialistic and Laestadius’ vitalistic notion is in 
the explanation. For instance, to refer to the most influential conceptions of individu-
ating angst, Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian’s angst is understood as existentially 
“subjectivating” or as Heidegger held that an angst individuate the Dasein, mean-
ing that the question of the meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein) is addressed toward 
oneself personally; man is put into the question as such.474 Overall, this existential 
individuation is seen as a positive occasion, for it brings man before its own-most 
existence and life, and thus forms the groundwork for subjective faith or the possi-
bility of responsibility and authentic being itself in the general sense. In Laestadius’ 
account, awakening is also seen as individuating, and a positive, even necessary, event 
that lays the ground for an embodied self-awareness, the possibility of morality, and 
an initial condition for reconciliation. 
4. Awakening also prepares the way for the active freedom of the will, insofar 
as the human being becomes conscious of the passion-life that is directing 
his action and mind. In this regard, moral passion forms a resisting force 
against the natural passions and their manifestations in both action and 
thought. Laestadius called this effect of moral passions the disgust of bad and 
evil (avsky för det onda) and stated that particularly the disgust signified the 
active freedom of the will; this resisting force of the active freedom of will 
is contrasted with the natural virtue which lacks the “disgust of bad”, which 
Laestadius saw as an initial condition for proper morality. (Cf. §376.) The 
disgust signifies the set/forming of a relative distance to the active natural 
passions in one’s own flesh, and on the other hand, an aloofness/distancing 
from the “world” that Laestadius often used as a synonym for the natural 
passions475. In this sense, the awakening can be interpreted as an emergence 
474 See, Heidegger (1992) on individuating angst (§40) and guilt (§58), about “mineness” (§9), and 
on the definitions of everydayness (§27), and on the falleness into the world (§38).
475 Especially in this respect, the way of using passions and a world synonymous to each other reveals 
the insight on the holistic idea of man within which the organic-passionate life of man is inextricably 
attached to the surrounding world through the senses. The extent of the phenomenon of passions 
actually depicts the intentional interrelatedness of man and the world, as we have seen here in the 
chapter on passions. As far as the activity of passions cannot be detached from the sensory world, 
neither can man be detached from the environment and factual reality within which he is living.
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of reflectivity. Laestadius generally held that distance or “detachment” from 
the present world was a sign of the awakening of a moral and spiritual life. 
This vital-existential distancing in its relation to the present world manifests 
itself also as agony, sorrow of the heart, and anxiety476. 
Given that awakening signifies the emergence of self-awareness, even if being in a 
psychologically un-comfortable condition, the disclosed self-awareness has positive 
significance in two senses: First, it constitutes the possibility and basis both for an 
embodied self-awareness and cognitive self-recognition; secondly, as a psychological 
“break down” of subjective totality constituted of natural passions, awakening enables 
a change both in embodied cognition and action. This change in embodied inten-
tionality signifies the possibility of change in habits and thus a change in identity.
What is philosophically interesting here is that Laestadius’ analysis of awakening 
revealed most clearly how he regarded “moral” as indicating the inner psychic, and a 
distancing reflective attitude toward the world; thus “moral” for him came to signify 
a certain kind of “psychological” relation with the world.
A breakdown is a break in the natural order, and thus, it constitutes a dissociation 
with the world. In other words, it discloses the question of “who am I” in more fun-
damental depth. Am I myself, genuine, or driven by the present world and worldly 
intentions, the natural passions? In the theological context, this is a classical question 
about rebirth, about the “old” and the “new” person. Dahlbäck researched the divide 
between an old and new human being in Laestadius’ thought, arguing that the Her-
rnhutian (Moravian) doctrines provided the background for Laestadius’ insight on 
heavenly passion: It is blood from God’s (heavenly parent’s) heart and the passions 
brought by that “imputation”, that take the place of those lower passions dominated 
by evil, and change the life of man from old to new477. 
We can also conceive the shift in another way as seen above, Laestadius did not 
posit a sharp divide between “inner” and “outer” – instead there were only different 
passions that could lead the human person as a whole. It seems that Laestadius did 
not constitute any dualism in identity. The question of “who am I” was rather related 
to the question of what kind of passions lead the human person. From a theological 
perspective, it becomes whether good or evil passions actually lead human persons. 
However, Laestadius also state that human beings can act morally without being 
Christian. On the general level, this entails the question of authenticity: Is the Self 
authentically oneself or led by worldly natural passions, currents, and inclinations? 
How can a human being maintain his/hers individual selfhood within a passional 
476 Cf. §739; Laestadius 2006, 138–139. (Huutavan ääni/ The Voice of One Crying [Laestadius 
1988])
477 Dahlbäck 1950, 288.
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world? Here Laestadius pointed to one’s conscience as the ultimate authority. Evi-
dence of heart, fides subjectiva, is experientially given in the believer’s psychic life. 
The mockery against the Holy Spirit is that of not following the call of conscience 
(§1412; that mockery is possible only when the effects of holy spirits are experienced). 
Dogmatic and theological principles are secondary in this respect, and it seems that 
Laestadius did have a strong trust in the power of conscience to lead human beings 
on the right path and a relationship with God.
Recognition of dissonance means also the possibility of self-reflection, and thus, 
a relative emancipation of leading natural passions, such as egoism, ambition, and 
greed, and their sinful manifestations. The awakened condition with proper self-
awareness means an embodied “disgust of bad” and evil. Therefore, an awakening 
signifies there is a formation of existential distance toward natural immoral passions 
and “worldliness” of the world. However, it does not mean that religious existence 
would be alienated from its relation to the world and other human beings, but rather 
a finding of a new morally passional basis for a more morally inspired agency and 
sociality in the world.
The self-knowledge or self-awareness disclosed within the conflict of passions 
and awakening is a certain kind of Christian theological-discursive identity theory. 
However, it also includes genuine phenomenological points of references to “lived 
experience,” particularly through the idea that the self-consciousness, the Self/ego, 
is conceived as a recognition of the own-most emotional life, and conflicting states 
that are present within it. A phenomenologist, however, would refer to an ambiguous 
world-relation on a neutral and ontological level.
5.4.4  The Basis of Self-awareness
We have earlier pointed out that Laestadius’ theory of consciousness was constructed 
as a constitutive theory based on the limited panspychistic interpretation of the prin-
ciple of life and organic life. Thus, consciousness is seen as a panpsychistic or vital 
emergent phenomenon. On this basis, his view of the possibility of self-awareness is 
partially examined, as it is based on the conflict of passions. Here, I focus once more 
on the basis and emergence of self-awareness, as it seems both are the central and 
interesting phenomena present within Laestadius’ explication. 
Laestadius’ core idea was that varying passions or organic states lay the ground 
for varying states of mind, which then enable “the comparison” and thus clear up 
“the concept”:
“Through the conflict of the passions, man acquires an improved awareness 
of his hidden passions; the concept is clarified through the comparison 
of two objects. Note: Hidden passions are those that a man believes him-
self to be free of, the presence of which he becomes convinced of only 
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when another passion is awakened. This is the foundation of the proper 
awareness of sin, because awakening brings forth a moral passion that 
is in conflict with man’s natural passions. I had not known that lust is sin, 
except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet [Romans 7:7].” (§281. See also 
§§726, 727)478
Laestadius did not elaborate on the “comparison theory479” further, but he did 
analyze the awakening as moral passion480 very broadly and seemed to recognize 
how self-awareness is fundamentally connected to the conflicting and varying flows 
of passions. He must have been aware of the vitalist way of explaining consciousness 
as continuous influence of organic life to sensory life, as the whole vitalist philosophy 
was expressing the infinitely variable character of the vital functions in man481.
We can also ask whether the emergence of self-awareness or self-consciousness 
necessarily requires a conflict of passions. In regard to this question, Laestadius 
leaned on the Biblical idea of natural law that awakens the sin (Paul). Laestadius 
referred to Paul’s idea of the awakening influence of law – and because of the given 
law and its influence on the heart, neither moral passions nor natural passions can 
be satisfied – a circumstance that awakens all the passions and drives man to search 
for reconciliation(peace of soul). A certain degree of conflict then seems to be a pre-
requisite for self-awareness.
Also from a phenomenological point of view, it seems that if the organic passional 
physical functions support and excite each other in the same intentional directedness 
and no breakdown or conflict emerges, then the whole intentional state of mind stays 
478 Laestadius seemed to hold that a certain kind of reflectivity is awakened in the conflict of passions. 
This opposition of passions enables a reflective comparison – in a sense a reflective objectification 
of specific passional states and their undelaying interests. This vital-existential comparison clears 
up coincidentally the “concept” or the nature of passions and builds one’s relation to itself which 
is referred as self-awareness. This self-awareness pertains to one’s passional and sinful nature, but 
it also offers a certain kind of capability for moral judgment. (See §726.) ”This is what the words 
of the apostle refer to: by the law is the knowledge of sin and the law has wrought all manner 
of conscupiscence (Romans 3:20, 7:8.). That is to say, when the sense of justice is revived by the 
spirit of the law, and is intensified to become a moral passion that conflicts with the immoral 
passions; only then does man acquire a clearer awareness (medvetande) of his moral depravity. It 
is logical truth that concepts become clearer by the comparison of two objects. … [in the] dead 
faith, man did not know the extent of his quilt; … He was in virtual state of innocence and did 
not know to rightly differentiate between good and evil.” (§727)
479 Here Laestadius’ comparison refers both to passions and ideas. There can be seen a connection 
or similarity to Locke’s thought, as he stated that truth reveals itself in the mind through a 
comparison of the ideas.
480 Awakening as moral passion, or the law as a moral element causes tornment and conflict upon 
a human encountering the heinous “natural” passions: §§374, 376, 403, 404, 696, 697–887.
481 See §705 where Laestadius stated that the term “moral passion” was present in French discussions. 
Cf. Williams 2002, 90–96; Haigh 1984.
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united, and thus no “comparison” is enabled. Therefore, the harmonious un-conflicting 
embodied condition cannot be called self-awareness or self-knowledge: The organic 
and sensory conditions cannot recognize themselves because of the lack of elements 
that can be compared. This condition signifies a certain kind of vital “flow”. In other 
words, without conflict or any breakdown of the prevailing passions, there is no 
conscious objectification or “reflectivity” toward one’s own passions. In any event, it 
is justifiable to call the harmonious state “consciousness”, as it still receives action 
and still acts toward the world, perceives, and so on. 
What we have here then is a phenomenologically interesting viewpoint. Broadly, 
self-awareness is constituted into the varying, multilayered and ambiguous moods of 
the psychic embodied experience itself. In other words, the “conscious experience” is 
conceived as a natural state of the interaction of organic and sensory lives, and self-
consciousness and self-awareness are disclosed for the Self in a stream of varying 
psychosomatic conditions that enable a direct comparison of changing conditions in 
a lived temporal existence (in different degrees). The continuous and varying streams 
of sensory, sensuous and conflicting influences affect the brains and cause movement 
and varying states of mind. This temporal process can thus be understood as a function-
ing of consciousness itself, at least at the basic level. Thus, there is no gap between the 
body and mind, as the brains are conceived as a receptive organ of consciousness and 
sensory capability, and its functioning is made up of feelings, sensations, and moods, 
etc., that unite in the consciousness of subjective and objective states. 
We can now see that Laestadius conceived the body/mind dichotomy in an al-
ternative holistic way. Phenomenally the gap between body and soul manifests itself 
from inside the embodied experience, for example, in the moral dilemma or religious 
awakening that he describes. Accordingly, body and mind cannot be conceived as 
opposites because they co-exist, as the body (immanence) is actually the foundation 
of the mind (transcendence). It is rather the opposition of the organic body (mat-
ter) and spirit (the highest actualization of the principle of life) that can be seen at 
work in man’s earthly corporeal life. In other words, the conflict is never between 
emotion and reason, body and mind, but instead between the organic body and the 
pneuma or “vital/spiritual man”; that is to say that from the vitalist perspective, the 
consciousness, self-awareness, moral conflict (awakening), and the spiritual nature 
of man are coincidentally all natural phenomena482.
“The conflict can arise between the two lives since one and the same prin-
ciple is active in both, even though it appears as if a battle is taking place 
482 Laestadius argued for a holistic notion of man. With regard to the question of responsibility and 
reconciliation, Laestadius highlighted the fact that the Self (jag) encompasses both the spiritual 
redeemed man and the natural man, and called the reconciled man a “redeemed devil” (§1378).
5 The Psychophysiology of Moral and Spiritual Intentionality | 247
between the mind [nervliv, sensory life] and heart [organic life]; this is an 
illusion. That which is discerned as a moral conflict within a person is in 
fact a struggle between passions. That which could truly be called a strug-
gle between body and soul is a struggle between life and death; between 
the physical forces and the metaphysical force that is life. All other con-
flicts that we may discern within us are conflicts between passions. Such 
conflict becomes clearly discernible when some new passion is awakened, 
such as the struggle between love and selfishness or between love and hate 
(jealousy).” (§223.)
In a sense, the organic-sensory body or “spiritual organism” is naturally capable of 
being “called” or “turned” toward a harmonious-reconciled condition of body-soul by 
the force of the principle of life (original soul). To a certain extent, this relative distinc-
tion refers to the same phenomena that medical vitalists referred to as the dualism 
of the physical/moral483. Laestadius appeared to be very clear and convinced of his 
view, and this opinion also reveals that his way of thinking was not mere empirically 
attached to a physiological organization but extended to a holistic phenomenologi-
cal analysis as well. Respecting Laestadius’ own endeavors to distance his theory 
from metaphysical rationalism, the transcendental philosophy [of Kant], and being 
well aware that Laestadius’ theory cannot be seen as fully phenomenological for its 
empiric-physiological emphases, I propose viewing his psychophysiological theory 
as a form of physiological transcendentalism.484
5.4.5  The Emergence of Spirituality
As Laestadius’ attached his theorizing to vitalist insights, it follows logically that 
the spiritual character of man could also be interpreted to have different levels of 
spirituality, depending on the stage of actualization. Before proceeding here to a 
more detailed analysis of spirituality in Laestadius’ thought, I want to briefly show 
how Bichat’s vitalist psychology lay the ground for Laestadius’ elaborations on the 
actualization of spirituality in human life.
483 See Williams 2002; Azouvi 2006.
484 The label given also to the vitalist thinkers, such as Fouquet. Dualism is not between the mind and 
body but includes the moral and natural body, thus it is between matter and spirit. Moral signifies 
the psychic-physiological sphere, but a specific distanced inner psychic mode of existence. Azouvi 
pointed out that for medical vitalists, the term “moral” was needed to indicate something differing 
or distancing from the bare physical; it was dealt with on the same plane as the physiological, 
but it indicated some kind of counterforce or “reflective distance to the mere physiological; the 
“moral” was also interpreted as “inner man” and “psychic”, and soon after a psychological quality 
of physiological human being. Thus “the moral” is now sometimes interpreted as an ancestor of 
the “psychic” and the “psychological”. (See, Rey 2006; Azouvi 2006; Williams 2002).
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We can see from Bichat the idea that not only the pre-eminence of a human being 
in relation to its surrounding is based on highly developed animal life, but also that 
spiritual life is reached by animal life. We recall that Laestadius adopted the notion 
of animal life from Bichat into his notion of sensory life (nervliv). Bichat suggested 
that society and social structures are also the consequences of the actualization of 
the functions of animal life.
“It is by means of the animal life that man is so great so superior to the 
beings, which surround him; by means of this that he possesses the sciences, 
the arts, and every thing which places him at a distance from the gross ele-
ments under which we represent brute matter; by this that he approaches 
spirituality; for industry and commerce, and whatever enlarges the narrow 
circle within which the efforts of other animals are confined, are exclusively 
under the dominion of the animal life of man.” (Bichat 1815, 61)
Further still, society is seen as continuum of the “exercise of the different functions 
of this [animal] life.” (Bichat 1815, 61–62)
Bichat thought that the functions of organic life enter and influence animal life 
and its functions. We thus find an interesting distinction between the pre-cognitive 
language of organic life and the ordinary language of animal life. However, here Bichat 
also holds that organic life and its functions, especially agitated by the passions485, lay 
the fundamental source for a common language. Here, Bichat seems to explain the 
relationship between pre-reflective consciousness and the reflective consciousness of 
animal life, holding that the more fundamental pre-lingual basis of organic life and 
the passions actually make the common shared language richer and more vivid. The 
language of organic life is also seen as the language of poetry, while the language of 
animal life is seen as a shared ordinary language. From this perspective, Bichat places 
religious preaching or declamation interestingly in between organic and animal life, holding 
that religious preaching can stimulate passions among the interlocutors.
485 “My present object is not to consider the passions metaphysically. It little matters, whether they 
be all of them the modifications of a single passion, or dependent each of them upon a separate 
principle. We shall only remark that many physicians in discussing their influence on the organic 
phenomena, have not sufficiently distinguished them from the sensations; the latter are the 
occasion of the passions, but differ from them widely. It is true that anger, joy, and sorrow, would 
not affect us, were we not to find their causes in our connections with external objects. It is true 
also, that the senses are the agents of these relations, that they communicate the causes of the 
passions, but in this they act as simple conductors only, and have nothing in common with the 
affections, which they produce; for sensation of every kind has its center in the brain, sensation 
of every kind supposing impression and perception. If the action of the brain be suspended, 
sensation ceases, on the contrary the brain is never affected by the passions; their seat is in the 
organs of the internal life.” (Bichat 1815, 62–63.)
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”We have always said a strong head, a head well organized to denote per-
fection of mind; a good heart, a sensible heart to indicate prober feeling. 
The expressions of fury circulating in the veins, and stirring up the bile; of 
joy making the heart leap, of jealousy distilling its passions into the heart, 
are by no means poetical expressions, but the enunciation of that which 
actually takes place in nature. In this way do all the expressions, the language 
of the internal functions enter into the poetry, which in consequence is the 
language of the passions or the organic life, as ordinary speech, is that of the 
understanding or the animal life. Declamation holds a middle place between 
the two, and animates the cold tong of the brain by the expressive language of 
the inward organs.” (Bichat 1815, 67. emphasis added) 
As Laestadius did lean on Bichat’s theory, it is obvious that these insights con-
firmed his conviction regarding the significance of the embodied awakening and also 
the significance of strong religious declamation or poetic preaching for moral and 
spiritual progress among the people. Laestadius was well aware of the influence of 
his strong preaching. He highlighted that the Christian faith consisted of high noble 
emotions, passions, and images. Preaching should precisely target the pre-cognitive 
level because that level is the foundation and source, not only of vivid language but 
also the proper foundation for living spirituality.
“It is undoubtedly surprising that the passions, essentially as they enter into 
our relations with the beings which are placed about us, that modifying 
as they do at every moment these relations, that animating, enlarging, and 
exalting the phenomena of the animal life, which without them would be 
nothing but a cold series of intellectual movements; it is astonishing, I say, 
that the passions should neither have their end, nor beginning in the organs 
of this life, but on the contrary, that the parts which serve for the internal 
functions, should be constantly affected by them, and even occasion them 
according to the state in which they are found. Such notwithstanding is 
the result of the strictest observation.” (Bichat 1815, 63.)
Altogether, it can be summed up here that Laestadius’ way of spirituality fol-
lowed the vitalist argumentation and differentiated the different stages of degrees 
of spirituality in human beings. First of all, Laestadius’ thought followed the vitalist 
theory of constitution in a way that the vital principle as original soul signified the 
natural spiritual or living nature of a human being; awakening (väckelse) as conflict 
between passions signifies the pre-stage of reconciliation and signifying the first step 
in the prober actualization of human spirituality; psychic reconciliation as an initial 
condition for a redeemed state was the perennial actualization of spirituality. Thus, 
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spirituality was a multifaceted and constitutive phenomenon in Laestadius’ theoreti-
cal thought, and I will analyze that aspect in greater detail in the next chapter here.
5.5  Reconciliation, Faith, and God
5.5.1  “The Order of Grace” in a Nutshell: From Psychophysiology  
to Ontotheology
Laestadius’ anthropology, psychology, and theology culminated in his notions of rec-
onciliation and living faith, conceived as the ultimate moral passion. In the beginning 
Laestadius highlighted the view that reconciliation is a truth that cannot be proven 
by intellect. As “a truth”, reconciliation is a genuine experiential phenomenon and 
a metaphysical necessity486. Reconciliation and faith do not pertain to intellect or 
reason in the first place, but instead to the heart and conscience; thus, Laestadius does 
not conceive of them as metaphysical rationalistic and transcendental conceptions, 
but rather stresses how they have embodied life, conscience, and heart as their core. 
As I have shown here, the notions of soul, mind, Self, and the holistic notion of the 
human person are all re-defined in vitalist terms as embodied phenomena within 
which the significance of a subjective consciousness is highlighted as the core of one’s 
own most or authentic selfhood, personhood, and faith. In this respect, the vitalist-
pietistic elaboration of the notion of faith constitutes an alternative epistemological 
and vitalist-ontological relatedness or intentionality toward being, the world, others, 
existence, and even God. 
The idea of the necessity of reconciliation is based on the psychic and moral 
necessity, which when taken together depict the awakened condition as an ultimate 
impossibility to achieve the proper morality and a redeemed condition by the power 
of the human Self ( Jag/ego) alone. The basic idea is that the dominating passions try 
to find ways to be satisfied in human life. However, if the sense of justice is “height-
ened” through awakening in the heart and conscience (subjective consciousness), 
then the natural passions cannot be satisfied anymore without causing an agony of 
conscience. The psychological demand for purity, when combined with a natural 
moral deficiency, means that the moral passion of justice cannot be satisfied, for it is 
impossible for a human being to remain pure in the depths of organic passional life. 
486 ”We now come to a truth that cannot be proven. But how much is possible to prove in spiritual 
matters? We are able to feel love, grief, joy, hatred, and other passions, but none of these can be 
proven. Only the expressions of these passions are visible, and therefore, even the misogynist 
must believe that there is such a thing as love, even though he considers this passion to be 
madness. Similarly, he who feels the effects of grace must be considered to be an ‘enthusiast,’ 
since it is not something reason is able to comprehend. It is the secret of the heart that is entirely 
incomprehensible, it cannot be grasped by the intellect.” (§1350.)
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The idea here is that man cannot resist the existence of immoral natural passions and 
their influences on his existence in the world. Rather, they unconsciously slip into 
both his thoughts and actions. This impossibility of a human to satisfy and combine 
the natural and moral passions simultaneously emerges as an absolute conflict or dead 
end, which Laestadius depicted by using psychopathological terms, such as trauma, 
agony, anguish, despair, and torment. 
In general, awakening, as a conflict between the natural and moral passions, signifies 
a psychopathological dissonant state – physical and psychological (moral/spiritual) at 
the same time. This conflict is basically the rivalry between natural egoism, ambition, 
and greed and opposite moral passions, such as those demanding a sense of justice, 
humility, and faith487. Laestadius stated that within the tormented dissonant state of 
conscience emerged a call that is given within one’s embodied experience but which 
coincidentally transcends “subjectivity”, as “the message” comes from beyond the 
physical, thus signifying a call from God. 
According to Laestadius the natural experience is in and of itself transcendental 
in various ways, for example, sensory perception is always supersensory perception, 
etc. Here it can also be noted that the “call” itself comes coincidentally from the 
animated flesh and from beyond the flesh, calling the Self “somewhere else.” Thus 
the experience of the call has a temporal structure, as it possesses the contrition of 
past deeds or prevailing natural passions already active in one’s embodied existence, 
and also a “future mode” as the call is a driving force for the human to “be moved 
into the better condition.” If we interpret this call as the call of an uncorrupted 
original soul (a principle of life) as the foundation (upphov) of the human person, 
and also the Creator that remains relatively independent and autonomous from the 
one created, then the call is twofold. It is calling back to itself, but now also to the 
original vital or spiritual Self, that exists not only “for-itself ” but in relation to God 
487 “On the other hand, one must seek for the motivation behind the actions of the spiritual person 
in one of the seven spirits that John beheld in revelation (Revelation 10), or the seven passions, 
which are the opposites of the seven devils. For instance, the opposite of egoism is selflessness; 
the opposite of ambition is to forsake worldly honor; the opposite of selfishness is altruism – that 
is, to further the temporal and eternal well-being of one’s neighbor; the opposite of envy is to 
not begrudge others good things; the opposite of wrath is burning love; the opposite of hatred is 
brotherly love; the opposite of the sexual drive is chastity. It is in these inclinations that one ought 
to seek the principle of determination, the motive, for the action of spiritual man. However, since 
only a few of these qualities can be intensified to the point where they become passions, the God-
given means of grace must suffice; that is, the primary elements of Christianity: awakening – the 
intensification of sense of justice – along with contrition, faith and love, insofar as it is capable of 
being kindled.” (§468.)
 Finally, only faith is the basis of the determination of good deeds (Cf. faith as awakened 
intentionality). According to Laestadius, Luther and those awakened after him saw the faith as 
the highest motivational ground for deeds and actions; they taught that faith must be the source 
and foundation of all good deeds. (§469. See also §473)
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[and others]. This process entails the modification of identity as one reaches the new 
basis of one’s own existence, and thus a renewed spiritual intentionality. For me it 
seems that Laestadius proposes that the Heart, as the organ of principle of life, must 
exist in relation to God. 
Here the aporetic psycho-physical impossibility of fulfilling the conflicting demand 
of flesh drives man to the edge of decision, when human is absolutely constituted 
by natural passions, and their sinful actualizations, and is coincidentally given a 
sense of justice and call that offers grace. It is then that man is under the situation 
of either receiving the grace to be freed of guiltiness of sins or reject the grace and 
lean on his own powers of egoism, etc. and proceed to fulfill the moral imperative 
by his own power (self-justification and self-righteousness). In a sense, this is the 
difference between self-justification by ego and outer justification by the grace of 
God. Laestadius’ idea of rebirth does not indicate there is an absolute transformation 
of the Self or identity, but it does hold that the reborn person encompasses both the 
“old and new self.” To accept and receive this grace signifies that a human being will 
be simultaneously sinner, and an innocent human. This condition within which the 
human being has to maintain its fundamental passional and sinful character gives 
Laestadius reason to call this reconciled human being a “redeemed devil” (§1378).
In terms of the question of reconciliation, Laestadius’ main intention was to argue 
that mere outer juridical reconciliation is not satisfactory for the proper actualization 
of full reconciliation. The point here is that juridical reconciliation (forensic) does not 
reach the depths of the psychological initial conditions of reconciliation, and thus 
does not constitute subjective evidence, inward moral motivation, and a living faith. 
Laestadius offered the “family psychological” allegory of the mother/child relation-
ship to depict the psychological character of reconciliation between man and God. 
He saw that genuine reconciliation demands mutual suffering of mother and child 
for their reconciliation to be authentic (psychic reconciliation). This concept pertains 
in its analogy to the psychic reconciliation between man and God: From God’s side, 
the conflicting situation is that a sense of justice – righteousness of God by defini-
tion – demands punishment for the criminal and simultaneously unconditional love 
for his child (Loving God by definition). From the man’s side, the reconciliation 
demands contrition and faith (trust, kr. pistis). Man cannot receive a feeling of be-
ing innocent (redeemed) by reason (for it is contradictory to accept that man can 
be simultaneously innocent and guilty) and man can only accept the grace of God 
via a true faith of the heart. Neither can the tormented heart of God be reconciled 
without the genuine contrition of man. An unreconciled condition thus signifies the 
common suffering of God and mankind.
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5.5.2  Reconciliation: The Kinship of the Triad of Man and the Trinity of God
I analyzed the notion of the human person above and have shown how Laestadius 
conceives man as being constituted of a triad of the principle of life that signifies 
the original vital soul, organic life, and sensory life, which together conceptualize the 
intertwined[ness] of the body and mind. These parts are inextricably related to each 
other, so that the principle of life lays the constitutive vital foundation that gener-
ates organic life. Henceforth, through ongoing growth and development, creates the 
specific organs of sensory life (brains and nerves) functions as the psychophysiological 
basis for human consciousness and the mind. Thus, Laestadius viewed human beings 
as having parts that interrelate with each other to form a triadic unity.
 Based on developmental order, and constitutional hierarchy, the principle of life 
signifies that the initial vital character of organic life, and organic life is the founda-
tion for sensory life and its functions. This constitutive order forms the notion of the 
vital person, a holistic notion of sensible man, who exists within various and variable 
relations (Cf. rapports) that surround nature and the world, other human beings, 
God, and existence as such. Through the sensible capability of the original soul (vital 
principle), sensitive susceptibility, and the capability of the body, and through the 
sensory, cognitive, and emotional capacities which are also conceived as having a 
special higher order and the sensitive capabilities of intentional mind, human beings 
exist in the world as both a corporeal and a spiritual organism. 
Behind this re-definition of human person still remains a harsh critique of the 
metaphysical notions of substance (substantia) and essence (essentia) which – when 
applied to the question of the nature of the soul and a human being – claim to lead 
to conceiving of the human soul, mind, Self, and nature of reason in dualistic terms 
as abstract, autonomous and distinct entities (substances). According to Laestadius, 
metaphysics and rationalism lead anthropology and theology to a situation in which 
they abstract both man from living and dynamic relatedness to a physiological body, 
factual world, nature, existence and God. Moreover, Laestadius seemed to indicate 
that within this metaphysical rationalism, God was reduced to an absolute meta-
physical sphere clearly detached from the events of life. According to Laestadius, this 
sphere was mainly so because the intellectualistic emphasis determined the essence 
of man and God wrongly, and thus missed the proper comprehension of the human 
relatedness to existence and God.
The holistic notion of a human person is elaborated in regard to the question 
concerning the notion of God. Laestadius was convinced that the correct under-
standing of a human being was a prerequisite for reaching the proper notion on the 
personhood of God. From the perspective of the triad of man, Laestadius also approached 
the question concerning the Trinity of God. Laestadius realized that the problem of this 
trinity could not be bypassed when dealing with the doctrine of reconciliation, and 
he emphasized the holistic view so that reconciliation would pertain to all the per-
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sons of God as well as the whole of triadic man (§§1404, 1405, 1410). He claimed 
that the particular persons of God – the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit – are 
related to each other in a similar way, as are the three life forms of human beings (Cf. 
§1414, 1422).
The relationship between the triadic constituents of man – the principle of life, 
organic life and sensory life – is usually described as parallelism. As I point out 
in several contexts, parallelistic interpretation does not coincide with Laestadius’ 
elaborations, especially regarding the mind/body problem. This is also the case for 
the question concerning the relationship between a triadic human being and God. 
Parallelistic interpretation is categorical, replicates the dualism and does not meet 
Laestadius’ pre-phenomenological vitalistic elaborations. Laestadius did not mean 
that triads of man and God related to each other in a parallelistic way, but rather he 
stated that “the three life forms within man are psychically related to each other in a 
same way that the three persons within Godhead are related to each other.” (§1422. 
Also §1422488) It could then be actually stated that the “parallelism” -interpretation 
justified and replicated dualism.
In this manner, Laestadius dealt with the problem of the trinity from an anthro-
pological perspective and argued for the analogy for the unity of a personhood of 
God. How then should the problem of trinity, the question of the united person of 
God, be viewed? Laestadius does not state that the body and mind or soul in man 
would simply be parallel. Neither did he hold that man and God or matter and spirit 
would simply be parallel, as is often claimed. Instead he seemed to be after a more 
fundamental re-definition of man and God, so that the constitution of human spir-
ituality and the possibility [of reconciliation] became holistically and experientially 
understandable. In this respect, Laestadius elaborated on the original idea of the 
correlative relationship of the parts of man and the persons of God, and coinciden-
tally related these stages to his psychological insight concerning the progress and 
development of the spiritual life:
”[…489]The principle of life within the egg is abstract life, corresponding 
to the first person; organic life within the egg that has been kept warm is 
the creating, generating, and productive life, corresponding to the second 
person; sensory life is the highest form of life, conjoined with feeling and 
consciousness, corresponding to the third person. Here there are not three 
different moral characters; there are three degrees of life, which corresponds, 
488 The natural historian conception of “vital design”; not an abstract idea of ultimate Being, but 
relatively manifested in nature as a creative force, and in the human experience as a vital “psychic 
essence.”
489 “It is roughly the nature of sin against the Holy Spirit.” (§1414)
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not only to the Trinity, but also to the different degrees of spiritual life 
within man; namely, first, the natural state with the spiritual principle of 
life within conscience; second, the awakened state with the beginning of 
spiritual life; and third, the redeemed state with a fully developed spiritual 
life. […490]” (§1414.) 
In the same context, Laestadius lets us understand that sin signified originally a 
certain kind of opposition against the principle of life, through which he then elabo-
rated on his insight of the “sin against God” and the reconciliation that must pertain 
to the whole trinity491. What is crucial to point out here is that Laestadius expanded 
the notion of the person of God in a similar way as he expanded the notion of the 
human person: From the vitalist perspective, organic life was itself animated, living 
based on its founding character, and the faculties and capabilities of mind (sensory 
life) were direct constitutional continuum of a growing, developing and functioning 
organic life. Analogical to this line of thought, Laestadius claimed that the hypostases 
(“life forms”) of the personhood of God were similarly related to each other, thus 
constituting the unity of the person of God and the necessary parts of the whole [vital] 
essence of God. For Laestadius the idea that anthropology must precede theology 
signified that he determined the relations between the principle of life, organic life 
and sensory life in man as an anthropological perspective to elaborate on the theory 
of the relations of the Father the God, the Son and the Holy Spirit.492
By this means, Laestadius appeared to oppose the metaphysical-theological specula-
tion concerning the trinity by claiming that the metaphysics of substance and essence 
confused and missed the true idea of the trinity: Rationalistic metaphysics applied in 
philosophical theology conceives of the persons of God as distinct entities or essences, 
and thus ends up with an unsolvable problem concerning the unity of these persons 
of God493. As already mentioned, the creation receives peculiar interpretations within 
metaphysics. From the perspective of rationalistic anthropology and the dualistic no-
tion of man, the vital personhood of God cannot be reached and the whole notion of 
God is unavoidably metaphysicalized and even mystified in the sense that it cannot 
ever become comprehensible (and effective) within the lived experience. 
490 “He who acts contrary to his own conscience prior to the awakening commits the first [degree]’s 
of sin against the Holy Spirit.” (§1414)
491 See e.g. §§1413 and §1414 where Laestadius tells how sin against Holy Spirit can be holistically 
understood through an example taken from nature. Here Laestadius seems to think that the 
highest moral or spiritual “intuition” is based on sympathetic emotions.
492 For comparison see a brief analysis of Leibniz’ rationalistic elaborations on the problem of 
Trinity in Antognazza 2010, 141–154 (Leibniz’s Metaphysics of the Trinity. Annales Academiae 
Scientarum Fennicae & Finnish Academy of Science and Letters).
493 According to Laestadius, the same problems pertained to the interpretation of the Eucharist and 
the two natures of Christ.
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Laestadius’ opposition to the metaphysical notion of God as a first Idea and mere 
intellectual essence (essentia) or absolute intelligence was exposed when he elabo-
rated on an alternative view concerning the classical claim that being and thinking 
are one within God. Laestadius did not accept this idea unconditionally. According to 
Laestadius, being and thinking are one within God, but only insofar as God’s creative 
action in eternity is an act of His will. However, thinking and being are not simply 
one within God when creation pertains to the birth/creation of the Son; the Son 
is the second “life form” or hypostasis of the Trinity of God, not created by means 
of God’s intellectual act of will, but rather a necessary corollary from the vital [and 
kinesthetic] essence or Being of God itself. Instead the creation and action of the 
Son is a psychic activity of the holistic vital essence of God itself within the world:
 
“[…494] Son, who corresponds to organic life, is the real Creator, or the 
true birth giver. The father has created through the Son, just as the human 
father creates through the mother; but this creation is something other than 
a work of art created by the artist from temporary material, either from 
clay or from ideas. Such creation depend on the will of the Creator; but 
the birth of the Son depends more on a psychic necessity (psychisk nödvändighet) 
than on the will of the Creator: it depends on certain foundational conditions 
(grundvilkor) that must be presupposed as being essential to life (nödvändiga för 
lifvet), and these foundational conditions are not dependent on the will of the 
Creator, but on his being (väsende). When it is said that in God, thinking and 
being is one, then this is correct when it concerns a creation that depends on his 
will; but to give birth to a son does not directly depend on the will (viljan), but 
on the being (väsendet), on the foundational conditions of life (lifvets grund-
vilkor): it is ‘generatio fysica’ within man, but a ‘generatio psychica’ within 
God.” (§1428. emphasis added) 
By not unconditionally accepting the idea that “being and thinking are one within 
God,” Laestadius opposed the notion of God as metaphysical substance and essence 
and highlighted his own conviction of God as “one united personhood” and effecting 
force and an actual activity of a “living God” within the world – a view that coincided 
seemingly with his own vitalist way of thinking. This view clearly indicates that 
Laestadius believed the person of God was not purely transcendent, but concurrent 
immanent-transcendence who is bound to “lifets grundvilkor”, and must act accord-
494 “But from this internal relationship of the persons, it also follows that man had transgressed 
against all three persons (generaliter). However, specialiter, this crime had fallen most heavily on 
the conscience of the second person, who carried this monster below his heart during the period 
of creation; that is …” (§1428)
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ing to his essence. The person of God is active from its foundational character and 
is thus a fundamental ontological process (rather than a mere transcendental being, 
essence, or intelligence.)
Laestadius’ anthropological analogism between the trinity of man and the trinity of 
God implies an interesting view about the essence of God. The “persons of God” are 
not viewed as relating to each other in intellectualistic conceptual terms, but rather 
in psychophysiological terms. As a harsh critique of enlightenment rationalism and 
metaphysical rationalism of romanticism colors, in all of Laestadius’ thought we 
can now see how the critic of substance and essence (essentia) culminated with the 
question of man, God, and especially the question of reconciliation. From Laestadius’ 
perspective. the notions of substance and the essence of metaphysical rationalism, 
applied in philosophical theology and anthropology, alienated the human being 
from its embodied relatedness within the existence/world [as ultimate immanent-
transcendental reality], and elevated an abstract God to an absolute metaphysical 
sphere conceived as reachable first of all by the human intellect.
As a consequence of his interpretation of the metaphysical rationalization of 
anthropology and theology, Laestadius also held that the comprehension of the 
nature of faith and reconciliation had been intellectualized, and the psychologi-
cal affective, emotional, and passional basis had been bypassed. Laestadius simply 
demanded that the notion of man and human soul should be brought back to the 
psychophysiological basis. The understanding of God had to be elaborated from the 
experiential vitalist perspective in such a way that God would be brought back from 
the ethereal metaphysical spheres to the dynamic events of living life. Further, the 
birth of Christ as the redeemer of human kind was derived from the vital essence 
of the Person of God, and the becoming of Christ was an objective necessity as part 
of God’s loving and vital essence (activity and intentions).
The perspective of “generatio psychica” led Laestadius to emphasize that God is 
bound to act according to his/her essence. Now the conceptual contradictions of 
God’s action in the world were not evaluated from the metaphysical perspective 
of conceptual necessities, but rather viewed as “psychic” necessities. Similarly, as 
Laestadius emphasized that a human being must act according to the necessities 
(psychophysiological essence) determined by a vital embodied personhood, God also 
must act according to His/Hers essence and necessities. The principle of life, or factual 
creation must function through matter and the world. Laestadius wanted to highlight 
that God is not mere abstract thinking and a willing being, a pure intelligence, but 
rather a living force. This view entailed that God had to function through organic 
life and the world, through greater awakening and reconciliation. We can interpret 
that absolution or reconciliation happening through developing a spirituality within 
man (pneuma). For instance, God cannot destroy the power of evil in the world, and 
He has to simultaneously act according to justice and grace.
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Laestadius, as a Christian-pietistic priest, held that a human being has to become 
self-conscious in order to be reconciled with the heart (the organ of the principle 
of life) and God:
”As the Father has created the world through the Son, the principle of life 
has created the organic being through organic life. The principle of life 
is, admittedly, obscure and incomprehensible to reason, but it is closer at 
hand to our eyes, than the abstract idea that the philosopher takes pains to 
hold up to the world as the first beginnings of all creation. Just the same, 
an idea without life cannot be thought, but a principle of life without self-
consciousness is something that we can see with our eyes, in the nature. From 
this principle of life emerges creative organic life. And this life is now closest 
to us. In order to be able to be reconciled with the Father, we must go to the 
Son, who is also the Creator, or the person who has given us life. But we 
are unable to come to the Son without going through the Holy Spirit. We 
must first arrive at self-consciousness, before we are able to reconcile with 
our heart. But this self-consciousness is not the abstract consciousness that 
subsumes within itself the entire sphere of its personhood; and if organic life 
is united to a universal consciousness that comprises, not only personhood, 
but also individuality, then the sensory life is united to a consciousness that 
subsumes within itself primarily personhood, which is not a ‘persona idealis,’ 
but a ‘persona substantialis’ that is bound by all the conditions of its existence 
and must act ‘according to the nature of its being (väsende)’; but precisely 
at this point, the highly praised freedom gets into a pinch: if man must 
act according to the nature of its being, it follows that, if his nature is evil, 
he must act accordance to this particular nature.” (§1420. See also §1428)
Under the highly theoretical elaborations of the constitutive order of reconcili-
ation, interpreted here as the “unio vitalis”, Laestadius supposedly referred to the 
Christian awakened self-consciousness, which signified the recognition of one’s own 
“persona substantialis,” passional, and sinful nature one’s deficient moral character. 
Thus, Laestadius proceeded by stating that in order to become reconciled with the 
heart, one had to go through Holy Spirit and the Son. In order to become reconciled 
with the Father, each human being has to be reconciled through a self-conscious 
contrition with/and in the Redeemer and thus with the Whole Trinity. Laestadius 
also highlighted that not only the Father, but the whole Trinity was pars laesa 
(§§1400–1410). Thus, the psychological order in reconciliation became the Holy 
Spirit, the Son, and the Father. 
Here again, Laestadius did not hold to the simple parallelism of man and God. 
Laestadius clearly indicated that redemption had a particular constitutive structure 
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or “order of grace”; first, the spiritual life was potentially within man by the principle 
of life, while in the second degree of the awakened state, spiritual life is in the begin-
ning condition, and in the third degree, which means fulfillment (absolution) of the 
spiritual life, the redeemed condition was then achieved. As pointed out above, Laes-
tadius viewed this constitutive order and the constitutional-developmental hierarchy 
of the principle of life, organic life, and sensory life as analogical to the way they all 
are developed within man. From this explanation, we can see that Laestadius viewed 
the sensory life as a pre-requisite of spirituality. However, Laestadius also held that 
reconciliation centers on the Son, which correlated with the organic life and thus 
was the actual link of renewal or returning to the principle of life (original soul, the 
Father). Thus, the reconciliation is lowered from the intellect to the passions and the 
heart. If my analysis and interpretation are both correct, Laestadius’ personal and theo-
retical breakthrough within philosophical theology elaborated on which the hypostases 
or life forms of human beings coincide with the hypostases or life forms of a vital 
God, and conceive man’s spiritual life as constitutional-developmental in character. 
This insight correlates with the “reaching of God” towards human beings in vital 
manifestations, beginning with the vital force of the Holy Spirit, and actualization 
of the force of Grace in the Redeemer, and the Father/Mother [the Lover]. Further 
still, the notion of creation and God’s work within the historical world is explained 
as a practical-naturalistic creative and temporal functioning of the Trinity.495 
From Laestadius’ anthropological perspective then, the personhood of God is a 
constitutional kinetic process and temporal. Insofar as the first principle was given 
as life itself, the Christ was the necessary continuum of the essence of the Father, 
and the Holy Spirit was an awakened force within humankind. The Son is created 
by psychic generation, “generatio psychica”, a direct necessary continuum from the 
essence of God; henceforth, the Holy Spirit is seen as originally given by the blow 
of God into Adam, but brought into the world by the Son and re-vitalized by the 
force of Grace within mankind.496 Laestadius thought that the spirit of God does 
not become real or actualized through intellect or consciousness, but rather through 
nature and the embodied life of the human being, which is the reason why awaken-
ing and psychic reconciliation is indeed emphasized.
495 Here we can note once again that Laestadius’ idea of creation, reconciliation, and redemption 
differed from Hegel’s intellectualistic vision. Laestadius’ dialectics functioned through nature 
and lived experiences within which God comes along; in Hegel’s system, God or Absolute Idea 
functions through intellect and consciousness, and all material and historical things and events are 
mere manifestations of the dialectical process of the Spirit. Laestadius’ system does not proceed 
to the ultimate Absolutization of the Spirit; instead worldly life remains under the power of evil, 
and only through psycho-physiological awakening and reconciliation may God – or if we will it 
so, The Spirit – function in the human life and the world.
496 Cf. Hegel’s Dialectic of Spirit in Hegel 1977.
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It thus appear evident that Laestadius did not conceive matter and spirit or man 
and God as simply being parallel497 to each other, but rather he emphasized the 
constitutive structure and fundamental relatedness. Man and God are essentially 
co-existent in the ontotheological structure in a similar way as the body and spirit 
are co-existent in man. Laestadius referred to Paul the Apostle by saying that there 
remains a certain kinship “between” man and God; “There is a psychological kinship 
(psychisk frändskap) between him and the children: they are his own work.” (§667)498 
Man exists towards its own origin, towards God as the creative living force on which 
the existence of human being is fundamentally dependent. God is a counter-pole or 
correlate of the whole of human existence, similarly as the principle of life forms the 
horizon for the phenomena of nature. Human beings as “relatives of God,” are partly 
divine [origin] from their origin (original soul), have the qualification to be related to 
God. As already pointed out, this prerequisite is given within the heart, in the sensi-
tive heart (organon lepticon), which is the organ of the principle of life. Thus, man 
should recognize its living essence through awakening (dissonant state) and reach 
toward reconciliation in hope and faith that does not objectify God as an absolutely 
transcendental and metaphysical being (väsendet), but instead encounters God in 
His vital manifestations, especially as a call given within a sensible and awakened 
conscience. This call simultaneously transfers the corrupted man back to its origin 
(upphov) of life, into the original soul, and thus to a living and ongoing relatedness 
with God as a most vital force (the Actualization of Spirituality).
Grace does not demand an act, but rather contrition that signifies the destruction 
of egoism, the ousting of the human own natural will-power as a self-justifying and 
self-righteousness that are deficient moral and spiritual grounds in the “eyes” of God. 
In this condition, man has to affirm the condition of being simultaneously guilty 
and innocent, an absolute paradox for a natural reason. Contrary to self-justification, 
psychic reconciliation signifies the opposite and necessary “outer” justification. Here 
we can open the question of what this redeemed state may signify in regard to man’s 
world relation or the Christian life. All we can say then, based on Laestadius’ writings 
in The Lunatic, is that it signifies an intentional condition of faith that lays forth the 
renewed [or reborn] moral and spiritual passional basis for human action, thought, 
life and existence as a whole. Within such redemption/reconciliation man, lets the 
natural passions of egoism, ambition, and selfishness under the dominance of an 
497 Rather the “relation” is co-existence, God is seen as the necessary counter-pole, a correlative, of 
human life, a holistic horizon of human existence as such. 
498 See also the consanguinity between man and God: §§993, 1283, 1324, 1326, 1425. In §668 
Laestadius indicated that the sins of the children of God execute the murder of God (interesting 
theory with a historical similarity to Nietzsche’s philosophy? Cf. §1427 wherein Laestadius states 
that awakened persons often feel they have murdered the Christ, which is not a result of aroused 
imagination, but rather a “psychological truth.”
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awakened heart, under the original power of principle of life as a divine and eternal 
vital force found within man. As mentioned above, Laestadius did not think that this 
rebirth would signify an absolutely new Selfhood or identity; the worldly and carnal 
condition remained. The reconciled Self still encompasses both the old natural and 
the newborn morally or spiritually inspired passional Self; this paradoxical condition 
is called a “redeemed devil” (§1378).
If we now ask how man is related to existence or Being, we will notice that the 
faith, as the renewed vital basis of a human being, is not related to God as a substantial 
being (väsendet, essentia), or the first Idea as a correlate of human intellect. Living 
faith does not have an intellectual intentional object, but manifests itself as “living in 
the faith of the heart [in the Christ]”, or living within the power of God. Laestadius 
held that there could not ever be formulated any concept of the first Idea without 
violating the notion of the person of God and faith. Thus, a human being’s intentional 
relatedness to existence through faith can be defined from its founding character an 
un-objectifying intentionality. This aspect is so, first of all, because faith as a revitalized 
power of the original soul dwells in its “object”, or to be more specific, in the “force”, 
residing on the foundation of the vital force of God as the “origin (Uphov) of life” 
itself. Thus, it is not the human being’s own [natural] intentionality that directs that 
human being, but instead the original force of God, the vital force of life. In a sense, 
this insight signifies a certain kind of destruction of subjectivity and a yielding to the 
power of the principle of life, a trust in the power of a God of creation and grace. 
Thus, self-justification, a mere affirmation of the grace/forgiveness by intellect, 
does not create the moral passional basis for human life. Instead, grace received 
in a passivity of heart and waiting for the mystical event of being freed from the 
guilty of sins lays the joyous and morally motivational basis for human life. Hence, 
Laestadius combines the pietistic idea of reconciliation with the vitalist idea of 
the psychophysical event happening in the corporeal plane. Laestadius called this 
subjectively emphasized notion of reconciliation psychic reconciliation499 which is the 
counter-pole of outer objective reconciliation that he called juridical reconciliation. 
This possibility of evidence of one’s own reconciliation also constitutes the grounding 
of Christian faith and Identity in human life.
5.5.3  Actualization of a Psychic Reconciliation and the Christian Faith
Despite the secret and ineffable nature of reconciliation, Laestadius sought to give 
a heuristic depiction of it500. His analysis was constructed in family psychological 
499 To be precise, the heart has to receive grace via blood in the first place. Also, the Eucharist is a 
psychic phenomenon that actualizes as a feeling in the heart. See the following citations below. 
500 Laestadius let us understand that anthropological parts of The Lunatic were written before 1855, 
and indeed, he began to thematize reconciliation in 1855, four years before his death. (See §1246)
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terms, and based on his conceptions of man and God. In this respect, it is worth 
recalling the distinction between the subjective and objective faculties of the soul; 
juridical conscience was posited into the sphere of sensory life as a faculty of ob-
jective consciousness, and spiritual or moral conscience as a subjective faculty was 
situated into the subjective consciousness. These distinctions and the emphasis on 
the subjective consciousness and subjective faculties of soul became the theoretical 
background for the discussion concerning reconciliation.
We also analyzed the above in at a quite theoretical formal level how the triadic 
parts of God and man correlate, and how the constitutive order exposed the degrees 
of spiritual life in man. However, Laestadius also offered a fully psychologically heu-
ristic depiction of the subjective and objective aspects of the event of reconciliation. 
Especially, Laestadius wanted to distinguish and accentuate the more inward aspect 
of reconciliation and show how it was crucial for the actualization of reconciliation. 
Thus, the notion of psychic reconciliation pertaining to a “psychic essence,” was 
posited against the mere juridical notion of reconciliation (forensic). This is quite a 
general pietistic way to emphasize the subjective inner sphere in the first place. Also, 
the re-depiction of the personality of God as a “heavenly parent501” (as a vital force) 
was posited against the philosophical idea of God. 
When dealing with the actual event of reconciliation, Laestadius analyzed the 
reconciliation by similar psychological means as he used to analyze the phenomenon 
of awakening. Then the depictions of the tormented and agonic condition of suffer-
ing were extended to pertain to the heart of God as well and the whole relationship 
between man and God. Laestadius used as a heuristic example the heart of the 
loving mother as a correlation to God’s loving heart: According to Laestadius, the 
loving heart of the mother is the highest manifestation of divinity in the world and 
thus, it is applicable to characterize the essence of God. Laestadius drew a conscious 
anthropocentric conclusion from the moral character of the heart of the mother to 
the gracious character of the person of God:
“However, to become reconciled with the source (uphof ) of one’s life is 
something entirely different, which we have sought to illustrate by means 
of example that show how reconciliation takes place between parents and 
children; considering especially the mother’s heart, since this is the most 
sacred (heligaste) character trait known in all of creation: it is a character 
trait within the personhood of the Creator, reflected in living nature; not 
merely in man, who is corrupted by infernal passions.” (§1351.)
501 On the notion of “heavenly parent” in Laestadius’ sermons, see e.g. Østtveit Elgvin 2010; Nilsson 
1988.
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There is a similar conflict between the sense of justice and unconditional grace 
within hearts of the mother and God. (§1308) Conflict is between the passions of 
unconditional love that the “creator” feels for her child, and the demands of justice or 
law; a mother is always open to forgiving her child, but she also has to act according 
to the equal moral principle of justice. The same pertains to God as just judicator 
and loving caretaker. The suffering derived from the conflict of passions within a 
mother’s heart is similar to the suffering of God’s heart.
God’s ultimately gracious act of giving his own Son to sacrifice himself for all of 
mankind, for his own children, is similar to the unconditional self-sacrificing love 
of a mother. God as a whole has given His existence [force, body and grace/Holy 
Spirit] on behalf of human beings in a similar way as a mother gives hers for her 
children. By emphasizing the character of God as a “heavenly parent” Laestadius 
wanted to highlight that God is a living personhood who is open to being related 
with the desiring human being through the heart, accepted as a vitalizing force (not 
as an object) by faith.
The characteristics of these persons of God are potentially conjoined with the vital 
centers of the triadic parts of human beings. Now the character of the Father as the 
first person and creative vital principle is offered by the allegory of the birth-giving 
and loving “mother”, and the heart is its organ. “The Son” is depicted as an innocent 
sacrifice given to satisfy the evil demands and passions of the world [an objective 
side to free mankind from sin], and it is an actual re-vitalizing power that has to be 
received “in passivity” through faith. “The Holy Spirit” is the living force given to men 
through reconciliation [social dimension]. Thus, the whole triadic person of God as 
unity is in and of itself understood as creative vital whole (a Father has to function 
according to its essence and according to the laws of matter. A Father has to function 
via the organic life), and an organic suffering of Son and a human being [of passions], 
and the Holy spirit as the manifestation of the faith of that heart as the re-vitalized 
power of human life. Thus, the Son is a factual psycho-physiological meeting-point 
for man and God, and it can be encountered only through faith [Cf. Luther].
The above discussion means that Christ conjoined through faith simultaneously 
re-vitalizes the original soul of the human being, and manifests itself as a Holy 
Spirit in the sensory life. Henceforth, man becomes directed by the Holy Spirit after 
reconciliation. Because of this loving act of God (sacrifice of the Son) conceived as a 
vital, absolutely loving and emphatic, and effective force[through faith], the character 
of the person of God is re-depicted as a “heavenly parent,” the term that Laestadius 
used to make a distinction between the philosophical impersonal God as a mere just 
adjudicator and the ultimate categorical being or Idea outside of human existence 
[having only intellect and will]. 
Such reconciliation pertains to the whole triadic person of God and thus also to 
the origin of the human being (principle of life). Here also, the loving heart of the 
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mother is used as a family psychological allegory to describe the event of reconciliation. 
The loving heart of God is always open for reconciliation (objective), but contrition 
is necessary and demanded from man in order to be reconciled (See §§1402, 1351).
“Before there can be any reconciliation between parents and children, a 
moral suffering must take place on both sides. It is not enough for the 
parents to suffer for the sins of the children must have a sincere sorrow 
over their sins before reconciliation can take place. Reconciliation is a 
consequence of the physical and moral suffering of the Redeemer; on the 
part of the Redeemer, and of the moral suffering on the part of the one 
who is to receive grace. The religious mother has also suffered physical pain 
for her children when it was born, whereby the mother’s heart has become 
more tender than the father’s heart. … But pains and aches heighten the 
maternal feeling. … We are unable to give reason for this, but this is the case: 
when the mother has acquired her child with pains and aches, it is much 
dearer to her, since the maternal feeling has its organ in womb.” (§1323.)
Despite the rough organicist views, we can proceed and notice, however, that the 
“psychic” and “the heart” refer to the organic functions that constitute the whole of 
subjective consciousness and vital functions and conflicting passions that strive for 
satisfaction. Thus, reconciliation, to be understood clearly, has to be understood in terms 
of the satisfaction of passions; here Laestadius held that legal or juridical reconciliation 
is insufficient, for that process belongs only to the level of sensory life or intellect, as 
the whole juridical conscience belongs there too:
”It seems clear, on the basis of all human relationships, that actus forensis is 
not capable of rendering reconciliation clear and comprehensible. Reconcili-
ation is not a legal act, but a psychic act. We call it ‘psychic,’ since it concerns 
the psyche; it concerns the heart, as a consequence of the testimony of 
feeling: ’I feel my heart reconciled.’” (§1349.)
Laestadius sought the psychological aspects of reconciliation (as spiritual and moral 
motivation). A mere conscious legal act does not constitute the satisfaction or give 
any evidence to the heart of one’s own reconciliation (“testimony of feeling”), and 
thus, reconciliation cannot be an act of objective consciousness in the first place. The 
preference for the precedence of psychic reconciliation over mere objective reconcili-
ation included a harsh critique of the notion of objective reconciliation of Lutheran 
orthodoxy (§1265). Laestadius pointed out the misinterpretation of the nature of 
reconciliation and assumes that it follows from a wrong interpretation and translation 
of a confession [of Lutheran faith] (§1266. See also §§1267, 1268).
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Laestadius is trying to say that in order for the ego to be reconciled, there have 
to be given moral passions that make one really feel reconciled. Juridical conscience 
“does not imply abhorrence/disgust of the desire (afsky för begäret) (§674). It does 
not imply a struggle against the desire, but against the satisfaction of the desire,” and 
thus does not create a living morality and spirituality.
Laestadius offers an example of the legal pardon by a graceful king to highlight 
the fact that a pardon alone does not release one psychologically from the feeling of 
guilt. In order to emancipate one from the accusations of conscience, a human being 
has to believe that he has been granted amnesty. This line of thought goes as follows: 
insofar as a human being exists in the world, he is fundamentally guilty because of 
the prevailing natural passions and their manifestations in thought and action. Insofar 
as the ego cannot reconcile itself [self-justification], it has to remain passive. It has 
to wait, and be open through faith for the grace, be open to a pure gift, which is not 
receivable by the [intellectual] mind but by the faith of the heart (clearly indicating 
the influence of moral passions on the faculties of the soul).
While God’s reconciling act is given through the Son objectively, man is offered 
the possibility of emancipation from the guilt of sin subjectively. Nonetheless, this 
(emancipation) cannot be accepted by intellect alone because it does not meet the 
demands of the principles of reason, as it signifies the contradictory condition of 
being both simultaneously guilty and innocent. 
However, the reconciling act of pure grace can be received by living faith of the heart 
(psychic); and it is coincidentally an affirmation of a contradictory vital-existential state 
– being guilty as a passional sinner (worldly existence), yet freed from the guiltiness of 
shortcomings and sins. The idea is that a human being has to take the responsibility 
of his vital personhood, and as absolute responsibility proves to be impossible, man 
has to accept his depravity and believe in the absolute responsibility placed on the 
charge/responsibility of Christ. This shift, namely, falling in front of the possibility to 
fulfill the moral imperative by one’s own power, becomes a necessary condition for 
man to able to be freed from the accusations of conscience and law. Man does not 
lose his responsibility and natural passional nature, but he does become simultane-
ously innocent through Christ. Thus, man is criminal and innocent simultaneously, 
a psychic fact proved by the “evidence of heart.” (See, §§ 1539, 1540, 1579, 1582.)
Laestadius’ interpretation of the presence of God in faith and his analysis of 
transubstantiation are interesting. Here Laestadius follows the vitalist-existentialistic 
interpretation highlighting that Christ is present in power when approached (“reached 
towards”) through a subjective inner faith. The vitalist approach seems to give him a 
satisfactory explanatory basis when he conceives of the transubstantiation of bread 
and wine as the vitalizing presence of Christ once received through subjective faith 
Laestadius wanted to highlight that Jesus’ body and blood are not mere Idea, imagi-
nary representation, or empty concept but rather an idea actualized through faith:
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“Whatever man perceives by faith is real, since it is actualized (realized) 
through faith. Thus, when the idea of the body and blood of Christ is ac-
tualized in the heart, the idea is actualized; that is to say, the object is not 
merely an idea, an imagination or an empty concept, but a reality within 
the heart.” (§1582.) “[T]he bread and wine are to bodily life, what the body 
of Christ given and the blood of Christ shed are to spiritual life. Or the 
bread and the wine are (to objective consciousness the same as) the body 
and blood of Christ to subjective consciousness.” (§1583.) “Thus, the most 
important thing in the Lord’s Supper is this psychic phenomenon: that the 
body and blood are truly present as soon as the idea thereof is actualized 
in the heart, through faith.” (§1584.)502
5.5.4  The Mystery of Faith and the Evidence of the Heart
Despite his detailed elaborations, Laestadius was still convinced that reconciliation 
remains – until the end – a secret. Faith “contains ‘mysticism’,” as it pertains to the 
condition of the individual human heart, and it is thus a question of one’s own-most 
faith without objective evidence. According to Laestadius, faith has to be understood 
in terms of passions and emotions, as living faith is constituted of “high heavenly 
emotions” and religion can be understood only in terms of passions, then religion 
cannot be objectified and defined precisely:
“The Christian religion excites all nobler feelings of which man is capable, 
and suppresses all heinous passion by which the heart is torn asunder. 
Through living faith, the heart is seized by blissful feelings, or moral 
pleasures, and this is what saving faith consists in. The rationalist claims 
just the same that feeling do not belong to religion, or that religion should 
be excluded from the mystical realm of the feelings.” (§721.)
There cannot be an objective explanation of how reconciliation happens in the 
individual heart. Faith is not a belief of the mind because the passions and emotions 
precede all the beliefs of the [intellectual] mind503. 
502 See further, §§1586–1588.
503 In this sense, we cannot really use the notion of fideism to pertain/depict Laestadius’ conception 
because the phenomenon of faith is analyzed at a more fundamental physical-psychological level. 
There also seems to be several evidentialist tendencies in Laestadius’ theory, for he conceives 
vitalism as explanatory basis for his religious views. The conceptual question concerning fideism and 
evidentialism in Laestadius’ thought is of course a task of another study. That kind of study should 
distinguish two kinds of evidentialism: First, Laestadius’ scientific-philosophical explanatory level 
for apologist purposes, and secondly, the experiential demand for proof and a double-foundation 
within religious experience.
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“Living faith consists in exalted heavenly feelings that are perceptible within 
the heart, and these feelings cannot be described with words; they cannot be 
defined since the intellect is unable to reflect upon these feelings or bring 
them to clarity through concepts (see section B.B.). Therefore, religion 
cannot be defined […504] How could it be possible to define faith, which 
is a living feeling, a passion, when not even natural love can be defined, nor 
grief or fear; passions of which one is unable to say anything more than that 
they are feelings! For this reason, then, affairs of love contain a ‘mysticism’ 
that only lovers are able to grasp, not with intellect (förståndet), but with 
the heart.” (§1557.)
Opposing the possibility of objective rational-conceptual proof, Laestadius si-
multaneously shifted the evidence pertaining to reconciliation to the inner order of 
the heart and conscience, or to put it in Kierkegaardian terms, into the inwardness, 
into the subjectivity.505 “Perceptibility” as an “evidence” of fides subjectiva refers to 
that inner conviction. Further, the lack of objective evidence turns into an even more 
demanding need of subjective evidence to the testimony of feeling of the heart:
”But if there is the case, that salvific faith depended on man’s will, then there 
would be no problem as all to become saved. However, if there is anything 
in the world that needs a sufficient foundation, it is the living faith, which in 
the letter to the Hebrews 11:1 is referred to as: “the substance of things hoped 
for, the evidence of things not seen”. Verbatim, according to Gerlach-Vensjö, 
the Greek text could be translated thus: ‘but faith is a foundation for that 
which one hopes for, the proof of things, which one does not see506.’ … if 
one enters more deeply into the subjective foundations of faith, one will 
find that a conviction that is dependent on the will in no way requires a 
foundation that is outside of will… there are many things in the world that 
man must believe contrary to his will; man prefers to believe that which 
he wishes. […] the foundation for man’s conviction about mortality is not 
located within the will, but in the sorrowful experience that all men are 
mortal.” (§1456.)
504 “[E]ven though the Apostle Paul tried to define faith, just as most theologians have tried to define 
religion. But they have not succeeded since the definitions are very different.” (§1557)
505 Cf. Kierkegaard, Sören 1974. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. [Orig. 1846.] Translated by 
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
506 In the original manuscript: “Men tro är en grundval för det man hoppas, en öfverbevisning om 
ting, dem man icke ser.”
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Altogether, Laestadius gives even a more radical evidential criterion for “living 
faith.” This conviction or evidence is an inner “testimony of feeling” which has a dif-
ferent character than objective convictions demand, say, for instance, the mathemati-
cal scientific or rational theological proofs of a God of orthodox faith. The evidence 
of heart signifies the subjective proof based on “subjective” feeling and experience. 
For heuristic purposes, Laestadius also compared mathematical truths and subjec-
tive truths with different evidential character. For instance, matters of love (§1145), 
faith, and religion cannot be proven by mathematical and mere rational evidence, 
but only through subjective evidence which also constitutes the initial conditions 
for any conceptual thematizations:
“The infallible grounds for the convictions of the intellect can be in part 
objective, for instance mathematical truths, which rest entirely on objective 
grounds; and in part subjective, which depend on the feelings of the heart, 
such as love, grief, jealousy, and so forth. Both these foundations for conviction 
are infallible, each on its own way, in that man can no more doubt a proven 
mathematical truth, then he can also not doubt his feeling; he cannot doubt 
love, grief, jealousy, hatred or other passions. The intellect cannot deny feel-
ings.” (§503.) “If lovers wanted to prove the real impact of love by means of 
mathematical or logical deduction, they would be viewed as lunatics.” (§505.) 
Laestadius also differentiated between the subjective and objective ground of evi-
dence and emphasizes the subjective basis of emotion and feeling and criticizes the 
faith that leans on the authorities. For Laestadius, the mere following of the faith of 
the authorities without one’s own emotional-subjective faith signified “dead faith.” 
(§§1052, 1054) Rationalistic faith or faith that was based on the faith of authori-
ties was not saving faith because it did not pertain to the “psyche” and heart. Here 
Laestadius leaned on common experiences and everyday-psychological examples 
about the character of love in order to make the phenomenon of reconciliation com-
prehensible. According to Laestadius, the same holds true with the religious truths 
even if modern theologians try to prove them with logic (§506)507. A discussion on 
507 See also §§ 504, 505, 506: The same holds with those religious truths which cannot be proven 
by logic. In these contexts Laestadius referred to syneidesis: “In subjective consciousness, the 
feelings of the heart manifest themselves as insight, “syneidesis”, or as an awareness of good and 
evil.” In a note, Laestadius draw a distinction between the knowledge of love and the actual feeling 
of love indicating that knowledge and insight belongs to sensory life while the actual feeling is a 
matter of organic life. Laestadius stated that “nevertheless, this knowledge of love is something 
entirely different than love itself because love knowledge belongs to the sphere of sensory life 
while love itself is a passion, which belongs to the sphere of organic life. The same relationship 
obtains between knowledge of religion and religion itself.”(§745. See also §§1142, 1143, 1144)
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the subjective and objective foundation as a necessary “double foundation” reveals 
reciprocal recognition as an initial condition of genuine love and faith:
“In love, like religion, conviction requires a double foundation; both an 
objective and a subjective foundation are required. It is not enough for 
the lover to have an objective foundation for her conviction – that she is 
loved. The woman is not satisfied with a declaration of love; she demands 
clear evidence of man’s love. The unfaithful man tries in vain to deceive 
his genuinely loving wife with false caresses. Love’s perception is focused 
and clear.” (§508.) “[T]he subjective foundation alone is also not enough. 
Certainly, the lover will discover, long before the declaration of love, that 
she is loved, but she cannot rely on her own feeling unless a declaration is 
made. It is easy to prove the truth that all moral conviction rests on double 
foundations. One seeks in vain to compel the respect of others through 
dissimulation or hypocrisy. Our conviction regarding the moral character 
of others always requires a subjective foundation.” (§509. emphasis added) 
The ultimate evidence of the redeemed state remains in the passions and emotions 
of the heart, in the fides subjectiva; a personal inward conviction within which on 
feels his/hers heart reconciled (§1338). Hence, emancipation from the guiltiness of 
sin could only be attested or confirmed by inward faith and implied insight into the 
reasons of the heart. This is what Laestadius finally meant, namely, that the ultimate 
condition of human life, faith, and reconciliation could only be understood by the 
heart, passions and emotions. The conflict of the passions of the heart were calling for 
reconciliation. Reconciliation as a “psychic act” is the only and necessary possibility 
for the satisfaction of the moral passion of conscience through outer justification. By 
this means, Laestadius was convinced that subjective (psychic) faith was the initial 
condition for the actualization of full reconciliation (metaphysical necessity).
Altogether, the person of God [the first Idea] is now re-depicted as an immanence-
transcendence with a personal character. God is given to human beings in three mo-
ments: In the living nature and thus in one’s own “psychic essence” as original soul 
(principle of life); in the body of Christ as the possibility (awakening) of reconcilia-
tion; and in the Holy Spirit actualized in a redeemed state, and thus the possibility 
to live with a spiritual/moral conscience and the living God. This structuring of the 
man/God relationship is not categorically parallelistic (but rather co-existent with 
the Other), and for this relation to be actualized demands a reconciling act from the 
side of God “as heavenly parent” [objective and real], and the contrition, desire, faith 
and trust [subjective and possible “psychic act”] to live with God from the side of the 
human being. According to Laestadius, it is not only the heart of man which demands 
reconciliation; first of all there is the heart of the God. (Cf. §§1311, 1312, 1323, 1334.)
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* * *
Laestadius’ idea of awakening and reconciliation can be viewed from the phenom-
enological perspective as a unique individuation or absolution. However, because of 
Laestadius’ emphasis on the embodied and carnal character of human life, rebirth as 
a result of the psychic reconciliation would be not a mere change of mind, but also 
an embodied experience:
”Luther’s experience proves that the new birth must be something perceiv-
able and perceptible; it is not merely an idea, but an ’actualized idea,’ an 
alteration of the heart that cuts deeply into man’s spiritual organism. To 
be sure, already the awakening is the gracious work of God’s spirit that 
is perceptible within the heart, just as a contrition, remorse, and sorrow 
over sin must be perceptible within the heart, if they are to be called true 
contrition. But these preparatory effects of grace must not be confused with 
the new birth, which is followed by a perceptible joy, peace, and rejoicing 
in the Holy Spirit.” (§1531.)
Awakening signifies subjectivization and self-awareness and reconciliation, which 
encompasses the suffering encounter between a child and a parent, is a personal 
individuating act. This act does not originate from the subject, but rather is the act-
ualization of the spirit, (a metaphysical necessity as an aspect of principle of life.) 
Psychic reconciliation can thus be conceived as personal individuation. The actual 
uniqueness of the human being is act-ualized upon hearing of the “call” that pertains 
to me and only me.508
From an anthropological perspective, reconciliation is not only an intellectualis-
tic spiritual act, but a psychophysiological and existential need to be free from the 
domination of natural passions and conflicting passions in the heart. 
We can summarize Laestadius’ psycho-theology of the Trinity in the following 
way: Anthropological “life forms” are hypostases through which the triadic unity of 
God is explained. Putting the notions of the principle of life as a foundational force 
to the place of substance, essentia, and Idea, Laestadius believed he was able to get 
rid of the metaphysical logical problems of Trinity and creation (and the doctrine of 
Jesus’ two natures and transubstantiation): Now the persons of God are conceived 
as essential vital activity related to each other in a similar way as the hypostases in 
man. Thus we can see, that God has a temporal and constitutive structure, which 
functions through an ineffable metaphysical force of the principle of life, through 
the Son and Holy spirit (passions) within the historical human world, and having a 
508 Cf. Steinbock 2009, 193–195.
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psychic reconciliation as its initial condition, to unite man and God, then man can 
become joined to the power of God, and thus human life could take up residence in 
the guidance of God. To admit and affirm one’s own passional character and condi-
tion of world is simultaneously an affirmation of the world as such. However, only 
through such awakening and reconciliation, can God function in the world and man 
remain under the guidance of God. To this end, Laestadius discussed whether love 
or faith precedes and concludes by following Luther in that faith is the perennial 
source of love and good deeds, morality, and justice509.
As Laestadius’ philosophical psychology and theology culminated in the phe-
nomena of awakening, psychic reconciliation (that individuates and reconstructs the 
personal intentionality), and faith (spiritual identity), we ask what significance there 
remains for subjective faith, once familiar with his theory? It seems contradictory 
to emphasize the non-intellectual core of awakening and faith and simultaneously 
highlight that lingual and conceptual elaboration seems to be an important role for 
the self to recognize one’s own moral and spiritual condition (Cf. §§1121–1130). 
The same pertains to the Biblical conceptualizations. What kind of role then do 
the conceptualizations play, in this respect, for moral and spiritual progress? The 
same problem can addressed regarding Kierkegaard’s religious existentialism within 
which subjectivity is emphasized. Simultaneously, his Postscript constitutes a broad 
intellectual theorization of “subjective faith” and “leap”510. Can Postscript lead one 
to a subjective Christianity, and if yes, is the faith still subjective but rather reached 
through a certain specific symbolic and lingual “objectivity”? Does the most shunted 
intellect then lift up its head? 
Basically this questioning concerns the relationship between theology and faith; 
does faith need theology? In Laestadius and Kierkegaard’s cases, we should logi-
cally respect their principles and consider that concepts and ideas are not the origin 
of subjective faith or “psychic” reconciliation and thus a living faith. Yet can these 
theoretical notions lead us to a living faith? Isn’t it always an impossible task to try 
to talk about faith which is a deeply subjective matter in the first place? Isn’t it an 
inconvenience and even a count against the possibility of religious awakening and 
reconciliation if one reads Kierkegaard and Laestadius only seeking to find one’s own 
most faith or a foundation for a personal “Leap”? Do Kierkegaard and Laestadius 
offer rational support and even evidence for the objective rationality of faith and 
thus make the whole process intellectual?
It is interesting that similarly to Kierkegaard Laestadius also indicated that think-
ing does have a certain kind of role for finding a subjective living faith (§§1146, 
509 See, §684. Cf. §709, in §711 Laestadius polemisized on whether the pietistic vitalist or the 
speculative rationalist was the lunatic.
510 See, Kierkegaard 1974 (Concluding Unscientific Postscript).
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1535). How should we then conceive this paradox, which in the other dimension 
signifies the relation between inward experience and objective cognition, such as 
understanding and knowledge? In the end, this enigma can be solved as follows: 
The aporetic condition of awakening, the ultimate dilemma of human existence, 
does not depend on whether one accepts certain conceptual “rationalizations”, but 
rather on whether a human being is open and thus accepts the Word (by first facing 
the existential dead end). Laestadius might have thought that an inward faith of the 
heart, beside it being the foundation of proper religious views and doctrines, also 
demands a conceptual and broader understanding and communal discussion of the 
matters of faith and life. It is the objective part of the actualization of a living faith 
that necessitates a communal life, a conceptual and theoretical perspective, varying 
discursive perspectives, and apological and other religious literature to be actualized 
in a very ambiguous world. If I am not mistaken, Lutheran-Laestadian pietism has 
as its source the inward experience of religious truths, but it does not turn to radical 
subjectivity. While it fights for the freedom of religion, from the very beginning, it 
points the finger at each and every one of us, asking us to question the condition of 
our own heart. 
However, there is still no ideal, conceptual, and theoretical evidence or proof of 
the rationality or truthfulness of religious faiths, and thus it remains until the end a 
matter of individuation for any awakening and possibility of reconciliation. There is 
no freedom of choice or rational “leap”, as it all pertains to trusting the word (logos) 
itself and the “evidence of heart”; whether given to the heart, existential experience, 
or the intellect, which receives its evidential affirmation from experience anyway 
(§1456). In a wider philosophical horizon, the problem is basically more general 
and pertaining only to the existential-ontological relation between pre-reflective 
and pre-ontological lived experience and a shared public lingual ethos within which 
a human being always actualizes. 
This is the challenge of human existence as such, not a problem that can be solved. 
We can note, however, that Laestadius was an emancipatory thinker, as he fought for 
freedom of religion, resisted the precedence of orthodox dogmatics in favor of the 
individual religious experience, and criticized the faith that follows the authorities, 
but simultaneously Laestadius appears as a demanding religious leader who insists 
on an inward living faith of the heart. On the general level, this is an analogical 
situation with whatever human situation in the world: A human being must person-
ally experience matters of life in order to reach proper understanding of the subject 
matter. Linquistic comprehension and reflectivity is a necessary aspect of a “living 
faith”, although not its primal foundation.
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5.5.5  Protestant Vitalist Metaphysics As the Overcoming of Substance 
Metaphysics
In this study, I have broadly gone through the philosophical, psychological and theo-
logical aspects of Laestadius’ thought by analyzing Laestadius’ “insights” and most 
of their philosophically and psychologically significant themes. The vitalist way of 
thought and Laestadius’ intentions to deconstruct the prevailing ideas of man and 
his notions of faith and God have been dealt with here. Laestadius’ elaborations 
concerning the holistic notion of man and a non-dualistic insight into the constitu-
tion of human consciousness as well as the constitution of both the moral and the 
spiritual life have been analyzed. 
It is now evident that Laestadius’ critique of Western metaphysical rationalism, 
outstandingly present in The Lunatic, was a particular application of the 18th and 
early 19th century vitalist critique of rationalism and metaphysics within a new 19th 
century context of Swedish intellectual and spiritual life that was dominated by 
German idealism and romantic speculative metaphysics. Laestadius’ criticism was 
particularly aimed against the rationalistic, metaphysical and idealistic doctrines of 
theologians, religious leaders, and philosophical anthropologists. Despite its original 
vitalist roots, Laestadius’ contextual critical evaluation of metaphysical rationalism 
and its notions of being, essence, soul/body –conception as well as the whole ap-
proach toward the phenomena of life, can also be seen as an obvious opposition to general 
Western metaphysical rationalism, particularly its Cartesian-rationalistic, Kantian-
idealistic, and Hegelian-speculative currents. This notification raises a question of 
whether Laestadius’ insights offer any perspective regarding the critique of Western 
metaphysics and rationalism in the more general sense [and especially in reference 
to the contemporary discussion of this theme511.]
In the following section, I offer a few important insights from this investigation 
that can contribute to the contemporary discussion on this critic of the Western 
metaphysical-intellectualistic stance. Here I shift the research perspective from an 
anthropological and psychological emphasis to a more general ontological questioning 
on the notion of life, being, and the notion of Being (varandet, substance) in terms 
of its broad metaphysical indication as the ultimate ground and horizon of human 
existence. In this respect, Laestadius’ vitalist Protestant metaphysic is discussed in 
relation to the concept of substance present in the Western tradition from ancient 
history to the modern era, beginning with Aristotle’s definition of “the constant 
511 e.g Stanley 2010; Adluri 2013; MacGrath 1985. Beginning with Heidegger’s philosophy, much 
interest has been paid to the problem of Western metaphysics and also to the so- called “originary 
ethics” which has focused on the phenomenological and ontological foundations of ethics. 
Especially, Emmanuel Levinas, Jan-Luc Nancy, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Charles Taylor, 
Jan-Luc Marion, and many other continental philosophers can be named in this regard.
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presence” (ousia)512. I ask, how does Laestadius’ understanding of human being and 
life, and God and faith relate to this horizon of Being and to existence as a “constant 
presence” (substance) as such? 
Insofar as Laestadius’ holistic way of thought had the empirical/experiential and 
the spiritual dimensions as inseparable, we cannot draw a sharp distinction between 
philosophical and theological metaphysics. In Laestadius’ thought, the philosophical-
anthropological and metaphysical-theological are inextricable; the idea of man and 
the notion of God or ultimate reality (spirituality) constituted the whole. General 
metaphysics also have in common the quest for ultimate experiential reality and 
constitutional ground and the horizon of life or being as such, which is tradition-
ally called first philosophy (philosophia prima or philosophia perennis). On this 
fundamental level, philosophy and theology face the common problem and task513 
of contemplating in a different means what is perennial being (substance), Being (es-
sence, Idea or force), or in other words, the perennial ground and horizon of human 
existence? Further, it can be asked what the different theoretical “solutions” disclosed 
through different theoretical-experiential insights indicate, for instance, in regard to 
the questions of how the perennial principles of existence are actually reached, and 
what are the prerequisites or necessities for a proper human life. Because this “rela-
tivity” or liquid nature of the ground and the horizon – whether God, the principle 
of life or whatever substance-principle – we can only analyze the philosophical and 
theological implications of these different theoretical insights. 
Thus, I will discuss how Laestadius’ theory relates to theological metaphysics and 
philosophical metaphysics, as he clearly seemed to have something to say against both 
branches. In this respect, we have to clearly note once again that the philosophical-
psychological quest for the idea of man is not distinct from the quest for the spir-
itual nature of human beings, and thus also the perennial metaphysical-theological 
quest for God and the possibility of reconciliation. The main notions of substance, 
essentia, and the Self (ego), as well as the reappraisal of the notions of the faculties 
of soul, God, faith, and psychic reconciliation have already been analyzed, and it has 
been noted herein that they are inseparable aspects of the Laestadius’ critique of 
metaphysical rationalism as a whole.
Laestadius’ way of overcoming the prevailing metaphysical rationalistic stance in 
theology and anthropology of his time had two sides. On the one hand, he advanced 
a theological critique with Luther’s emphasis of faith and theology of the cross, and on 
512 About Heidegger’s deconstruction of Western metaphysics and his interpretation of Aristotle see, 
e.g. Heidegger 2001, 3–102; Heidegger 1993a, pp.92–110; Marx 1982, 7–37; van Buren 1994b, 
220->; Kisiel 1995, 221–276; Backman 2015, 44–55.
513 Cf. Aristotle 1995 (Metaphysic). In his Metaphysics Aristotle states that the perennial philosophy 
of the first principle is either meta-ta-physica (metaphysics) or theology (the thematic of God 
as a “first principle”). 
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the other hand, he formulated a critique of anthropology applying his vitalist insights 
on man, faith and God. As noted above, Laestadius’ vitalist psychology became the 
basis for his theological and anthropological elaborations, and henceforth also his 
critical evaluation of theological and philosophical metaphysics. This knowledge 
allows us to view Laestadius’ thought in the wider context of the full critique of 
Western metaphysics.
If we take a look at contemporary philosophical anthropology and theology we 
will notice that the most influential and holistic critic and deconstruction of West-
ern metaphysics is found in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, presented especially in 
his Being and Time514. It is also interesting that Heidegger takes his core ideas for 
his destruction of metaphysics from Luther’s interpretation of Paul and Luther’s 
formulation of the theology of the cross515. 
With regard to the general critique of philosophical and theological metaphysics, 
Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation is the most important and most referred source (also 
the lectures on the letters of Paul)516. It is clear that Luther was critical of the predi-
lection of scholastic theology to practice abstract philosophical reflection. Luther’s 
lectures on Paul in the summer of 1516 manifested his obvious dislike for metaphysics: 
“But alas, how deeply and painfully we are ensnared in categories and questions of 
what a thing is; in how many foolish metaphysical questions we involve ourselves!”517 
Also in Heidelberg Disputation in 1518 Luther shunted over metaphysics: “He 
who wishes to philosophize by using Aristotle without danger to his soul must first 
become thoroughly foolish in Christ.”518 After this, Luther continued to criticize 
Aristotle’s understanding of the eternal nature of the world, contrasting him with 
Plato, whom he found to be superior. Then he proceeded to the proof his thesis, his 
theologia crucis, wherein he formulated the famous statement “a theologian of the 
cross calls the thing what it actually is”.519 Stanley interpreted it, suggesting that here 
Luther “refocuses his interlocutors’ attention upon the physicality of Jesus Christ on 
the cross, while simultaneously calling metaphysical presuppositions into question”.520
514 Heidegger 1992. See also Heidegger 2000; Marx 1982; Kisiel 1995, Part 2.
515 Heidegger 2010; Stanley 2010, 14–26; Van Buren 1994a, 159–174 and 1994b, 157–202, 220; 
Kisiel 1995, Part 1, Chap. 2,3&4; Stanley 2007; Adluri 2013.
516 Luther, Martin, Luther’s Works, edited by Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut 
T. Lehman. American ed. 55 vols. 14, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 38, 41, 51. Philadelphia, PA: Forthress 
Press, 1999.
517 Luther, Works, 55 vols, 25, p. 361; See also, Stanley 2010, 14–25.
518 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p.41.
519 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p.53.
520 See, Stanley 2010, 14–25. Stanley highlighted “sight” as an outward vision. Contrary to the “sight” 
we can note that Laestadius encouraged his readers to turn on the merit of God in the cross of 
Christ and thus, he seems to emphasize a more emphatic inward relation of faith in order to 
receive the power of grace, which he believed was the genuine “essence” of Christ.
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The foundational idea for Luther was to destruct the objectifying theoretical no-
tions of God and Christian faith as manifested in a so-called theology of glory521. 
Luther formulated a harsh critique of scholastic intellectualism, holding that the 
proper nature of God cannot be grasped by theoretical-intellectual contemplation 
or scholastic philosophy.522 For the question concerning the revelation of God, the 
theology of the cross approached God through the cross and suffering of Christ, and 
shifts the core emphasis onto an inwardness of faith; for Luther the essence of God 
cannot be approached and transparently reached by intellect, but instead the grace 
of God has to be received by “faith alone”523.
Stanley saw that ”[o]ne of the direct ways in which Luther´s ideas demonstrate the 
critical yet ambiguous relationship to his scholastic contemporaries was in regard to 
freedom.”524 Luther stated in his Heidelberg Disputation that “free will, after the fall, 
exists in name only, and as long as it does what it is able to do, it commits a mortal sin.”525
The principal theme in the Heidelberg Disputation, in which Luther proceeds to 
define the limits of the theory of knowledge, is paying attention to the natural and 
theological possibilities of human being/life. This is crucially important when reading 
the debated statement of Luther – “free will, after the fall, has power to do good only 
in a passive capacity, but it can always do evil in an active capacity.”526 Here is found 
also that the often referred notion concerning the human being’s possibility to have 
an influence on his own salvation: “It is certain that man must utterly despair of his 
own ability before he is prepared to receive the grace of Christ.”527
In theses 19–21 of the Heidelberg Disputation, which covers the discussion on the 
cross of the Christ, Luther’s position is the clearest and indeed lays out his meta-
physical stance528:
Thesis 19: “The person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks 
upon the invisible things of God as thought they were clearly perceptible 
in those things which have actually happened [Room. 1:20]…529”
521 See, MacGrath 1985; Stanley 2010, 1–21.
522 Cf. Kisiel & Sheehan 2007, 187–195; On the influence of Aristotle’s notion of happiness 
(Eudaimonia) on later ontotheology of Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl and 
its connection to theology of glory as mere intellectual contemplation of highest being.
523 MacGrath 1985. See furher of Luther’s relation to scholastic tradition in Stanley 2010, 16–17.
524 Stanley 2010, 23.
525 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p.48
526 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p. 49.
527 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p. 49. See further of Luther’s breakthrough in Stanley 2010, 23–24.
528 Stanley 2010, 25–27.
529 Luthers works, vol. 31, vol. 31, p.52. Luther, Martin, Luther’s Works, edited by Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, 
Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehman. American ed. 55 vols. 14, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 38, 41, 
51. Philadelphia, PA: Forthress Press, 1999.
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Thesis 20: “He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who compre-
hends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and 
the cross …530” 
Thesis 21: “A theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil. A theologian 
of the cross calls the thing what it actually is.531”
These often referenced statements of Luther have broadly inspired different 
theological and philosophical metaphysicians, and they also have radiated into 
many dogmatic questions, for instance, the problem of transubstantiation532.
Later Luther added an addendum to Thesis 21: “he who does not know Christ does 
not know God hidden in suffering.533” This addendum is seen as including Luther’s 
goal to fit natural reason and theological reason together. Insofar as God is revealed 
in the cross of the Christ and when the Christian believer contemplates that horrible 
death on the cross, the believer has to admit that God does not seem to appear to 
be revealed at all.534 Stanley concluded that for Luther, then, “there is no way to get 
from metaphysical reflection to a revelation of Christ’s divinity.535”
However, the cross as the limit of natural reason in the matters of faith includes 
the idea that natural reason and the “reason of faith” can peacefully co-exist. Faith 
is not irrational and opposite to the natural reason, but is rather ungraspable by any 
natural reason, and is able to reach even further than natural reason can536.
530 Luther, Works, vol. 31, vol. 31, p. 52.
531 Luther, Works, vol. 31, vol. 31, p. 53.
532 Stanley writes: “For Luther, the Cross of Christ revealed the being of God, and this is the chief 
reason why the ’is’ in Christ’s statement ’this is my body’ could not be understood in a strictly 
metaphorical sense.” (Stanley 2010, 27.) If “is” does not refer to its object as a metaphor, but instead 
to the “nature or essence of Christ” then the reference indicates or coincides the meaning with 
which Laestadius thought of eucharist as being genuinely received a “in faith mode” and within 
its inward vital-existential meaning within which the Christ “is present” in the Eucharist as a 
“object of faith.” If my interpretation of Laestadius’ notion of faith as un-objectifying intentionality 
is correct, we may see that Laestadius’ notions of God on the Cross encountered through faith 
and the Jesus’ body and the blood received in Eucharist “in its vitalizing power through faith”, 
deconstructed the idea of “being” or “is” as God really is present and actualized in the heart of a 
believer through faith. This notion of actualization could very well be interpreted as Laestadius’ 
vitalist-existentialistic interpretation; in a transcendental horizon of faith of the heart, the Christ 
“is present” and ”lives” as a vitalizing force in the inward religious existence of the believer.
533 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p. 53.
534 See McGrath 1985, 163 (Luther´s Theology of the Cross); Stanley 2010, 27.
535 Stanley 2010, 27.
536 Stanley states that this does not signify that the cross would be the anti-thesis to human reason. 
However, Luther encourages his interlocutors to turn their eyes upon the cross, as if it would 
force man to encounter the impossibility of God in the depravity of human beings, and then 
the theological truth would become a real possibility. (Stanley 2010, 27–28) As McGrath writes: 
”Though the relation of natural reason and revelation which we have discussed indicates a diastasis 
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Heidegger interprets and inscribes to Luther’s theology of the cross, both onto-
logical and epistemological meanings. Based on Luther’s Heidelberg disputations 
(19, 20 and 21) Heidegger, Luther overcomes the prevailing Aristotelian paradigm 
of the metaphysical notions of being (ousia) or substance, within which the Being 
is, in the most general sense, conceived of as a “constant presence.” The metaphys-
ics of substance and essence also prevailed in scholastic theology. God was mainly 
conceived of as a “constant presence”, the ultimate Being, unmovable mover, and a 
perennial object of theoretical thinking or human intellect537. This would mean a 
philosophical notion of God. It would signify the intellectualization of faith and the 
dismissal of experiential faith that was emphasized by Luther.
Heidegger’s interpretation is interesting with respect to this current study. Luther’s 
critique and Heidegger’s interpretation constitute the core of Protestant metaphys-
ics, which includes a strong critique of philosophical intellectualism and the use of 
metaphysical rationalism in matters of faith. Having summarized the basic idea of 
the theological origin of the critique of Western metaphysics, we can now turn back 
to The Lunatic.
We can begin here with the following citation that highlights Laestadius’ particular 
intention to move from a metaphysics of substance to the ontology of a vital event: 
“Once we have been liberated, through the principle of life, from ontology 
and metaphysics, we only need the given axiom, the dynamics of life, in 
order to uncover the elements that belong to the sphere of personhood. 
Through this logical trick (life), we have moved away from the being of 
the idea (ideväsénde) to the life of the idea[s] (idelif ); from substantiality 
to vitality, from the unthinkable idea substantialis to the more thinkable 
‘idea vitalis’; and even if the idea is not in the principle of life, as Heinroth 
claims, it is nevertheless present in formed life.” (§1206.)
Even though this formulation is not yet aimed at thematizing atonement or recon-
ciliation (as an absolution of the existence or God-relation), it is an anthropological 
preparatory move toward the notion of vital personhood. Thus, the turn from the 
between reason and faith which the creature can not eliminate, it certainly does not imply a divorce 
between the realms of reason and faith. Far from postulating a double truth, it rather excludes 
it. Faith is not irrational or contrary to natural reason but rather ungraspable by natural reason. 
This very conception allows for the reconciliation and harmonization of seemingly contrasting 
conclusions in science and theology by way of a ’peaceful coexistence.’” (McGrath 1985, 162–3) 
See also Stanley 2010, 27 footnote 126; Luther, Works, vol. 26, p. 174. Also Gerrish 1962, 69.
537 It has been argued that Heidegger’s interpretation of Luther’s intentions is inflated. However, 
Heidegger’s interpretation has been influential, thereby gaining many successors in Protestant 
theology, metaphysics, and phenomenological ontology. For example, Rudolf Bulttmann, Paul 
Tillich, and all of contemporary France philosophy, including Jean-Luc Marion, Derrida etc.
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ideas of essences or beings (ideväsénde) to the life of ideas or “thought life” (idelif ) is 
definitely Laestadius’ “path into thoughts.” We have seen above that this shift signifies 
simultaneously the turn from the mere logical analysis of metaphysical rationalism to 
the analysis of psychophysiological organization, functions, and processes – which lays 
the ground in general for a constitution of living ideas and cognition in man – and Laes-
tadius’ own [methodological] turn toward lived experience and pre-phenomenological 
thinking, and thus, to the life of ideas (idelif ). (Life precedes concepts and ideas)
In this respect, Laestadius offers an alternative way of conceiving the human soul 
as vital intensity and a holistic intentional relatedness with both existence and God. 
Also, the emphasis on psychic reconciliation plays a crucial role for the event of 
unification or the participation of man and God as a metaphysical necessity in order 
to return to the originally empowered soul.
Based on his idea of man, Laestadius also explains and re-interprets the character 
of human psyche, moral and spiritual experience, and the notion of reconciliation, 
which became his main goal in The Lunatic. With respect to the notion of reconcilia-
tion, Laestadius elaborated on the original theory of the correlative relation between 
the triadic man and the Trinity of God, and highlight the concept that reconciliation 
pertains to the whole Trinity of God and also holistically to the embodied human 
being. This holistic reconciliation between man and God necessitates both objective 
and subjective aspects, but Laestadius emphasized the subjective aspect as a “psychic” 
reconciliation. This “psychic” sphere is also conceived of as the genuine domain of “liv-
ing” or an inward faith through which the reconciling act of God in his “self-sacrifice” 
(the Son) can only be received (as it does not fit with the principles of natural reason). 
Thus, albeit that the reconciliation is the holistic “unio vitalis” and pertains to all the 
persons of God, Laestadius still holds that the possibility of reconciliation progresses 
through a specific order, so man has to first enter the self-conscious state (signifying 
the recognition of his own vital passional essence or fundamental deficient character), 
then secondly the affirmation of the reconciling act in the Son, which discloses the actual 
character of God as (suffering and) having unconditional love and grace (for the sinner) 
and henceforth leading to the discovery that God exists as an essentially whole and 
ultimate Being (varandet). This “ontotheology” understood as a three- dimensional force 
in human life: 1) as the original creative power in nature in the “form”/function of the 
principle of life and thus an original soul of a human being; 2) as an “imputation” into 
a factual organic life through the embodied Christ; and 3) as a Holy Spirit re-vitalized 
through reconciliation with the humane spiritual life and vital consciousness538.
538 Here it can be also analyzed to see how the existence of God has a temporal structure: A 
genealogical foundation for the principle of life, the historical occasion, and the present possibility 
in the Son, and disclosed a future possibility in the Holy Spirit. Naturally, this analysis had to be 
excluded from this study.
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Insofar as the emphasis is on encountering the God in Christ through faith, 
Laestadius’ psychophysical insight followed the line of Luther’s idea in that God 
will be properly encountered in the “cross and suffering” through faith, instead of 
an intellectual reaching toward an ultimate being and cause (substance, essence). 
More generally, Laestadius’ thought relates naturally to the tradition of Protestant 
metaphysics through its emphasis on the Lutheran critical attitude toward philoso-
phy and the emphasis on “faith alone” (sola fide) and the suffering and the cross, but 
also through a pietistic radicalization of Luther’s ideas combined with the vitalist 
interpretation of the nature of living faith. It seems clear, therefore, that Laestadius 
was indeed influenced by Luther’s anti-philosophy.539
In Laestadius’ case, a God encountered through faith does not actually illuminate 
itself as being, but rather as the “living force” that manifests itself in different ways 
within nature (the principle of life) in history and also present life (the Son, born 
and becoming organic life) and in the Holy Spirit as a consciousness brightened 
and empowered by moral passions and faith.540 Laestadius stated that the father 
creates/is the Son is a necessary essential continuation of his vital essence, and the 
Son “creates” the world through the Holy Spirit which is the highest constitutive 
manifestation of the functional essence of the Father, the God. Thus, Father/Mother 
the God, the ultimate Being (varandet) or principle of life creates the world through 
the Son. As far as Laestadius’ opposition to applying rationalistic and metaphysical 
philosophy to the matters of life and faith formed his general critical stance toward 
the intellectualization of the notion of God, man, faith and life, psychic reconciliation 
can be seen as the core notion within which the man/God relationship is interpreted 
in the opposite way, from a holistic experiential perspective that emphasizes the 
inward encountering of the God instead of using an intellectual approach. This 
turn into inwardness, the psychological affirmation of the “work of Christ” on the 
cross and suffering (as a pure gift and offering the possibility of emancipation for 
the guilty of sin) can be seen in Luther’s terms as a “theology of the cross,” contrary to a 
“theology of Glory.”
Laestadius does not stress the “gaze” on the cross and suffering of the Christ, 
but he does highlight the necessity of sacrifice and the actualization or experience 
of the power of grace as revealed in the inwardness of faith in Christ; this sense is 
thematized in psychic reconciliation as the initial condition for actual reconciliation, 
539 Laestadius, of course, could not be familiar with Heidegger’s interpretation, but its other roots, 
such as the pietistic critic against Lutheran orthodoxy as well as the general pietistic critic against 
Hegelian metaphysics – for example, found in Kierkegaard’s philosophy – re-vitalized Heidegger 
and Laestadius’ critics. It is not sure either whether Laestadius knew Kierkegaards work even 
though they were contemporaries.
540 Laestadius could have not developed his doctrine of the trinity of God without Bichat’s distinctions 
of principle of life, organic life, and animal life (Sensory life).
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contrary to the outer “gaze” or knowledge objective aspect of reconciliation. In this 
respect, psychic reconciliation includes such an inner evidential experience.
Laestadius anti-philosophy begins with a different theoretical frame than Hei-
degger’s existentialistic approach. However, the theology of the cross and the pietis-
tic emphasis on subjective experience or inwardness are inscribed into Laestadius’ 
psychological-philosophical theory. It can be seen not only in the titular critique of 
metaphysical rationalism, but also fully in the fact that the intellect plays a secondary 
role with respect to embodied experience (which culminates in the intentionality of 
faith). Further, this anti-philosophical-epistemological stance overcomes the “mere 
objective”, “material”, and “spiritual” and pursues to elaborate on the notion of life, 
which is simultaneously immanent and transcendent (the principle of life as the vital 
essence of God as well as the essence of a human being). 
Laestadius’ whole philosophy aims to make psychic reconciliation necessary and 
thus entails a psychologization of the theology of the cross. From this perspective, 
Laestadius fits well within the tradition of Protestant metaphysics, and as we have 
seen, this inward relation to God and the consequences it is assumed to have in hu-
man organic passions and henceforth for human consciousness; the inward relation to 
God and its cognitive indications seem to have both ontological and epistemological 
significance. Even if Laestadius began with the notion of the principle of life or vital 
force in nature given by God (theology of nature), he came to think that the divinity 
of nature is not given directly to an “empirical gaze” of experience; rather for nature 
to be disclosed as divine necessitates the religious experience – as only through the 
religious experience of awakening, is nature conceived as created by God and thus 
a manifestation of divine force. The being, especially all organic life as animated 
constitutive and creative life541, is first of all appreciated as such as a creation of God, 
and the knowledge about God is from the very beginning experiential and disclosed 
though both moral passions and living faith. Thus, we may conclude that in Laestadius’ 
theory the philosophical and theological metaphysics of substance is coincidentally overcome 
by a vitalist-existential emphasis and by the emphasis on the theology of cross as affirmed 
through the notion of psychic reconciliation.542 Life is a dynamic event and enable to 
541 To say this about the whole organized physical universe would demand an argument on Laestadius’ 
radical panpsychism, which cannot be formulated in this study. 
542 The similarities between Luther’s theology of the cross and Laestadius’ vitalist-existentialist 
interpretation of the notion of psychic reconciliation and the “living faith of the heart” disclose 
an interesting connection with the pioneering Finnish Luther –research: Cf. Mannermaa 1998a 
and 1998b. Especially Tuomo Mannermaa’s Luther –interpretation regarding the idea of God’s 
actual presence in faith (Union with Christ) seems to have a similar understanding of Luther’s 
conception of faith as Laestadius presents. The question of whether Laestadius’ interpretation 
of “living faith” and “unio vitalis” is an explicit interpretation of Luther’s notion of faith and 
the cross and whether Laestadius’ idea of psychic reconciliation and living faith included the 
ideas of participation and divinization are fruitful theological questions for further research. As 
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approach itself only through experience, feeling, and passions. In this respect, Laes-
tadius’ psychophysiological anthropology turns to an ontotheological Christology 
which, however, also seems to include the “natural philosophical” dimension of the 
divinity of nature. 
5.5.6  Overcoming Philosophical Metaphysics
Presumably inspired also by Luther’s critique of metaphysics, Laestadius saw in his 
context that metaphysical rationalism combined with theological questions created 
problems.543 What is interesting is that Luther and Laestadius both referred to 
the need for overcoming metaphysical speculation and they both moved from an 
objectifying and re-presentational way of looking at metaphysics into the realm of 
descriptive thematics on inner existential relatedness. For Luther, it was Aristotelian 
metaphysics (scholastic Aristotelianism) that objectified God and the theology of 
glory that embraced God only in its eidos or outward essence (achieved by intellect). 
According to Laestadius’ critique, it was the later currents of rationalism (Cartesian 
tradition) and German idealism (especially Hegelianism) in the 1800’s context that 
misled theology scholars/philosophers into objectified notions of God, faith and 
man. Luther and Laestadius do share the basic trend of critiques when criticizing 
philosophical theology on idealistic speculation, which then misled them form 
correct understanding of a living Graceful God and idea of man as an embodied 
fleshly being. For Luther, the shift meant a move to the intentional sphere of faith 
as the inner basis for meanings; this view emerges in the Heidelberg disputation 
in the questions of “what really Is” and seeing the Cross as revealing the true God 
within the (suffering and) faith. For Laestadius, the emphasis of an own-most faith 
and reconciliation is also explained by the anthropological argument of primality 
of subjective consciousness and metaphysical necessity (psychic reconciliation) so 
as to move from the metaphysics of substance into the metaphysics of a vital event.
demonstrated above, Laestadius elaborated on the insight of the idea of a “union with Christ” 
and an empowered embodied soul through a living faith, but to make plausible claims in this 
respect would demand more detailed analysis and further interpretation. Altogether, if it could 
be shown that Laestadius’ notions of faith and reconciliation did encompass particular ideas of 
participation and divinization, then the discussion on the “New Finnish interpretation” would 
naturally have a new advocate from the school of “Old Swedish interpretation.”
543 Critique of ”hylomorphism” and the emphasis of humoral secretion (§996.); See also §997, §998, 
§1202 to note how Laestadius claimed that the philosopher postulates essence and substance 
into the God. Further Laestadius applies vitalist criticism of rationalism, dualism and mechanism 
into contemporary philosophical theological context arguing its God to become highest Being, 
keeping immaterial dualist soul, abstract personhood and falsely see human being free and moral 
in-itself without outer justification. In §681 Laestadius insist that emotions and passions precede 
concepts and thus metaphysics.
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For both Luther and Laestadius, the character of God is revealed in the “suffering 
and the Cross” (for Laestadius, God is suffering and self-sacrificing, but above all 
also gracious). God can be encountered through own embodied suffering, through 
awakening through the breakdown of human egoism and the affirmation of Grace as 
a pure [emancipatory] gift. This encountering of the “proper” Christian God, not an 
outer essence represented by intellect and reason, occurs through experiential faith, 
or in Laestadius’ case, through subjective consciousness or “inner” intentionality of 
faith (psychic reconciliation).
Proper understanding of the phenomena of life, human beings, and God has to be 
based on an inner experience of the heart rather than any rationalistic metaphysical 
and re-presentational conceptualization. The result of these shifts is to open up an 
anti-intellectualistic and existential stance for the ontology of the events of life and 
faith, and the possibility of reconciliation.
We can assume that Laestadius had in mind Luther’s harsh critique against scho-
lastic Aristotelianism and the applications of the ideas of substance and essence that 
led to an abstract idea of essence of God as ultimate being and unmovable mover. To 
put it briefly, Laestadius’ endeavor here was to shift from thinking about “outward 
essences (eidos)”, which indicated intellectualism, to inner experiential thought, 
which now signified a more “existentialistic” approach. In this way, the embodied 
character of the human being, as well as the “hiddenness of God,” are grasped ex-
perientially, not only through reason, but also holistically in the experiential domain 
of faith. Thus, “faith” in Laestadius’ case meant embodied passional intentionality that 
was contrary to mere intellectual relation. In a sense, Laestadius’ “metaphysical turn” to 
vitalist existentialism can be perceived as inscribing Luther’s distinction between the 
theology of the glory and the theology of the cross into his own theory. 
This “turn” also has interesting philosophical implications: It is not possible to 
conceive of the whole of human life by only a rationalistic “gaze” or conceptualizations 
of being (seiende), but instead to conceive that whole as an event of life, tensions of 
natural and moral passions, and influences of surrounding world. These events and 
tensions lay the fundamental ground (passional, mood) for every meaning (being) 
of human life. In this sense, it can be interpreted that God is similar to Being as 
the horizon for all meanings of the manifestations of Being. Human life or being 
whatsoever is disclosed/revealed within/through passions, and finally on the basis 
of an intentionality of faith that overcomes the “constant presence” (ousia) and the 
substantiality, and releases human existence into its inner experiential sphere of the 
event of life.
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Because God is not properly encountered by intellect, but rather necessitates an 
inner experiential grasp of faith, faith remains secret to reason. 544Because religious 
experience as a lived experience is based on pre-cognitive passions, faith is not pos-
sible to be fully conceptualized and thematized by reason and understanding545. From 
this clearly thematized position, Laestadius moved toward an alternative approach, 
toward the evidence of heart that was for him a more reliable source of evidence 
than reason in matters of life and faith.
According to Laestadius, faith has to be understood in terms of passions and 
emotion, as a living faith is constituted of “high heavenly emotions”; religion can be 
understood only in terms of passions, so religion cannot be objectified and defined 
precisely:
544 The core of Laestadius’ philosophy exists and tightens around the question of the nature and 
possibility of the religious experiences of awakening, conversion and reconciliation. Therefore, 
Laestadius’ philosophy can be interpreted as holistic and a pre-phenomenological explanation 
of the necessity of change of mind to which the word Metanoia refers in the Bible. Within a 
theological context, Laestadius’ view of conversion and reconciliation is quite classical Lutheran-
pietistic with an emphasis on one’s own most and inner need for religious experience on which 
the passivity of will in favor of outer “imputation” of grace plays a crucial role (in the change of 
the heart). In the anthropological direction, it is also important to notice how Laestadius’ scientific 
and pre-phenomenological descriptions tried to explicate metanoia not only as a change of mind, 
but also the change in the whole embodied intentional directedness of the human being.
 In the frames of philosophical anthropology or philosophical theology, Laestadius’ theory also 
reveals a connection to a more general shift in the metaphysical approach towards metanoia: 
Laestadius saw Western rationalism and metaphysics as inadequate approaches for discovering the 
true nature and meaning of the embodied religious experiences of awakening and reconciliation. 
His main idea was that reason is not the faculty of the soul within which faith and matters of 
life can be understood. Also, idealistic ideas of immaterial soul as the essence of a human being 
as well as the whole stance of metaphysics of substance are insufficient approaches.
 Laestadius’ thesis was that – in understanding faith and existential matters of life, sorrow and joy 
– research had to move from the perspective of the idea of substances to the idea of vital processes. 
Laestadius saw that the idea of substance and the reflections of reason led to misunderstanding 
of the essence of the human being as well as in understanding the living God correctly because 
both objectified and created unneeded dichotomies (such as body and mind). He saw that vitalistic 
monism was more dynamic, heuristic, and experientially more plausible ground for understanding 
and explication. (Metanoia as a fundamental change in embodied intentionality cannot be 
explained by the metaphysics of substance and rationalism, but only in terms of monistic vitalism 
and medical psychology. BY forming the anthropological theory of metanoia and grounding it 
in vitalism, Laestadius thematizes an alternative metaphysical position that contrasted with the 
rationalistic-metaphysical doctrine of man. Laestadius thus created the metaphysics of event or 
process by positing man in an organic body and a factual world.)
545 Laestadius emphasized that matters of faith and life have to be understood by the heart, thus 
referring to the grounding level of subjective consciousness as a pre-cognitive and unconscious 
sphere: Matters of faith and life are not given as any direct empirical or rationalistic perception, 
but rather through an inner embodied experience and these matters are always mediated through 
the passions, emotions, drives, instincts, intuition, and the spiritual conscience!
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“Living faith consists in exalted heavenly feelings that are perceptible within 
the heart, and these feelings cannot be described with words; they cannot 
be defined since the intellect is unable to reflect upon these feelings or 
bring them to clarity through concepts (see section B.B.). Therefore, reli-
gion cannot be defined even though the apostle Paul tried to define faith, 
just as most theologians have tried to define religion. But they have not 
succeeded since the definitions are very different. How could it be possible 
to define faith, which is a living feeling, a passion, when not even natural 
love can be defined, nor grief or fear; passions of which one is unable to 
say anything more than that they are feelings! For this reason, then, affairs 
of love contain a ‘mysticism’ that only lovers are able to grasp, not with 
intellect, but with the heart.” (§1557, see Chapter DD.)
From this discussion, we can conclude that Laestadius’ monistic vitalism signi-
fied a certain kind of ontology of event and also a partially hermeneutic endeavor 
to understand the fundamental pre-cognitive initial conditions of faith and the 
possibility of a change in an embodied intentionality (awakening). From this per-
spective, Laestadius’ theory of awakening or conversion – in terms of the meaning 
of metanoia - suggested not only a “change of mind”, but also a change in the whole 
embodied pre-cognitive intentionality [of being-in-the-world].
It is similar to Pascal saying that the “heart has its reasons that reason does not 
know” or Kierkegaard emphasizing “the Leap” as an existential necessity of decision-
making without any rational objective evidence, when Laestadius emphasizes the 
“living faith of the heart”. It was actually the whole deconstructed Biblical idea of 
soul that came into question in Laestadius’ case:
“But the simple man judges the soul according to what he feels. May not 
feeling be as reliable a source of knowledge as intellect and reason, especially 
in matters that lie beyond the grasp of both intellect and reason? Neither 
intellect nor reason is capable of obfuscating (jäfva bort) or rejecting as lies 
(göra till lögn), that which man feels within himself.” (§58.)
In terms of the emphasis on the evidence of heart (passions, moods) instead of 
rationalistic intellectual evidence, we can use a fragment from Heidegger’s Being 
and Time as even more fundamental ontological grounding for Laestadius’ endeavor:
”Phenomenally, we would wholly fail to recognize both what mood discloses 
and how it discloses, if that which is disclosed were to be compared with 
what Dasein is acquainted with, knows, and believes ‘at the same time’ 
when it has such a mood. Even if Dasein is ‘assured’ in its belief about its 
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‘whiter’, or if, in rational enlightenment, it supposes itself to know about 
its ‘whence’, all this counts for nothing as against the phenomenal facts 
of the case: for the mood brings Dasein before the ‘that-it-is’ of its ‘there’, 
which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma. 
From the existential-ontological point of view, there is not the slightest 
justification for minimizing what ‘evident’ in state-of mind, by measuring 
it against the apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something 
which is purely present-at-hand [object-like]. However the phenomena are 
no less falsified when they are banished to the sanctuary of the irrational. 
When irrationalism, as the counter play of rationalism, talks about the 
things to which rationalism is blind, it does so with a squint.” (Heidegger 
1992, Being and Time §29, p. 175)
Based on this critical assessment of the distinction between rationalism and irra-
tionalism, Heidegger’s intention was to thematize attunement or mood (Befindlickeit 
der Stimmung) as an original existential-ontological “structure” of the revelation of a 
thing, being, or event. Rationalism, by focusing its theoretical gaze to mere present-
at-hand or objectified being, overrides the experiential phenomena (thus, signifying 
empiricism in its trues essence) as well as emotivism by emphasizing that the psy-
chological dimension misses the ontological-existential character of attunement as 
an opening structure of being or thing as such. 
What is interesting here then is that Laestadius saw rationalism as a form of 
objectifying approach and likened to empiricism, as it missed the phenomenal-
experiential sphere of spirit-life [the domain of faith as subjective consciousness]546. 
For Laestadius, rationalism was calculating along with objectivity and an objectified 
being in a theoretical gaze without exploring the things through the experiential 
stand point of the subjective consciousness or “heart”. Laestadius emphasized pas-
sions as grounding the intentional correlates of the things and matters perceived as 
to whether the object of idélif [life of the idea or thought life] is the world, God, or 
a thing whatsoever. Laestadius did not simply reduce passions to human biology, but 
rather saw them as synonymous to the world; thus, passions are always awakened by 
sense perceptions, but they simultaneously also direct the gaze of objective cognition 
and consciousness. Laestadius also interpreted passions as a phenomenal-experiential 
grounding of the human intentionality of being-in-the-world547. For Laestadius, the 
heart forms the core and center of passions, and thus any change of intentionality has 
to begin in the sphere of organic passions, not the objective consciousness of the mind. 
546 Laestadius saw rationalists sometimes as materialists and sometimes as spiritualists. He directly 
opposed both materialist psychology and transcendentalism. 
547 See, Chapter 4.2.4 Passions as Vital-Intentional Correlates (nexus).
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However, Laestadius was critical of an emotivism that leads to moral relativism. 
Following the emotions awakened by more noble passions is to rely on the relative 
ground within which both human action and thought depends on the mere rivalry 
of the impacts of natural passions. Instead, he claimed that spiritual awakening that 
directly touches subjective consciousness is necessary for any genuine moral change 
of mind; in other words Laestadius realized that grounding the forces of passions 
in flesh and in the world constituted the underlying basis for intentionality and 
repentance (kr. metanoia) or moral development as such. Awakening as a conflict of 
natural and moral passions constituted the self-aware state that makes either moral 
or spiritual change possible.
5.5.7  Capturing Metaphysics
Life as phenomena and a worldly immanent-transcendental occasion is not dealt 
in terms of being (ontology and metaphysics), but rather in terms of vitalism (vital 
force) and an experiential-moral description as an dynamic event, development, 
(evolution), a continuous change, a tension between forces, and life and death. Life 
cannot be re-presented as conceptually transparent, for it cannot be objectified by 
an intellect that belongs to the physical constitution of life itself. Thus, life cannot 
be grasped by any representation in its deepest significance by the intellect. Life is 
a mystery, and this characteristic has to be secured within the theological dogmatic 
and genuine religious faith. However, life can be approached by experience, in the 
form of passion, emotion and feeling; this inner entrance into the life can reveal life 
in terms of its inner and un-categorized meaning.
However, despite the holistic critique and the fight against metaphysical rational-
ism in anthropology and theology, Laestadius had to lean on metaphysics, as we have 
seen here, and use the language of metaphysics of substance and essence, even if in its 
re-defined significance. As a consequence of moving between scientific-psychological 
and religious discourses, Laestadius’ theory was captivated by the Western metaphysi-
cal theorization. This view is present, for instance, when he called the horizon of all 
beings and phenomena of life by the concept of God as “absolute being”.
Here Laestadius’ physiological transcendentalism shows its perennial metaphysical 
character. The ontological difference between absolute Being (varandet) and being is 
made explicit. Coincidentally, the principle of life is conceived as something autono-
mous and transcendental from matter itself even though it does have to function 
through matter. God and His manifestation in nature – the principle of life – signifies 
the absolute transcendental horizon, varandet, of being whatsoever:
“But the physicians who posit the soul as substance and the body as con-
tingent cannot reasonably be accused of materialism. They proceed from 
the principle that matter is ‘ens contingens’: something that can exist or 
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not exist, but need not necessarily exist, because it does not contain within 
itself the foundation of its existence. In relation to God, which is absolute 
Being (varandet) matter can never be substantive, only contingent, since its 
foundation lies in something beyond matter itself.” (§54.)
This citation shows that Laestadius had to lean on the metaphysical concep-
tions of essence (väsen) and Being (varandet), even if he tried to rid himself of such 
philosophical terms. Thus, his critique of Western metaphysics had to be conceived 
only as a re-evaluation and deconstruction of theological and ontological notions 
from the given vitalist and experiential point of view, and for a given historical 
epoch. Thus, the most valuable insights of his critique of Wastern metaphysics and 
ontology (being and Being, essence and substance) is included in his critique of the 
idealistic and rationalistic notions of soul, faith, and God. Laestadius’ critique of 
metaphysical rationalism and ontology strove to offer a more dynamic alternative 
account so as to destruct and deconstruct the objectifying conceptions prevailing in 
his times. However, as a consequence of its attachment with tradition, Laestadius’ 
theory remained ontotheological, as it held that God as an “ultimate Being” was the 
horizon, foundation, source, and ground for all of existence.
5.5.8 Eternal Soul and Resurrection
Laestadius insisted on a vital-existential understanding of the phenomena of life and 
faith. Coincidentally, Laestadius compared the kingdom of heaven as an internal 
condition to the classical phenomena that vitalists used to explain the functioning of 
vital force: As well as God, a human being is also a immanent-transcendence within 
which the transcendentality remains: 
“When we say that the feelings are objectivized into living visions (the 
explanation of which falls to the physiologist), we have thus hinted at our 
conviction, that ‘visionary only sees his own feelings,’ ‘he sees the Savior 
and the kingdom of heaven in his own heart.’ However, since the Savior has 
said that ‘the kingdom of God is within you,’ (Luke 17:21) the philosopher 
needs to prove that the kingdom of God is not internal, within man, but 
somewhere outside of him; in the sun, in the moon, or in the stars. The 
philosopher has too little faith, or no faith at all, in the empirical discoveries 
that the physiologist is able to show concerning somnambulism, animal 
magnetism (sv. animala magnetismen, hypnosis), nightmares (maran), vi-
sions, and dreams, along with other physio-psychic phenomena, the real 
existence which he is unable to deny, yet he does not believe in them any 
more than he wants to, because he cannot comprehend them. And yet, he 
claims to know more than the other people about spiritual matters, even 
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though he does not have the least understanding of life and its dynamics, 
which is taking place right before his eyes. How much does the philosopher 
understand of his own dreams? How much does he understand of grief, 
joy, jealousy, hatred, and other passions, the effects of which he sees with 
his own eyes every day?” (§1340.)
This citation is clearly connected with our earlier analysis of non-sensory per-
ceptions within conscience.548 In life, vital force or the principle of life is a psychic 
quality achieved through lived experience. However, Laestadius seems to have been 
influenced by natural scientific ideas and conceived of the principle of life as being 
analogical to physical laws when he conceived it as a quantity after death. Laestadius 
held that the force of life is a particular form of natural law: “Life is a quality, but 
when the body dies, life becomes a quantity.” (§64.)
This is not quite an original thought, as many seventeenth/eighteenth century 
physicians admired mechanist theorizing, and especially, Newton commonly ac-
claimed it in his accurate explications of the laws of nature. This Newtonian influence 
led some vitalists, for example, Bathez, to conceive of the vital principle parallel to 
Newton’s law of gravitation, except for having it pertain to organic life (not physical 
inert matter)549. Altogether, the vital principle as a law-like organization was seen as 
analogical to the laws of physics, which could only be perceived through their effects, 
manifestations, and “conclusions.”
In Laestadius’ thought, the idea of vital force as a quantity is present, especially 
when he anticipates the accusations of materialism; materialist or naturalistic ration-
alization would naturally have to include an account of the possibility of immortality 
and resurrection of the soul. In this regard Laestadius referred to the law of constancy 
[of force], stating that no philosopher had yet been able to prove that the mass of 
matter and force would dissipate/disappear simultaneously: 
“The above-mentioned psychological thesis-that the soul is a life and not 
being (väsen) – is likely to be countered by the philosopher by claiming that 
what is merely a property of the body – such as, for instance, organic life – 
548 Also in The Voice of the One Crying Laestadius states that the visions and revelations can be 
explained only by the help of physiology which is the part of the science of medicine (Laestadius 
1988, 38.) Furthermore Laestadius held that visions can be explained as thoughts actualized within 
embodied passional life within which they become “subjective truth.” In turn this psychosomatic 
process also explained how “subjective matter can be understood subjectively. Or how the feelings 
of the heart can change to visible pictures in one’s subjective consciousness.” (Laestadius 1988, 
54–55.) If my interpretation is correct, Laestadius here describes his naturalistic view of the 
visions and revelations as increased force of passions and its impact on consciousness that he later 
explained in more detail in The Lunatic. See about passions also in Laestadius 1988, 22–23.
549 Haigh 1977, 1–14.
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must cease when the body ceases to exist. If the soul is merely a property of 
the body, rather than being (väsen) or substance, then it must vanish when 
the body dies. But if we were to accept the philosopher’s own notions of time 
and space, which he often employs in regard to transcendental matters, then 
no quantities can exist beyond time and space. If the soul is of an intensive 
rather than extensive order – that is to say, force – then no philosopher has 
yet been able to prove that matter and force are destroyed at the same time; 
or that force must dissipate when matter ceases to be.” (§138.)
Even if the idea of the constancy “of force” might have been adopted from Petrelli’s 
Psychologie (§88), it seems that Laestadius preferred, or at least flirted with, the idea 
of a constancy of force, and he seemed to imply that the immortality of soul could 
be understood, if not explained, in analogical way to the law of constancy. If doable, 
Laestadius seemed to think that the principle of life as the force (kraft) of the soul 
could transform or change from quality to quantity in death550.
Laestadius claimed that the natural philosophical idea that says that nature emerges 
through the “blind force of nature,” and acquires consciousness through man, lacks 
a sufficient rational principle (principium rationis sufficientis). Natural philosophers 
have not been able to prove that the “blind force of nature,” can function without 
preconditions. Laestadius questioned the emergence of the “force of nature” and 
referred to Plato by stating that the
“sharpest thinkers have been forced to realize and admit that the institution 
of nature pre-supposes both will and intellect; it presupposes an idea that 
has been actualized. Plato’s anima mundi [the soul of the world] was not 
unconscious force (medvetslös naturakraft).” (§1600.) 
Laestadius was especially worried that the doctrine of only the abstract or ideal 
forces of nature would lead to pantheism, panpenumatism, naturalism, dualism, 
and fatalism, and thus wanted to highlight that his stance was a rather limited 
panpsychism, which would presumably avoid the [unchristian] problematic stances 
of natural philosophies:
”Moreover, the doctrine of the forces of nature leads, by its logical exten-
sion, to pantheism, naturalism, dualism, and fatalism. To be sure, we have 
550 Does this idea signify that original soul as the principle of life, is not personal or qualitative after 
death? Does this signify the end of experientiality, a qualitative character? Is the human soul the 
same? What part of the soul and how does the soul change in death? (i.e., Heart as the organ of 
the principle of life). It is notable that we cannot find much depictions and characterizations of 
the life after death from The Lunatic.
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previously in these treatise accepted ’panpsycaismus’ within the material 
part of man, but we have not accepted ’panpneumatismus,’ which would 
lead to pantheism within nature. At the same time we have accepted the 
substantiality of matter, but no one has been able to accept the substantiality 
of life, since the very concept of substance and being (väsen) are material-
istic. However, since many sharp thinkers have assumed that matter is an 
‘ens contingens,’ something that can be and not be, from which it follows 
that matter does not possess substantiality, but must be considered as ‘con-
tingent,’ which certainly destroys materialism in its darkest hollows; while 
many great thinkers also assume the substantiality of both body and soul, 
that is to say, of both matter and life, or force; even as idealism assumes that 
the idea is the real substance; we are unable to assume that any of these 
several unproven hypotheses is true. Rather, in the question of substance and 
non-substance, we must follow the guidance of revelation, which teaches 
us that the world will be annihilated and disappear, and that man’s body 
shall become immortal through the power of resurrection, the life force 
will be heightened (stegra) to the extent that it negates gravity and other 
characteristics of matter, which can be concluded from transfigured body 
of Christ. From this, one may also conclude that the force (characteristics) 
of matter can be altered.” (§1601.) 
Following classical vitalist ideas and expanding the notion of having a vital force 
for life philosophical and theological directions Laestadius elaborated on the funda-
mentals of his philosophy of religion. He held that passions can cause even death, but 
the re-vitalizing force of God (the principle of life as original soul vitalized through 
grace) can heighten any corrupting powers and resist the forces of death (§738, 739). 
In this way, the vitalistic interpretation of soul and grace offer a key insight into 
the possibility of eternal life. The principle of life, the actualization of God’s eternal 
thought in nature, signifies a creative energetic principle and an eternal principle of 
human life. Thus, Laestadius seemed to offer a quite classical Christian idea on an 
evidentialistic way. The carnal worldly life of human beings is a passage through the 
world; the eternal vital force (Life) in man finally returns to its own foundation or 
source (Uphov).
5.6  Summary: Faith As Un-objectifying Intentionality
In the previous Chapters (2, 3, and 4), I have shown how Laestadius attached his apol-
ogy of Christian pietism on medical vitalist philosophy and followed its basic ideas. 
He deconstructed the mind-body dualism and dealt with it in vitalist physiological 
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terms, especially leaning on Bichat’s distinction between organic life and animal life, 
and elaborating further on his own ideas of objective and subjective consciousness. 
Laestadius also elaborated on his theory of the “moral” and the “spiritual” on the 
physiological plane and replaced mind-body dualism with a relative distinction be-
tween physiological (the flesh) and moral/spiritual (the spiritual) which were however, 
conceived as constitutively interrelated domains. Laestadius used the term “moral” 
to indicate the “psychic” and “spiritual” domain of human existence. Thus, “physi-
ological” and “moral/spiritual” encompass both the “mental” or psychic phenomena, 
irreducible simply to a distinct “rational soul” or consciousness, and the physiological 
phenomena, irreducible to mere inert matter and its functioning mechanisms. This 
undertaking was done by referring to the notion of the principle of life as original 
soul and a constitutive force within matter.
In regard to the above analysis, Laestadius seemed to have scientific explanations 
and justifications for experiential pietistic faith, religious experience, as well as for 
his own use of powerful poetic sermons. It becomes understandable that Laestadius 
demanded real embodied experiences as the basis of learning, moral progress, and 
genuine own-most faith because he perceived (following Bichat) that mere outer 
“knowledge” which is only “in the head” is unable to awaken deep embodied experi-
ences (as it does not affect the subjective consciousness) that can influence experiential 
change. In other words, “strong embodied experiences” are needed for learning and 
spiritual awakening. Outer knowledge, Laestadius argued, does not reach the level 
of blessedness/salvation. Laestadius saw experientiality as being very important, 
as formulated and emphasized by the terms of passions, heart, conscience, and the 
subjective consciousness, and unconsciousness.
Whatever the combinations of different organic functions – whether impulses, 
humoral activity of the liver, kidneys or genital organs – Laestadius saw as evident 
that organic organization and its vital functions lay the groundwork for motion, 
voluntary and in-voluntary action, and a higher sensory or cognitive life, and thus 
also a grounding for morality and spirituality551.
Laestadius’ insight naturally raised questions. Are moral habits and personal 
characters determined by physiological laws? Is there any room for freedom of will 
551 Thus, even the physiological seat of the organic body is depicted in a quite rough way from the 
perspective of modern medicine, as it still remains analogical, at least formally, to the present day 
physiological-materialistic explanation of consciousness. Organic functions influence the organs 
of consciousness and mind, manifesting as different cognitions, such as emotions and thought, 
depending on their varying contents. In psychological research, the power of the use of pictures, 
music, and lyrical speech is generally recognized. (Vitalists as well as Laestadius have been well 
aware of the power of sermons and pictures; physicians as well as priests who are familiar with 
vitalist doctrines of pathology have certainly applied their knowledge to curing people (in matters 
of the soul and body)…
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and autonomy (however framed and conceived)? Why is humoral activity conceived 
as a “moral element,” and does that view entail forcing human freedom, autonomy, 
morality and habituality to have more to do with humoral activity (secretion) than 
neural sensual functioning? Are neural functions the grounding of deterministic 
activity and is the humoral a source of change, variability, and more voluntary activity 
(both sympathetic and autonomous nervous systems)? Altogether, despite the fact 
that Laestadius overcame dualism with respect to both origin and cause (as mind 
and body have the same common principle of life as their basis), his theory offers 
another kind of function dualism on the physiological plane which manifests as the 
distinction between the physical and the moral/spiritual552.
Conflict between the passions is dealt with on the physical plane, perceptibly in a 
naturalistic fashion and partly even mechanistically in vitalist terms. These examples 
reveal that Laestadius’ way of conceiving the character and action of the human person 
can be fundamentally explained in terms of two distinct systems that influence the 
organs of sensory life (brain). Laestadius seemed to conceive the distinction between 
humoral and neural effects as concomitant, but also as somehow interactive with 
regard to their effects on each other and their object, the brain. Also, moral impact 
(experience) is explained on a physical level as humoral activity that manifests itself 
as a “distancing” or debilitating influence on a natural sensual impact (functioning 
mostly through nerves). 
We can thus conclude that the physical itself includes a tension, which may mani-
fest in either subjective consciousness or spiritual conscience as “moral”, “something 
else than mere physical”; the emergence of conflict, tension, or temporally variable 
effects of such passions signifies itself as “psychic” phenomena, and thus also “moral” 
phenomena. Personal characteristics and habits are seen as based on individually 
varying unique functions of the organic life, while also the possibility of the moral is 
conceived to be based on the conflict of passions on the physical level. With respect 
to the transcendentality and supersensory experiences as psychic phenomena, they 
were interpreted in a way that transcendentality was originally found within the 
organism or flesh itself. A sensible human organism transcends itself via different 
levels, such as sensory capabilities, affects, emotions, and cognitions agitated by the 
psychophysical impacts of passions, and finally by means of religious experiences, 
such as the calling voice of God within an awakened conscience (lower parts of the 
subjective consciousness).
The philosophical-psychological endeavor to hold the physical, moral and spiritual 
together and analyze them on the same physiological plane created an interesting 
dilemma within which Laestadius found he had to conceive main concepts, such 
as heart, passions, subjective consciousness and conscience, in a more holistic sense 
552 Cf. Azouvi 2006, 275.
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(“dual-meaning”) having simultaneously all modes of existence – the physical, psychic/
moral, and metaphysical/spiritual. In defining especially passions a-metaphysically 
as “existences” without substance and essence and exposing their organic influences 
Laestadius elaborated on a conception of man that includes both immanent-physical 
and transcendental-psychological domains. Thus, Laestadius’ philosophical stance 
can be named physiological transcendentalism to highlight the critical distance to 
metaphysical rationalism or transcendentalism that was prevailing in the anthropol-
ogy and theology of his time.
In regard to the notion of spiritual perception, it is possible to offer a philosophical 
interpretation of moral “disgust” and awakened self-awareness. They constitute the 
reflective distance to the person itself and to the present world. It was obvious that 
disgust (avsky) did not signify a theoretical reflective distance of gaze, but instead, a 
holistic embodied and physiological distancing condition toward the natural passions 
of the flesh and present worldly nature of the world. Thus, moral disgust and spiritual 
self-awareness replaced, as a spiritual-moral existence, the transcendental sphere of 
a “rational soul”. Still, they both are irreducible to mere consciousness (imagination 
or phantasy) or mere physiology. The moral and spiritual reflection is natural vital 
phenomenon and grounded in an embodied and empirical spatio-temporal related-
ness (situatedness).
The experiential “living faith of the heart” (fides subjektiva), is not defined in terms 
of intellectual cognitive intentionality (of beliefs), but rather in terms of passions and 
emotions as embodied in the pre-reflective intentionality of subjective consciousness, 
which thus overcomes the intellectualistic re-presentational notion of faith (and the 
Deistic notion of God). Viewed from a philosophical perspective, faith, Laestadius 
seemed to signify there was a fundamental embodied un-objectifying intentionality – 
not just an intentionality of intellect – which opened simultaneously an alternative 
view of Western objectifying metaphysics and an original vitalist perspective of a 
Christian-pietistic existence. A living faith as experiential-emotional, and thus “se-
cret” in its character, thus precedes all theological and intellectual conceptualizations. 
In Laestadius’ use of the concepts, the moral and spiritual are often synonymous, 
and his idea of faith was inextricably attached to morality. Living such spirituality 
interpreted as the “living with conscience and God” naturally entailed Christian 
morality of his time. However, Laestadius’ apology of pietism emphasized strongly 
the ultimate authority and freedom of conscience which altogether highlighted 
religious tolerance and freedom of religion. Un-objectifying intentionality entails 
epistemological indications as well as moral and spiritual summons. The precedence 
of experience is emphasized both in the moral and the spiritual sense. (§1277, 1278.) 
Generally speaking, therefore, experience precedes knowledge.
Laestadius’ anthropological-theological grounding was supposed not only to con-
stitute a scientific apology of pietism, but also to form a more general explanatory 
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basis for reformers’ – such as Luther and Augustine’s – views on human life, faith, 
and God. Laestadius claimed that medical vitalism could serve as an explanatory 
basis for the Biblical understanding of human life, faith, and God. He sensed that 
vital force as original soul was embedded to organism itself, thereby coinciding with 
the ancient idea of soul as the “breath of life”; thus, the human soul was not sepa-
rated from the organic body, but rather conceived as the breathing or “life of the 
body” itself. Theologically, the principle of life means the blow of God into Adam; 
the living soul of man was blown by God into Adam’s nostrils. Therefore, mankind 
was considered as a continuation of the principle of life. Laestadius seemed to be 
convinced that medical vitalism did scientifically explain the Biblical idea of human 
life/soul and especially the Hebrew idea of heart as the center of all human thought, 
action, and intentionality (psyche, pneuma, soma). (§§1274, 1281, 218, 87–88.)553
553 Especially, the main vitalist concept of the principle of life is interpreted as the living soul 
of man given to Adam via the blow of God, which is assumed to coincide with the Hebrew 
understanding of “logos” as a living power, and heart as the center of a vital force, and thus, the 
core of intentionality.
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Concluding Remarks: The Philosophy of the  
Sensory-Intensive Human
Laestadius’ philosophy became a unique manifestation of classical ideas of medical 
vitalism in a Nordic spiritual context. The Lunatic was conceived as an application 
of the classical vitalist philosophy for defending and justifying North Scandinavian 
Lutheran-pietistic religiosity and humanity. In this respect, Laestadius’ “system” 
extends beyond classical medical vitalism and is applicable to those questions and 
phenomena beyond the usual medical ken of vitalism.554 Simultaneously, it offered 
detailed critique of enlightenment rationalism, Western metaphysical positions that 
dominated the theology and anthropology of Lutheran orthodoxy during the 1800’s.
Laestadius can be seen as a successor of enlightenment and romantic science 
and philosophy in the same sense as the medical vitalists viewed themselves. The 
Enlightenment era was not united but did include debates on basic elements and 
theoretical approaches, such as vitalism-mechanism, within which the intellect 
and emotions were emphasized in varying ways. Laestadius’ philosophy offered 
in The Lunatic is the systematic rationalization of religious faith and explains pi-
etistic spirituality in scientific-philosophical terms. Thus, Laestadius also had clear 
transmission-theological interests. He grounded his religious views on the science 
of man, contemporary psychology, and the vitalist philosophy, and even elaborated 
on them for his own purposes, especially with regard to the philosophical theology 
of reconciliation, anthropology, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of mind. As 
an apology, justification, and scientific explication of Northern pietism, vitalism 
became the main theoretical perspective for Laestadius. Indeed, he highlighted that 
“his teaching” and Northern pietism were well grounded on a clear “system”.
“The primary purpose of this treatise is to show the psychological perspec-
tives that have provided the foundation for the author’s sermons, which, 
on the other hand, have been considered Jesuitism, fanaticism (svärmeri), 
and indecency, but on the other hand, have had a remarkable impact on 
the hearts of those who have heard it. If the author is able, through these 
treatise, to convince some of the intellectuals that there is a consistent 
system of thought underlying this so-called fanaticism, then the semi-
educated who are not bothered with thought may continue to call him a 
554 Cf. Williams 2003, 277
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Jesuit and say: ‘thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil.’” (Laestadius 2015, 
The Lunatic, Foreword, p. 16.)
His clear message was that pietistic experiential religiosity is not only a fanatic 
and emotional form of religiosity, but also presents a clear idea of man and an 
understanding of Christian God and faith – a system – based on it. This system 
is thematized in The Lunatic to reveal and justify the pietistic idea of man and the 
character of religiosity – or “the order of Grace” within the state of Sweden and the 
Lutheran Church. 
In terms of the title, The Lunatic – An Insight Into the Order of Grace, it seems 
obvious that beside the “Biblical authors” its ”Insight” refers to vitalism, whereas 
”the order of Grace” refers to the pietistic-Lutheran and Biblical understanding of 
faith and God that Laestadius defended and justified at a time when pietism was 
marginalized by the Conventicle Edict.
The term “Dårhushjonet” (The Lunatic) is more complicated, and Laestadius stated 
that it could refer to many different things.555 Laestadius did not refer directly to the 
Scriptures when he spoke of choosing the title, but in the letter where he touches on 
the title, Laestadius cited 1. Kor. 4:10: “Vi äre dårar för Christi skull; men I ären kloke 
I Christo …”556 Åberg proposes that one could also think about Rom. 1:21:22: “… då 
de höllo sig för visa, äro de vorne dårar …”557 In a broad sense, we could also think 
of the biblical story about the confrontation of the Apostle Paul and philosophers 
in Athena where the Apostle views Christianity as madness (dåre) for the Greeks, 
referring to philosophers by the “Greeks”. It looms in the background of the word, 
“Lunatic.” It is sometimes assumed that Laestadius indicated with the “Dårhushjonet” 
those pietistic believers who were sometimes considered as insane and sent to mental 
hospitals because of their emphasis on their experiential-emotional faith and strik-
ing religious experiences (affective religious enthusiasm, “liikutukset” in Finnish).558
However, during the 1800’s when philosophic-theological speculation also flour-
ished in Sweden, those theologians and philosophers who applied speculative phi-
losophy and science to matters of faith were in public discussion called “Dårhushjon.” 
Åberg suggested that the title has a double reference: On the one hand it referred 
to speculative philosophers as lunatics (dårhushjon) in light of the new empirical 
sciences and even from the perspective of scripture and its psychological insights. 
On the other hand, those who were considered to be lunatics (dårhushjon) in the 
eyes of the world and the officials of the church actually proved to be advised and 
555 See, Bäcksbacka 1938
556 See, Bäcksbakca 1997, Inledning till Dhj, Part 2, p. XIX; Åberg 1997, 43.
557 Åberg 1997, 43.
558 Cf. Åberg 1997, 42.
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driven by the spirit of God.559 Altogether, by choosing the title, the Dårhushjonet 
suggest that Laestadius identified himself as a philosophical theologian who wanted 
to join in the contemporary discussion on the nature and role of religion in society, 
and the discussion concerning anthropology and the role of the intellect and virtues 
in matters of faith and life.
Leaving the question open about the significance of “Dårhushjonet” in the title, 
I would dare to propose here an alternative philosophical interpretation. Could 
“Dårhushjonet” refer to the more general philosophical quest for a holistic under-
standing of humane well-being and moral pathology? Classical vitalists were more 
interested about the variable phenomena of life; normal and pathological, illness, 
health, and physiological ground of mental functions without excluding cultural-
social, linguistic, spiritual, and environmental factors. In this respect, the vitalists 
emphasized susceptibility – the passional, emotional, and experiential character – of 
being human, whereas the rationalists seemed to emphasize the soul as a distinct 
“rational principle” of life in a functioning “human machine”. The classical Cartesian 
soul/body dichotomy was deconstructed in the vitalist approach, as they held that 
the mind or soul existed as a vital principle or life force in the actual organic matter. 
Also, mentality was thereafter considered as being grounded in physiological organic 
matter. Thus, the “problems of soul” were viewed differently in these camps; rational-
ists saw the problems and dysfunctions that derived from the mental sphere of the 
intellectual mind or soul, while the vitalists emphasized the dissonance or in-balance 
of physiological functions which became the foundation for the higher cognitive 
functions, dysfunctions, problems, or dissonance. From this perspective, it is possible 
to assume that Laestadius, as a vitalist-pietistic thinker, might have been referred 
by “Dårhushjonet” to the pietistic experiential-emotional religiosity as a follower 
of “madness” in that era of enlightenment and metaphysical rationalism. However, 
Laestadius’ apologetic and justifying analysis certainly turned into an unstated ques-
tion, namely, whether the metaphysical function-rationalism of enlightenment itself 
would signify irrationalism or lunacy. 
Actually Laestadius saw that world has gone crazy. Did Laestadius believe that an 
experiential “lunatic” faith could become more rational than rationalism during the 
rise of metaphysical rationalistic speculation? It disregarded the concrete experiential 
basis of human life and faith. Or did Laestadius refer to the more general condition 
of Western civilization, meaning that human existence signified a dissonant “lunatic” 
state from the very beginning, an idea that would coincide with the idea of original 
corruption or sin. Laestadius saw pietistic psychic inward reconciliation as a neces-
sary entry path into the un-dissonant condition and thus into proper morality and 
humanity, and considering that total “absolution” was not possible in the everyday 
559 Åberg 1997, 42.
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carnal world, the existential-ontological condition of human beings would actually 
indicate the necessity to exist as a “madman”, a “lunatic” or a “madhouse inmate.” 
There is no outer or objective rationalizing criteria for how one should be or should 
believe in the world because belief is a matter of conscience and faith. And for faith 
to be authentic, it has to be own-most or “subjective” which is always a form of lunacy 
to the intellectual and dogmatic gaze of the world. Could The Lunatic – An Insight 
Into the Order of Grace, have been intended not to be just a philosophical-theological 
and scientific apology of pietism, but also an ambitious thematization of the full 
human condition as such?
* * *
The title of this study, The Physical, Moral and Spiritual: A Study on Vitalist Psychology 
and the Philosophy of Religion of Lars Levi Laestadius, was chosen to cover Laestadius’ 
holistic intention to hold all the physiological, psychological and metaphysical realms 
together and thus explain the possibility of morality and spirituality. Laestadius 
elaborates on the holistics psychophysiological and psychosomatic theory of the 
constitution of consciousness, morality (psychical) and spirituality (transcendental, 
metaphysical) that is based on the vitalist notion of the principle of life. This study 
shows that Laestadius’ theoretical thought cannot be reduced to simple empiri-
cism, materialism, or spiritualism. He sought a way that was between rationalism 
and empiricism, simultaneously rejecting idealism and an idealistic natural phi-
losophy that he conceived as merely speculative metaphysics. Laestadius’ vitalist 
stance clearly signifies that his “naturalism” and “reductionism” differed from the 
materialistic and biological naturalism and reductionism – and in this respect, if I 
am correct, Laestadius’ psychological vitalism cannot be viewed as a strict natural 
scientific physicalism.
This study also affirms the already exposed interpretation that anthropology pre-
ceded Laestadius’ theology and lay down an explanatory psychological-philosophical 
basis for his religious and theological insights. Through this more specific analysis of 
Laestadius’ anthropological-psychological elaborations, it is clear that his analysis can 
be seen as moving in a transcendental direction within the vitalist psychophysiologi-
cal framework. As a consequence, Laestadius’ theory can be conceived as a form of 
physiological transcendentalism and vitalist existentialism. By pointing out Laestadius’ 
emphasis on the psychosomatic constitution, this study offers an alternative inter-
pretation to the earlier theological interpretations of Laestadius’ theory as paral-
lelistic monism. It is obvious throughout the Lunatic that Laestadius’ apologetics 
had a transmission-theological character, even when the more explicit analyses of 
the relationship between the theological and scientific explanations are left and set 
aside for future research.
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Generally, this study confirms that particularly the vitalist perspective and its 
psychological implications, which form the founding character and “insights” of 
Laestadius’ anthropology, psychology and philosophical theology, are central for 
clearly understanding and evaluating Laestadius’ theoretical thought. Laestadius’ 
theoretical thought relates most closely with medical vitalism and indeed characterizes 
his applicative theorizing as being related to theological, psychological and apolo-
gist purposes. This is important aspect to notice here, as Laestadius’ philosophical 
starting points and psychological views have been often disregarded when others 
have been analyzing the precise formation of his theological, moral philosophical, 
social-political, and religious views.
Laestadius especially adopted the philosophical vitalist notion of the principle of 
life for his theory. The anthropological conceptions pertaining to the holistic notion 
of the human person, such as the principle of life, organic life and sensory life, were 
adopted by him from Xavier Bichat’s psychophysiology and vitalist philosophy, and 
constituted a basis of Laestadius’ theory on the constitution of the human person 
and human consciousness, morality, and spirituality. Thus, Bichat’s vitalist thought 
played a crucial role in Laestadius’ anthropology, psychology, and the ontotheologi-
cal system as a whole. Of course, one must not forget that some of his more specific 
distinctions, e.g., sensory and supersensory perception, conscious and unconscious 
realms, and faculty psychological distinctions were also inherited form other sources 
but still further explicated by Laestadius within the medical vitalist frame.560
By such a vitalist and pre-phenomenological means, Laestadius was able to 
deconstruct Cartesian body/mind dualism using the vitalist conceptions and then 
format an explicit vitalist and metaphysical critique of the classical metaphysical 
notions of substance and essence and their implications for the nature of conscious-
ness, the faculties of soul and the human person as such. Claiming that metaphysical 
rationalism and intellectualism dismissed the psychophysiological foundation of 
experience and human personhood, Laestadius then formed an alternative notion 
of the embodied human person. In doing so, he redefined the notion of Self ( Jag) 
and the faculties of soul more or less as embodied and organicist phenomena and 
functions. The faculties of soul were determined as “senses”, intimately attached via 
corporeality and sensory impacts in a worldly situated life. The objective faculties 
of soul were conceived as being receptive and susceptive faculties of the sensory life 
that were submissive to an underlying organic life and functions and prevailing pas-
sions within which human being fundamentally exist. Vital embodied personhood 
and the theory of consciousness elaborated within that personhood thus became the 
philosophical-psychological basis for Laestadius’ philosophy of religion. Laestadius’ 
insights concerning creation, the human person, the faculties of soul, the personal 
560 Cf. Åberg 1997.
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Trinity of God, redemption and the intentional human mind, religious experience, 
and possibility of morality and spirituality were mainly viewed and explained by him 
from the perspective of vitalist psychophysiology.
* * *
 
This study shows that Laestadius’ theoretical thought offers interesting notions for 
several philosophical and psychological themes: 1) A philosophical interpretation 
reveals that Laestadius was able to elaborate on the coherent psychophysiological 
and psychosomatic theory concerning the constitution of consciousness and its 
functions on which his insights concerning morality and spirituality became based; 
2) Laestadius overcame the classical Cartesian dualism in the stage/level of origin 
and cause by attaching his theory on the vitalist notion of the principle of life. A 
limited panpsychistic interpretation of the vital principle served as a constitutive 
basis for his further elaborations of the emanations or emergence, the development 
and functioning of mind and avoiding the classical problem of the emergence of 
consciousness. Even if there cannot be found any sharp dualism between the body 
and mind in Laestadius’ theory, he still leaned on the dual functions in a physiological 
plane, especially in his psychophysiological explanations of the constitution of moral 
feelings and emotions (tensions within a psychophysiological mind). This relative 
dualism or tension is explicitly present in Laestadius’ distinction made between 
“sensuous feeling” and “moral feeling,” which are based on the distinct physiological 
functions of both neural and humoral impacts on conscious experience;561 3) The 
relationships of the faculties of soul are conceived as intertwined, and together, they 
characterize the holistic embodied intentionality of human beings and life. From 
the perspective of the embodied faculties of soul, Laestadius was able to offer a 
view that emphasized the constitution of personhood in a worldly situated life, an 
unconscious dimension of the influences of present world, and the impossibility of 
absolute responsibility and moral purity; 4) In the broad sense Laestadius proposed 
an holistic insight into how the sensitive human organism is attached to the world, 
561 In this part, Laestadius’ theory could be conceived as reductionistic or even mechanistic. However, 
Laestadius simultaneously held tight to the idea that all physiological functions are inextricably 
related to an objective sensory world and psychological phenomena, especially to the passions. 
Also, these passions are divided into natural and moral passions in regard to their phenomenal-
vital nature and their impacts on the psychophysiological human organism. Altogether, with 
respect to this correlative and simultaneous psychological dimension, which is always present in 
any physiological explication, Laestadius’ theory cannot be viewed as fully reductionistic; lived 
experience is not explained fully by physiological-biological functions, but must also be explained 
by psychological-social tensions within which a human being always does exist in the world. Thus, 
experience is always explained and always encompasses social-psychological and physiological-
biological aspects.
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and how it reaches toward own most spiritual existence in a natural way through 
inward experiences.
In this way, Laestadius was able to conceive a personal embodied intentional-
ity and religious faith (an actualization of psychic reconciliation) for constituting 
a modified everyday way of existing which, however, was not absolutely different 
and not distinct from the natural vital-existential modes of being. A human person 
actualizes in the world and relates God as a tension of the passions (the condition 
of self ) and as a tension of a natural embodied intentionality and un-objectifying 
spiritual intentionality.
In Chapter 1, Introduction, Laestadius’ theoretical work and the state in the aca-
demic Laestadius –studies was briefly depicted and the phenomenological perspective 
of this study was introduced. It was pointed out that Laestadius found the spiritual 
phenomena as an objective of his theoretical thought already in his research concern-
ing to Sámi mythology and further developed within his philosophy of religion in 
the Lunatic. Also the historical schism between Lutheran orthodoxy and pietism 
was discussed as a context of the birth of The Lunatic. The multidisciplinary nature 
and ambiguous purposes of The Lunatic was highlighted and noted that phenom-
enological hermeneutical way of researching Laestadius’ theory fits plausibly with 
Laestadius’ own pre-phenomenological way of thought. 
In Chapter 2, Historical Contextualization, the spiritual and intellectual back-
ground of Laestadius’ theory was discussed. Laestadius’ theoretical thought was 
closely attached to medical vitalist psychophysiology and philosophy. The grounding 
ideas of Laestadius’ thought were to conceive the human being as a thinking, feeling, 
and acting being whose existence depends on physiological and vital-psychological 
pre-requisites in such a way that all actions and functions of the human mind are 
seen as a constitutive continuum of a natural growing, developing, and evolving dif-
ferentiation of animated organic life itself. Laestadius combined these psychophysi-
ological insights with the Biblical and reformist ideas of man and the Christian faith. 
Laestadius was critical of the prevailing metaphysical and rationalistic currents of 
anthropology and theology. His theoretical elaborations can also be seen as an ap-
plication of the vitalist critique of rationalistic mechanism and metaphysics in the 
later spiritual and intellectual context of metaphysical rationalism, transcendental 
idealism, and absolute idealism.
 Chapter 3 The Creation and Initial Condition, demonstrates that to a certain 
degree Laestadius held to the approach of natural theology emphasizing vital nature 
and lived body (flesh) as the initial starting point for proceeding in anthropology 
and theology. Laestadius insisted that the classical starting point in theology (the 
first Idea) was problematic and contorted the Christian understanding of human 
being and God. Alternatively, he held it necessary to begin with a natural animated 
nature and embodied life as the actualization of the creative act of God. However, 
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his approach was also “transcendentalist”, as he began with the notion of principle 
of life which he also interpreted as a limited panspychistic principle. Laestadius’ idea 
of the relationship between the creation and the created can be interpreted as ad-
dressing the problem of origin as such, and a pre-condition for the possibilities for 
philosophical-anthropological and theological thinking. Similarly, as the principle 
of life was conceived as a necessary metatheoretical hypothesis when proceeding in 
anthropology, God as vital force also had to be presupposed/believed when proceeding 
in theology. It can thus be stated that Laestadius’ starting point held a certain kind 
of physicotheology on the basis of his ontotheological system.
In Chapter 4, Person and Intentionality, The Lunatic is interpreted as elaborat-
ing on a vitalist account of person and intentionality as a critical alternative to the 
then prevailing metaphysical rationalistic notions of man and human personhood. 
Laestadius elaborated on the interesting organicist psychophysiological theory of 
embodiment and faculties of soul that constituted the core of his psychology and 
philosophy of mind. Laestadius placed a strong emphasis on pre-cognitive states, 
especially the passions, emotions, and drives, and indeed, the whole subjective con-
sciousness as pre-reflective ground. Within the realm of subjective consciousness, 
Laestadius also referred to the notion of unconsciousness. The realm of pre-reflective 
subjective consciousness laid a constitutive basis for the functions of mind and higher 
cognitions, and thus constituted the human/world relationship and its situatedness, 
and further still gives Laestadius a plausible and fundamental anthropological foun-
dation to use to proceed to argue for his Christian-pietistic idea of the precedence of 
the inward religious experience. Thus, it was shown that subjective consciousness did 
play a crucial epistemic and ontological roles in human existence. Passions and their 
manifestations in the human consciousness and personal embodied intentionality do 
not only mean the pre-condition of the actualization of sin, but also have significance 
for how man is seen to be situated in the living world. It is precisely passions that 
have much to do with individuation, self-awareness, morality, and identity, and finally, 
reconciliation (mutual suffering demanded). Passions characterize man’s intentional 
relatedness to the world, existence, and God. Thus, it was shown that Laestadius’ 
elaborated on the theory of personal embodied intentionality.
Overall Laestadius’ was able to elaborate on the holistic notion of the human per-
son and argue using his anthropology for the impossibility of the moral subject and 
absolute responsibility. Laestadius’ sees the human person fully under the dominance 
of the influences of organic life, but then also betokens the possibility of a relative 
freedom of will, action, and genuine morality through the human religious experi-
ence of awakening and reconciliation, thereby constructing a relative compatibilist 
view of human life.
In the second major Chapter 5, Psychophysiology of Moral and Spiritual In-
tentionality, Laestadius’ theory is viewed and analyzed from the perspective of the 
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common vitalist conception of the physical/moral. In this respect, it is clear that 
Laestadius’ elaborated on his conception of constitution of morality and spiritual-
ity using a psychophysiological foundation. Laestadius was able to form a coherent 
“naturalistic” explanation of human spirituality for the most part in similar way as 
medical vitalists had done. Laestadius explains the spheres of morality and spirituality 
on the psychophysiological plane. The connections between the physical, moral and 
spiritual realms are seen as overlapping realms and constituents of each other in a 
vital, developing evolving life. 
The religious experience of awakening (väckelse) became a most central notion 
through which Laestadius then vitalistically explained religious experience as a 
positive psychopathological event and the pre-stage of moral progress and birth of 
genuine embodied self-awareness and reflectivity. Laestadius also formulated interest-
ing psychosomatic view on the possibility of non-sensory or “supersensory” percep-
tion, which played an important role in explaining the phenomenon of conscience 
and spiritual experience. The notion of faith as well as Laestadius’ onto-theological 
reconstruction of the relationship between the Trinity of God and the constitutive 
triadic of the human person enclosed his systematic thought. It was shown that 
awakening was conceived in psychopathological terms and reconciliation with fam-
ily psychological allegories and they enabled Laestadius to elaborate the insight 
on how the Trinity of man and the Trinity of God were co-existent. The notion of 
psychic reconciliation was viewed as primal in regard to the possibility of receiving 
grace and a vitalized living faith. Laestadius’ emphasis on inwardness in vitalist-
existentialist terms indicate there was a certain kind of unification/participation in 
a living God. Faith was interpreted as un-objectifying intentionality, as it pertains 
to the inward experience. Laestadius’ notion of psychic reconciliation was attached 
through Luther’s theology of the cross to the more general critique of the Western 
metaphysical position. By developing an un-dualistic notion of mind and attaching 
it to organic vital functions, Laestadius disclosed the possibility of conceiving faith 
in anti-intellectualistic and a-metaphysical terms. 
In contrast to the notions of God as an immaterial absolute Idea, spirit, conscious-
ness, unmovable mover and first cause (in Aristotelian and metaphysical rationalism 
[from Descartes to Hegel] traditions), Laestadius elaborated on the experiential 
approach that constituted a new view of the embodied existential-vital mode of actu-
ally being-in-God. This outcome is thematized in this study as the “un-objectifying 
intentionality of faith” and the coincidence of triadic man and the Trinity of God, 
and is viewed as being closely similar to the Lutheran notion of faith as elaborated 
through the theology of the cross. 
The philosophy of the intentionality of mind (the question of “what Is”), tends to 
reveal the “proper concept of reason and reasoning” and suggest an advantage for an 
alternative epistemic relation between man and world. Faith as the intentionality of 
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conscience signifies a re-definition of reason, so that man is not related to the world 
by intellect in the first place, but instead by embodied experience (which includes 
the foundation for moral and spiritual judgment). This account, therefore emphasizes 
the primacy of morality and spirituality in terms of mere epistemic “knowing” or the 
intellectualistic relationship. 
Faith illuminates what and how things and beings are revealed to a lived experience 
in a faith-mode. Thus, when faith drives back to its roots of lived experience and a 
life world, it also tends to overcome the Western metaphysical notion of “ultimate 
Being” (ousia) in terms of the significance of a “constant presence” as Being is often 
conceived. For Laestadius, life is a mystery that cannot be grasped by intellect or by 
objectifying reason, and neither can it be understood in the conceptual sense even 
though its functions, events, and occasions can be “known” by feelings, emotions, 
and the passions. However this pre-ontological and pre-reflective basis and source is 
never intended to be totally transparent, and thus, life, God and reconciliation always 
remain secret, only disclosing an attractive direction, route, or destination “towards 
which” the existence of man is then called from its vital essence (the principle of life 
and spiritual conscience).
* * *
This study analyzed Laestadius’ theoretical thought, using the written text of The 
Lunatic, seeking to offer a clarifying holistic view on its philosophical, psychologi-
cal and theological elaborations, and insights. As such, the paper does not take into 
any systematical analysis the certain philosophical questions, such as ontological and 
theological realism or the question of the role of natural scientific explanation which 
did play a crucial role in Laestadius’ theory. In this study, it became necessary to 
analyze and interpret first of all Laestadius’ theory at the level of its own language 
and views in order to lay out the heuristic possibilities for understanding Laestadius’ 
theoretical thought as a clearly whole. As far as I could see, this task is also necessary 
for any further future systematic studies concerning the more specific disciplinary 
questions. Thus, the study hopefully has opened up new possibilities for further 
studies, especially with regard to the questions related to ontological and theological 
realism and the question regarding natural scientific explanation and its relationship 
to theology and the philosophy of religion.
However, a reflective reader may have recognized that my analysis touches often 
the more general questions, for instance, concern ontological realism and theological 
realism. The headline of my study also indicates the precise philosophical question 
that concerns the character of human reality as such. How does one conceive the 
nature of reality from reading Laestadius’ philosophical-theological thought? What is 
the perennial reality found in Laestadius’ theory? Is it animated matter, the principle 
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of life as such, God, or something else? These are problematic questions regarding 
ontological and theological realism. According to the realistic stance, there exists a 
kind of reality that is independent and autonomous of the human being and mind. 
It raises a question of how one can reach any knowledge of such an independent 
reality if there is no any presupposed relation to it in the first place.
In the following, I briefly question and offer a preliminary clarification for the 
questions on ontological and theological realism from the perspective of Laestadius’ 
theory. This is not to offer a full and complete analysis here, but rather a preliminary 
perspective for likely future research on Laestadius’ philosophy of religion, theology, 
and psychology. Indeed, it has always been from the start worth highlighting that 
Laestadius did not systematically elaborate on theories and views about the later 
thematized questions on ontological realism and theological realism. However, he 
does appear develop certain philosophical questions, so thus it is possible to construct 
a preliminary interpretation by questioning how Laestadius’ theory relates to the 
questions that seek to problematize and clarify the perennial nature and character-
istics of reality and the relationship between human life and either a transcendental 
or supernatural reality?
Based on my interpretations herein, we have noticed that Laestadius’ limited 
panpsychistic interpretation of the vital principle suggests that the perennial reality, 
the living organic life and soul – is conceived to be somehow “mental” in its fun-
damental character. This idea was given a twofold character focus on the principle 
of life. Even though the principle of life can exist independently of everything else, 
similar to God, it does signify there is a specific confluence of spirit and matter, and 
one that can be reached only through its actualizations and manifestations within 
nature or in organic life. By applying vitalist psychology Laestadius suggested that 
spiritual things and entities can be reached through their manifestations in living 
the “psychic essence” of the human person; the principle of life and its passions as 
experiential-emotional realities (correlates) of the psychological existence of human 
being that are reached through their manifestations in their embodied life in the 
world. Thus, Laestadius, while holding that there does exist something distinct to 
human beings, could be seen as a realist, for he clearly insists that we have to assume 
[principle of ] life in and of itself as an independent “transcendental sphere” and the 
original sensitive human soul, which all together lays the foundation for and initial 
resounding and clear horizon for all that exists. 
However, when we move from the question of “that it is” to the questions of “how 
and what” is the perennial reality, we must notice that Laestadius strongly emphasized 
the mediation of the manifestations and actualizations of these perennial realities. 
For instance, life itself within nature or the vital principles of passions that embody 
the lives of human being cannot be reached directly, but only through their actualiza-
tions and manifestations within nature and an embodied social and individual life. 
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In this way, he indicates that the vital principle and its passions are clear part of the 
real actualization of nature and human life even if they are distinct and independent 
ontological-existential factors of that life.
To assume life is not yet very informative statement about reality. However that 
formally indicative assumption is all that is possible and necessary for reaching actual 
human understanding; to know the more specific characteristics of life demands a 
turn toward the phenomena of nature and the psychic vital-experiential essence of 
the human that is based on a single fundamental vitality and sensibility, the principle 
of life. Analogical to this turn toward phenomena of living nature, the actual char-
acteristics of God and Evil can be reached and studied only through their precise 
manifestations in the actualized human life in the world. Thus, Laestadius seems to 
hold a similar stance in regard to the question concerning theological realism: God, 
Evil, and spirit-world exist as the ultimate reality-horizon, but human cannot reach 
and study them directly. In a sense the realm of morality and spirituality are reach-
able only as a psychological phenomenon: The original soul has the capacity to reach 
out toward the ultimate [Being, as that Being is its own foundation], and indeed, 
the ineffable foundation of its own [Original vital soul]. What and how this onto-
theological reality is presented/accessed for human beings can only be approached 
through the actualizations of the ultimate itself/as such within the human life. As 
far as passions in the world are philosophically defined as real existences or vital-
existential “spirits” without substance and essence, similarly to how principle of life is 
seen as a constitutive vital foundation (sine substantia et sine essentia) it is possible 
and even plausible for Laestadius to have held that God and Evil are (for the most 
humane understanding) personifications of natural and moral passions. Evil and God 
exist in a human world as aggregates of varying natural and moral passions; in other 
words, these aggregates are destructive and vitalizing forces apparent and existing 
in a human’s psychophysiological life. 
Insofar as Laestadius conceives of Evil and God as personifications of passions it 
can also be asked whether Laestadius executes a naturalistic anthropological reduction 
of religion within the limits of vitalist theory? To me, it seems that Laestadius actually 
executed a certain kind of naturalistic reduction to anthropology within the frames of 
vitalist psychophysiology. Similarly, the ultimate Being, principle of life, or God is then 
relatively reduced to anthropology in the vitalist frame; all we can know about Being 
is only reached through its manifestation in nature and our own lived experience.
Further, the effects of God and Evil are approached, explained, and interpreted 
naturalistically. This focus makes us ask how we should understand the effects of the 
Holy Spirit within Laestadius’ religious discourse? Are the effects of the Holy Spirit 
interpreted – in line with theological realism – as effects of ultimate or supernatural 
reality that are absolutely transcendental to human reality? Does the anthropological-
vitalist reduction pertain also to ultimate reality within the religious talk on the 
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effect of the Holy Spirit as such? Are they – in line with theological realism – the 
supernatural effects to psychosomatic events and processes?
In the psychological-anthropological context, the holistic notion of natural-
spiritual reality is based on the psychosomatic notion that sensory perception is 
always supersensory perception; the same Self that feels is the same Self that thinks, 
and thus there is no sharp distinction between a thinking and feeling being in the 
embodied selfhood. Similarly, there is no sharp distinction between sensory and 
supersensory perception, which why the naturalistic anthropological reduction of 
divinities (personifications of passions, real existences) coincides with the partly 
supersensory, supernatural, or ultimate reality that is real existence in the sense that 
it is independent and distinct from the human mind. Indeed, there is no sharp dis-
tinction between natural and supernatural reality, but the two are rather intertwined, 
as for me, it seems that supernatural reality, sometimes called the spirit-world, is 
seen as a natural part of the psychological-existential experience of humane reality 
and generally refers to the psychological reality of human being. If so, the questions 
concerning ontological realism or theological realism are problematic in the context 
of Laestadius’ theory, as they presuppose or seem to approach “realities” from only a 
categorical, objectifying substantial, dualistic perspective. 
Laestadius defines the existence of “spirits” clearly as non-substantial and 
non-essential, with the addendum that spirits and passions are experiential, vital-
psychological realities or “real existences”, as he calls them. Laestadius’ vitalist and 
pre-phenomenological approach deconstructs the dualities and sharp distinctions 
between the immanent and transcendence from the start. It is simply expressed as 
the idea of the principle of life as being a relative transcendence within organic life 
in and of itself and in the idea that the notion of the principle of life can be applied 
to the question of God or a spiritual supersensory world/reality. Thus, Laestadius 
can actually say that natural human life and experience is not (absolutely) outside 
the spiritual existence at all, and vice versa, namely, that the ultimate spiritual realm 
is not absolutely transcended to the natural human life. Thus, the premises of the 
vitalist “anthropological reduction” of a supersensory “world” are constituted coin-
cidentally with the first premises of the principle of life and passions (vital organic 
matter, and a living God) which then does disclose the psychological-existential 
reality of human beings.
Beside Laestadius’ naturalistic vitalist reduction of God and Evil into anthropology, 
God is still called the ultimate Being. How should we, then, interpret this reductive 
and ultimately transcendental character of God as the foundation of life within an im-
manent organic life and at the same time, a coincidental notion of God as the ultimate 
Being that grants both natural existence and human life and its soul as such? This is 
the problem that Laestadius recognizes as an aporetic or unsolvable problem for the 
precedence between Life (principle of life) and Idea (God as first Idea).
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Here it is possible, first of all, to conclude that the effects of the Holy Spirit and 
the spiritual perceptions are and should be natural phenomena within a vitalist frame 
when Laestadius follows his own principles, namely that vital spirits (passions and 
devils) cannot be reached directly by the intellect but only through their experiential 
manifestations and actualizations. In a way to accept Laestadius’ notion of passion 
as a vital existential correlate indicates it is not difficult to see how he conceived his 
ultimate Good and absolute Evilness natural phenomena of the manifestations and 
personifications of the passions. Awakening as a pre-stage moving toward reconcili-
ation can be naturalistically explained based on the conflict between the natural and 
moral passions and the calling “voice of God” within conscience that is awakened in 
this condition. However the “voice itself ” is not natural, but “a call of God itself ” as 
it includes the “call” or effect clearly transcendent to the embodied subject itself. It 
thus discloses something to the human self-experience which is not merely from the 
[capsulated] subjectivity itself and also calls the human being simultaneously back to 
the foundation of its own life (principle of life as this original soul) and thus toward 
the nearness and participation of God (as the ultimate foundation of all nature and 
all Good). In this sense, the question concerning theological realism seems irrelevant 
here as far as Laestadius holds that the immanent and transcendental or profane 
and divine intertwine, although Laestadius also holds that God as the principle of 
life, ineffable in and of itself, but always present in organic life, is the ultimate Being.
It seems to me as well that the question concerning ontological and theological 
realism is problematic in the context of Laestadius’ theory for two reasons: 1) The 
vitalist notion of the principle of life is present within the immanent, but coinciden-
tally independent and has an autonomous existence (sine substantia et sine essentia) 
as such, and 2) this notion is applied to the question of God, so that God itself pos-
sesses “ontologically” the same character of being immanently present and relatively 
transcendent in its own autonomous and independent existence.
Overall, the question concerning ontological realism and the perennial charac-
teristics of reality seems to be irrelevant in Laestadius’ case. In both the ontological 
and theological directions, reality exists independently, but the “what” and the “how” 
it actualizes and manifest as itself is a different and more important question which 
pertains to the way a human being is constituted and in relation to that reality, whether 
it is Life or God itself. Here we notice also that the question concerning mere physi-
cality or spirituality as possible perennial characteristics of reality, misses the point. 
For Laestadius’ theoretical insight, all that exists is viewed from the perspective 
of a vitalist psychophysiological constitution: The principle of life or God as the 
ultimate Being and foundation (not a first Idea, but a founding vital force); morality 
as a struggle of personal life within the tension of varying influences of passions; and 
spirituality as a possibility and initial condition of redemption, the actualization of 
proper human nature as far as spirituality through reconciliation is concerned signifies 
310 | Kosti Joensuu: The Physical, Moral and Spiritual
the reaching of one’s own vitalizing constitutive foundation (upphov) in the original 
soul or principle of Life and in God. Thus, physical and spiritual are interlinked 
[natural] constitutive dimensions of human life; they are the vital-natural realms of 
the one and the same experiential reality562. 
To conclude then, on the question of realism we can say that the perennial reality 
is always only presupposed, and its nature and character always depends on its mate-
rial manifestations and the embodied consciousness and intentional relationship of 
human being towards it. All that human beings can experientially know of ultimate 
reality or God is enclosed in the psychic passional-emotional capability/realm, even 
though not only for intellectual-conceptual realities. 
Vital-existential reality is always individually unique, and its “that it is” is irrelevant 
for the human being who always lives in the “what” and “how” that is. Accordingly, the 
question of whether there is God and an ultimate spiritual reality is a vain and empty 
question for the human being who lives within it and seeks through the deepest of 
experiences to feel and know what and how divinity and sacredness are/exist for him/
her. Laestadius himself might use the heuristic example of love in this context, as 
the one who has fallen in love does not doubt the existence of the object of that love 
but instead reaches towards it with all the power of his/hers intellect and emotions.
The question of realism is then a question of perspective. From a vitalist perspective, 
similar to the vital nature, that nature “could only be appreciated in its manifestations”; 
also spiritual vitalizing and destructive psychological reality can be respected and 
appreciated as a natural dimension and possibility of the holistic psychological reality 
of human existence. Laestadius’ convictions about the precedence of the authority 
of conscience in relation to all intellectual conceptualizations and dogmatics, the 
fight for the freedom of religion, and religious tolerance are all connected to these 
fundamental ideas of the coincidental psychophysiological and spiritual existence of 
the human being to gain a more holistic grasp of psychological personhood.
562 With regard to the perspective of a modern scientific worldview, we can note that Laestadius’ 
vitalist-religious approach deconstructs the mere objectifying attitude toward beings and 
physicalistically oriented theoretical gaze. Life or its manifestations cannot be understood by only 
focusing on bare matter using intellectual means; the functioning, actualization and manifestations 
of that Life are only the foundation and horizon for theorization. It is rather the experiential and 
manifesting of life itself that leads to understanding things and phenomena holistically.
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